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ABSTRACT
i.
This thesis concerns Sierra Leone Faintly Law. The law 
is examined from the viewpoint of the pluralistic system - general, 
Islamic and customary laws - applicable in the country. The 
thesis is divided into three Parts. This being a pioneering
A
work, it is necessary to give first an explanatory outline of the 
country and its legal system and how family law works within that 
system. Part One, which contains four chapters, is devoted to 
this preliminary explanation.
The Second Part deals with non-customary family law. It 
is mainly an analysis of the general law and Islamic law, but it 
also considers specific areas in family law in which there are 
conflicts in the pluralistic legal system . The highlights of 
this Part are: statutory marriage (Chapter 5); the essentials j
i
of a valid statutory marriage (Chapter 6); matrimonial relations 
(Chapters 7 and 8 ); matrimonial property (Chapter 9); raatri-
i
monial reliefs (Chapter 10); termination of marriage (Chapter 11); 
the parent-child relationship (Chapter 12); and succession to 
property under non-customary law (Chapter 13).
Part Three discusses customary family law. The inform­
ation contained in this Part is derived partly from previous pub- j 
lished and unpublished sources, and partly from the personal field 
investigations of the present writer. The method of exposition 
of the customary laws is by topics rather than by ethnic groups, 
though with each topic, ethnic/local variations are indicated 
where relevant. This Part begins with an introduction showing 
how the present writer collected his data on customary law.
i
Chapter 14 examines the nature and character of customary-law 
marriage. Chapters 15 and 16 analyse the formation of a custom­
ary-law marriage and the essential requirements for such marriage
ii.
respectively. The husband and wife/wives relationship in the 
compound/polygamous family is dealt with in Chapter 17. Chapter 
18 discusses the termination of a customary-law marriage. The 
parent-child relationship under customary law is examined in 
Chapter 19. Finally, Chapter 20, dealing with succession under 
customary law, concludes the thesis.
iii.
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Note on Sierra Leone^reporting
A great obstacle to anyone embarking on research into a 
Sierra Leone legal topic is the dearth of reported case-law.
Until 1969 when the African Law Reports (Sierra Leone series) 
were begun, law reporting in Sierra Leone has been negligible. 
Throughout the long period of the country’s legal history, the 
only law reports have hitherto been (a) M.F.J. McDonnell's 
Sierra Leone Law Reports, 1912-1924 (one volume); (b) E.S. 
Beoku-Bett's Sierra Leone Law Recorder, 1950 (three volumes); 
and (c) Sierra Leone Law Reports, 1960-1963 (three volumes) 
published by Sweet & Maxwell, London. None of these reports 
contains sufficient material in any one area of Sierra Leone law 
in order to kindle enthusiasm for research into that field. 
Despite this obstacle, the present writer has tried to supple­
ment the few Sierra Leone reported cases with unreported ones 
which he himself discovered, and he has drawn abundantly on rele­
vant case-law from other Commonwealth countries, notably from 
Britain, from which much has been borrowed by the Sierra Leone 
Courts themselves.
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PART ONE
THE LEGAL SYSTEM
2.
CHAPTER 1
THE COUNTRY, THE PEOPLE. AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
A. THE COUNTRY
(i) Location and physical features *
Sierra Leone lies on the West coast of Africa between 
6°55» and 10° North Latitude and between 10°16» and 13°18* West 
Long^itude. On its northern and south-eastern frontiers are 
the states of Guinea and Liberia, respectively. The territory 
covers an area of approximately 27,927 square miles, and for ad­
ministrative purposes is divided into a Western Area and three 
Provinces, namely the Eastern Province, the Northern Province said 
the Southern Province.
The Western Area consists of two regions. One is a small, 
mountainous peninsula of approximately 256 square miles containing 
a range of thickly-wooded hills rising to a height of about 2,000- 
3,000 feet, with a wide estuary beside it protruding into the 
Atlantic Ocean from the coastal plain. At the mouth of the 
estuary is the capital city, Freetown. The other is Sherbro 
Urban District, comprising the townships of Bonthe Sherbro and 
York Island lying about 100 nautical miles along the west coast, 
south of the Peninsula.
The Provinces physically comprise two types of land. The 
Eastern and Northern portion consists of savannah land which rises 
to form an upland plateau elevating generally to a height of about 
1,500 feet, broken by irregular mountain ranges of a height of 
between 3,000 and 6,000 feet. The Western and Southern portion
1. We can, in a work of this nature, give only a brief outline of 
the geography of the country. For a recent detailed work on 
this topic, see Sierra Leone in Maps, University of London 
Press Ltd., (2nd ed., by J.I. Clarke), 1969.
is a woodland with ranges of hills rising to about 1,000 feet*
The centres of the Provinces are Kenema (Eastern), Makeni (North­
ern), and Bo (Southern)*
(ii) History 1
The country became independent on 27 April, 1961* On 19
April, 1971, it became a Republic within the British Commonwealth
of Nations* Formerly, it was a British dependency consisting of
a Colony and a Protectorate* The Colony ooraprised what is now
the Western Area* The Protectorate has for a long time been the
same territory, but for the sake of administrative convenience, it
has been subdivided from time to time into three units of unequal 
2
size* At independence, the Colony and Protectorate were re­
designated the Western Area and Provinces, respectively.
Origins of the Colony
The Colony was founded in the eighteenth century. In 
1772, the Court of King's Bench in England decided the classic
3
case of Some erset v* Stewart. This case concerned the right
of a master over his slave, and in it Lord Mansfield delivered a 
judgment which heralded the emancipation of some 1,400 slaves, who 
were then held in bondage in England, the victims of the wave of 
slave trading which had swept along the west coast of Africa dur­
ing the past centuries* Lord Mansfield said:
"The state of slavery is of such nature, that 
it is incapable of being introduced on any 
reasons, moral or political* It's odious 
that nothing can be suffered to support it.
Whatever inconvenience, therefore, may follow 
from a decision, I cannot say this case is 
allowed or approved by the law of England;
1. The most comprehensive modern work on the history of Sierra 
Leone is C. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, O.U.P., 1962.
2. The present divisions are the Northern Province, the Eastern 
Province, and the Southern Province. See map at p*(y.
3. (1772) Lofft 1*
4.
and therefore, the black must be dis­
charged* M 1
The immediate result of emancipation was that thousands of 
African ex-slaves were left on their own to roam along the streets 
of England in search of food and work* Some British philanthro­
pists, among whom Granville Sharp, William Wilberforce, Henry
Thornton and Dr* Henry Smeathman figured prominently, formed an
2
association, the St* George*s Bay Company, for the purposes of 
helping the "Black Poor", as the ex-slaves were ca}J.ed« On the 
advice of Dr* Smeathman, who had previously spent four years on 
the West African coast as a naturalist, Sierra Leone was selected 
as a suitable site for the settlement of the ex-slaves* Under 
the Company*s auspices, the first batch numbering about 400, to­
gether with 60 white women, left England on Christmas Day, 1786, 
and arrived in Sierra Leone on 8 May, 1787*
On their arrival, a grant of 20 square miles was made to 
them by King Tom* They found a site for the settlement, and 
named it Granville Town in honour of Granville Sharp, the Chairman 
of the Company* Disease and sporadic attacks from the inhabi­
tants of the neighbouring lands would have completely wiped out 
the settlement had it not been for two more batches of ex-slaves
1* Ibid*, p*19* Note that Lord Mansfield has been quoted as de­
claring in this case that "as soon as any slave sets foot on 
English ground he becomes free*" See T.O. Elias* Ghana and 
Sierra Leone* the development of their Laws and Constitutions* 
London, 1^62, p*2l9* Elias gi ves the reference of the case-as 
(1772) 20 St.Tr*l. The present writer searched in vain for 
this Report, but the Lofft Report cited by the present writer 
which contains the full judgment of Lord Mansfield does not 
contain Elias* quotation*
2* The Company was incorporated by RoyalCharter in 1791, and re­
named "The Sierra Leone Company"*
3* This was by the Treaty of 11 June, 1787, between King Tom and 
the Company. The Treaty was declared invalid by another King, 
Naimbana, by the Treaty of 22 August, 1788, but the grant re­
mained* The area was increased from time to time by Treaties 
with other kings: see, for example, the Treaty of Peace of 
1807 made between the Governor of Sierra Leone and Kings Firama 
and Tom in A. Montagu: The Ordinances of Sierra Leone* London*
1857-81, Vol.II, pp.272-3*
sent again from England in 1788 and 1790* In 1792, they were 
reinforced by 1,131 African ex-slaves from Nova Scotia*^ The 
latter joined the former to found Freetown* Eight years later,
some 550-800 Maroons 2 from Jamaica arrived* In 1807, jslave thufe.
was abolished by a British Act of Parliament* The result was 
that from time to time, the population of the settlement was in­
creased by the inflow of liberated Africans,2 recaptive from 
slave ships*
Again in 1807, the Sierra Leone Company surrendered its
1* These were African slaves who had fought on the British side in 
the American War of Independence* As a reward for their ser­
vices, they were promised a certain quantity of land in Nova 
Scotia on which they could settle as free men* Though as many 
as 3,000 of them went to Nova Scotia for this purpose, the pro­
mise was not fulfilled* Under the aegis of Governor Clarkson 
of the Sierra Leone settlement, their leader Thomas Peters was 
introduced to the Sierra Leone Company, which expreseed willing­
ness to receive them into Sierra Leone upon the production of 
satisfactory testimonials of their character* For the history 
of these people, see F*W. Butt-Thompson, Sierra Leone in History 
and Tradition, London, 1926*
2. These too were ex-slaves of African origin, believed to have 
come from the African Cormantine Coast in what later became 
known as the Gold Coast (now Ghana)* They were taken to Jamica 
during the slave trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centur­
ies and served under their Spanish masters* When Britain took 
over Jamaica from the Spanish, there were frequent revolts amid 
these slaves against their new masters* The final revolt came 
in 1690, after which they asserted their freedom and settled in 
the eastern and northern parts of Jamaica* They were called 
Maroons, probably because they were thought to be fugitives - 
Note: Spanish for fugitive is cimaroon, or probably because the
Spanish referred to them as Moor s * The Spanish for Moor is 
muruno* In 1738, Governor Edward Trelawney of Jamaica made a 
grant of 1,500 acres of land to them on which they established 
settlements* This kind of gesture did not result in ever­
lasting peace* In 1773, the Maxoons rose in rebellion again* 
When the rebellion was finally crushed in 1791, the Maroons 
were first despatched into exile in Nova Scotia, but they too,
were later introduced to the Sierra Leone Company* For their
history, see F*W. Butt-Thompson, ibid*, pp*120-131. See also
generally, R.C, Dallas, The History of the Maxoons, Frank Cass
& Co* Ltd*, London (new impression), 1968*
3. These were Africans from the West Coast of Africa who were be­
ing transported into slavery* With the abolition of slavery,
the ships which carried them were seized on the high seas and 
tried in Freetown by the Admiralty Court, and later by the 
Court of Mixed Commissions* Following the decisions of these 
Courts? the slaves were freed* For the establishment of
these Courts, see Chapter 2*
political functions and administration of the settlement to the 
British Crown and the settlement was declared a Crown Colony by 
an Act of Parliament,1 which took effect from 1 January, 1808•
In 1822, the Colony became the administrative headquarters 
of the British West African Settlements, the other territories be­
ing the Gold Coast and the Gambia* Lagos joined them in 1861* 
This arrangement was short-lived; twelve years afterwards, the 
Gold Coast and Lagos were separated from the settlements* Gambia 
was also separated in 1888*
None of the administrative arrangements hitherto mentioned
affected the physical size of the Sierra Leone Colony, except that
2in 1861 Bonthe Sherbro was added to it* Thereafter, it has 
since been the same size*
3
Origins of the Protectorate
Up to the 1890s, apart from the 1861 accretion to the 
Colony, both the Sierra Leone Company and the British Crown daring 
their respective regimes, did not demonstrate any territorial am­
bitions over the lands immediately adjacent to the Sierra Leone 
settlements* The adjacent lands remained under the full control 
and jurisdiction of their indigenous tribal chiefs* Though fre­
quent inter-tribal wars within the hinterland made the Colony's 
position rather precarious, the Government of the Colony took no 
further action than the establishment of a police force in 1890 to 
guard its frontier* Meanwhile, as a result of trade, contacts 
between the people of thejbolony and the hinterland became frequent;
1* An Act for transferring to His Majesty, certain Possessions and 
Rights vested in the Sierra Leone Company within the Colony of 
Sierra Leone, dated 8 August, 1807: 47 Geo*3 C*44*
2* See Colonial Office Minute No.267/277 by the Hon* T.F. Elliott, 
Assistant Under-Secretary on Governor Blackball's despatch No* 
18, of 16 February, 1863*
3* On the evolution of the Protectorate, see generally C* Fyfe, 
Sierra Leone INheritance, London, O.U.P., 1964, pp*252-277.
and yet neither tribal wars nor trade prompted the British Crown 
to adopt an expansive policy over the hinterland*
It was the French who sparked off a forward policy in the 
British Crown* By 1890, the former were laying claims to terri­
tories from the Sahara Desert to the Liberian frontiers* It was, 
therefore, felt in British circles that any further attitude of
unconcern would leave the Crown with a Colony confined to a tiny
1 2 coastal strip* Eventually, boundary agreements were concluded
with the French, the purpose of which, from the British standpoint,
was to allow an extension of British sphere of influence* To
follow up these agreements, the Governor of the Colony by Royal
Proclamation, declared a Protectorate over the hinterland on 31
August, 1896*
B. THE PEOPLE
3
According to the 1963 Census, the population of Sierra
Leone was 2,180,000 inhabitants who, for certain legal purposes,
may be divided into two distinct classes, namely, native and non-
native* A native is defined by section 4 of the Interpretation
Act, 1971, as:
"Any person who is a member of a race, tribe 
or community settled in Sierra Leone (or the 
territories adjacent thereto) other than a 
race, tribe or community -
(a) which is of European,Asiatic or American 
origin;
(b) whose principal place of settlement is in 
the Western Area*”
1* Seebonfidential despatch of Lord Knutsford,Secretary of State, 
to 'the Officer administering the Government of Sierra Leone, of
1 January, 1890, Colonial Office Minute 806/325, pp*2-4*
2* i.e. Agreements of 10 August, 1889, and 21 June, 1895, see
C* Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance* London, O.U.P., 1964, p*13*
3. Central Statistics Office, Freetown, Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin, 1963*
The section goes further to define a non-native as:
"Any person other than a native"
According to the above definitions, the term "native" would be
applicable to any person who belongs to any of the tribes in
Sierra Leone or those on the borders of Sierra Leone and Guinea,
and Sierra Leone and Liberia, which are either autochthonous to
Sierra Leone or migrant but have settled so long in Sierra Leone
that they are now recognised as indigenous*^ The autochthonous
o
tribes are the Mende, Loko, Susu, Sherbro, Gola, Krim and
3 4Gallina* The migrant tribal population consists of the Limba,
Kono, Koranko, Kissi, Yalunka, and Temne* The 1963 Population
Census stated that the tribes constituted 96*6% of the country^
population, while the non-tribal people were 3*4%*
Ethnically, while it may be true that the tribes have over the
ages established themselves in different and specific parts of the
5
country, there has been the tendency to migrate internally, and 
several ethnic groups may now be found in places which they had
1* For a terse but interesting, historical analysis of these
tribes, see Lord Hailey: Native Administration in the British 
African Territories, Par t""l 11, West Africa, Sierra Leone,
H.M.S.O. (19^1), pp*294 et seq*
2* The Sherbro tribe is divided geographically into two sections, 
separated by the Temne Chiefdoms and the northern part of the 
Western Area* Those settled in the North are called Bullom, 
while those occupying the Southern territory are called Sherbro*
3* These are also called Vai; but it is proper to reserve the 
latter name for the language of the tribe*
4* Lord Hailey expresses doubt as to whether or not the Limba were 
a migrant people* However, a study of the early history of 
this tribe shows that they were, in fact, such. See R.H. 
Finnegan: Survey of the Limba People of Northern Sierra Leone*
H.M.S.O. (196^), P.T4......
5. A map showing the distribution of the tribes, their established 
location and ethnic divisions is at p* l#V. There are a number 
of African tribes, namely the Foulah, Kru and Mandingo, which 
form 3*1%, 0*2% and 2»3% of the population of Sierra Leone*
These are, however, omitted from the map and our discussion in 
this thesis, because they are regarded both politically and 
legally as aliens from the neighbouring Liberia and Guinea.
not originally inhabited*1 The impact of such migration has 
been two-fold* Firstly, tribal ghettos have arisen in the cosmo­
politan city of Freetown, and in large townships in the Provinces 
in which the manners, laws and customs of the tribe are retained 
side by side with other laws and customs of other tribes which are 
found in the area* Secondly, in the wake of migration, there 
has been the tendency for some of the tribes to superimpose their 
innate cultures on the peoples of their new residence* In this 
regard, specific mention must be made of the Mende and Temne
o
tribes which share between them 60*7% of the country's population* 
Mende influence in the southern part of the country has 
been so great that culturally and linguistically, the Gola, Krim 
and Gallina tribes are now almost extinct, having integrated with 
the Mende* This is also true for most of the Southern Sherbro*
In the North-West, along the coastline, the Temne too have almost j 
absorbed the Northern Sherbro*
Tribal people have had many things in common* At first, 1 
their religious outlook did not penetrate beyond ancestral worship; 
but later, the vast majority embrased Islam and now, a good many
3
are Christians*
1* Some of the reasons which have been adduced for internal migra­
tion are: trade, missionary activities, spread of education,
the development of mining, the advent of road construction and 
employment facilities. See M.E. Harvey, "Ethnic groups" in 
Sierra Leone in Mapst (ed* Clarke), p*36*
2* According to the 1963 Population Census, the Mende and Temne 
compose 30*9% and 29*8% respectively, of the population*
3* Writing in 1959, J* Spencer Trim Ingham gave the population of 
Sierra Leone as 2,350,000, of which 72% were Animists, 25% Mus­
lims and 3% Christians* See his Islam in West Africa, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1959, Appendix V. There is no other available 
data on the issue, but it is doubtful how accurate these figures 
are* Most non-natives are either professed Christians or Mus­
lims. Even the vast majority of the people referred to as 
Animists are professed Muslims and many are Christians* Hardly 
can a citizen of Sierra Leone be found who does not claim member­
ship of one or the other of the Muslim and Christian religions* 
Whether they zealously practice the faith is another issue with 
which we are not concerned here*
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As is seen from the definition above, the non-native class 
is wide enough to encompass both non-nationals and nationals of 
Sierra Leone who do not fit into the native class. For our pre­
sent purpose, the most important group in the non-native class is 
that of the Creoles. "Creole11 is a generic term for any descend­
ant of the settlers of the Colony of Sierra Leone, namely the ex­
slaves from England, Nova Scotia and Jamaica, and those liberated 
Africans who were rescued from slave ships in the nineteenth cen­
tury. Creoles have always been territorially identified with 
the Western Area of the country.
By virtue of their early introduction to, and long-standing
association with Western civilization, the Creoles are to a great
and
extent, Europeanized in culture habit. During the colonial era, 
it was apparent that the British Administration treated them dif­
ferently from the aboriginal natives. Legally, for instance, 
they were "British subjects", whilst the natives were merely 
"British-protected" persons. Culturally, religiously and soci­
ally too, they behaved j'ust as if they were Englishmen living in 
England. The only Courts available to them in the Colony were 
the British-established type. Only recently has it been made 
possible for them to seek and obtain remedies in the Local Courts.* 
Basically, Creoles practise the Christian faith. But the commun­
ity of the descendants of the liberated Africans who settled in the 
city of Freetown prefer Is leas.
In modern times, a third class has socially emerged,though 
it is without legal significance as a class. The advance of edu­
cation coupled with the influence of Western culture has brought
1. S.13 of the Local Courts Act, 1963; Act No.20 of 1963 i*ow ex­
tends the jurisdiction of the Local Courts to all persons within 
the area where the Court is located. Such persons include
Creoles and other non-natives. This section is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2.
11.
into existence a new social elite drawn from the tribal groups* 
These educated and Westernized natives too, like the Creoles, 
have adopted, in many ways, Western manners and habits, and yet 
despite their acquired social status, they are in law still regard­
ed as natives*
The effort to escape from one* s legal background has not 
been one-sided* Among the non-natives also there are certain 
individuals whose mode of life is that of natives* They spend
their lives among natives in such places as villages, homesteads, 
and provincial towns, inter-marry with them and conduct some, if 
not all, of their affairs in accordance with customary law* These, 
too, have not been accorded any special legal status, at any rate 
before a non-native court, and are still regarded in law as non­
natives**
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 2
(i) Development up to 1924
Before 1924, the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone 
were administered as two separate territorial and constitutional 
entities*
1* In tribal society, however, once they have integrated into that 
society they are treated on equal basis as natives.
2. Detailed accounts of the Constitutional development of the 
countty are given by: T.O. Elias, op.cit.* pp.217-260;
M. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, A Study 
of the Modernization Process, Harvard tjniversity Press, Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1966; J.R. Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone, 
1947-1967, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970; H.J. 
Fisher, "Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967" in the 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 7, 1969, pp^ 611-636; G. 
Collier, Sierra Leone: Experiment in Democracy in an African
Nation, New York; New York University Press: London, University 
of1 London Press Ltd., 1970, pp.3-35.
The Colony
Prior to 1799, both the executive and legislative powers 
over the settlement were vested in the Court of Directors of the 
Sierra Leone Company* By a Royal Charter of Justice of 5 July, 
1799, the office of Governor was set up and, with it, a Council.* 
Under that Charter, the executive and legislative functions of the 
Court of Directors of the Company were transferred to the Governor
2
and his Council. Again, in 1863, by another Chaxter of Justice, 
the Governor and his Council were split into a separate executive 
council and a legislative council.
The Protectorate
Between 1896 and 1913, a system of indirect rule prevailed 
whereby the chiefs and their principal men constituted both the 
executive and legislative organs. Their law was the law of the 
land; only the royal prerogative could invalidate it. In 1913, 
however, the legislative power was divided between the chiefs and
3
the Legislative Council of the Colony. By the Sierra Leone Pro­
tectorate Order in Council of that year, the Legislative Council 
of the Colony was empowered to legislate for the Protectorate.
(ii) Development in 1924 and after
In 1924, the Legislative Council was reconstituted with
4
the Protectorate having more representation on it than the Colony. 
In addition, a political union between the Colony and the Protect­
orate was evolved. The two entities were no longer regarded as
1. This Charter of Justice was revised both in 1808 (by the Charter 
of 9 August, 1808) and in 1821. See Montagu, The Ordinances 
of Sierra Leone, Vol.Ill, pp.144-196.
2. The Charter of 27 May, 1863; Montagu, op^cit., Vol.Ill, pp. 
193-196.
3. Though in case of conflict, the legislative powers of the 
Council probably prevailed over that of the chiefs.
4. Of the 11 elected unofficial members, 7 were to be elected from 
the Protectorate, of whom 3 were to be Paramount Chiefs.
two separate territories, but as a single political unit, namely 
Sierra Leone, consisting of a Colony and a Protectorate*
Further reforms in 1951 * brought an increase in the repre­
sentation of the Protectorate in the Legislative Council to two- 
thirds of the elected unofficial members* In protest at this 
constitutional change, the Sierra Leone National Council was form­
ed, which later emerged as a political party, the first in the 
country, representing the feelings of the Creole community of 
the Colony* In opposition to the National Council, the Sierra
Leone Peoples Party was established, having as its declared policy
3
the unity of the peoples of the country*
The election of the unofficial members of the 1951 Legis­
lative Council had not been fought on party lines, but with the 
establishment of the two parties, the members took sides*
Another significant reform in 1951 was the reconstitution
4
of the Executive Council* Of the 21 elected members of the 
Legislative Council, 15 indicated their support for the Sierra 
Leone Peoples Paxty, whilst 6 stood for the National Council*
Out of the members of the majority party, the Governor selected 
6 to serve in the Executive Council*
In 1956, the Legislative Council was redesignated the 
House of Representatives* Elections took place in the following 
year on a party basis, and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party was re­
turned with a majority.
The composition of the Executive Council changed further
1* By a new constitution of that year, i.e. The Sierra Leone
(Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951, S.I. (1951), No.611
2. For the meaning of Creole, see ante* p*10*
3. See Lamina Sankph: The Two P»s or Politics for the People* Free - 
town, 1 9 5 1 see also Fyfe* op*cit* * pp*3^9-33^*
4. i.e. By the 1951Constitution*
in 1958. The official members, except the Governor, who re­
mained as President until 1960, withdrew from the Council*
Cabinet government was established and the leader of the Sierra 
Leone Peoples Party, Dr. M.A.S. Margai, became the first Prime 
Minister.
Following a constitutional conference held in London in 
April and May, 1960, the country became independent on 27 April, 
1961*^ Parliamentary government subsisted from independence 
to 23 March, 1967, when following a general election and the 
appointment of Mr. S* Stevens, leader of the All Peoples Congress, 
as Prime Minister, a military coup temporarily brought a halt to 
it* A third military coup in April, 1968, restored civilian 
rule to the country. The country became a Republic on 19 April, 
1971* Two days after wards, Dr* Siaka Stevens was sworn in as 
the first Executive President.
1. For the Report on the Constitutional Conference, see Cmnd. 
1029/1960.
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CHAPTER 2
THE COURTS AND SOURCES OF LAW <
A. THE COURTS
(i) The early Courts *
In addition to the establishment of a Governor and Coun­
cil, the Charter of 5 July, 1799, which we have already mentioned, 
also set up two civil courts of first instance, namely a Court of 
Requests for the recovery of small debts, and a Mayor's Court to 
hear and determine the more important civil cases, and one crimi­
nal court of original jurisdiction, viz., the Court of Quarter 
Sessions.
Consequent upon the abolition of slavery, a Vice-Admiralty
Court was constituted by Order in Council of 16 March, 1808, for
the trial of ships captured on the high seas dealing in slaves.
This Court was active until 1819 when it was superseded by The
Court of Mjxed Commissions.
By the Police Court Ordinance of May, 1810, a police court
presided over by a Magistrate was established. This Court even-
2
tually took over the jurisdiction of the Courts of Requests. At 
first, appeals from the lower courts lay to the Governor and his 
Council, but later with the arrival of the first Chief Justice in 
18£1, this jurisdiction was transferred to him; his court then 
became known as the Court of the Recorder of Freetown. The 
Charter of 9 August, 1808, abolished the Mayor's Court and replaced
1. A concise history of the early courts in the Colony is given by 
J.J. Crooks in his History of the Colony of Sierra Leone» Frank 
Cass & Co. Ltd., London (new impression),
2. See s.43 of Courts Ordinance, 1946 (now repealed); the juris­
diction still remains vested in the Magistrate's Court. And 
now see s.11 of Courts Act, 1965.
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it by the Court of the Recorder of Freetown. An Ordinance No.
10 of 1858 * abolished the Court of Quarter Sessions and the
Court of Recorder of Freetown, and in their stead constituted a
Supreme Court having: (a) the same original jurisdiction as that
of the common law and equity courts in England; and (b) criminal
and civil appellate jurisdiction over decisions from lower courts.
Since the inception of the Supreme Court, a considerable amount of
reorganization took place from time to time in its panel, as well
as in its sphere of jurisdiction. In 1971, it was redesignated 
2
a High Court.
In 1866, another Court, the Court of Summary Jurisdiction,
3
was set up, having power to try personal actions where the claim 
amounted to no more than £100. As with the other lower courts, 
appeal fromthis court lay to the Supreme Court.4
To examine the cases o£ violent or inexplicable deaths, a 
Coroner1s Court was established in 1872.5 This Court is still in 
existence today.
(ii) The Early Courts in the Protectorate
Prior to the declaration of the Protectorate, the only
1. See in particular ss.l, 5 and 44* As will be seen shortly, 
the Statute Law (Amendment) Act, 1961, changed all Sierra 
Leone "Ordinances" into "Acts". In order to avoid ambiguities 
however, we shall retain the use of "Ordinance" for those sta­
tutes by that name which are already repealed, and call "Acts" 
those which continue to exist after 1961*
2. The present High Court is constituted under the Courts Act, 
1965, and the Constitution, Act No.6 of 1971, s.66(l).
3. Ordinance No.5 of 1866. See A. Montagu: Ordinances of the 
Settlement of Sierra Leone (1861*1867), Vol.Ill, p'. 104, pub­
lished in London, 1868.
4. The Court of Summary Jurisdiction was abolished by the Admini­
stration of Justice Ordinance, 1876 (Ordinance No.4 of 1876). 
The jurisdiction of the Court was transferred to the Supreme 
Court.
5. Ordinance No.8 of 1872. See A. Montagu: Ordinances of the
- Settlement of Sierra Leone; (1870-1874), VoI.V. p.54. London. 
1875.
court rthich the British Administration established to dead with the 
affairs of the hinterland was concerned with crimes* The Supreme 
Court Ordinance, 1881, gave jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of 
the Colony to try criminal offences arising from the hinterland, 
such trials to take place either in the Colony or in the place
where they were committed. Hitherto, the courts in the terri-
/
tory, which laterbecame the Protectorate, were the indigenous 
tribunals*
The Protectorate Ordinance, 1896,* recognised the existing 
courts of native chiefs as courts of record having jurisdiction in 
civil disputes in which the sole parties were natives, and in 
addition, set up two other Courts: (a) the District Commissioners
Court, for the hearing and determining of minor disputes between 
non-natives resident in the Protectorate, and (b) the Court of the 
Chief and District Commissioner for the hearing of minor criminal 
cases in which only natives were involved* For dealing with 
civil matters where the amount claimed exceeded £50, and also grave 
criminal matters axising in the Protectorate, a Circuit Court
1* No*20 of 1896* This Ordinance was repealed in 1898, but the 
portion dealing with the courts was re-enacted by the Protector­
ate Ordinance of that year* By various Ordinances and Acts 
since 1896 * the most important of which were the Protectorate 
Ordinance, 1901; the Protectorate Courts* Jurisdiction Ordinance 
1903; the Protectorate Native Law Ordinance, 1905; the Pro­
tectorate Native Law Ordinance, 1924; Protectorate Courts Juris­
diction Ordinance, 1932; Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction (Amend, 
ment) Ordinance, 1937; and the Local Courts Act, 1963 - consid­
erable reorganisation has taken place in the "native" (now 
"local" since the Local Courts Act, 1963) system, as the system 
of native J . judicial administration recognised by the 1896 Ordi­
nance became known* The result is that at present there are 
local courts of first instance, Group Local Appeal Courts, to 
hear appeals from the former, and a Local Division of the High 
Court to hear appeals from local courts from both their original 
and appellate jurisdiction. See H.M.J. Smart, "The Local Court 
System in Sierra Leone11, Sierra Leone Studies * New Series No*22,
January 1968, pp.31-44, for a history of the development of 
Local Courts up to 1963*
2* For the legal meaning of the words "native" and "non-native" as 
used in Sierra Leone, see ante* pp.7-8.
consisting of a sole judge of the Supreme Court of the Colony 
was established in 1 9 0 3 The District Commissioner’s Court 
aid the Court of the Chief and District Commissioner were abolished 
in 1946,** and their jurisdiction taken over by the Magistrate’s 
Court. The Circuit Court was also abolished in the Courts Ordi- 
nance, 1946, and replaced by the then Supreme Court.
(iii) Appeal Courts outside the Country
The highest and final Court of Appeal was formerly the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This Court had a long­
standing connection with the country, dating as far back as the
4
Charter of 1808. By an Order in Council of 1 March, 1867,
appeals lay to the Judicial Committee from final judgment of the
5
Supreme Court for sums above £300.
An intermediate appellate machinery introduced in 1928 
was the establishment of the West African Court of Appeal.6 On 
attainment of independence by Ghana and Nigeria, the two countries 
which together with Sierra Leone and the Gambia had recognised the 
appellate jurisdiction of the West African Court of Appeal, with­
drew from it and the Court became known as the Sierra Leone and 
Gambia Court of Appeal. When Sierra Leone achieved independence 
in 1961, she set up her own Court of Appeal, which then superseded
1. By the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1903; No.6 
of 1903.
2. By the Courts Ordinance, 1946; see in particular s.41.
3. Ibid.
4. Ante, p. 12.
5. Statutory Rules and Orders, 1904, Vol.VI, ’Judicial Committee’, 
p*81. See A.W. Renton and G.W. Phillimore: Colonial Laws • and 
Courts, London, 1907, p.274.
6. Recognised in Sierra Leone by the West African Court of Appeal 
(Civil Cases) Ordinance No.9 of 1929, and the yfest African 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Cases) Ordinance No.10 of 1929*
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the Sierra Leone and Gambia Court of Appeal.*
(iv) The Present Court System 
The Privy Council
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council continued to
be the highest and final Court of Appeal until the Republican 
2
Constitution came into effect on 19 April, 1971, which abolished 
the Court as thecountry*s highest Court of Appeal for appeals after
3
that date. However, under ss.ll and 12 of the Constitution 
(Consequential Provisions) Act, 1971, any appeal or petition for 
leave to appeal that was pending before the Privy Council continued
t
to be heard by it after the entry into force of the Republican 
Constitution. Under these provisions, an appeal would be re­
garded as pending if the records were registered, and in the case 
of a petition for leave to appeal, if such petition was filed in 
the office of the Privy Council before the commencement of the 
Republican Constitution.
S.12(2) provides that an order made by the Privy Council 
on an appeal that lies to it either before or after the Republican 
Constitution came into force is enforceable in the same manner as 
it was enforced before the commencement of the Republican Consti­
tution.
The Supreme Court
This is the new highest and final court of appeal which 
took the place of the Privy Council since the country became a 
Republic. It was established under 5, 66 of the Republican
1. The Sierra Leone Constitution, 1961, 4.79.
2. Act No.6 of 1971.
3. S.11 of the Constitution (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1971: 
Act No.9 of 1971.
4. Act No.9 of 1971.
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Constitution. At least three Justices constitute a quorum. 
Qualification for appointment as a Justice of the Court is entitle­
ment to practise as an advocate or solicitor in a court having 
unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters irksome part 
of the Commonwealth,or in a court having jurisdiction in appeals 
from any such court, and has been so entitled for not less than 
ten years.
The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction but hears 
appeals from the Court of Appeal with the leave of the Supreme 
Court itself, which may be granted only upon condition that within 
a period to be fixed by the Court, but not exceeding three months 
from the date of the hearing of the application for leave to ap­
peal, the appellant provides a security to the satisfaction of the 
Court in a sum not exceeding Le 1,000.* This condition is pro­
bably intended to minimize the hearing of groundless appeals. The 
court also hears appeals from the Court of Appeal with leave from 
that Court,if such leave was granted before the 19 April?, 1971.
The procedure for appeals is governed by the procedure in
3Appeals to the Supreme Court (Adaptation) Order, 1971, and the
, . .  4 ..............
Supreme Court Rules (Adaptation) Order, 1971.
5
The Court of Appeal
This Court is also established by section 66 of the Republi-
j
can Constitution. Its judges are Justices of Appeal having the | 
same professional qualification and entitlement to practice as the 
Supreme Court Justices. As also with the Supreme Court, three
1. «T*2 of The Procedure in Appeals to the Supreme Court (Adaptation) 
Order, 1971. P.N. No.34 of 1971.
2. Ibid.. T.17.
3. Ibid.. P.N. No*34 of 1971.
4. P.N. No.35 of 1971.
5. For a detailed analysis of the Court system in Sierra Leone be­
fore the country became a Republic, see H.M.J. Smart, f,Sierra 
Leone” in Allott*s Judicial and Legal Systems in Africa (2nd ed.) 
Butterwortns, London^ pp.9-2d.
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justices constitute a quorum*
Generally, the Court has such jurisdiction and powers as 
are conferred upon it by the Republican Constitution and any other 
law*1 Specifically, following the old Appeal Court which it re­
placed, the Court gives opinions on questions of law on cases
2
stated by a Judge of the High Court* The primary jurisdiction
3
of the Court is to hear appeals from the High Court* In turn, 
an appeal from the Court of Appeal lies to the newly-constituted 
Supreme Court except appeals pending before the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council before 19 April, 1971. In civil cases, 
appeal: lies where the matter in dispute or amount is not less than 
Le 1,000 and against final decisions in (a) disciplinary proceed­
ings against members of the medical, dental and legal professions, 
and (b) proceedings for the dissolution or nullity of marriage*
4
Appeal lies as of right in criminal cases*
The High Court
As with the other Superior Courts of Record, the High 
Court is established by section 66 of the Republican Constitution* 
The period of entitlement to practice as an advocate or solicitor 
in order to qualify as a High Court Judge is reduced to seven yeaxs 
under the present Constitution* This Court replaces the old 
Supreme Court and its constitution and powers remain the same as 
those of the old Court*5 These are examined more fully in 
Chapter 3 herein*
1* S.66(1) of the Republican Constitution*
2. Ss*53(3), 68 of Courts Act, 1965; s.4(1) of Act No*9 of 1971.
3. S.72 of Act No.6 of 1971.
4. S.70(1) of the Courts Act, 1965; Act No.31 of 1965.
5* In order to avoid anachronism, throughout this thesis the ex­
pression "Supreme Court" will be retained when referring to that 
Court which in 1971 was redesignated "High Court" for all matters 
affecting the Court before that date. In order to obviate con­
fusion, when we wish to refer to the present highest Court of 
Appeal in the country, we shall call it the "new Supreme Court".
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The Magistrates* Court
These as also Courts of Record established under the
Courts Act,1965, the Courts Act (Amendment) Decree,1967,* and the
2
Children and Young Persons Act* They are of three classes, 
namely, the ordinary magistrates* courts, a special magistrates* 
court sitting in the Western Area alone to decide matters affecting 
customary law, and Juvenile courts* A Juvenile court comprises 
a single magistrate and two or more Justices of the peace* The 
composition and Jurisdiction of the other two classes of magistrates 
courts are discussed in Chapter 3* Here, we should, however, 
point out that the change of the country from a Monarchy to a 
Republic did not affect the constitution and powers of the magi­
strates* courts and other lower courts.
Customary-Law Courts
For want of a better term, we use "Customary-law courts'* 
as a generic term for those Courts whose primary law is customary 
law* They range from the Local Appeals Division of the High 
Court, the District Appeals Court, the Group Local Appeals Court, 
and then to the Local Court* They were established by the Local
3
Courts Act, 1963, and are situated in the Provinces* The lowest 
is the Local Court from which an appeal lies to either the Group 
Local Appeal Court or the District Court* An appeal from the 
District Cour goes straight to the Local Appeals Division of the 
High Court, while an appeal from the Group Local Appeal Court must 
go through the District Court before reaching the Local Appeal 
Division of the High Court. From this latter Court, an appeal
1* N.R.C. Decree No.56, dated 26 October, 1967*
2* Cap*44 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
3. Act No.20 of 1963.
lies to the Court of Appeal, and then finally to the new Supreme 
Court*1
B. THE SOURCES OF SIERRA LEONE LAW
The sources of Sierra Leone law are: (i) the general:law;
(ii) Islamic law, and (iii) Customary law*
(1) The General Law
2
The term "general law" is used to describe English law 
as applied in Sierra Leone, and such local adaptations and modifi­
cations that have been made of it* The courts that primarily 
administer it are the British-established system of courts of the 
colonial era and non-customaxy courts of the post-independence 
period, as opposed to the customary local courts, the indigenous 
system of traditional courts in the Provinces* The general law 
consists of: (i) local enactments, and (ii) received English law* 
Received English law is of two kinds:- 
(a) "Adopted law", which is defined by section 4 of the 
Interpretation Act, 1971, as:
"any Act of the United Kingdom or English 
Parliament or an Order in Council or other 
legislative instrument made thereunder 
otherwise than by an Authority in Sierra 
Leone which has effect in Sierra Leone*"
1. We can state here only the presence of these customary-law
courts in the Sierra Leone Judicial system at the expense of de­
voting time and space to matters which are more relevant to the 
subject-matter of this thesis* The present writer has, however, 
fully dealt with these Courts in Allott* s Judicial and Legal 
Systems in Africa* pp*16-20, and in an article entitled k,The 
Local Court System in Sierra Leone", S.L.S. (N.S.), No.22, pp.31- 
44.
2* This term is first used in the Local Courts Act, 1963; s*2 of
which provides, inter alia, "... * general law* includes the com­
mon law, equity and enactments i£n force irisierra Leone, except 
insofar as they are concerned with customary law ..." S.4 of 
the Sierra Leone Constitution,1971, defines "general law" as 
meaning "the Common law, equity and all enactments in force in 
Sierra Leone*"
In this category will fall those statutes of the United
Kingdom Parliament which applied automatically to Sierra Leone as
Imperial Statutes,1 as well as those statutes which are adopted
2
from time to time by the local legislature*
(b^ Non-statutory English law which serves as the residual 
law of Sierra Leone* In this group, are the common law and the 
doctrines of equity*
Authority for Application
Note that the Constitution, 1971, s*93(l) provides that:-
11 in this Constitution, unless a contrary inten­
tion appears - ..* * law' includes (a) any instru­
ment having the force of law made in exercise of 
a power conferred by law ..."
Note also that the Constitution in s.33 further provides that:-
"Subj’ect to the provisions of this Constitution,
Parliament shall be the supreme legislative au­
thority for Sierra Leone.11
The effect of both sections is that any law passed by the Sierra
3
Leone legislature will answer to the description of "general law”.
Apart from Imperial Statutes which before the country be­
came a republic applied in Sierra Leone automatically, and those 
statutes which are from time to time adopted by specific legisla­
tion, the rest of English law applies in Sierra Leone as a result
4
of a reception statute*
Before we discuss the content of this Statute, it is neces­
sary to show how English law was introduced into Sierra Leone*
1. e.g. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894*
2* These are also of two kinds: (a) those which come within the
reception date (see belowj^ , and (b) those which are outside the 
reception date, e.g. the adoption of the English Perjury Act, 
1911; Forgery Act, 1913; and Larceny Act, 1916, by the Imperial 
Statutes (Criminal Law) Adoption Act, 1933.
3. Except that which falls within the definition of customary law. 
See post , p?q.Q
4. "Reception Statute" is used here for the Sierra Leone Act of 
Parliament which provides that so much of English law at a parti© 
cular date, shall apply as the residuary law of Sierra Leone.
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According to Halsbury* s Laws of England,*" there are three
forms of settlement. First, occupation of territory may be
authorised by the Crown, possession taken in the name of the
Crown, and settlers introduced. Secondly, the Crown may recognise
as British territory settlements made by British subjects without
previous authority. Thirdly, uninhabited islands or areas in
the Arctic or Antarctic may be formally annexed.
Sierra Leone is listed as one of the territories acquired
2
by settlement of the first type. This statement is true for 
the country as from 1808 when it was declared a Crown Colony al­
though the Sierra Leone Company from England had occupied part of 
it in 1787, as we have seen earlier. Authority for the informal 
introduction of the English Common law into the settlement of the 
Sierra Leone is afforded by Renton and Phillimore, who wrote:
"Sierra Leone, having been acquired by occu­
pancy and not by conquest or cession, is a 
'plantation* and therefore the common law of 
England prevails in it."4
At the initial stages, however, no direct legislative
authority could be found for the application of English law to
Sierra Leone. Its introduction was informal. Early evidence of
it was the introduction of the English frank-pledge system.5 But
1. 3rd ed., vol.5, p.544.
2. Ibid.
3. Colonial Laws and Courts, London, 1907, p.273.
4. This statement presumably does not apply to the territory that 
later became the Protectorate in which English law was applied 
by Ordinances in Council since the declaration of the Protect­
orate in 1896.
5. Under this system, an English town was^  for the purpose of local 
government, divided into tithing,i.e. districts of ten families. 
The headmen of the families elected'one of them as a tithingman 
to watch over the interests of the ten families. The tithing 
men, in turn, elected one of their numberias a hundreder to be
in charge of every hundred or district ox ten tithings.
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unlike England, the township 1 was divided into districts of 
twelve instead of ten families. The whole body of tithingmen 
and hundreders sat with the Governor and his Council to review all 
proposed legislation before it became law. Another evidence was 
in the Charters of Justice of 1799, 1808 and 1821. But neither 
the frank-pledge system nor any of the Charters of Justice con­
tained a clear and precise statement that English law should apply 
to Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, the settlers applied the current 
common law because it was the law known to them and to which they 
had been accustbmed. They also applied locally-enacted law, but 
only when it was not contrary to English law. For example, the 
Charter of 1808 referred to the Governor and Council as having 
power -
"to enact laws, statutes and ordinances not 
repugnant to the laws of England but as-near 
thereto as circumstances would permit."
Consequently, laws passed by the Governor and Council had 
to be sent to Westminster for approval within six mo&ths of enact­
ment and any law so disapproved or disallowed ceased to have effect 
In this legislative process, by virtue of the background of the 
persons concerned with it,English law was gradually introduced.
The same background made English law the more welcome by judges 
and laymen who embarked on Judicial functions.
The first express provision for the application of English 
law came in 1857. By s.2 of Ordinance No.96 of that year, all 
laws and statutes which were in force in England on 1 January,
1857 were extended to Sierra Leone insofar as local circumstances 
3permitted. The reception date was altered to 1 August, 1862,
1. i.e. the area in Freetown which was first occupied by the 
settlers.
2. See Montagu, op;cit.. vol.Ill, p.183.
3. See Montagu: ap;cit.t Vol.I, p.295.
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by s.2 of Ordinance No.3 of 1862. Supreme Court Ordinances 1
since 1862 retained the date, but the Supreme Court Ordinance of 
2
1881 changed it to 1 August, 1880. This date has been adhered 
to ever since. The 1881 Ordinance first introduced the phrase 
"all laws and statutes"^ as with its predecessors^ ' it made no 
mention of "the common law and equity". The reception statute
in its present form was first enacted by s.37 of theCourts Ordi-
3 4nance which came into effect on 1 January, 1946. The present
reception statute is the Courts Act, 1965, s.74 of which provides
that:
"subject to the provisions of the Constitu­
tion and any other enactment the common law, 
the doctrines of equity and the statutes of 
general application in force in England on 
the 1st day of January, 1880, shall be in 
force in Sierra Leone."5
The interpretation of the phrase "the common law , the doctrines
of equity and the statutes of general application in force in
England on the 1st day of January, 1880, has not been without
difficulty. ^
1. See Act No.8 of 1864; Act No.7 of 1876.
2. Act No.9 of 1881, s.19#
3. Cap.7 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960 (now repealed).
4. Note that T.O. Elias, op.cit.. p.271, erroneously gives the first 
reception statute as Ordinance No.$ of 1862. Presumably, the 
learned jurist lost sight of Ordinance No.96 of 1857, as nowhere 
in his book does he make reference to it.
5. The provision with local variations in regard to the reception 
date, i.e. the date delimited by the reception statute, is found 
in the reception statutes of a number of ex-British dependencies, 
e.g. in Nigeria,the date is 1 January, 1900:- see the Interpre­
tation Act, Cap.89 (1958 Ed.) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria; 
in Ghana, the date was 24 July, 1874:- see the Courts Ordinance 
of 1 July, 1935, Cap.4, Vol.l of the Laws of thefeold Coast 
(1951).
6. For concise but very apt meanings of the terms "common law" and 
"equity", see Park, op.cit., pp.5-13.
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"The common law, the doctrines of equity **♦"
So fax as the common law and doctrines of equity are con­
cerned, there are two schools of thought as to the time limit of 
their application* One school, of which Allott 1 is the most 
eloquent advocate, maintains that the reception date applies to
the common law and equity no less than it does to the statutes of
o
general application* The other school, led by Park, would not 
impose any such restriction, conceding that the applicable common 
law and equity are those in currency and not merely those that 
existed at the reception date* In short, the argument of this 
school is that the reception date applies only to the statutes*
Q
Whichever view is taken in this highly academic controversy, it 
is submitted that the phrase in s*74 of the Courts Act is a nebu­
lous one, one whose content cannot be satisfactorily ascertained 
without reference to the construction which the Sierra Leone 
courts have placed upon it*
It must be pointed out and borne in mind that in Sierra
Leone there is at present, no separate provision like s*17 of the
4 5Gold Coast Ordinance, and s*16 of the High Court of Lagos Law
to which the two contenders seem to address themselves respect­
ively, and which they agree provide for a "timeless" application 
of English law in divorce and matrimonial causes and matters in
1* Essays in African Law, p*31, and New Essays in African Law, 
Butterworths, 19^0, pp.31-34.
2* The Sources of Nigerian Law* pp.20 et seq.
3. See Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, "The adaptation of imported law
in Africa" in [i960 ] J.A.L., pp*66-77, where the" writer appears 
to hold a modified view of the Allott thesis*
4. The section provided that the Gold Coast Supreme Court was to
exercise matrimonial jurisdiction, "in conformity with the law
and practice for the time being in force in England*"
5. The section also reads as follows:- "The jurisdiction of the 
High Court in ••• matrimonial causes and proceedings may ••• be 
exercised by the Court in conformity with the law and practice 
for the time being in force in England*"
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those countries. Formerly, there was a similar provision * in
Sierra Leone, but no agreement among Sierra Leone Coutts as to
whether it had a "timeless" effect in Sierra Leone.
2
In Richards v. Richards, the question was which English
rules of procedure should apply in a matrimonial cause. The
answer depended on the construction placed on s.6 of the Supreme
3
Court Ordinance. Holding that it was the current English law
that applied as opposed to English law as at 1 January, 1880,
4Tew, C.J. had this to say:-
"It is agreed that it has been the invariable 
practice of this Court to follow the current 
English practice and I think the procedure is 
correct."
About two years after this decision, without any reference to it,
the West African Court of Appeal took a diametrically opposed view
in the Sierra Leone case of Godwin v. Crowther 15 by holding that
the phrase "the law for the time being in force" which appeared in
the Ordinance meant the law in force at the time the reception
statute was passed. Delivering the judgment of the Court,
Macquarrie, J. said:-6
"It appears to me that strong evidence 
should be required if the intention of 
the legislature is to effect such unusual 
purpose as the wholesale application of 
all English law whatever it might be on
1. i.e. s.6 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1904, which stateds- 
"The jurisdiction hereby conferred on the Supreme Court in pro­
bate, divorce and matrimonial causes and proceedings may subject 
to this Ordinance and to rules of Court be exercised by the 
Court in conformity with the law and practice for the time being
in force in England." This provision was repealed by the Su­
preme Court Ordinance, 1933.
2. Unreported; decided by the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone on 
11 March, 1932.
3. i.e. The 1904 Ordinance, now repealed.
4. At p.542 of the Supreme Court Judgment Book, No.l.
5. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 109.
6. Ibid., p.lll.
the subject in question as well as those
of divorce and matrimonial causes* No
such evidence exists•**
The other two learned judges * concurred with him.
Applying the doctrine of precedent and the hierarchy of
Courts here, one would tend to conclude that Godwin* s case stood
as authority over Richard* s because Godwin* s was decided by a
higher court. However, Godwin* s case was heavily undermined by
a subsequent case, again decided by the West African Court of
2
Appeal. In Taylor v. Taylor» a Nigerian case, in which one of 
the judges was the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone and Butler-Lloyd, 
J. who took part in Godwin*s case, an opinion contrary to that in 
Godwin* s case was taken by the Court without reference to either 
Richard* s case or Godwin*s case. Butler-Lloyd, J. concurred with
Kingdon, C.J. without giving reasons and without perhaps the least 
suspecting that he had contributed to the opposite view ten months 
earlier. Later practice in Nigeria, Ghaiaand Northern Rhodesia
followed, the principle in Taylor v. Taylor.3
Our conclusion, therefore, is that,so far as Sierra Leone
is concerned, the question whether s.6 of the Supreme Court Ordi­
nance conveyed a **timeless** implication was one which remained un­
settled. Therefore, the contrast on which Allott and Park stood,
i.e. the lttimelessI* application of English law in divorce and matri­
monial matters, cannot be of much help to Sierra Leone in the inter* 
pretation of the phrase **the common law, the doctrines of equity 
and the statutes of general application in force in England on the
1st day of January, 1880.11
1. i.e. Butler-Lloyd, J . and Deane, C.J. at 112-113, respectively.
2. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 348.
3. See the Nigerian case: Whyte v. Commissioner of Police [j.966 3 
N.M.L.R. 215 at p.218; the Ghana case: As hong v. Ashong (1968)
C.C. 26; the Northern Rhodesian.case: In the matter of the
Estate of Frederick Ntonga [1964] J.A.L. 41, High Court.
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As we have said earlier, guidance for interpretation must 
be sought from the Sierra Leone Courts themselves. As a rule, 
these Courts have not in the least hesitated to hold as applicable 
law under s.74 of the Courts Act, 1965, any recent development in 
the English common law and equity. Post-1880 English decisions 
have been cited with approval in the Sierra Leone Courts with the
utmost frequency as pre-1880 cases. For example, English cases
1 2 like P.P.P. v. Smith and "The High Trees” case, have been
cited and accepted as authority for the propositions which they 
supported without question. This judicial attitude, in our sub­
mission, is accentuated not so much by the desire to give a "time­
less" interpretation to the phrase as by the desire for convenience 
and expediency.
"The Statutes of general application in force in England ..."
It is important for our topic to know what statutes of 
general application in force in England are applicable in Sierra 
Leone. The reason is that the family law of a given country 
takes into account the race, the religion and the culture; in 
short, the background, of the peoples of that country. One must, 
therefore, be wary of transporting statutes which have been en­
acted taking these factors into consideration to a people with a 
different background without making modifications in the applica­
bility of the statutes in order to suit the local conditions of 
the country in which they are transplanted.
All the authorities are in agreement that statutes of 
general application are limited to the reception date. Neverthe­
less, there is difficulty of interpretation in respect of the 
class of English statutes which should be regarded as being "of 
general application in England". No satisfactory definition of
1. [i960 ]3 All.E.R. 161.
2. [1947 ]K.B. 130.
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the expression has been preferred either in Sierra Leone or in 
any other country which has a similar provision in its reception 
statute. Definitely, private local Acts cannot be within the 
expression. Conversely also, not all public Acts apply through­
out the country or to all classes of persons. It will, therefore, 
be incorrect to say that all such Acts are statutes of general 
application. Here again, as with the common law and equity, one 
has to look for guidance to the courts of tie territory in which an 
Bnglish statute is to apply as a statute of general application.
In Sierra Leone, the Courts have not adopted a hard and
fast rule as to which English statutes are of general application
and therefore, applicable to Sierra Leone, and which ones are not.
Apart from one case,3, in which the West African Court of Appeal
in an appeal from the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone held that the
English Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, was not an enactment of
general application in England and therefore, not applicable to
Sierra Leone, the general tendency has been to asgard all English
statutes which fall within the reception date as being of general 
2application. They apply to Sierra Leone subject only to s .11
(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1971, which provides that whenever
1. In the Matter of the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance (1945), 
11 W.A.C.A. 31. See, in particular, the judgment of Kingdon,
C.J. at p.33.
2. c/f Allott: New Essays in African Law, pp.59-54, where he gives 
ten requirements in which an English statute qualifies as "of 
general application". They are summarised as follows:- (i)
It must be a public general Act of Parliament; (ii) It must be 
in force in England at the relevant date eventhough it had been 
subsequently amended or repealed; (iii)) It need not be appli­
cable by all courts in England nor to all classes of persons 
nor in all localities; (iv) It must be suitable for general 
application outside England; (v) It must not be peculiarly 
and solely adapted to English local conditions; (vi) It must 
be suitable for import into a given country; (vii) A ruling 
must be made by a court of the receiving country that a statute 
is of general application and that ruling must remain unreversedj 
(viii) It may apply only to a particular case or class of per­
sons ; (ix) The consequence of ruling whether or not a statute
is of general application should be considered; (x) The statute 
of general application should not be inconsistent with a subse­
quently enacted local statute.
any Act of the United Kingdom or English Parliament applies in 
Sierra Leone, "it shall be read with such verbal alternatives as 
to names, localities, courts, officers, persons, moneys and other­
wise as may be necessary to make the same applicable in the circum­
stances." This attitude is perhaps a reflection of the "English- 
ness" of Sierra Leone judges.1
Somewhat similar to the point at issue, is also the ten­
dency of Sierra Leone courts to accept English decisions as autho­
rity for the interpretation of local statutes which are couched in
the same language as English Acts of Parliament, for example, the
2Sierra Leone Matrimonial Causes Act, 1949. This Act contains
3
almost the same grounds for divorce and nullity of marriage as 
the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, and English cases on the 
interpretation of terms like cruelty, desertion, and non-consumma­
tion of marriage have been applied indiscriminately to interpret 
the same terms used in the Sierra Leone Act. In our submission, 
such a practice should be deprecated. English judges sitting in 
England interpret these terms by taking into consideration, inter 
alia, the social and cultural background of the British people.
It is in this light that Sierra Leone judges should look at them. 
An act by a husband like coming home late at night in a drunken 
state, which an English judge may regard as an act of cruelty, 
should not indeed be regarded per se as cruelty in Sierra Leone, 
bearing in mind the background of the community in which the
1. All Sierra Leone judges and lawyers are British-trained. The 
country has not, as yet, a Law School.
2. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Veone» 1960.
3. Except that insanity is not a ground for divorce in Sierra 
Leone.
4. See Hall v. Hall [l962 ] 3 All E.R. 518.
husband lives.
(ii) Islamic Law *
The majority of Sierre Leone Muslims, like those in other
parts of West Africa, belong to the Maliki School of the Sunni 
2
Sect. The Sharia does not apply in Sierra Leone as a system of
law in the same way as the "general law" and customary law, but 
it may apply either as (d.) part of statute* law; or as (&) part 
ofcu$totn*i\f law.
(<*,) Islamic Law as part of Statute Law
The only reference to Islamic (Mohammedan) law in Sierra
3
Leone is in the Mohammedan Marriage Act. The Act stipulates 
that,
"Every marriage entered into and subsisting 
between persons professing the Mohammedan 
faith and domiciled in the Colony and Pro­
tectorate which is valid according to 
Mohammedan law (hereinafter called a Moham­
medan marriage) shall be valid for all 
civil purposes."4
It goes on to say that "Proof according to Mohammedan law of the 
existence, past and present, of a Mohammedan marriage or of a dis­
solution of a Mohammedan marriage, shall be received in evidence,
5
by all the Courts in the Colony." It further provides that
Mohammedan Marriages and final divorces may be registered; ^ that
1. On Islamic Law in Sierra Leone generally, see J.N.D. Anderson: 
Islamic Law in Africa» H.M.S.O., London, 1954.
2. There are a few foreign Muslims and members of the Ahmaddiya 
sect.
3. Cap.96 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, passed in 
1905.
4. Ibid., s.2.
5. s .3 .
6 . s . 5 .
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"the Registrar, when requested so to do, shall enter a record ... 
of any Mohammedan marriage or final divorce, if satisfied that 
such marriage or final divorce is in accordance with Mohammedan 
law." S.9, which regulates succession on intestacy, enacts
that,
"if any party to a Mohammedan marriage and 
being at the date of his death a Mohammedan, 
shall die intestate, the real estate and 
personal of such intestate shall be distri­
buted in accordance with Mohammedan law"
the persons entitled to take out letters of administration being
"the eldest son of the intestate if of full age according to Mo- 
2
hammedan law", and failing him "the eldest brother of the intest-
3ate, if of full age according to Mohammedan law", with a proviso 
that,
"a creditor, not being a Mohammedan, may 
apply to the Court for letters of Admini­
stration and, notwithstanding that letters 
of administration have already been granted 
to another person, the application of such 
creditor shall be granted ... unless the 
previous grantee shall pay the debt, or 
prove to the satisfaction of the court that 
nothing is owing from the estate of the in­
testate to the applicant."
The section continues that "save as regards distribution or any
other matter expressly provided for in this section, the estates
of the intestate ... shall be administered in accordance with the
4
law of the Colony," and that,
"in the event of there being at the time a 
Tribal Authority of a race which is Moham­
medan, the Official Administrator shall, in 
the absence of any direction given by the 
Chief Justice to the contrary, consult such 
authority as to what is the Mohammedan law 5 
as to distribution of an intestate's estate."
1. s.6(1).
2. s.9(2)(a).
3. s.9(2)(b).
4. s.9(3).
5 . s .10 .
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Looking at the substance of the Mohammedan Marriage Act 
in regard to applicable Islamic law as part of Sierra Leone family 
law, one significant point stands out clearly. It is that the 
Act does not give any court whatsoever power to enquire on its own 
accord whether or not the formalities of a Mohammedan marriage or 
divorce were complied with according to Islamic law. Registra­
tion of a marriage or divorce by a Registrar selected from among 
the Mohammedan community is prima facie evidence of compliance with 
the norms of theSharia. The ultimate result is that in many 
cases, what is usually registered as a Mohammedan marriage or 
divorce iB in form and content a customary law marriage or divorce.
A distinctive feature of a Mohammedan marriage is that the
wife has the same rights under the Married Women*s Maintenance Act
2
as a wife married under the Christian or civil marriage Acts.
(&-) Islamic Law as part of Customary Law
True,Sierra Leone Muslims do observe the ritual ordinances 
of their religion but they, except perhaps the small Aku Muslim 
community in Freetown, scarcely apply or are knowledgeable of 
Islamic law. Even among this minority, though the ceremony of 
marriage is normally carried out in accordance with the tenets of 
Islamic law, other requirements stipulated by the Sharia, such as 
the payment of dower to the wife by the husband as distinct from 
the marriage consideration, are not strictly observed. In the 
field of intestate succession, they adhere to the rules of the 
Sharia only when a dispute is in contemplation. Among the 
majority of Muslims in the Provinces not even the ceremony of 
marriage is conducted in the manner ordained by the Sharia.
1. For the effect of this, see Chapter 10, pp. £5$^ 23^
2. See J.N.D. Anderson^ op.cit., p.295.
Customary law usually takes the place of Islamic law in many situ­
ations.
As we shall also see later, the non-customary courts have
no power to hear any matrimonial cause under Islamic law. They
have power only to receive evidence of a valid marriage and a
valid dissolution of that marriage tinder Islamic law as supplied
to them. Nevertheless, because of s.2 of the Mohammedan Marriage
Act, which provides that a Mohammedan marriage '*shall be valid
for all civil purposes’*,* it would appear that non-customary courts
can accommodate a matrimonial suit between parties to a Mohammedan
marriage and apply the general law. It is submitted, however,
that **civil purpose** under the Act does not include a matrimonial
cause; for under the Matrimonial Causes Act a Mohammedan marriage
ois not a "marriage” and the spouses are not “husband and wife*'.
A Mohammedan marriage, therefore, assumes the status of a custom- \
ary marriage and matrimonial relief would have to be sought from a
3
Local Court or from other sources, probably ad hoc tribunals.
The position is the same for Mohammedan marriages in the Provinces
4
since the Mohammedan Marriage Act does not apply to the Provinces.
(Hi) Customary Law
Customary law or “native law and custom", as it was form­
erly called, was the law of the indigenous tribunals in the whole 
of Sierra Leone before the colonial era. The Protectorate Ordi-
5
nance, 1896, for the first time officially recognised it as the
1. Islamic Law would therefore, be regarded as part of the general 
law.
2. S.2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1949, cap.1©&.
3. A tribal headman or some highly respected local Muslim usually 
constitutes the tribunal. Usually, such matters are referred 
to the jamaat (local Muslim Community).
4. See Chapter 4.
5. Ordinance No.20 of 1896.
law of the courts of the native chiefs in the Protectorate.
Later, s.6 of the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance *
provided for the application of this law by District Commissioners
Courts and Circuit Courts in the Protectorate. The provisions
2were substantially re-enacted in the Courts Ordinance, and fin-
3
ally reproduced m  the Courts Act, 1965.
There is no legislation in Sierra Leone specifically per­
taining to customary family law, but it is submitted that custom­
ary family law is recognised and applied by theCourts because it 
constitutes a substantial part of the whole body of customary law 
for whose application provision is made. Besides, there are ref-
4
erences in the Marriage Amendment Acts, 1965 to the recognition 
of customary-law marriage as a bar to a subsequent statutory mar­
riage, not to mention the fact that on a number of occasions, the 
general law courts have granted reliefs, though non-matrimonial, 
based on customary marriages in exercise of their power under 
s.76 of the Courts Act, 1965.5
The current statutory provisions in Sierra Leone for the 
recognition and application of customary law are found in the Con-
f L ............................................................... .............
stitution, the Native Courts Ordinance, the Local Courts Act, 
1963,® and the Courts Act, 1965.^
Note that the Constitution, 1971,   J $* 93(1) provides
that:-
1. Act No.6 of 1903.
2. Cap.*? of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960j $*32
3. Act No.31 of 1965.
4. Acts Nos. 48 & 49 of 1965.
5. See the unreported cases decided by the Supreme Court at Free­
town, namely, Alpha Suliman v. Mballey, 199/43; Brown v. 
Jelaney, 363/45; Suiiman v. Foday. *507/33.
6. Act No.6 of 1971.
7. Cap.8 pf the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
8. Act No.20 of 1963.
9. Act No.31 of *965.
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”In this Constitution, unless a contrary 
intention appears - ... ‘law* includes - 
... (b) customary law and any other un­
written rule of law ...”
After continuing the policy of the Protectorate Ordinance,
1896,in giving recognition to native courts as courts of law, the
Native Courts Ordinance, 1933 * in s.5 stated:
”The Native Courts and the Combined Courts 
shall administer justice in accordance with
native law and custom so far as the same is
not repugnant to natural justice, equity
and good conscience or incompatible, either 
directly or indirectly with any Ordinance 
applying to the Protectorate but subject 
always to the provisions of this Ordinance.”
The Native Courts Ordinance has been repealed by s.50(l)
2
of the Local Courts Act, 1963. There is no express clear pro­
vision in the Local Courts Act, as it was in the Native Courts
Ordinance that customary law shall be the law of the Local Courts, 
and s.5 of the Native Courts Ordinance is not saved. But s«13(2) 
of the Local Courts Act in giving jurisdiction to the Courts over 
persons within its territorial limits provides that ”where there 
is no provision of customary law the general law shall apply”.
This provision may be subject to two interpretations:
It may mean that wherever in the Act no provision is made 
for the application of customary law, then the general law will 
apply, in which case the general law automatically applies as the{ 
law of the local courts, since the Act does not specifically pro­
vide for the application of customary law. It may also be inter­
preted that customary law is the primary law of the court, but in 
any case, where customary law cannot apply because either there is 
none or for some reason or the other, it is impracticable or
1. Which is Cap.8 of the revided Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960. It 
was formerly Cap.50 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1946.
2. No.20 of 1963.
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inappropriate to apply one, then the general law will apply as the 
secondary law* It is submitted that the second interpretation is 
the more reasonable and should be preferred* To adopt the first 
interpretation would be not only a reduction of the issue to ab­
surdity but also a flagrant disregard of the intention of the 
legislature which can be gathered from the Act as a whole*1
The terms "native law and custom", "native customary law",
and "customary law" appear to be used synonymously in Sierra Leone 
2
legislation* "Native law and custom" itself has never been de­
fined by any Ordinance or Act, but s*2 of the Local Courts Act, 
1963, defines "customary law" as meaning:-
"any rule, other than a rule of •general law*, 
having the force of law in any chiefdom of the 
Provinces whereby rights and correlative duties 
have been acquired or imposed which is appli­
cable in any particular case and conforms with 
natural justice and equity and not incompatible 
either directly or indirectly, with any enact­
ment applying to the Provinces, and includes 
any amendments of customary law made in accord­
ance with the provisions of any enactment*"
3
Power to other courts, presumably to general^law courts to apply
1* A statute must be read as a whole and a construction made of all 
the parts together. See C.E. Odgers, The Construction of Deeds 
and Statutes* London (5th ed.^, by G.Dworkin, 1967, p*237*
2. e.g. ss.ll and 39 of the Courts OrdinanQe. i%6(now repealed). The 
terms axe used as such in the legislation of other West African 
Common Law Countries, e*g* Nigeria* See L.C.B. Gower, 'Niger­
ian Statutes and Customary Law' in The Nigerian Law Journal. 
Vol.l, No*l, November, 1964, p*73, note 3; A.E.W. Park, The 
Sources of Nigerian Law, London, 1963, p*2, footnote 2.
3* In Brima Kormor v. Nicholas Coosah and Asinu K* Lamin (1960-1),
1 S.L.L.R. p.66, Cole J* sitting in the^a^e*»cCourt, applied 
"native law and custom" in a case where both parties were nat­
ives* The plaintiff, an illiterate, owned a building in Kaila- 
hun in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone* Some time in 
1952, the chiefdom people of Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun, decided 
to give ParamountChief Ngobeh a house which was then occupied by 
the second defendant* Consequently, the second defendant was 
asked to leave the house. The plaintiff agreed to allow the 
second defendant to occjxpy.'Use building rent-free. Two months 
after the second defendant took possession, the plaintiff was 
asked by the Paramount Chief, in the presence of the second de­
fendant, to sign a document which, as he was told, concerned 
with his allowing the second defendant to live in his house*
In fact, the document was a conveyance which purported to trans­
fer to the second defendant all the interests of the plaintiff
/Contd. on p*41.
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customary law is conferred by the Courts Act, 1965. After stat­
ing in s.74 the local statutory law and the residual law that is 
in force in Sierra Leone, s.76 provides:-
(1) "Nothing in this Act shall deprive any Court
when determining matters arising in the Pro­
vinces in its civil jurisdiction, of the 
right to observe and enforce the observance 
of, or shall deprive any person of the bene­
fit of any customary law existing in the Pro­
vinces and not being repugnant to natural jus­
tice*. equity and good conscience nor incompat­
ible either directly or by necessary implica­
tion with any Act applying to the Provinces."
(2) "Subject to sub-section 3 such customary law
shall, except where the circumstances, nature
or justice of the case shall otherwise require,
be deemed applicable in all cases and matters 
where it shall appear to the Court that sub­
stantial injustice would be done to any party 
by a strict adherence to the rules of any law 
other than customary law."
(3) "No party shall be entitled to claim the bene­
fit of any customary law if it shall appear 
either from the express contract, or from the 
nature of the transaction out of which any 
cause or matter may have arisen, that such 
party agreed that his obligations in connect­
ion with such transaction should be regulated 
exclusively by any law referred to in Section 
74 or any Act of Sierra Leone and in cases 
where no express rule is applicable to any 
matter in controversy, the Court shall be 
governed by the principles of justice, equity 
and good conscience."
Some significant points raised by s.76 will be discussed 
at their respective relevant places. For our present purpose, we 
must only draw attention to certain prerequisites which may be 
deduced from the statutes herein mentioned for the application of
Note 3. from p.40 - continued:
in the building. On the strength of the document, the second 
defendant entered into an agreement with the first defendant 
for the letting of the building. When the first defendant 
tried to evict the plaintiff from the building, the plaintiff 
brought am action for possession, damages and mesne profits.
The Court held, inter alia, that according to native law and 
custom which bound the parties, the document was invalid since 
the prior consent cf all the relatives of the plaintiff was not 
obtained before its execution.
customary law by a local court as well as by a general-law court. 
First, customary law must not be inconsistent with any enactment, 
local and, probably, adopted.
To begin with the first requirement, it would now seem 
that customary law must conform with any statutory provision re­
lating to the area of its operation. Thus, a customary law rule 
which lays down that a parent has the jus vitae necisque over his
child expressly contravenes the Offences against the Persons Act,
1 2 1861, and the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926, so
that if he maliciously wounds that child or if the child, being
under 16 years of age, is wilfully neglected by him in a manner
likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health,
that customary law rule will not apply. So would be the fate of
a customary law rule requiring a widow to be subject to "widow
inheritance" within the deceased husband* s family in the face of
an enactment to the effect that upon the death of a man who had
been a party to a customary marriage, his widow is free to remarry
3whomever she loves.
But it has not always been the rule that customary law 
must conform with every statutory e;nactment in force in Sierra 
Leone and which applies to the Provinces. Before 1961, the posi­
tion seemed to be that customary law should be compatible with 
only local enactments because prior to the Statute Law (Amendment)
4
Act, 1961, only Sierra Leone local legislation was referred to 
as "Ordinances", whilst English adopted statute law was alluded
1. This is the English Offences against the Persons Act, 1861, 
which applies in Sierra Leone as "adopted law" by virtue of 
s.74 of the Courts Act, Act No.31 of 1965. For the meaning 
of "adopted law", see ante. A*23
2. S.4 of Cap.31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960.
3. See the Sierra Leone Cabinet directive dated 27 April, 1964.
For details of this directive, see Chapters 15, 16 and 18.
4. Act No.48 of 196L;
to by the term "Act11 or "Statute"; and the repugnancy clause as 
it then was specifically mentioned "Ordinance" and not "Act" or 
"Statute".
Now, all the three pieces of legislation already mentioned 
refer to such "Ordinance" or "Act" or "Enactment" as "applies to 
the Provinces". The Statute Law (Amendment) Act, 1961, changed 
the titles of all Sierra Leone Ordinances to "Acts". This exW 
plains why the Courts Act, 1965, has "Act" in its repugnancy pro­
vision though the explanation for the use of the word "enactment" 
therein cannot derive from the Statute Law (Amendment) Act. What 
is true, at any rate, with the passage of the Interpretation Act, 
1961,* is that the words "Act", "Ordinance" and "Enactment" have 
come to mean the same thing, for s.3 defines an "Act" as includ­
ing
"... an Ordinance and any order, proclama­
tion, order in council, rule, regulation 
or bye-law duly made under the authority 
of an Act, Ordinance, Order of Her Majesty 
in Council or any other legislative enact­
ment applicable to and in force inSierra 
Leone ..." '
"... enactment includes legislation of any 
type whatsoever having the force of law in 
Sierra Leone ..."
From the plenitude and clarity of the Interpretation Acts,
we can safely conclude that customaxy law must now be consistent
with the local as well as adopted legislation pertaining to the 
2
Provinces.
Secondly, customary law must not contravene the prin­
ciples of natural justice, equity and good conscience.
1. Act No.46 of 1961. This Act was repealed by the Interpreta­
tion Act, 1965, which itself has been replaced by the Interpre­
tation Act, 1971. S.3 of the 1961 Act was the same as s.2 of
the 1965 Act and s.3 of the 1971 Act, except that the $971 Act 
has "Act" instead of "Ordinance" in its definition.
2. cf. L.C.B. Gower: "Nigerian Statutes and Customary Law" in
N iger ian Law J ournal, Vol.l, No.l, November, 1964, pp.73-92.
As regards the second prerequisite, one must exercise
caution in declaring a rule of customary law repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience,* merely because the prin­
ciples it stands for are foreign to another legal system. Ques­
tions of incompatibility should not be decided without reference 
to the religious, social and cultural background of the community 
in which the law is intended to:operate. This does not, of
course, mean that the rule must be accepted as compatible solely
2because it is agreeable to the persons for whom it is intended.
To be unacceptable, the rule must actually offend against the con­
ventional principles of morality of mankind in general. The 
point is made vigorously by Allen, who commenting on the applica­
tion of customary law in the then British Colonies, had this to 
3say:
M... It is clear that when a dominant people 
is dealing with the customs of a different 
civilization and of different religions the 
test of reasonableness, morality and public 
policy must be looked at from an angle some­
what different from that which would be 
appropriate in the conditions of English 
society. In general, British administra­
tion has endeavoured to leave indigenous 
customs intact, however alien they may be 
to Western and Christian notions; but where 
they axe considered to violate elementary 
considerations of humanity and decency, 
they are either rejected by the Coufts or, 
more frequently, suppressed by legislation.11
4Thus, a custom that permits a mem to practice sororal polygamy
1. For a good definition of "natural justice, equity and good con­
science”, see A.N. Allott: Essays in African Law, pp.197-199;
and New Essays in ^ African Law t pp.158-164.
2. See Park, op;cit., p.70.
3. Law in the Making; 7th ed., 1964, p.158.
4. i.e. One man marrying two or more sisters. This custom tradi£
tionally persisted among the Kono and Kissi in Sierra Leone 
and it is still in vogue among these tribes in some chiefdoms.
or a woman to indulge in adelphic polyandry 1 is not inconsistent
with this branch of the repugnancy clause even though these insti­
tutions may be viewed with the utmost abhorrence by British stan­
dards of morality* But one that permits a man to obtain a 
divorce on the grounds of his wife’s persistent adultery and thus, 
entitle him to the teturn of the marriage consideration which he 
paid for her without giving the wife an opportunity to refute the
allegation made against her would clearly, in our submission, run
2
counter to the repugnancy clause and will not be upheld*
We have not been able to come across any Sierra Leone 
Court decision holding a rule of customary law to be caught by 
the repugnancy provision* It would appear that it is the 
legislature that has been active in giving a verdict on this
1. i.e* One woman concurrently marrying two or more brothers.
This custom does not exist in Sierra Leone but was, in olden 
times, common in certain tribal societies like among the Nayars 
in India* See Radcliffe-Brown: African Systems of Kinship 
and Marriage* p*75.
2* There is no known Sierra Leone Court decision to support this 
statement, but the principle of natural Justice which it con­
veys is one known even to traditional societies*
3. But see Shakeen v. Duralia, (1912-24) S.L. Law Reports, where 
a native custom to the effect that a person who lets a canoe 
to another,can place goods and passengers of his own in it in 
the presence of an agreement for exclusive possession which 
showed clearly that a custom to the contrary could not be in­
voked. See also Regina vi Members of Kholifa Chiefdom Native 
Court (1962) 2 S.L.L.R., p*3. In this case, the applicant 
was convicted by a local court for convening a secret meeting 
without the consent and knowledge of the Paramount Chief con­
trary to customary law. In the course of the proceedings, 
one of the court members had become ill and had been replaced 
by another without the trial beginning de novo* The applicant 
applied to the then Supreme Court to set aside the proceedings 
in the local court on the grounds that they were abortive,void 
and a nullity and contrary to the principles of natural Justice^ 
The Supreme Court, Benka-Coker, C.J. upheld the application on 
the ground that the triad, was a nullity but remained silent on 
the issue as to whether or not the principles of natural Just­
ice were contravened.
matter* The legislature has done so in the fields of customary 
court procedure and customary criminal law, but there has been 
very little activity in the sphere of substantive customary family 
law. This caution, if one may call it so, may be a reflection 
of the desire to see customary family law develop side by side with 
the general law*
Thirdly, customary law must be current customary law.
This prerequisite is satisfied if a rule of customary law which 
has become obsolete or one that is no longer regarded as having 
the force of law in the local community is excluded* A rule be­
comes obsolete when the majority of the people among whom it oper­
ates cease to have regard for its existence and prefer a more 
modern version of it in the regulation of their relationships*
A classic example is the rule which was traditionally in vogue 
among the Mende that a man of means who intended to marry a woman 
must give as part of the marriage consideration * (tolei) a gbali 
(sing.) or gbalisia - (pi*) (native-woven cloth) to the woman’s 
parents* As will be seen in Chapter 16, in modern Mende-land, 
a money payment has now superseded the gbali*
Current customary law may be one that has subsisted 
throughout the ages, or one which now exists in a modified form. 
There are at least three agents of modification: (a) the people
themselves through changes in usage; (b) the District Councils
o
as provided in the District Council Act, and (c) the central
1. For the definition of a marriage consideration inconnection with
a customary law marriage, see Chapter 16, at pp. S‘&i~S'&3
2. S.40 of the District Council Act (cap.79 of the revised Laws of
Sierra Leone, 1960) provides: ,*... it shall be lawful t&c a
District Council, with the approval of the Governor in Council, 
to make rules altering or modifying native customary law in the 
district, and all native courts in the said district shall take
,cognisance of all rules so made*”
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1 2 legislature, Agents (b) and (c) are the best methods for
unification, but if used with indiscretion they may produce a
"customary law" which does not depict the customs and traditions
of the people concerned.
Though, as we have seen, customary law applies in Sierra 
Leone, it is not easily ascertainable. There are no properly- 
kept records of local court decisions, very few, if any at all, 
reported decisions of superior courts and a dearth of legal writ­
ing on the law. In the absence of these, the evidential reposi­
tory is the "breasts" of the local court judges and of the elders, 
whose interpretation of the law at times varies in accordance with 
the mood in which the enquirer finds them.
1. See the definition of "customary law" in s.2 of the Local Courts 
Act, 1963, which states that customary laff "... includes any 
amendment of customary law made in accordance with the provision 
of any enactment." e.g. s.6 of the Protectorate Act,caf*(oO 
provides "the legal status of slavery and slavery in any form 
whatever is abolished throughout the Protectorate." This sec­
tion amends a prior customary law which gave right to a slave­
owner in the Protectorate to recapture his run-away slaves.
See R. v. Salla Silla and R. v. M'Fa Nonko and others (unreport­
ed) decided by the Supreme“"Court in Freetown in i.9%7 in which 
such a right was successfully upheld.
2. It is better to regard modification by these two agents as "en­
acted" customary law.
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CHAPTER 3 
CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. NOMENCLATURE AND DEFINITION
(i) External Conflict of Laws
The judicial and legal systems of countries are not uni­
form in every respect. Consequently, problems of conflict of 
laws arise from time to time whenever an issue before the Courts 
of one country contains a foreign element. It is then the function 
of the Courts to ascertain which of several potentially applicable 
legal systems should be chosen in order to resolve the issue; 
for this purpose, a body of rules have been formulated by every 
country.
Several terms have been used by writers to describe this 
body of rules voluntarily chosen by a given country as part of its 
municipal law for the decision of cases which have a foreign com­
plexion. The commonest of these terms are "Comity1* "Extra-
o q
territorial Recognition of Rights'*, "Intermunicipal Law",
..........................4 ........................ c .........
"Private International Law", and "The Conflict of Laws". None 
of these names commands universal approval, and Cheshire has shown 
one flaw or another in the use of some of these terms; for example, 
he says that the expression "Private International Law" has the
1. Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Lawj Private 
International Law or Comity, Vol.IV. (3rd ed.). 18&9.
2. Holland, Jurisprudence, 13th ed., 1924, p.424.
3. F. Harrison, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1919, p.130.
4. J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. 8th ed. by G. 
Melville Bigelow, 188^; Cheshire, Private International Law,
8th ed., 1970.
5. Story, op;cit.; Dicey and Morris, A Digest of the Laws of 
England with reference to the Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., 1967; 
Graveson.Tbe Conflict of Laws, 6th ed., 1969.
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tendency to be confused with "Public International Law".* Jean- 
o
Gabriel Castel has miserably attempted to minimize the confusion 
by defining "Private International Law" as "the rules which apply 
to cases arising between private persons (or state) engaged in 
private transactions with contact with two or more legal units",
sind "Public International Law" as "the rules which deal with the
activities of states and not private persons." This attempt, to 
say the least, creates as much confusion as it tends to avoid, for 
in the modern conception of Public International Law, private per­
sons can be the subjects of that law - a typical example being 
found in the doctrine of acquired rights.
"The fact is that", as Cheshire rightly says,
"no title can be found that is accurate and 
comprehensive, and that the two titles ’Pri­
vate International Law’ and*The Conflict of
Laws' sire so well known to, and understood
by lawyers that no possible harm can ensue 
from the adoption of either of them.”^
But, although he concedes that the two terms can conven­
iently be used interchangeably, Cheshire prefers "The Conflict of 
Laws" because as he maintains, "it is a little unrealistic to 
speak in terms of private international law if the facts of the 
case are concerned with England and some other country under the 
British flag."4
We shall, for our discussion which follows, adopt Cheshire’s 
preference with an additional prefix to it, i.e. "External". The 
reason is that in a country like Sierra Leone, as in many other 
African countries, the legal system is pluralistic and other pro­
blems of conflict arise within it which have nothing to do with the
1. Cheshire, Private International Law, 8th ed., 1970, p.14.
2. Cases on the Conflict of Law (Toronto), 1960, p.l.
3. op.cit., p.15.
4. Ibid.. p.5.
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laws of foreign countries. We shall, therefore, use the term 
"External Conflict of Laws" to describe the body of rules volun­
tarily chosen by Sierra Leone for the decision of cases which 
have a foreign complexion.
(ii) Internal Conflict of Laws
We have already indicated that Sierra Leone has a plural­
istic system of municipal law. This system has three different 
laws - the general law, Islamic law, and customary law - which are 
not geographically separated and which co-exist in the country. 
Allott has ingeniously devised the term "Internal Conflict of 
Laws" to describe conflicts between such laws.'*' In his view, the 
term refers to cases,
"where a judge is required to choose between 
two or more systems or bodies of law which are 
not territorially distinct, i.e. which apply 
concurrently and without spatial separation. 
within a single territorial jurisdiction."
Farran has suggested the expressions "co-operation of
laws" and "Cohabitation of laws" as descriptions of the same con­
cept. He deplores the use of the term "conflict of laws" within 
the Sudanese society, whose system of law is as pluralistic as 
that of Sierra Leone, because "How can the Sudan ever achieve
unity - by no means yet established - ", he asked, "if even her
4
laws are in perpetual conflict with one another."
5
Allott has ably exposed the fallacious nature of Farran* s 
argument. "The use of the term * conflict of law* does not imply 
that the affected systems are in perpetual conflict", he commented. 
He rightly concluded that "the conflict, and the conflict situation,
1. New Essays in African Law. p.112.
2. Ibid., p.112.
3. Matrimonial Laws of the Sudan, London, 1963, p.vii.
4. Ibid.
5. New Essays in African Law, p.112.
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are analogous to those which occur in Private International Law, 
and the term is therefore, apt.3. We shall, therefore, with 
justification, use the term as suggested by Allott in our treatment 
of choice of law and choice of courts in matters arising within 
the Sierra Leone legal system.
B. EXTERNAL CONFLICT OF LAWS
Sierra Leone* s rules of external conflict of laws are 
derived mainly fromthe received English law and to a very little 
extent, from local legislation. They deal with three questions,
namely (i) the choice of law; (ii) the choice of courts, and
(iii) recognition and enforcement of foreign marriages, judgments 
and decrees of divorce and nullity.
(i) The choice of law
The rules for the choice of law indicate the particular 
legal system - Sierra Leone or foreign - by reference to which a 
solution of the dispute must be arrived at. The basic determinant 
for the selection of the lex causae« i.e. the legal system that 
governs the matter, is what has been described as the connecting 
factor, i.e. **some outstanding fact which establishes a natural 
connection between the factual situation before the court and a 
particular legal system.11 This factor is, however, not static 
but varies with the circumstances. In matters connected with 
the family, Sierra Leone law owes a heavy debt to the English com­
mon law but in other matters, especially commerce, the country is a 
party to international bilateral and multilateral conventions.
1. Ibid,
2. Cheshire, op.cit., pp.40-41. There is a vast literature on 
this point, and we can here state only some of the important 
ones. See J.D. Falconbridge,(l937j 53 L.Q.R. 235, 236; A.H. 
Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 1940, p.92; 
A. Nussbaum, 1940, 40 Columbia Law Review, 1937, 1461, 1464.
3. Cheshire, op.cit.. p.41.
(ii) The choice of courts
Generally speaking, the Sierra Leone courts are open to 
foreigners, except that an alien cannot be a plaintiff before them. 
An action may lie against a defendant even when he is not person­
ally present in the country, but leave of the High Court must be 
obtained for service of the writ upon him outside the jurisdiction 
of the Court^ Foreign sovereigns, ambassadors and representa­
tives of certain international organisations, for example, the 
United Nations and its specialised Agencies, and the Organisation
of African Unity, are immune from the jurisdiction of the Sierra 
2Leone Courts.
Specifically, the courts have no jurisdiction in certain
proceedings affecting status for instance, a petition for divorce
or nullity, unless the petitioner is domiciled or resident in the 
3
country.
( iii.) Recognition and enforcement of foreign marriage, judg­
ments and decrees
(a) Recognition of foreign marriages
Prior to the passing of the United Kingdom Matrimonial 
Proceedings (Polygamous Marriage) Act, 1972, the attitude of the 
English Courts towards foreign marriages which were potentially
4
polygamous has been neatly summarised by Judge Grant in two 
basic propositions. The first is that neither party to the mar­
riage was entitled to any English matrimonial relief, so that they 
could not in the English Courts successfully bring against one
1. See Ord. VIII of the Supreme (sic.) (High) Court Rules, Vol.VI, 
of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. This 15 ?by bilateral and multilateral treaties to which Sierra 
Leone is a party.
3. See the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961, Act No.16 of 
1961, and the discussion on jurisdiction in divorce and nullity 
which follows in Chapter/j, ^  3t3'3fy.
4. Family Law. London, 1970, p.48.
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another matrimonial proceedings of any kind, including a claim 
for maintenance. Secondly, that a marriage which was valid by 
each party* s personal law and by the lex loci celebrationis was 
generally recognised as valid, by English law except for the pur­
pose of matrimonial relief.
The first of these propositions was derived from the judg­
ment of Lord Penzance in a case, which has been misunderstood by
1 2 many writers, namely, Hyde v. Hyde. In that case, an English­
man petitioned for divorce on the ground of adultery and bigamy.
He had embraced the Mormon faith and married a Mormon lady in Utah 
in the United States of America, according to the Mormon rites. 
After three years* cohabitation with his wife, he renounced his 
faith and became a minister of a chapel at Derby in England. He 
then petitioned for a decree of divorce in England after his wife 
had contracted another marriage in Utah. His Lordship refused 
the decree on the ground that the matrimonial laws of Ezlgland were 
adapted to monogamous marriage, and were wholly inapplicable to a 
polygamous marriage which his Lordship thought the Mormon marriage 
to be.^
.................................................... 4
The rule in Hyde v. Hyde has now been abolished in England j
but it still remains as part of Sierra Leone law as the received
common law. It is, however, not applicable to all Sierra Leone
courts. As will be seen later, it applies to matrimonial causes
5
before the Magistrates* Court and the High Court.
1. For more discussion on this, see later in this chapter.
2. (1866), L.R.J.P. & D. 130.
3. Batholomew (1964), 13 I.C.L.Q. 1022, 1031-1033 argues that 
though polygamy was part of the Mormon doctrine in the American 
Courts, a Mormon marriage was regarded by the law of Utah as 
monogamous•
4. The Matrimonial Proas/edings (Polygamous Marriages) Act, 1972, 
impliedly abolishes the rule by providing in its s.l that Eng­
lish Courts shall not be precluded from granting matrimonial 
relief because the marriage is a potentially polygamous one.
5. The Mattimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the revised Laws of 
Sierra Leone, 1960.
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The second proposition may be illustrated by the case of 
Baindail v. Baindail * which was the first clearly to admit that
a polygamous husband had the status of a married man in English 
law, which precluded him fxrni entering into a monogamous marriage 
in England. In that case, a Hindu man, while domiciled in India, 
married a Hindu woman, such marriage being potentially polygamous. 
During the subsistence of this marriage, he later went through an 
English marriage ceremony at a London Registry Office with an En­
glish woman. In a petition for nullity by the English woman 
when she discovered that her alleged husband already had a wife in 
India, the Court annulled the English marriage as being bigamous. 
The decision was a recognition that the polygamous marriage in 
India was a marriage in England though not for all purposes.
Lord Green, M.R. stressed that since the status of a per­
son depended upon his personal law, the status of husband and wife
conferred upon the parties to a polygamous marriage by the law of 
their domicile must be accepted and acted upon by other countries. 
One result of recognition of the status in England was the inabi­
lity of one spouse to contract a subsequent monogamous marriage 
with a third party during the subsistence of the potentially poly­
gamous marriage.
The rule in Baindail v. Baindail could not, in our con­
tention, have applied in its entirety to Sierra Leone before 1965. 
Before that date, under the Christian and Civil Marriage Acts, it 
was possible for a spouse of a subsisting customary law marriage
- which is polygamous - to contract a monogamous marriage with a
2
third party; the second marriage was valid and not bigamous.
It was not the policy of the courts to distinguish between a
1. [1946] P.122; [L946 ] 1 All E.R. 342.
2. For more discussion on this, see Chapter 6.
customary marriage contracted in Sierra Leone and one entered into 
elsewhere. Therefore, the spouse of a polygamous marriage con­
tracted outside Sierra Leone could enter into a monogamous marriage 
with a third party which could be recognised as valid by the Sierra 
Leone courts.
Since s.l of the Christian Marriage (Amendment) (No.2) Act, 
1965,* the position would now seem to be on the same basis as the
rule in Baindail v. Baindail, insofar as contracting a monogamous
marriage during the subsistence of a polygamous marriage is con­
cerned. But fdr the converse situation, whereby a party already 
monogamously married contracts a polygamous marriage, we concede 
that in Sierra Leone the subsequent marriage is recognised as 
valid by the customary law courts, though not by the general law 
courts. It is our submission that such a marriage taking place 
outside Sierra Leone ought to be recognised by the customary law 
courts in,Sierra Leone, though not by the general law courts.
Before a foreign marriage may be recognised in Sierra
Leone, the received English common law rule is that it must comply 
with the lex loci celebrationis Thus, it must conform with the
formalities as imposed by that law. As an exception to this rule, 
certain marriages, generally called "consular marriages", which 
take place in legations or High Commissions outside Sierra Leone, 
require special mention. Many of these do not generally conform 
with the lexloci celebrationis which may be fatal to their recog**
nition. For such marriages entered into by . Sierra Leone citi-
4
zenS abroad, the Foreign Marriage (Recognition) Act, 1966, provides
1. Act No.48 of 1965.
2. For more argument on this, see Chapter 16.
3* Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1752), 2 Hag. Con.395; Dalrymple v. 
Dalrympie (1811), 2 Hag. Con.54; Warrender v. Warrendier (1835), 
£ Cl. & Fin. 488 , 530; Harvey v. Farnie 7T882) A App. Cas. 43, 
50; Kenward v. Kenward, [l951 ]P .1^4; [ 1950] 2 All E.R. 297.
4. Act No.29 of 1966.
a remedy. S.2 of that Act says that,
“All marriages between parties, one of whom 
at least is a citizen of Sierra Leone solemn­
ized in accordance with the provisions of 
the United Kingdom Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, 
in any foreign country or place by or before 
a marriage officer as defined in section 11 
of that Act shall be as valid as if the same 
had been performed in Sierra Leone in accord­
ance with the provisions of the Civil Marriage 
Act.”
The persons who may be appointed marriage officers under 
s.ll of the United Kingdom Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, include 
Ambassadors, Governors, High Commissioners and Consuls
The Sierra Leone Foreign Marriage (Recognition) Act, 1966,
is the only statute in Sierra Leone which recognises “consular mar- 
2
riages” abroad. The only other enactment on a somewhat similar
3
issue is the Foreign Marriage Act; but this Act is for the bene­
fit in England of British subjects who contract such marriages in 
Sierra Leone.
What then is the legal status in Sierra Leone of “consular 
marriages” entered into abroad or in Sierra Leone by parties both 
of whom are non-Sierra Leone citizens and which do not comply with 
the lex loci celebrationis? Our contention is that under the 
present law, such a marriage is subject to the common law rule of 
locus regit actum and if it does not comply with the lex loci cele­
brationis, it is void. Because of international comity, however, 
it is desirable that such marriages should be accepted as valid by 
the states concerned and this can conveniently be done on the basis 
of reciprocity.
1. Other members of the diplomatic staff are excluded. The United 
Kingdom Marriage Order, 1964, S.l. 1964 No.926, art.19, which 
includes such staff is of no application to Sierra Leone.
2. It appears from the Act that a Sierra Leone citizen cannot con­
tract such marriages in Sierra Leone which^cognizable without 
compliance with the formalities of Sierra Leone Law.
3. Cap.98 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
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(b) Recognition of foreign judgments
Under the Maintenance Order (Facilities for Enforcement)
Act as amended,1 the President is empowered, if satisfied that 
reciprocal provisions have been made by the Legislature of any 
territory within the British Commonwealth for the enforcement with* 
in such territory of Maintenance Orders made by courts in Sierra 
Leone, by proclamation to extend the provisions of the Act to such 
territory. The Act provides for the registration and enforce­
ment of Maintenance Orders made by the courts in such territories. 
This rule of reciprocity formally enacted for Maintenance Orders 
is erroneously applied in practice to other foreign judgments.
The law pertaining to the enforcement of foreign judgments
is not, therefore, clear and we must resort to the relevant English
law on the issue which is applicable to Sierra Leone under the
reception statute.
Originally, under the common law, the recognition of
2foreign judgments was based on comity. Later, the doctrine of 
obligation was evolved whereby it was considered a legal obliga­
tion on a judgment debtor to satisfy a judgment of a foreign court 
which could be enforced in England by action.
"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction", 
Blackburn J. postulated, "imposes a duty or obligation on him to 
pay the sum for which judgment is given, which the courts in this
4
country axe bound to enforce."
Following up judicial opinion, the United Kingdom
1. Cap.101 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960; as amended 
by the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcements)(Amend­
ment) Act, 1957; Act No.10 of 1957.
2. See F. Piggott, Foreign Judgments and Parties out of Jurisdict­
ion, (3rd ed.), 1£o&-10, Part I, pp.10 et seq.
3. Russell v. Srnyth (1842), 9 M & W. 810, at p.919, per Paxke, B.
4. Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 at p.159.
Parliament in 1868 gave a legislative sanction to the doctrine and 
made its application easy for countries within Britain and Ireland 
by passing the Judgment Extension Act. The: Act rendered judg­
ments obtained in the Superior Courts of one part in the United 
Kingdom effectual in any other part of the country without the 
judgment creditor having to bring a fresh action for its enforce­
ment. This Act falls within Sierra Leone's reception date of
English law, as it was a statute of general application in force 
in England. But how effectually can it be used by Sierra Leone 
vis-a-vis the countries therein named is doubtful.1
To sum up, therefore, the clearest conflict of law rule 
for recognition of foreign judgment in Sierra Leone is the common 
law doctrine of obligation. In modern times, however, when many 
sovereign states have emerged since the rule was formulated, and 
which are iealous of their acquired status, it is our contention 
that this rule is of very little practical effect in Sierra Leone.
A more rational and practical rule, therefore, is one based on 
comity and reciprocity.
(c) The recognition of foreign decrees
Sierra Leone law is not very clear on the question of 
recognition pf foreign decrees. For a better understanding of 
the Sierre Leone position, therefore, we should first refer to the 
relevant English law on the matter which may apply to Sierra Leone 
as received law in the absence of local statutory or case-law or 
by way of guidance.
The recognition of foreign decrees had its foundation in 
the common law rule that the propositus must be domi"cLled in the
1. Because the nature of the Statutes tends to be localised, al­
though it was of general application in England. An Order in 
Council extending its provisions to the British Colonies or Pro­
tectorates would, in our submission, enhance the possibility of 
its being used outside England.
country in which the decree was obtained.*" This rule has given
2rise to what has been described as a "limping marriage", i.e. a 
marriage regarded as valid in one country but void in another, 
since not every legal system in the world recognises the domicile 
concept as the jurisdictional basis for divorce or nullity.
A later improvement on the common law position came in 
1953, when the English Court of Appeal modified the domicile con­
cept in respect of foreign jurisdictions and held that, on the 
basis of reciprocity, an English court would recognise a decree 
pronounced by a foreign court, if that court assumed jurisdiction
on the same basis that an English court would assume jurisdiction
3
on the matter. In Travers v. Holley, a husband and wife who were 
domiciled in England emigrated to Australia and purported to ac­
quire a domicile in New South Wales. The husband, however, re­
turned to England and reverted to his domicile, while the wife re­
mained in Australia and there petitioned for divorce on the ground 
of his desertion, and the decree was granted. The English Court j 
of Appeal recognised the decree even though it was not granted by 
the court of the common domicile of the parties. The justifica­
tion for recognising the decree, however, was that the law of 
Australia had a provision similar to s.18(1)(a) of the English 1
4
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950.
Since this decision, the rule has been extended and the 
English Court has recognised a decree of a foreign court where 
facts existed which would have given am English Court jurisdiction
1. A fuller discussion of domicile follows shortly in this chap­
ter. For domicile as the basis of divorce or nullity, see 
Chapter 11, p.383.
2. This expression has been used by a number of writers. For ex­
ample, see Cheshire, op.cit., p.357; Bromley, Family Law (4th 
ed.), London, 1971, p.18; Grant, Family Law, London, 1970,
p. 126.
3. f 1953] P.246; f 1953*] 2 All E.R. 794. The principle in this 
case was approved by the House of Lords in Brown v. Brown, 
[1968] 2 All E.R. 11.
4. Now s.40(lY(a^ of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965.___________
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although the grounds on which the foreign court granted a decree
1
would not be recognised by English law.
In a recent decision of the English House of Lords,
2
Indyka v. Indyka, the rule in Travers v. Holley was not only furth­
er extended but also stretched even to a breaking point. The 
facts were as follows:- In 1938, Indyka, a national of Czechoslo­
vakia married a Czech wife in their country. When the Seoond 
World War broke out, he left his country and went to England where 
he acquired a domicile of choice. His wife refused to join him, 
and in 1949 she obtained a decree of divorce in her country. Ten 
years later, Indyka remarried in England which was not successful* 
The second wife instituted proceedings for divorce in England on 
the ground of cruelty. In his defence, Indyke contended, inter 
alia* that the divorce granted to his first wife in Czechoslovakia 
was invalid, which rendered his second marriage void* The House 
of Lords recognised the Czech decree and declared his second mar­
riage valid on grounds which we may summarise in the following 
propositions:
First, an English court would recognise a foreign decree 
wherever a real and substantial connection is shown between the 
petitioner and the country or territory which granted the decree. 
The first Mrs* Indyka was born in Czechoslovakia and had always 
been domiciled there before the decree was obtained, and she was, 
therefore, really and substantially connected with that country* 
Secondly, an English court would recognise a foreign 
decree based on a jurisdiction which the English court itself did
not have at the time the decree was pronounced, but which it
1* Robinson-Scott v* Robinson-Scott [l958 ]P*71; EL957 ]3 All E.R.
47T.
2. [ 1969 ] 1 A.C.33*
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eventually has at the time when the recognition of that decree is
an issue before the English court* Thus in 1949, when Mrs.
Indyka obtained the Czech decree, the English court did not have
jurisdiction to gtant a divorce on a basis other than the domicile
of the petitioner and the wife was not domiciled in Czechoslovakia
at that time, since her husband was already domiciled in England.*
But at the time that the recognition of the Czech decree was an
issue before the English Court, that court was capable of exercis-
o
ing a divorce jurisdiction on the basis of residence*
By reaching the second proposition, it is submitted, the 
majority of the House of Lords did not appreciate the difficulties 
that would ensue if there is some other matrimonial act or proceed­
ing or one of the spouses dies intestate between the date of the 
foreign decree and the date of the English legislation as to the 
basis of jurisdiction* These difficulties were pointed outby 
Russell L.J. in his dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal:
**If the suggested effect be given to the
statute, what would be the effect on a pre-
1949 second marriage in England?*1
He rhetorically asked:
Presumably**, he continued, **it would vali<- 
date the hitherto invalid marriage in Eng­
land? But this**, he rightly conceded,
**seems an untenable posit ion«**3
His Lordship went on to further expose the unrealistic
nature of the proposition by posing the following questions:
**Suppose a relevant pre-1949 decree of 
divorce and a pre-1949 death of the hus­
band intestate with estate in England, 
not having attempted marriage* The wife 
would in English law have rights to his 
estate accruing on his death as being his 
widow* Would the coming into operation
1* Under English law, the domicile of a married woman is that of 
her husband* On this, see later in this chapter, pp*68-&?
2. Jurisdiction was conferred by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Pro­
visions) Act, 1949, now s*40(l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Actj 
1965.
3. [l967] P.233 at p.263*
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of the Act of 1949 deprive her of her 
rights? And, if so, would such depri- - 
vat ion be limited to undistributed assets?11
The problems posited by Lord Russell are indeed real and 
it is our contention that a retroactive effect should not be given 
to a statute which confers jurisdiction on the Courts in these 
circumstances unless that statute is specifically ante-dated.
To what extent are English decisions since Travers v. 
Holley on the recognition of foreign decrees based on grounds oth-| 
er than domicile are applicable to Sierra Leone as received com­
mon law is a question which we must now examine. Clearly, these 
decisions are based on statutory developments in England and are 
not, therefore, the adopted English common law, as is understood 
under s.74 of the Sierra Leone Courts Act, 1965. But we may point 
out that there is legislation in Sierra Leone on the issue of 
jurisdiction based on residence couched in substantially the same 
language as s.40(l)(b) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act,1965,
3
i.e. s.5 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961.
Would the Sierra Leone courts be guided by the English de­
cisions on the issue as is their wont when faced with the interpre­
tation of local statutes couched in the same terms as British sta­
tutes? The English decisions based on recognition of foreign de­
crees from Travers v. Holley to Indyka v. Indyka axe not stricto 
sensu interpretations of English statutes, but are rules evolved 
by the courts themselves in order to determine questions of exter­
nal conflict of law, and there would be j’ustif icatdon in applying 
them to Sierra Leone if they are suitable. We have pointed out tie 
unsatisfactory natufe of the decision in Indyka1s case as a whole,! 
but the reciprocity doctrine,introduced by Travers v.Holley.which
1. Ibid.
2. The rules in Travers v. Holley and Indyka v. Indyka have been 
abolished in the United Kingdom, wath retrospective date, by 
The Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act,1971.
See, in particular, ss.2 and 10(4) of the Act.
3. Act No.16 of 1961.
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it did not abrogate is one which Sierra Leone Courts ought to adopt. 
Recognition of decrees on the basis of reciprocity is the only 
feasible and practical solution in an age when countries demand
that their sovereignty - and thus, the decisions of their courts -
LatU-t
must be recognised by other countries if the; A want theirs to be 
recognised too. The universal adoption of such a rule will re­
move the possibility of "limping marriages"• In this regard, the 
law of one state vis-a-vis another can be reduced to the simple pro­
position: "If the courts of your country recognise the decrees of
the courts of my country, our courts will do the same in respect of 
decrees of your own courts." In such a case, strict municipal 
legal rules will be mellowed in order to meet the realities of 
international intercourse* In the case of concurrent assumption 
of jurisdiction by the courts of two different states on the same 
issue, the rule that ought to apply is that the first decree should 
prevail. Consequently, if State A and State B are adjudicating 
a divorce proceeding between the same parties, the first decree 
ought automatically to discontinue proceedings in the other State, 
and this other State ought to recognise that decree. In no other 
manner can sanity be invoked in order to resolve such a complex 
problem of conflict of laws. In some cases, of course, injustice 
may result to individuals, but this is compensated by the complex 
conflict of law situation which is avoided.*
For non-self'-governing territories, the problem may not be 
so acute because for many purposes the law of the governing state 
is the law of the dependent states. But as these countries attain
1. Cff .Cotton L.J. in Sottomayor v. De Barros (1877) 3 P.D.J at p.7, 
where his Lordship said: ^Nocountry is bound to recognise the 
laws of a foreign state when they work i'njxtstice to its own sub­
jects." This statement is true as far as it goes, but because 
of international intercourse, states may recognise the laws of 
other states even though they are unfavourable to private indivi­
duals. This policy is present even at the municipal law level.
to sovereignty, any suggestion contrary to what the present 
writer has made would result in exacerbating the conflict of law 
problems. For example, the United Kingdom Colonial and Other 
Territories (Divorce Jurisdiction) Acts, 1926-1950 empowered the 
Courts of the Colonies and Protectorates to grant divorce to 
British subjects domiciled in England, if they were resident in 
the territory in which the divorce was sought, but only on the 
conditions that the grounds were those recognised by the existing 
law of England and that the decree was registered in England.*
This was an Imperial Statute applicable to all the British Colon­
ies and Protectorates*
On the attainment of Republican status, Sierra Leone has
2
by s .13(1) of the Constitution (Consequential Provisions) Act,1971,
decided that,
"On and after the 19th day of April, 1971, no 
Court having jurisdiction under the law of 
Sierra Leone shall by virtue of the Colonial 
and Other Territories (Divorce Jurisdiction)
Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament 1926- 
1950 have jurisdiction to make a decree under 
those Acts for the dissolution of a marriage 
or as incidental thereto to make an Order as 
to any matter unless proceedings for the de­
cree were instituted before the commencement 
of the Constitution*"
The effect of this section is that from 19 April, 1971, a 
Sierra Leone divorce court can, in the case of a British subject 
domiciled in England, grant a decree of divorce on any ground other
than those recognised in English law and there will be no need to
register such decree in England. Whatever may be the fate of 
such a decree in England is a matter for the decision of the Eng­
lish courts. Presumably, as with all other foreign decrees, the 
current English law will apply.
Our conclusion to this part of our discussion is that,even 
though the reception statute provides for the application of English
1. These Acts were originally intended for India, but were later 
extended to other British territories.
2. Act No.9 of 1971.
law to Sierra Leone as residual law, under certain circumstances, 
in the absence of definite rules made by the Sierra Leone legisla­
ture or the Courts themselves on the question of recognition of 
foreign decrees, it is difficult to state with precision what actu­
ally is the Sierra Leone law on the matter* The external conflict 
of law problem between Sierra Leone and England, created by the 
independence of the former and the absolute power vested in her 
to pass whatever law she thinks fit without recourse to, or ques­
tioning by, the British Parliament, is a novel situation which per­
haps was not anticipated when the English conflict of law rules 
were evolved. Our advice, therefore, is simple: f,Let Sierra
Leone reappraise the situation and ascertain her own private inter­
national law.”
(iv) Domicile *
Many matters of family relations and family property are 
in external conflict of laws governed by the lex domicilii of the 
propositus. These include the essential validity of a marriage, 
jurisdiction to grant a divorce or nullity decree, mutual rights 
and obligation of husband and wife, parent and child, legitimacy 
and legitimation, effect of marriage on property rights of husband 
and wife, the validity of wills of movable, and succession to mov­
ables.2
From this list, the importance of domicile can hardly be 
neglected in a discussion of family law.
We must point out from the outset that Sierra Leone*s 
rules of external conflict of laws on the issue of domicile axe 
substantially derived from the received English common law. How
1. Some writers spell this word "domicil1* and others "domicile**.
We shall adopt the latter.
2. Cheshire, op.cit.» p.153.
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How far such rules are of relevance to the Sierra Leone situation 
will be considered in this discussion.
Meaning of domicile
According to Sir George Jesse11, "The term domicile is im­
possible of definition."^ Despite this introductory discourag­
ing remark, the English Courts have stated that in order to acquire 
domicile in a country, it is necessary that a person establishes 
his residence and has the intention to remain there permanently or 
indefinitely. An intention of indefinite residence is, neverthe­
less, not equivalent to permanent residence, if it is contingent
upon an uncertain event. Lord Cranworth illustrated the differ-
2
ence in Moorhouse v. Lord when he said:
"The present intention of making a place a 
person* s permanent home exists only where 
he has no other idea than to continue there 
without looking forward to any event, cer­
tain or uncertain which might induce him to 
change his residence. If he has in his 
contemplation some event upon the happening 
of which his residence will cease, it is not 
correct to call this even a present intention 
of making it a permanent home. It is rather 
a present intention of making it a temporary 
home, though for a period indefinite and con­
tingent ."
The early English decisions attempted to discover the 
necessary intention to establish domicile by considering such 
factors as a person's "taste, habits, conduct, actions, ambitions,
3
health, hopes, projects ..." "There is no act, no circumstance
in a man's life, however trivial it may be in itself which ought to
4
be left out of consideration." In opposition to these state­
ments, Dicey and Morris have rightly commented that there is no
1. Doucet v. Geoghegan (1878), L.R.9 Cfo.D. 441 at p.456.
2. (1863) 10 H.L. Cas. 272 at pp.285-286.
3. Casdagli v. Casdagli [l919] A.C.145 at 178 per Lord Atkinson.
4. Drevon v. Drevon (1864) 34 L.J. Cii. 129, 133.
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circumstance or a group of circumstances which can furnish a 
definite criterion of the existence of the necessary intention*'*' 
These decisions are, therefore, arbitrary* However relevant 
these decisions might have been to the ages in which they were 
made, it is our contention that they are not in conformity with 
the facts of modern life* With increased world tension and mobi­
lity, one of the uncertainties of life is a man’s intention to re­
side permanently or indefinitely in a given place.
Modern English cases are, however, very much aware of the 
present world situation and are prepared to hold that a person who 
intends to reside in a country indefinitely might be domiciled
there, although he envisages the possibility of returning one day
2
to his domicile of origin.
Domicile of origin
The only means of ascertaining a person* s personal law is 
on the basis of his domicile. For this reason, everybody has a 
domicile when! he is born. This is known as the domicile of origin. 
In the English common law, a legitimate child takes the domicile
of his father, an illegitimate or posthumous child that of his
3 4mother, and a foundling where he is found*
Domicile of choice
An adult other than a married woman, may acquire a domi­
cile of choice. This is done if he leaves his domicile of origin
1. The Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., p.93.
2. In the Estate of Fuld (No .3)» [1968] P.675 at p.684. Scarman J* 
Henderson v. Henderson L 1967 ]P.77; [1965] 1 All ER. 179.
3. Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R.l Sc. & Div. 441 at p.457.
4. J. Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law, (7th ed.) 
by N. Bentwich (1925), s *248; F.Wharton, A Treatise on ~ the Con­
flict of Laws, (3rd ed.), by G. Parmele (1905), s.39; F.Savigny, 
A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, translated into English by
W.Guthrie, (1st ed.), 1&69, pp.8^-88.
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and takes up residence in another country with an intention of
living there permanently, all other things being equal.* There
must be a concurrence of factum and animus though there need not
2
be unity of time in their concurrence. Thus, a man domiciled 
in Ghana may come to Sierra Leone bn a holiday and noticing that 
there are better opportunities for him in Sierra Leone, ultimately
decides to live there permanently. The domicile of choice is
acquired not on his arrival but at the time that he forms the in­
tention to stay permanently.
The domicile of choice is lost when the propositus departs 
from the country which he had made his domicile of choice with a 
similar intention of not returningthere to make a permanent home.
As soon as this domicile is lost, his domicile of origin revives 
until he acquires a fresh domicile of choice.
Domicile of dependence
Either because of non-age, physical dependence on others, 
or for the lack of mental capacity, certain persons are deemed by 
the common law to be incapable of acquiring a domicile of choice. 
This category of persons includes married women, infants aid per­
sons of unsound mind. VJe shall deal with only the first two 
classes, as they are more relevant to our subject.
(a) Domicile of a married woman
Both the received English common law and Sierra Leone local 
legislation.deal with the matter, and we shall begin with the com-
q
mon law position. This ia accurately summarised by Graveson 
who says:
1. Cheshire, op.cit., p.162.
2. Ibid., p.162.
3. The Conflict of Laws. 6th ed., London, 1969, p.219.
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"On marriage a woman takes the domicile of 
her husband, and her domicile remains the 
same as his so long as the marriage lasts*
Any domicile of choice she may have at mar­
riage is lost and her domicile of origin 
ceases to operate* ... If the marriage is 
valid or voidable only, the husband*s domi-^ 
cile will attach automatically to the wife*
But if the marriage is a nullity, e*g* biga­
mous, the wife will retain her own domicile,
and by the fact of living with the husband 
in the country of his domicile, she may ac­
quire independently a similar domicile of 
choice to his*’*3
By way of supplementation we may add that a married woman
cannot acquire a domicile of choice where she is separated from
4 5her husband, either judicially or by agreement, or where die is
deserted by her husband who leaves the jurisdiction and acquires 
a domicile abroad.^
An example by way of illustration is as follows: Miss X
who was born in Jamaica but is now permanently living in England,
meets Mr* Y, domiciled in Sierra Leone, who is on a year*s course
in London and they get married* Upon the marriage, Miss X loses
her English domicile of choice and becomes domiciled in Sierra 
Leone even before setting her foot in that country, because Mr. Y 
is domiciled there despite his temporary residence in England*
If Mr. Y cannot consummate the marriage because he is impotent - a 
thing that renders the marriage voidable - Miss X still retains 
Mr. Y*s domicile until she obtains a decree annulling the marriage, 
when she will revert to her domicile of origin (Jamaica) or domi­
cile of choice (England) depending on which of the two countties 
she wishes to make her permanent home. If they go to Sierra Leone
1. Dfeflphin v*Robins (1859) 7 H.L.C. 390.
2. De Reneville v. De Reneville [l948]P.100.
3. White v. White [1937] P.111.
4. A-G for Alberta v. Cook [1926] A.C. 444 P.C.
5. Dolphin v. Robins (1859) 7 H.L.C. 390.
6. H. v. H. [192S] P.206.
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and Miss X discovers that, in fact, Mr. Y had married before and 
that marriage still subsists, her marriage to Mr. Y was void, and 
automatically her Sierra Leone domicile ceases and her domicile of 
origin (Jamaica) returns. If she wishes to live in Sierra Leone 
permanently, she acquires a domicile of choice quite independent 
of that of her ex-husband.
If the marriage is valid but a few months after arrival in 
Sierra Leone, the parties separate either by agreement or judici­
ally, she still retains her husband*s domicile and if Mr. Y goes 
to Ghana with the intention of permanent residence there, while 
Kiss X wishes to go back to England and live there, her domicile 
of choice is that of her husband which is Ghana and not England. 
Similarly, if the break in cohabitation was caused by desertion by 
Mr. Y and not by an agreement to separate or judicial separation, 
Miss X*s domicile is still in Ghana.
The above is an illustration of the common law position of 
a married woman's domicile. We may now examine the statutory in­
road that has been made on it.
S.5 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act * amending
s.30 of the principal Act, reads as follows:
"30(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in 
proceedings by a wife for divorce, notwith­
standing that the husband is not domiciled 
in Sierra Leone, if the wife is resident in 
Sierra Leone and has been ordinarily resi­
dent there for a period of three years imme­
diately preceding the commencement of the 
proceedings."
"30(2) Without prejudice to any jurisdiction 
exercisable by the Court apart from this sec­
tion, the provisions of the preceding sub­
section shall apply to proceedings for nullity 
of marriage as they apply to the proceedings 
for divorce."
1. Act No.16 of 1961.
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The effect of this provision is to enable a wife petitioner 
for divorce on any of the recognised grounds or for nullity of 
marriage to have as if it were a ’’temporary” domicile for the pur­
poses of the proceedings only if she has been resident in Sierra 
Leone for three years preceding the commencement of the proceed­
ings and the husband is not at the time of such proceedings domi­
ciled in the country. As jurisdiction of the Courts in such 
matters normally depends on the petitioner’s domicile, but for the 
statutory provisions, the High Court will not have jurisdiction in 
the case of a married woman who is a petitioner because her domi­
cile changes as frequently as her husband alters his domicile*
A criticism of this provision centres on the three years’ 
residential condition* It causes undue hardship to a wife peti­
tioner who is not a citizen of Sierra Leone, and who does not want 
to stay/ in the country but who has sufficient grounds for divorc­
ing her husband who having gone abroad with the intention of liv­
ing there permanently, has lost his Sierra Leone domicile* If, 
for example, her husband commits adultery a few weeks after their 
arrival in sierra Leone and he immediately elopes with the adulter­
ess to;*, say, Liberia, intending never to return, she is obliged to 
wait in Sierra Leone for the elapse of the statutory period before 
the High Court of this country cam hear her petition.
Curiously, according to the new s.30(3) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, the three years’ period must also elapse in the case 
of the wife whose husband has voluntarily changed his Sierra Leone 
domicile without deserting her, and who desires to petition the 
High Court for maintenance against him.^ This means that if she 
is not in employment or does not have the means of maintaining
1* S.5 of the Mattimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961, which 
introduces a new s.30(3) in the principal Act.
herself, she has to expose herself to the rigours of destitution 
until the statutory period expires. In a country like Stgrya* L&one. 
where there is no provision for national assistance from the state, 
one can hardly see the justice of this piece of legislation.
The three years1 period is omitted only where the husband 
is in desertion and is out of the country or has been deported or 
expelled from the country.in which case the wife can institute 
proceedings for divorce, nullity or maintenance without a resi­
dential qualification.* But even this is of benefit only to a 
wife who has grounds other than desertion. Where her only 
ground is desertion, this provision entitles her to an immediate 
remedy from the High Court for maintenance only. But if she 
wants to institute divorce proceedings, she will have to wait for 
three years which is also the period during which desertion must 
last before a divorce can be obtained therefor.
3
(b) Domicile of infants
In the absence of Sierra Leone statute and case law on
the domicile of a child, we may again resort to the English common
law, which is also the Sierra Leone law on the matter.
4
At common law, an infant who is legitimate and unmarried, 
possesses the domicile of his father as long as the father is
5
alive, and this domicile changes as frequently as the father
1. The new s.30(4) introduced by s.5 of the Matrimonial Causes 
(Amendment) Act, 1961.
2. This last hardship, of course, has nothing to do with domicile, 
but is one common to all petitioners for divorce, husbands and 
wives alike.
3. On this topic generally see: Halsbury*s Laws of England (3rd 
ed.), Vol.7, p.23.
4. In Sierra Leone, an infant is still a person under the age of 
21 years.
5. See the English case of Forbes v. Forbes (1854) Kay 341, 353 
per Wood V.C. Note that the other cases quoted herein on 
domicile are English cases.
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acquires a domicile of choice. But the child's domicile of origin
does not change; it continues to be the domicile of his father at
the time of the child1s birth.* However, when the father dies,
2
the domicile of the child becomes that of his mother during the
3
period of her widowhood. If she remaxries, the child's domicile 
is not automatically affected by her acquisition of the new hus- 
band's domicile, if different from her ante-nuptial domicile. 
Nevertheless, she can confer the domicile of the step-father on
the child by taking a positive step to that effect, but she must
« 5do so in good fcuth and in the interest of the child. Thus, she
can effect a change in the child's domicile by taking the child to 
live with her permanently in the country of her new domicile.
In the case of an infant illegitimate child, his domicile 
is that of his mother. It is as yet undecided whether this is 
affected by a subsequent maxriage of the mother. In our sub­
mission, if the marriage is to the child's father and the child
7
becomes legitimated, he acquires the domicile of his father; but 
if the marriage is to some other man, the same principle as in the 
case of a legitimate child applies.
An infant, legitimate or illegitimate, cannot by himself
1. Henderson v. Henderson tl967 ] P.77; &L965 ] 1 All E.R. 179.
2. This may be the child's domicile of origin if the mother has 
not changed her domicile since the child's birth or the mother's 
new domicile of choice if she has acquired a new domicile since 
the death of her husband.
3. Potinger v. Wightman (1817) 3 Mer. 67.
4. In re Beaumont [1893] 3 Ch.490.
5. Ibid., per Stirling J. at p.497.
6. Urquharfc v. Butterfield (1887) 37 Ch.D. 357 (A Portuguese woman 
domiciled in England at the time she had an illegitimate child; 
held, that child's domicile was England.)
7. Legitimation per subsequens matrimonium is possible in Sierra 
Leone under customary law only.
acquire a domicile of choice. The choice is always that of the 
person on whom he is dependent,*
We have so far been dealing with an infant who is un­
married, We shall now consider the case of a child that marries 
during infancy. Does the marriage have any effect on his or her 
inability to acquire a domicile of choice? The answer to this 
question depends on the sex of the infant. In the case of a 
male child, it is settled that he cannot acquire his own domicile 
of choice independently of the person on whom he depended for his 
domicile were he single, although he can choose his own residence. 
But a female infant, on marriage, loses the domicile of her par- 
ents and automatically acquires that of her husband,
A short critique of the law of dependent domicile
The concept of dependent domicile arose in England at a 
time when husband and wife were regarded as one person in law with 
the wife's legal existence incorporated into that of the husband. 
Thus, the wife's domicile became dependent on that of the husband. 
The consequence of this rule, as we have indicated, is that should 
the wife be deserted, she should normally follow the husband to his 
new domicile in order to be able to obtain a divorce. What hap­
pens if the grounds of divorce in the husband's new domicile are 
different from that of his former domicile? The inevitable re­
sult is that the wife goes without a remedy. This is just one of 
the many hardships which the doctrine wrqughts. Another example 
is that if the wife wants to make a will the deserted or separated 
wife has to comply with the lex domicilii of her husband. Upon 
this law also depends succession to her movable estate on her 
death intestate,
1. Forbes v, Forbes (1854) Kay, 341,
2. Harrison v, Harrison [ 1953]l W.L.R. 865.
3. See Graveson, op.cit., p.215.
Probably because of these hardships, which are tantamount 
to injustice, in some countries like Norway, Denmark and Russia, 
a wife’s domicile is not dependent on that of herhusband* There 
has been much criticism of the English doctrine of dependent domi­
cile* According to Graveson, "the result of the unity of matri­
monial domicile is that the married woman may dispose of her own 
property, make her own contracts, commit her own torts but never
acquire her own domicile."* Lord Denning has castigated it as
2
the "last barbarous relic of a wife’s servitude."
Small wonder, therefore, that the United Kingdom Law Com- 
mission has recommended the abolition of the rule and has sug­
gested that the domicile of a married woman should be determined 
independently of that of her husband.
CriticismSsimilar to those levelled in the case of married 
women may also be advanced for infants. We may recall that a 
change of father's domicile necessitates a change of an infant's 
domicile. If the father deserts the family or his marriage is 
dissolved and the mother is granted the custody of the children, 
what is the point of basing the child’s domicile on that of the 
father? If the male child is married but wants to dissolve his 
marriage, should he have to go to his father’s domicile, which^ 
under the present law^  is the child’s domicile, in order to be able 
to obtain a divorce? The American position renders more justice 
to infants in this respect. In most of the States in the UNited 
States of America, the father’s domicile ceases to attach to his 
infant if the infant has been emancipated (i.e. from his parental
1. 3 I*C.L*Q.. 149, p.159.
2. Gray v. Formosa [l963 ] P.259 at p.267.
3. Family Law Report on Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes (Law 
Com. 48, H.C. Paper 464, H.M.S.O.
control) by the father or if the infant is married or if he is
abandoned by the father.1 More specifically, the domicile of a
ominor in those States is that of the person with whom he lives.
On the dependent domicile of infants, too, the United 
Kingdom Law Commission has recommended that the domicile of a 
married minor should be determined as if he or she were an adult.
If this is implemented it would mean that a married infant, either 
male or female, will have his or her own independent domicile.
This critique, so fax, has dealt with domicile in the 
English law context. We must now address ourselves to the appli­
cation of the doctrine to Sierra Leone as part of the received 
common law.
Whatever statutory reform that is made in England will not 
automatically become law in Sierra Leone unless it is adopted. We 
must, therefore, consider the question in the light of the present 
law.
The doctrine of the dependent domicile of a wife sprang in 
England from the recognition of the husband as head of the element­
ary nuclear family. In Sierra Leone where there are various 
categories of families and marriages, such doctrine is, in our sub­
mission, applicable only in the case of a wife of a monogamous mar­
riage. At customary law, the concept of domicile appears to be 
unknown since a wife can obtain a divorce anywhere without refer­
ence to the husband’s domicile.
Secondly, in the case of a polygamous family when, on the 
death of the father both the wife and children pass into the guar­
dianship of the head of the deceased husband’s family, it is
1. The second Restatement, s.22.
2. Ibid.
impossible for the domicile of an infant to become that of the 
mother if, for instance, she remarries outside the deceased’s 
family. The guardian substitutes the infant’s deceased father 
for all legal purposes. These are just a few of many complex 
situations which the domicile doctrine creates in African coun­
tries like Sierra Leone with a different social condition from 
that prevailing in England. Commenting on the hardship which 
the doctrine has created even in England, and the greater hardship 
that follows it outside the United Kingdom, Graveson has emphati­
cally asked:
"Is it not surprising that parts of the 
British Commonwealth should have found the 
rigid concept of English domicile irksome 
and unsuitable to their own special and 
very different social and geographical 
conditions?" *
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the doctrine of domi­
cile requires modification in Sierra Leone to suit local conditions 
For example, the termination of the dependent domicile of an infant 
at the age of majority is arbitrary. In Sierra Leone, an infant
can voluntarily choose to leave or stay with his parents before or
. . .  o ........  ........................
after 21 years of age, depending on economic factors. The law
should take cognizance of this fact. We may finally suggest
that the proposals for change made by the English Law Commission
on the law of dependent domicile with respect to married women and
married infants ought to be adopted in Sierra Leone as they are
sound and they remove injustice.
Unity of domicile
A person cannot have more than one domicile at the same
1. Five Sheffield Jubilee Lectures, 1960 , 85 at p.92.
2. This is still the age of majority in Sierra Leone. In England, 
the age is now reduced to 18 years. See s.l of the United 
Kingdom Law Reform Act, 1969.‘
time.* Domicile signifies the connection of a person with a 
o
"law district*1, i.e. a territory subjected to a single system of
law. In the case of a federation or a country divided into a
Colony and protectorate, this law district is generally represented
by the particular axea in which the propositus has established his
3
permanent place of residence. Thus, it is possible within the 
same country for a man to be domiciled in one part and not in the 
other.
At present, Sierra Leone is a single country or jurisdict­
ion though it has a tripartite legal system which is, nevertheless, 
regarded as one legal system. Therefore, there is only one domi­
cile in this country*
During the colonial days, however, when the country con­
sisted of two territories - the Colony and a Protectorate - said 
two separate legal systems, one for each territory, there were two 
domiciles. With independence and the country now operating under 
one legal system, there is now a single domicile.
As the doctrine of domicile is capable of modification by 
4
legislation, it was possible in colonial times to grant jurisdic­
tion to the Courts of the Colony in matters arising in and affect- 
ing the Protectorate. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Colony had, 
inter alia, jurisdiction to grsint decrees of divorce to persons 
married under the Civil Marriage Act and permanently resident in 
the Protectorate. A case which, in our submission, established 
that there were two domiciles in Sierra Leone, one in the Colony
1. Cheshire, op.cit., p.160.
2. Dicey and Morris, op.cit., pp.12-13.
3. Cheshire., op.cit., p.160, cf.The Nigerian case of Odiase v. 
Odiase 11965 ] N.M.L.R. 196.
4. Cheshire, op.cit., p.160.
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and the other in the Protectorate is Solomon v. Solomon.^  In 
this case, a Syrian national whose domicile of origin was in Syria, 
but who was permanently resident in the Protectorate of Sierra 
Leone with no intention of returnirg finally to his country, peti­
tioned for divorce in the Colony, and counsel for his wife objected 
to the petition on the ground that he was domiciled in the Pro­
tectorate and not in the Colony, and therefore, the Supreme Court 
of the Colony could not exercise jurisdiction in the matter.
Now, by art.14 of the Protectorate Order in Council, 1924, 
jurisdiction was granted by the King in Council to the courts of 
the Colony in respect <f matters within the Protectorate which were 
within the jurisdiction of His Majesty in the Colony. One such 
matter was the dissolution of marriage contracted under the Civil 
Marriage Act. On the strength of this Order in Council, Beoku- 
Betts Ag. P.J. held that the Supreme Court in the Colony had juris­
diction to dissolve the marriage. Delivering his judgment, the 
learned acting Puisne Judge said:
"As Article 14 created jurisdiction in the Pro^ 
tectorate for matters arising there as if they 
had occurred in the Colony, it in effect made 
Colony and Protectorate one for the purpose of 
jurisdiction. Domicile in a place where 
jurisdiction exists is sufficient, and if juris­
diction exists in the Protectorate the require­
ments of the law are fulfilled by domicile in 
the Protectorate."
This case, it is submitted, was rightly decided. It ad­
mits of two domiciles in the two territories then forming Sierra 
Leone. It is possible for the courts of one "law district" to 
be granted jurisdiction in matters affecting another "law district".
1. Unreported. Decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on the 
14 October, 1944. See Vol.IV of the then Supreme Court Judg­
ment Book, p.81. Also see another unreported case of Josei v. 
-Josei decided by the same Court on 14 October, 1944, in which 
the learned Acting Puisne Judge took the same view.
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and this was what happened in the instant case* This is the in­
evitable result with countries constituting a colony and protects 
orate, as we have indicated earlier*
C. INTERNAL CONFLICT OF LAWS
The pluralistic * system of laws operating within the 
wide compass of family law in Sierra Leone, together with the two 
systems of courts poses certain problems of conflict* First, 
there is the problem of choice of law. Second, there is the 
problem of choice of court.
(I) Choice of Law
The problem of choice of law presents itself in three 
shades:- (a) Inter-tribal conflict stemming from the multipli­
city of customary laws; (b) conflict between customary law and 
the general law resulting, to some extent, from the division of 
powers between local courts and the general law courts; (c) which 
law applies to whom and in what part of the country.
(a) Inter-tribal conflict
As we shall see in Part III, similarities may be traced 
in the customary laws of the tribes in Sierra Leone and varying 
items in detail can also be found in them* Furthermore, two 
persons subject to the same customary law may bring an action be­
fore a court in an area where a customary law different from theirs 
predominates. A court confronted with any of these two sets of 
situations will have to advise itself as to which customary law 
to apply. Will it be that of one of the parties where there is 
difference between them? Or, will it be that of both of the
1. We prefer the term "pluralistic" to "dual" in this coriext, be­
cause in family law, there are jurisdictions where the three 
systems: general law, Islamic law and customary law, co-exist.
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parties as opposed to the lex loci of the court?
Neither statutory law nor case law in Sierra Leone is of 
guidance to us in this respect.
In dealing with the situation where two persons subject to 
the same customary law bring a case before a local court in an 
area where a different customary law prevails, some local courts 
have applied the customary law of the area in preference to that of 
the parties.* Customary law being unwritten but safely depo­
sited in the "breasts1* of the local judges, thesd judges empanel­
led from the same vicinity as the court tend to apply the custom­
ary law that is known to them, that is, their own customary law 
which is the predominant customary law of that area. Eventually, 
the law of the parties is thrown overboard. But in areas where
a local court panel consists of persons whose horizon has been 
broadened by education and travel and have therefore, become un- 
parochial in outlook, it is normal for them to prefer the law of 
the parties. This approach, in our submission, is in the inter­
est of justice and ought to prevail. The stringent attitude of 
the more conservative local courts in choosing the law of the area 
of the court is mellowed by s.14(2) of the Local Courts Act, 1963, 
which make it possible for the Judicial Adviser or a District 
Appeal Court of their own motion or on the application of a local 
court or any party to the proceedings to transfer any proceedings 
initiated before a local court to another local court, a Magi­
strate* s Court or the District Appeal Court, any such proceedings 
so transferred to be commenced de novo. Using this procedure, 
the parties may have recourse to a local court which is equipped 
with judges knowledgeable of their own law. It is, however, not
1. e.g. In the metropolitan tosm of Bo, the Kakua local court app­
lies Mende customary law in all cases before it to which custom­
ary law is applicable. The same policy is Adopted in Moyamba 
and Pujehun.
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an entirely satisfactory process in practice as it is likely to 
cause the parties more expenses and inconvenience.
A general-law court faced with a similar situation, assum­
ing that it has already satisfied itself that customary law should 
apply in the case before it, would apply the law of the parties.
Not hampered in any way by the customary law of the area where it 
sits, if at all there is any, it will listen to evidence of the 
customary law it is to apply from the parties themselves, and will 
apply it on the personal-law basis.
The difficulty posed by the other situation, i.e. where 
the parties are subject to different customary laws, is even more 
complex than the first.
Many local courts have tackled the problem in the same 
manner as in the case where the parties’ customary law is differ­
ent from that of the area where the court sits, and have applied 
the latter law. Justice may appear to be done to the party 
whose own law happens to be that of the court. On the pontrary, 
if neither of the laws of the parties is the same as that of the 
court, injustice will be the lot of both parties. S.14(2) of 
the Local Courts Act cannot be of any help to either of the parties 
because to whichever court they go, recourse alone to that court
will not solve the conflict. Ought we to interpret that part of
s.13(2) of the Local Courts Act which states where there is, !,no 
customary law the general law applies” as affording a solution; 
that a case of conflict between two or more customary laws should
be regarded as a case of ”no customary law” and therefore, apply
the general law? The answer, it is submitted, must be in the 
negative, for there is not only one but two or even three custom­
ary laws different from that of the parties. As the interest of 
justice is paramount in all the legal systems, it is submitted 
that a choice as to which customary law should apply ought to
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depend on the nature of the transaction between the parties, 
their conduct and the circumstances of the case*
A general-law court also cannot rule outright against 
customary law in favour of the general law, once it is established 
that this is a case to which customary law should apply* Never­
theless, it may regard the case as one on which there is no ex­
press rule as envisaged by s*76(3) of the Courts Act, 1965, and 
therefore, decide the question as to which customary law should 
prevail by applying the principles of justice, equity and good 
conscience* If the equities are equal, then it will, in all 
probability, be unjust to prefer one customary law to another,
in which case the general law ought to apply*
1 2 Other territories like the Eastern, and Northern Regions
of Nigeria^faced with similar problems to the ones we are discuss­
ing, have attempted a solution by making the law prevailing in the 
area of the jurisdiction of the Court or binding between the 
parties applicable* This arrangement, if adopted in Sierra 
Leone, may siifc local courts but it may yet create another diffi­
culty for general-law courts sitting in a place, like the Western 
Area, where no customary law prevails,at anj/rate^legally* Per­
haps a reasonable suggestion one could make is that before a local 
court or a general-law court, if the parties have the same custom­
ary law, or are agreed upon one customary law, that law should 
supersedeall others* In case of conflict between the customary 
laws of the parties, the court should be guided by the principles 
of justice, and equity* Giving the court carte blanche to apply 
the law of the area where the court sits to the exclusion of all 
other customary laws is a derogation from this principle*
1. Sees.23(2) of $he Eastern Region Customary Courts Law, 1963,
. cap*32, 1963, Laws of Eastern Nigeria*
2. See s*20if 1) of the Northern Region Native Courts Law, 1963, 
cap*78, 1963 Laws of Northern Nigeria*
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(b) Conflict between customary law and the general law
As we have seen, s.13(2) of the Local Courts Act, 1963, 
makes the general law applicable in the local courts, "where there 
is no provision of customary law". There is "no provision of 
customary law" if a transaction to which it is sought to apply 
customary law is one that is unknown to that law. For example,
a breach of covenant of title in a sale or lease of land,* and an
2
agreement for hire of premises have been held to be transactions 
unknown to customary law. If the transaction is kiown to custom­
ary law but at least one of the parties is not ordinarily subject 
to that law, for instance, where he is a non-native, then, unless
that party consents, customary law cannot apply to the transaction, 
not
This is • so^because it is a case of, "no provision of customary 
law", but because it will be repugnant to justice, equity and
3
good conscience to do so.
To recapitulate, before a general-law court customary law 
applies as its secondary law upon certain conditions: (i) where
the circumstances, nature and justice of the case render it essen­
tial to do so; (ii) where the parties have not contracted express­
ly or impliedly for its exclusion; (iii) where it appears to the 
court that substantial injustice would be done to any party by a 
strict adherence to the rules of any law other than customary law. 
These conditions are not alternative but cumulative.
1. See theGold Coast (now Ghana) case of Vanderpuye v. Plange and 
Ors. (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 170, 171.
2. See thefahana case of Asante v. Gold Coast Drivers Union (1957)
3 W.A.L’.R. 5 at p.9.
3. See the judgment of Wiseham,_C.J. in the Gambian case of Koykoy 
v Jatta v. Menna Camara & Anom. (Civil Suit No.5 64/60) reported 
in [1964 ] J.A.L. , p.35. An implied consent may be construed 
from a case where, before the transaction, the non-native party 
to it has been given sufficient warning that the transaction 
may be governed by customary law and he takes the risk to enter 
it. .
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To take the third condition first, it has been held in a 
Gold Coast case * decided in 1934, the principle of which ought to 
apply squarely in Sierra Leone, that for substantial injustice to 
be established, there must be something more than ordinary hard­
ship to a party; the equities must be on the side of the party in
2
whose favour it is sought to apply customary law* Condition (i)
is more or less an appendage of condition (iii).
The second condition appears to be fraught with more diffi­
culty than the others. When can it be truly said that the par­
ties have contracted to exclude the operation of customary law in 
in favour of the general law? Is marriage a contract of such a 
nature that it completely displaces one set of law for another?
On the question of contracts generally, caution must be
exercised where illiterate persons are involved in holding that
the exclusion of one system of law has been contracted for. There
should be a prima facie presumption of exclusion, but it must be
open to rebuttal. This point has been made vigorously by the
Privy Council in the Gold Coast case of Kwamin v. Kufuor to the
following effect:-
"... when a person of full age signs a con­
tract in his own language his own signature 
raises a presumption of liability so strong 
that it requires very distinct and explicit 
averments indeed in order to subvert it.
But there is no presumption that a native ... 
who does not understand English, and cannot 
read or write, has appreciated the meaning 
and effect of an English legal instrument, 
because he is alleged to have set his mark 
to it by way of signature. That raises a 
question of fact, to be decided like other 
such questions upon evidence.”
1. Koney v. Union Trading Co. Ltd. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 188.
2. Ibid. See in particular, .the judgment of Kingdom, C.J. at
p7l92.
3. (1914) 1 Ren. p.808 at p.814.
Upon close examination of the wording of s.76(3) of the 
Courts Act, one could observe that it is only when a party has 
agreed that his obligations in connection with a transaction should 
be regulated exclusively by some other law that customary law is 
dropped.* Note that the section does not mention ••rights” •
The conclusion that may be drawn from it is that a person is not 
barred from the benefit of customary law unless he has ostensibly 
agreed that an obligation of his own in connection with the trans­
action between him and another person is to be governed by the
i ^
generallaw.
Taking now the question ofmarriage, one must bear in mind 
that marriage if at all a contract, is unlike many other contracts. 
Verily, it is a transaction between two persons or parties but 
its effects go far beyond the immediate parties and it affects the 
children of the union and sometimes third parties.
It may be argued that when a person marries, he agrees ex­
pressly or impliedly to be bound by all the consequences of the 
mode of marriage that he chooses, so that if he, being a native, 
decides to marry under theChristian Marriage Act or the Civil 
Marriage Act, the whole of his matrimonial relationships and rights 
duties, and privileges occurring from this relationship will be
regulated by the general law. Thus, he will be obliged to prac-
2tice monogamy which is the essence of this kind of marriage. 
Furthermore, all matrimonial causes and matters, property rights 
between him and his wife, choice of the matrimonial home, rights 
and duties inter se and the custody; of children should be
1• On a similar point arising from a similax legislation in Ghana, 
see W.C.E. Daniels, TheCommon Law in West Africa, London, 1964, 
{>.372.
2. The general-law courts will zealously guard this obligation and 
will refuse to aid a party seeking to enforce his right to a 
second ”wife”. See Demby v. Bishop (19SC?) 3 S.L. Law Recorder, 
p.7.
determined by reference to the general law and not to customary 
law, except where statutory law provides otherwise. This argu­
ment may hold a firm ground if the parties to the marriage are j
aware of the nature of the transaction into which they are enter­
ing and have the intention to regulate their future lives in every 
respect in accordance with their newly acquired "status”• But it 
cannot be of considerable weight in the case of, say, two illiter­
ate natives who usually marry under the Christian Marriage Act, 
and whose only reason for doing so is that they have been told by 
their local pastor that it is against the will ofGod for a man to 
have more than one wife, and who, after the ceremony and for the 
rest of their lives continue to live like natives in a native 
milieu. To say that customary law cannot apply in certain mat­
ters affecting their married life, such as reasonable chastisement 
of the wife by the husband, property rights, and custody of the 
children, would be not only a mistaken attribute of absolute inten­
tion to the parties but also a flagrant disregard for the social 
circumstances of their relationship. Maxriage is a social arran­
gement followed by legal consequences, and where the paxties axe 
not of questionable conduct towards each other judging by the 
standards set by their social community, these legal consequences 
must help to harden and not weaken that arrangement.
The fact that a person is married in one form or another 
ought not Affect a transaction between that person and third per­
sons. His personal law should always be the law applicable to 
that transaction unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Thus, if while married under the Christian Marriage Act a native 
commits adultery with the wife of another man married under custom­
ary law, he ought to be liable to be sued under customary law.*
Though the status of children is determined by the marriage
1. See Coleman v. Shanq f19591 G.L.R. 390.
of their parents, yet the children1s personal law ought not be 
affected by such marriage. They must be able to choose for them-
i
selves any form of marriage even though their parents had selected 
some other.*
To summarise, one system of courts applies one system of 
law as its primary law. The secondary law only applies upon the 
fulfilment of certain conditions. The parties to a transaction 
can agree to be bound by one law and not the other but this agree­
ment must be viewed waxily. In questions of marriage and family 
law it will not be easy to arrive at a conclusion that a person 
has elected for all purposes to be bound by one system of law to ^
the exclusion of the other. An election may be said to be made
with regard to the essence of the particular kind of a marriage; 
for example, marriage in the Christian form must be deemed to be 
attended by the obligation to practice monogamy, and matrimonial 
causes affecting such marriage must ostensibly be governed by the 
general law. Other matters, like transactions with third par­
ties and the determination of the personal law of the children, 
which are not directly connected with the kind of marriage of two 
people, must remain unaffected by their choice of law.
There is no authority in Sierra Leone in support of these 
propositions. But there axe authorities in Nigeria and Ghana 
which, in our submission, ought to apply in Sierra Leone since all 
the countries concerned have the same social background and are 
presented with the same problems.
We must, however, begin on a disappointing note. In the
2Nigerian case of Cole v. Cole, which concerned which law to apply
1. See the Nigerian case of Smith v. Smith (1924) 5 N.L.R. 105 and 
the Privy Council case of Bamgbose v. Daniel [1955] A.C. 107.
2. (1898) 1 N.L.R. 15 at p.22.
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- English or Customary - to the intestate estate of a Nigerian 
whose personal law as customary but who had in his lifetime con­
tracted a Christian marriage, Griffiths J. applied English law be- j
I*
cause, as he said: [
1
” •«• a Christian marriage clothes the pities I
to such marriage and their offspring with a I
status unknown to native law.”
By this statement, the learned judge implied that someone marrying
under the Nigerian Marriage Ordinance must be taken to have opted
out of his personal customary law completely.
This extreme view, which does not take into consideration!.
the realities of life in an African country like Nigeria, has been
open to criticism not only from legal writers,* but also from the
2Nigerian judiciary itself. In a later case, Smith v. Smith,
Van Der Meulen J. said in disapproving the Cole v. Cole doctrine:
”It would be quite incorrect to say that all 
the persons who embrace the Christian faith 
or who are married in accordance with its 
tenets, have in other respects attained that 
stage of culture and development as to make 
it just or reasonable to suppose that their 
whole lives should be regulated in accordance 
with English laws and procedures.”
The principle enunciated in the case of Smith v. Smith has been 
undermined by statute in Nigeria in making the general law rather 
than the customary law applicable in the case of persons whose per­
sonal law is customary law by marrying under the Marriage Act. We 
$ha(£ argue in Chapter 13 the merits and demrits of legislation in 
Sierra Leone on intestate succession to the property of a native, 
which law presents the converse situation of what obtains in 
Nigeria. What we approve here is the principle enunciated in
1. See, for example, S.N. Obi, Modern Family Law in Southern 
Nigeria, London, 1966, p . 48; ~ . Agbede, Coni:lict of Laws in
Nigeria, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis of the University of 
London, 1970 at p.244.
2. (1924) 5 N.L.R. 1 0 \Otj>
the above-quoted dicta of Vain Der Meulen J • This principle may, 
however, be modified by statute where it is just and reasonable to 
do so.
The Ghana case of Coleman v. Shang * provides the exact
answer to the problem which we are discussing. In that case, the j
Court of Appeal held:
"We are of the opinion that a person subject 
to customary law who marries under the Marri­
age Ordinance, does not cease to be a native 
subject to customary law by reason only of 
his contracting that marriage. The custom­
ary law will be applied to him in all matters 
save and except those specifically excluded 
by statute."
Much as we approve this statement, it must be applied with caution. 
The statute which purports to exclude the application of customary 
law should take into consideration the manner of life and the 
social status of the person concerned since the date that he con­
tracted the marriage. Otherwise injustice is likely to step in.
A typical example is the present intestacy law in Sierra Leone
2with regard to natives.
Can a "native;)married under statute* sue in customary law for 
adultery?
This question presents the converse situation of that 
where a man married in accordance with a Marriage Act becomes li­
able in customary law for adultery with the wife of a man married 
under that law.
In the SQcoftd situation, as we have- seen, the adulterer is
1. (1959) G.L.R. 390.
2. For fuller discussion on this issue in specific cases in the law 
of Sierra Leone, see Chapters 9 and 13. For the factors affect­
ing the choice of law in such cases in many African countries, 
see generally, A.N. Allott, New Essays in African Law, pp.217- 
236.
3. Statutory Marriage is used here to denote marriage under the 
Christian and Civil Marriage Acts.
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liable without reference to the fact that he is married in accord­
ance with a marriage Act# His marital status is completely irre­
levant since what he has done is not an incidental consequence of 
that status#
In the fWsfc situation, the fact that the complainant is 
married under Statute is relevant to the question whether, in fact, 
adultery has been committed under customary law.* Statutory mar­
riage is not per se a marriage known to customary law# It is 
only when the marriage also conforms with the requirements of a 
valid customary marriage that a question of adultery can possibly 
arise under customary law# Otherwise, the complainant goes
without a remedy in customary law, though he can pursue his right
2
under the general law# Where the marriage conforms with the
requirements of both customary law and the general law, then he
might obtain a remedy under either of them# In this case, he must 
3
elect. This principle may be difficult to apply in practice, 
and depends upon the judicial interpretation of s.l of the Christ­
ian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act, 1965. That section provides 
that before obtaining a marriage licence in order to contract mar­
riage under the Christian Marriage Act, a party to the intended 
marriage must make a statutory declaration to the effect that he 
believes, M... where the persona}, law of either of the parties is 
customary law that neither of the parties is a party to a subsist­
ing marriage whether by customary law or otherwise.11 If the 
courts interpret this provision as meaning that a subsisting custom­
ary law between the parties makes a subsequent statutory marriage 
void, then no case of election arises and the complainant will have 
to fall on his customary law right*
1# Though there is no doubt that it has been committed under the 
general law#
| 2. See s.20 of the Matrimonial Casses Act, cap.102 of the revised
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
j 3. See the Ghana case Ackah v. Arinta (1893) Sar.F.L.R. 79.
I
i
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A fuller discussion of this section follows in Chapter 6. 
Here, we shall limit ourselves on}.y to the point at issue.
Again, there is no Sierra Leone case law for our guidance,
and we may yet resort to the law of other countries. Two Ghana
cases are most helpful. In Ackah v. Arinta * the Gold Coast
Court held that a husband of a Christian Marriage had no right of
action under customary law for adultery committed with his wife
even where the other party was subject to customary law under
which such a claim was recognised. Presumably, the marriage in
this case was not preceded or followed by a customary law marriage
which might have raised the possible question of conversion.
oSimilarly, in another Ghana case, Akwapin v. Bundu, the 
Gold Coast Divisional Court held that no prosecution lay for 
adultery committed with a spouse of a statutory marriage although 
adultery simpliciter was a criminal offence under the Ghana custom­
ary law at that time.
The raison d*etre of these cases, in our submission, ought 
to apply in Sierra Leone as the situation in which they were de­
cided is similar to what prevails in Sierra Leone.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that a native married under 
the Christian or Civil Marriage Act cannot sue in customary law 
for adultery committed with a wife married under any of the Acts.
Can a^non-native^sue or be sued under customary law for adultery?
We shall first deal with the question whether he can be 
sued. Our discussion, which will follow later in this chapter, 
on the subjection of a non-native to customary law will indicate 
that there is nothing to prevent him from availing himself of the 
benefits and burdens of customary law if he chooses^ as in the case
1. (1893) Sar. F.L.R. 79.
2. Div. Ct. 1931-37, p.89.
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of marriage. This he must, however, do before an action arises. 
The choice of customary law as secondary law is not the same thing 
as customary law becoming his personal law, as in the case of a 
native. This tenacious line of distinction leads us to the con­
clusion that he cannot be sued for adultery.
Now to the question whether he can sue. Where he is mar­
ried under a statute, he cannot sue under customary law. His in­
ability to do so is quite obvious because there is nothing to in­
dicate that he wishes customary law to apply to him. If he is 
married under customary law, however, the position is not quite 
clear. Doubtless, he cannot invoke the general law provision 
for the award of damages for adultery because that provision ap­
plies only in the case of a Statutory Marriage. But he might be 
able to sue before a Local Court for damages for adultery, since 
such action is consequential upon a customaxy law marriage.
Breach of promise of marriage situation
There is a general consensus of opinion that at least be­
fore a formal betrothal, an action for breach of a bare promise of 
marriage is not maintainable in customary law.* Marriage in 
customary law is normally preceded by a period of negotiation 
which sometimes lasts for weeks, months, and even for years. This 
period of negotiation, in some instances, extends from the time 
when an infant girl is still in the womb of its mother up till the 
time of the formal betrothal. It is regarded more or less as a 
trial period during which the parties and the parents make up their 
minds with regard to the desirability of the union. It is also 
the period during which the intended bridegroom and his parents
1., See Allott, Essays in African Law, p.223; T.O. Elias, The 
Nigerian Legal System (2nd ed.), London, 1962, p.294; A.K.
Ajisafet Law and Custom of the Yoruba Peoplet 1924, p.73; on 
the other hand, there are now some reported,cases from differ­
ent parts of Africa where a breach of promise action under 
customary law has been allowed by the Courts.
pull their energies together to get the marriage consideration 
ready. Any promises to marry made within this period are re­
garded as a mere indication of am intention that at some future 
time a formal contract to marry will be effected. To put it in 
common law parlance, it is a mere "agreement to marry" and, there­
fore, not an enforceable contract. Any party to the agreement
cy sA&
can withdraw at will and provided that he had not received any
or A/s
material benefit from the other or her^  family as a result of that 
agreement, can do so with impunity.
On the contrary, under the general law, a bare promise to 
marry made at any time by one person followed by a counter-promise 
by the other automatically gives rise to an enforceable contract 
to marry.*
No conflict of law problem is, therefore, expected to be 
encountered with regard to choice of law once it has been estab­
lished that a promise to marry was one made under one system and 
not the other. The problem, however, is in arriving at the 
decision as to under what system of law the promise to marry was 
intended to take effect,in the absence of an express preference 
for one system.
Take for instance, the case of X, a native man, who makes
a bare promise to marry Y, a native woman, and the latter recipro­
cates. As the position stands without anything more, the promise 
can be interpreted as one to marry under either the general law or 
customary law, for X has capacity to marry under either of them.
If both parties are Christians then there is a strong prima facie 
evidence of their intention to marry under the general law; but 
this is not conclusive. Further evidence must be adduced to
1. Provided the parties have capacity to marry. See post» pp.H3-a.oZ.
2. He cam marry under customary law because that is his personal
law and he can also marry under any of the marriage Acts.
displace an intention to contract a customary union* The station 
of life and education of the parties may also be of considerable 
weight* The weight of evidence in favour of marriage under the 
general law in the case of an educated native who is a professional 
man will be heavier than that in the case of an illiterate peasant 
leading a customary way of life* So with the manner in which 
the promise was made: mutual promises of marriage made by X and
Y after, say, a night out at a cinema, plus the fact that both are 
educated and are Christians, will almost invariably point in the 
direction of a promise to marry under the general law, while a 
promise made by X to Y through an intermediary or through the 
parents, accompanied by the customary gifts of kola nut or headtie 
may raise some doubt as to the efficacy of the transaction under 
the general law^ and if the parties are also illiterate and are 
animists, the balance will certainly be tipped in favour of custom­
ary lav; *
The dearth of decisions of Sierra Leone courts disables 
us to state definitely how these courts would deal with this issue 
if presented to them. But two Nigerian cases tend to show that 
one or other of the considerations^ which we have mentioned, might 
have helped to influence the decision of the Nigerian courts and 
these considerations may be unquestionably adopted by the Sierra 
Leone courts with approval. The first case is Uso v. Iketubosin.^  
The dependent in this case, aifter promising to marry the plaintiff, 
broke his promise in 1957 by marrying another woman. It was held 
that English law governed the breach of promise. Unfortunately, 
the facts of the case, as reported, do not tell us whether the 
parties were Christians and whether they were educated or not, but 
it is recorded that damages were assessed with regard, inter alia,
1. (1957) W.R.N.L.R. 187.
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to the "stations in life of the parties and all the circumstances". 
The other case is Aiyede v. Norman-Williams«* Both the plaintiff 
and defendant in this case were Nigerians and met in that country 
in 1945 where they mutually promised while they were infants to 
marry each other. They again met in London while they were pur­
suing further studies, and the plaintiff, now having reached his 
majority, confirmed his promise. The defendant later broke his 
promise by marrying smother woman. Whichever view is taken of 
the promise in 1945, it will not be enforceable either under 
customary law or the general law: under customary law because it
was a bare promise not followed by a formal betrothal; under the 
general law because the parties were minors when the contract was 
made in 1945. Coker, J. without giving express reasons for do­
ing so, took the promise to be governed by the general (English) 
law. Presumably, the choice of English law was influenced by 
the education of the parties.
(c) Which law applies to «whom and in what part of the country? 
Sphere of operation of the general law
Sphere as to persons
In respect of persons, the general law applies to everyone, 
native as well as non-native, who contracts a non-customary mar­
riage. But the extent to which the general law applies in the 
case of a native who contracts a non-customary marriage, but whose 
manner of life remains substantially native is one that is fraught 
with controversy. We have already examined this issue earlier 
and will do so later in our discussion on specific areas in family 
law.
1. L'L‘R-2£3 ^ - ' ' ' : '
2. See s.2 of the Infants Relief Act, 1874, and the discussion on
breach of marriage under the general law in Chapter 3.
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Sphere as to territory
Unless otherwise specifically provided by a statute, the 
general law is not confined to any particular part of the country. 
Wherever a court sits, provided the proper law to apply in the 
suit before it is the general law, that law applies.
Sphere as to areas in family law
The general law is the proper law to determine the valid­
ity of a non-customary marriage and its incidents. It deals
with such aspects as matrimonial causes and proceedings; pro-
2perty rights of the spouses during coverture; privileges attach-
3 4ed to the matrimonial stats; succession to property; the care
5
and protection of children; the rights and duties of spouses
fL
towards each other and towards their legitimate children; and
7
legitimacy; to name a few. It is interesting to note that 
there is no general lav/ on adoption and legitimation in Sierra 
Leone•
The general law also determines those incidents of a 
customary-lav/ marriage for which the provision made under custom­
ary law is invalid as being repugnant to statute or to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience.
1. See the Matrimonial Causes Act, No.9 of 1949, cap. 102 of the 
revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. Under the common law. See also The Imperial Statutes (Law of 
Property) Adoption Act, cap. 18. *
3. Under the common law and local statutes, e.g. The Criminal Pro­
cedure Act, 1965, which deals, inter alia, with the evidence of 
spouses at criminal trials.
4. See the Administrationof Estates Act, 1946, cap.45 of the re­
vised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960. Except where the parties 
are natives. See s.26 of cap.95.
5. Under adopted law and various local Acts, e.g. The Prevention 
of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926, cap,31 of the revised Laws 
of Sierra Leone, 1960.
6. Ibid.
7. Under adopted laws.
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Sphere of operation of Islamic Law
Sphere of operation as to persons
The provisions of the Mohammedan Marriage Act seem to
apply to all persons in Sierra Leone, native as well as non-native,]
the only condition being that the marriage should be celebrated in
the Western Area. In an early case decided by the Supreme Court
in 1932, Sufan v. Jalloh,* it was held that the Act did not apply
to natives. It is submitted that this case was wrongly decided.
The court might have been misled by the fact that the Act applies
only to a marriage contracted in the Western Area. This decision
does not represent modern practice whereby the High Court accepts
evidence of Mohammedan marriage contracted in the Western Area^
and divorces involving natives. Nor has there been any recent
contention that the Act does not apply to natives. Sufan1s
case is probably an isolated one and may not be followed now.
Evidence of current Judicial thinking on the matter is afforded by
2
the case of In re Allie (dcd.) in which Smith C.J. said of a
native who had died while permanently resident in thei then Colony
(now Western Area),
"Although the testator was a native Moham­
medan law might have become applicable to 
distribute his estate on intestacy, the 
fact that he made a will ... leads me to 
conclude that I must apply English law."
—  Sphere of operation as to territory
The Act relates to Mohammedan marriages contracted in the 
Western Area. So far as divorce of such marriage is concerned, 
it would appear that it can take place anywhere in Sierra Leone 
but in order that the divorce may be recognised by the courts of
1. Unreported. Decided at Freetown on 11 June, 1932
2. 1950-1956 A.L.R.S.L. 338, 341.
the Western Area, it should be registered. As there are no regi­
strars of such marriages in the Provinces, the registration must 
obviously take place in the Western Area. Insofar as intestate 
succession is concerned, the Act applies to Muslim natives only j 
when they die in the Western Area.
3>( Sphere of operation of customary law
Sphere of operation as to person
(i) Application in traditional society
In traditional society, both natives and non-natives have 
always been found since the beginning of the colonial era and the 
establishment of trading links between the peoples of the then 
Colony and Protectorate. Through contact with people foreign to 
this society, there has been increasing modification of its feat­
ures by the insertion of non-traditional ideas either informally 
or more directly through the control of the district commissioners* 
Nevertheless, in the field of marriage, traditional society 
hes never discriminated against non-natives as such, although it 
did not socially favour marriage between a native and a Creole.* 
Even in the case of a Creole, there was no legal bar. So long 
as the Creole was prepared to respect the tribal institutions, 
he was also most welcome.
Undoubtedly, a maniage between a native and a non-native 
has always been regarded as valid by the native or local courts so 
long as the essential requirements of such marriage under custom­
ary law are complied with. It is, therefore, strange that Fenton 
has argued that such a marriage cannot take place under customary 
law when he said:
1. For the reasons, see Chapter 16, pp.5^-54*^*
"They [non-nativesj do sometimes go through 
the form of a native marriage but cannot 
sue for the refund of marriage money if the 
woman deserts them."*
This opinion, in our submission, does not accord with the law and
practice of the local courts past and present* Customary law
regards the payment of the marriage consideration and the consent
of the parties and their relatives as the essential character-
2istics of a valid marriage* Local courts have indeed granted 
relief to non-native complainants-paxties to customary unions - 
the one obstacle before these courts had jurisdiction over non­
natives being that non-natives, if they were defendants, under­
standably refused to submit to jurisdiction* That recognition 
and validity are accorded to such unions is inherent in the evi­
dence of certain Mende chiefs given in the case of Kamanda Bongay 
3
v* Macaulay decided by the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone* The
chiefs gave testimony on succession to land under Mende customary
law, but the principles enunciated apply squarely to the customary
laws of other tribes in Sierra Leone* The evidence which was
accepted by the learned Judge, although the Court arrived at its
decision on another ground, ran as follows:-
4
"If a settler who has obtained a grant of 
land maxried a woman of the country 5 the 
land would on his death go back to the 
family to whom it belonged, and the wife 
and children would be absorbed into the 
woman*s family, in the case of the non-
1• Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law* Government Printer, 
Freetown, 1932, p.30. A further discussion on the capacity 
of a non-native to contract a customary law marriage follows 
later in this chapter.
2. For the details, see Chapter 16.
3. See the unreported judgment of Tew, C.J. of 5 March, 1931, in
S.C. Judgment Book ITol.l, 427 at p.436.
4. "Settler" in this context refers to anybody who is foreign to
the local community, not necessarily a Creole from the former
Colony.
5. "Country" in this context probably refers to the local community.
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native, or in the deceased settler1s 
family, in the case of a native of the 
Protectorate."
Presumably, by marriage in this context the chiefs were alluding 
to customary marriage, since Macaulay, a non-native, whose pro­
perty was in dispute had contracted that farm of marriage with 
a native woman*
(11) Application according to statute
For a better understanding of the application of customary 
law to persons according to statute, it is necessary to review 
statutory provisions relating to the subject before 1963, as well 
as those at and after that date:
Pre-1963 statutory law
Pre-1963 statutory provisions indicated quite clearly that 
the native courts had jurisdiction over natives but not non-
1
natives. This was explicit in s.7 of the Native Courts Ordinance,
which set out the constitution and jurisdiction of the Native
Courts as follows:-
uThe Native Courts shall consist of the 
Native Courts as now existing according 
to native law and custom and such other 
Native Courts as may be established under 
this Ordinance; and such Courts shall 
have jurisdiction according to native 
law and custom -
(1) to administer the estates of deceased 
persons, ... where such deceased per­
sons are natives; and
(2) to hear and determine -
(a) all civil cases triable by native 
law arising exclusively between 
natives; ...
(b) all criminal cases in which the 
accused and the person who is, or 
was, primarily affected by the 
alleged offence are both natives ..."
1. Cap.8 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960 (now repealed).
Native courts were not the only courts in which customary 
law could apply. It applied also in combined courts and in non- 
customary courts such as the old Supreme Court and the Magistrates* 
Courts. Though a lesser degree of scope was given to customary 1 
law in these courts, it applied to both natives and non-natives.
Under s.5 of the Native Courts Ordinance, a combined court 
had as much power as a native court to administer customary law.
A combined court was a court consisting of the Paramount Chief of 
the Chiefdom in which it was established and a non-native who had 
settled in that chiefdom, both of whom acted as joint judges. It
had jurisdiction in civil cases arising between natives and non-
1 2 natives where the subject matter m  dispute did not exceed £5.
The effectiveness of the judgment of the Court depended on unani-
3
raity. If the joint judges disagreed, the fees of the parties 
were returned and the matter had to be tried db novo by other 
judges if any party so wished. Cases such as matrimonial dis­
putes under customary law between a native and non-native frequently 
came before combined courts.
The Combined Court system fell into desuetude long before i 
1963 because of two reasons:- (a) the unanimity rule did not make 
it an effective avenue for the administration of customary law, 
particularly where non-natives were defendants. There was always 
bound to be disagreement between the joint judges when an action 
was brought against a non-native; (b) the limited jurisdiction of 
the court, i.e. jurisdiction in civil cases not exceeding £5, left 
without remedy in customary law more serious civil cases such as an 
action for the return of marriage consideration which on many occa­
sions far exceeded £5.
1. S.23 of the Native Courts Ordinance.
2. Ibid.
3. S.24 of the Native Courts Ordinance.
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The Courts Ordinance of 1 January, 1946,* made customary 
law as administered by the then Supreme Court and Magistrates1 
Court applicable to natives and non-natives in well-defined circum­
stances. As regards actions betwden natives, customary law was
observed "except where the circumstances, nature and justice of
2
the case shall otherwise require ..." With respect to actions 
between natives and non-natives, customary law applied "where it 
shall appear to the Court that substantial injustice would be 
done to any party by a strict adherence to the rules of any law 
other than native customary law ..."
It must be noted that in actions solely between non­
natives, neither the Native Courts Ordinance nor the Courts Ordi­
nance, 1946, made a provision for the application of customary law.
1963 statutory law and after
S.13(2) of the Local Courts Act, 1963, states:-
"The jurisdiction conferred by this section 
shall apply to all persons within the limits 
of the Court’s jurisdiction ..."
S.13(l), which sets out the areas of actions in which the 
Court has jurisdiction, includes the word "persons" where "natives" 
was used in prior legislation.
It is clear, therefore, that both natives and non-natives 
are intended to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court.
But now that a local court is empowered to apply customary law 
as well as the general law, one cannot safely conclude that the 
Statute intends an automatic application of customary law to non­
natives whose personal law is not that law. Presumably, in the
case of non-native, customary law only applies as secondary law 
in the presence of an agreement as such or in circumstances where
1. Cap.7 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
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it could be presumed that the parties would have intended no 
other law to apply in their transaction but customary law.
The other enactment which makes customary law applicable 
to natives and non-natives is the Courts Act, 1965. S.76(2) of 
it is simply a collation of the two provisions in s.38 of the 
Courts Ordinance, 1946, one relating to actions between natives,
and the, 0 to nofivei a n d  n o n -  n a t i v e s  «
What is of special significance with s.76(2) of the Courts Act,
1965, is that unlike its predecessor, no differentiation is now
made between actions where the parties axe natives and those in
which at least one of them is a non-native.* The use of the
word "any court" in s.76 instead of "the Supreme [High] Court
2
and Magistrates* Court", however, introduces some ambiguity.
Does "any court" in this context include customary courts such as 
Local Courts; or does it refer to non-customary courts alone?
If it includes customary courts, then customary law is not the 
primary law of these courts, but only applies "where it shall 
appear to the court that substantial injustice would be done to 
any party by a strict adherence to the rules of any other law 
than customary law"; in which case, s.13(2) of the Local Courts 
Act, 1963, must be deemed to be impliedly repealed by s.76 of the 
Courts Act, 1965. It is submitted, however, that this cannot be 
the correct position for, according to one of the canons of statu­
tory interpretation,
"where general words in a later Act sire 
capable of reasonable and sensible appli­
cation without extending them to subjects 
especially dealt with by the earlier legis­
lation ... that earlier and special legis­
lation is not to be held indirectly repealed,
1. Where the sole parties are non-native, customary law will not 
ordinarily apply.
2. As used in s.38 of the Courts Ordinance.
altered or derogated from merely by force 
of such general words, without any indi-  ^
cation of a particular intention to do so,1*
The subject of the law applicable by local courts is especially ,
settled by the Local Courts Act, 1963. The Courts Act, 1965,
on the other hand, generally deals with such non-customary courts
as the High Court and the Magistrates1 Court and the laws which
these courts may apply. One may, therefore, reasonably conclude
that "any court1* as used in s.76 should be understood as meaning
exclusively non-customary courts.
As a conclusion to this statutory review, it may be said 
that, generally, customary law formerly7 applied to natives as 
well as non-natives. More specifically, however, it now applies 
in appropriate circumstances, in actions between native and native, 
and native and non-native. Where the sole parties are non-natives, 
it is inconceivable whether it will apply at all without their 
choice.
Somewhat interlocked with the question as to whom custom­
ary law applies is the question in family law whether or not a 
non-native has capacity to marry under customary law.
(iii) Capacity of non-native to marry under customary law
The opinion of some writers supports the proposition 
that a marriage under customary law in which at least one of the 
parties is a non-native is invalid at any rate under the general 
law on the ground that customary law applied to persons whose legal
1. See dictum of Lord Selborne in Seward v. The Vera Cruz (1884)
10 App. Cas.59 at p.68. See also dictum o£ Somervell, L. J . in 
Harlow v* Minister of Transport [ 1951J 2 K.B. 98 at p.102; and 
R. v. Ramasamy [1965J A.C.lV
2. Fenton, op.cit., p.30 and ante, p.iao ; A. Phillips, "Mar­
riage Laws in Africa", in Marriage Laws of Africa by A. Phillips
and H.F. Morris, O.U.P., 1971, pp.75 et seq.; - . Hollins
"Notes on Mende Marriage Law", S.L.S. (O.S.) No.13 , 1928, p.33.
status is for the purposes of private law that of natives. It
is submitted, with the greatest respect, that this opinion cannot
be of considerable weight in Sierra Leone because, as we have seen,
customary law does not apply to natives alone; it is also in some
respect the law of non-natives even though the latter primarily
have none of their own.*
Juristic opinion might have been influenced by factors in-
2eluding the classic case of Re Bethell decided by the High
3
Court in England and Savage v. Macfoy, a decision of the Supreme
Court of Southern Nigeria.
In Re Bethell, concerning an Englishman who went through
a form of marriage according to African custom with a woman of
to
the Barolong tribe while he was resident in what was then Becuana- 
land, it was held that the child of the union was illegitimate 
under English law^ Tscause the marriage was not "on the same basis 
as marriage throughout Christendom", and was not in its essence 
"the voluntary union for life of one main and one womam - to the 
exclusion of all others." Stirling, J. based his decision on 
the ground that Bethell had no capacity under the law of his domi­
cile to contract such a marriage since in English law, a monoga­
mous marriage was the only one recognised by the courts.^ It is 
submitted that these sentiments cannot apply to persons domiciled 
in Sierra Leone. Whereas English law in England recognises for 
its citizens only one form of marriage, i.e. a monogamous marriage
1. See s.76 of Courts Act, 1965, Act No.31 of 1965.
2. (1888) 38 Ch.D.220.
3. (1909) Ren. 50^.
4. In re Bethell (1888) 38 Ch.D.22- at p.234.
5. The decision was not based on the ground that the marriage was 
void under Tswana customary law, but on the ground: that the 
English man whose lex domicilii recognised only monogamous 
marriages had no capacity•
Sierra Leone recognises both monogamous and polygamous marriages 
and Sierra Leone law does not discriminate between persons domi­
ciled in the country in regard to the type of marriage into which 
they may enter. Note that Stirling, J. recognised the union in 
Bethell1s case as valid under Tswana customary law*
In the Nigerian case of Savage v. Macfoy, Macfoy who was 
born in Freetown of liberated African parentage and was, therefore, 
statutorily classed as a non-native in Sierra Leone, went to live 
permnanently in Nigeria, where he married under customary law a 
Nigerian woman of the Yotuba tribe. On his death, the wife 
brought an action to establish her right as administratix of her
husband1s estate. Macfoy was domiciled in Nigeria, but Southern
Nigerian law just as Sierra Leone lav? regarded him as a non-native, 
Holding that the woman had no right to administer the estate since 
she was not the lawful wife of the deceased, Osborn, C.J. said:
"The common law of England is in force by 
virtue of section 14 of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance, as also the doctrines of equity 
and the statutes of general application 
which were in force in England on the 1st
day of January, 1900, and this is the law
ordinarily applicable to persons who are 
not subject to native law and custom.
Claudius Macfoy was such a person. He 
came from Sierra Leone where polygamy is 
unlawful. By the common law a person is 
endowed with the capacity to contract only 
that kind of marriage known to the common 
law, viz. the voluntary union for life of 
one man and one woman to the exclusion of 
all others."
The learned Chief Justice must be taken to task for three 
propositions which his statement conveys, namely, (i) that the 
common law lays down that a person can validly contract only a 
monogamous marriage; (ii) that polygamy is unlawful in Sierra 
Leone; (iii) that a non-native is not subject to native law and
1. (1909) Ren. 50if.
2. Ibid. at pp.507 , 508.
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custom and, therefor©, the common law ordinarily applies to him.
We shall begin with the first proposition. This proposi­
tion, it is submitted, is based on a misconception of the judgment 
of Lord Penzaneein Hyde v. H y d e When he made the famous re­
mark that)* "marriage as is known in Christendom is the voluntary 
union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others", Lord Penzane&was saying that it was to this type of mar­
riage that the matrimonial law of England was adapted. That law, 
in his opinion, was wholly inapplicable to polygamous marriages, 
and it would be impossible to do justice to the parties if the 
law applicable to one institution were applied to a different 
institution so that a Mormon spouse polygamously married in Utah
could not dissolve the marriage in England by means of a procedure
2
which was devised for monogamous marriages. The effect of his
decision was purely negative; it said nothing positive as to the
status of the parties. At the end of his judgment, after having
laid down that the English court should accept no jurisdiction to
enforce directly or indirectly in any way the obligations arising
out of a polygamous marriage, Lord Penzance said:-
"This decision is confined to that object.
This Court does not profess to decide on 
the rights of succession or legitimacy 
which it might be proper to accord to the 
issue of the polygamous unions, nor on the 
rights or obligations in relation to third 
parties which people living under the sanc­
tion of such unions may have created for 
themselves. All that is intended to be 
here decided is that as between each other 
they sire not entitled to the remedies, the 
adjudication, or the relief of the matri­
monial law of E n g land."^
Hyde v. Hyde is, therefore, no authority, as was thought by
1. (1886) L.R. J.P. & D. 130.
2. See C.K. Allen, "Status and Capacity" in L.Q.R., July 1930,p.277,
3. (1866) L.R. ^.P. & D. 130 at p .138.
Osborne, C.J. that the common law lays down that a person can
validly contract only a monogamous marriage.*
In Sierra Leone, the principle of Hyde v. Hyde is clearly
2expressed in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1949.
S.2 of this Act states:-
,!In this [ordinance ] [Act ] unless the con­
text otherwise requires, court means the 
Supreme [High] Court; ... marriage means 
the union of one main and one woman for life 
to the exclusion of all others, and the ex­
pressions 'husband* and 'wife' shall be
contrued accofdingly."
The matrimonial reliefs provided by this/Act are limitedI 3
to monogamous marriages under the Christian Marriage Act and the
4
Civil Marriage Act. This is all that may be concluded from the 
Matrimonial Causes Act.
It is true that matrimonial reliefs may not be granted by 
the High Court under this Act in the case of polygamous marriages.
But the High Court is not the only matrimonial court, nor is mono­
gamous marriage the only marriage recognised by law in Sierra 
Leone. There are the Local Courts and there are customary marri­
ages, which are potentially polygamous; and jurisdiction over 
such marriages is given to the Local Courts.
Now we turn to Chief Justice Osborne's statement that
polygamy is unlawful in Sierra Leone. It may well be that he 
made this remark relying on his prior statement on the position 
of a polygamous marriage at common law, in which case the latter 
remark is as untenable as the first. If, on the other hand, he
1. Nor does the case support Re Bethell which decided on rights 
of succession.
2. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960v
3. Cap.95 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, now redesig­
nated "Act", see Act No.48 of 1961>;
4. Cap.97 of the revised Laws ofSierra Leone, 1960, now redesig­
nated "Act", see Act No.48 of 1961.
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made the pronouncement in reliance on the state of the law in 
Sierra Leone in general, it is submitted that he was wrong.
True, there are pronouncements which seem to suggest that 
effort has been made in the past to suppress polygamy in Sierra 
Leone, but no definite enactment can be found prohibiting that 
institution.
When the Colony of Sierra Leone was founded, the Rules and
Regulations issued by the Governors of the St. George*s Bay Company
to the Superintendent and Council for the settlement instructed
them, inter alia, as follows:-
"You will take every proper means of dis­
couraging polygamy where it has already 
been engaged in, the toleration of which 
seems unavoidable, but new engagements of 
this sort among those who settle on our
lands, we think ought by no means to be
permitted. The common arguments for 
it appear to us quite ill-founded, and 
the practice subversive of domestic peace 
as well as good order and morals .’*1
To execute this mandate, the Governor and Council enacted 
the Act of 8 October, 1808 ( to which Osborne, C.J. does not refer
in his Judgment). Because of the interest this subject evokes,
it is worth the while to set down the essential parts of this Act 
in extenso.2
The title runs as follows:-
"An Act for declaring such children of the 
people called the Maroons as have been 
or shall be born before the first day of 
December 1808 to be entitled to the privi­
leges of born in lawful wedlock [sic ] and 
for regulating marriages among the said 
Maroons and for making provisions for the 
encouragement of good lawful marriages 
among the inhabitants of this Colony•**
1. See L.E.C. Evans, S.L.S. (O.S.), No.18, 1932, p.72.
2. The writer was privileged to examine the original handwritten 
copy of this Act in the Library of the Commonwealth Office, 
Downing Street, London, as it was not possible to lay hands 
upon a printed copy. Any mistake in deciphering the writing 
is, therefore, deeply regretted.
The Act consisted of three parts: the first part merely
legitimised the children of Maroons born before 1 December, 1808. 
The second part regularised marriages of Maroons who appeared be­
fore a Justice of the Peace before 1 December, 1808. It is the
third part that made provisions for future marriages. It reads:-
"And whereas there are many of His Majesty*s 
subjects within this Colony not professing 
themselves to be of the Christian religion, 
whom nevertheless it is highly expedient, 
not to debar from the advantages of legal 
and regular marriage, in as much as the 
benefits resulting therefrom are among the 
most probable means of hereafter promoting 
the extension of the Christian Religion 
among the same -
"Be it enacted by the Governor and Council 
of this Colony and it is hereby enacted ...
"That from the 8th day of October 1808 if 
any man and woman shall present themselves 
before a Justice of the Peace in this Colony, 
and shall declare their intention to be 
married before the said Justice of the Peace, 
the Justice of the Peace shall first require 
enquiries and determine to his own satisfact­
ion, whether there be any sufficient reason 
why such persons should not be joined to­
gether in marriage and if he declare that 
there is such reason, he shall be obliged 
to give an account thereof in writing, to 
any of the parties that require it, and if 
the Justice of the Peace shall see no suffi­
cient reason why such persons shall not be 
joined together in marriage, he shall cause 
the parties respectively, in the presence of 
credible witnesses, to make oath after such 
manner as according to his knowledge of the 
Religion and;customs of the party he shall 
believe to be of the greatest obligation 
that such party hath not any lawful wife or 
husband then living, and shall therefrom 
cause an entry to be made in a Register to 
be by him kept for that special purpose 
which entry shall be made and signed by 
the Justice of the Peace with the proper 
addition and also by the parties themselves, 
and shall be attested by two or more cred­
ible witnesses, besides the Justice of the 
Peace before whom the parties shall appear 
in their own handwriting -
"And the Justice of the Peace shall there­
upon declare the parties to be lawfully 
married and the same shall be to all ink 
tents and purposes whatever truly and law-
fully married. And the Justice of the 
Peace shall deliver a copy of the entry 
to either of the parties requiring it 
signed by himself and also by the witness 
who did sign the entry. And the Justice 
of the Peace shall carefully preserve the 
book of the aforesaid Register and shall 
deliver it to the Governor. And the 
Register and copy of same shall be suffi­
cient evidence that such marriage was 
truly and lawfully contracted."
The most reasonable construction that may be put on this 
Act is that it gave legal effect to a monogamous marriage; this 
was to be the form of marriage for which relief could be obtained 
from the English courts in the then Colony. But the Act in no 
sense suggested that polygamous marriages are unlawful. As may 
also be seen, notwithstanding the fact that it applied to the 
Colony alone, any one - native as well as non-native - could avail 
himself of its benefits.
The present writer cannot find evidence of the express
repeal of this Act,but it may be reasonably assumed that it is now
superseded by the Christian Marriage Act,* and the Civil Marriage 
2
Act, which are now the two statutes that regulate monogamous 
marriages•
As the Act of 1808 gave legal validity to a monogamous
marriage, so two latter statutes, namely the Protectorate Ordi-
3 4nance, 1896, and the Mohammedan Marriage Act, 1905, accorded
legal effect to polygamous marriages.
Now we turn to the third proposition that a non-native is 
not subject to native law and custom and, therefore, the common 
law ordinarily applies to him. From Savage v. Macfoy it is
1. i.e. Ordinance of 1 April, 1907, cap.95 of the revised Laws of 
Sierra Leone, 1960. Now redesignated "Act", See Act.48 of1961.
2. i.e. Ordinance of 12 September, 1910, cap.97 of the revised Laws 
of Sierra Leone, 196Q, Now redesignated "Act", see Act No.48 
of 1961.
3. Act No.20 of 1896.
4. Cap.96 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
5.(l909) Ren. R. 50^ -.
clear that the learned Chief Justice reached this conclusion from 
the fact that s.19 of the Southern Nigerian Supreme Court Ordi­
nance, 1876, while stating generally- that the Supreme Court shall 
not deprive "any person" of the benefit of any law or custom exist­
ing in Southern Nigeria specifically provided that such laws and 
customs should be deemed applicable in causes and matters between 
natives and Europeans where it appeared to the court that substan­
tial injustice would be done to either party by a strict adherence 
to the rules of English laws* The learned Chief Justice opined 
that "any person" could not include a European* If this were 
otherwise, he asked, "what was the necessity for special provision 
as to the transactions between Europeans and natives?". It is 
submitted that this reasoning is untenable because Macfoy was not 
a European but an African whose lex domicilii recognised both 
monogamous and polygamous marriages* The fact that he was an 
African but a non-native did not make his position any worse*
Sierra Leone law has always recognised monogamous and 
polygamous marriages* Marriage under the Christian Marriage Act 
has always been open to natives as well as non-natives* All 
Sierra Leone citizens have always been free to contract marriage 
under the Mohammedan Marriage Act, the only requirement being that 
the parties must be Muslims. Formerly, when it was intended 
that natives should not marry under theCivil Marriage Act, there 
was express legislation to that effect.1 But nowhere in Sierra 
Leone statute or case law has it ever been laid down that a non­
native cannot marry under customary law.
The Sierra Leone counterpart of s.19 of the Southern 
Nigerian Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876, is s.76 of the Courts Act,
1. S.4 of the Civil Marriage Act which is now repealed by the
Civil Marriage (Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1965, Act No.49 of 1965.
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1965, which has already been quoted in full. As has been seen,
s.76 contains no special provision for natives and non-natives, or 
natives and Europeans, but uses the words "any person". That 
section behoves any court to apply customary law in civil matters 
arising in the Provinces subject to the usual repugnance clause, 
where it appears to the court that substantial injustice would be 
done to any party by a strict adherence to the rules of any law 
other than customary law. Whether or not a non-customary court 
has jurisdiction over any specific civil matter like a matter 
affecting a customary marriage is a question which is quite dis­
tinct from that whether a person has capacity to marry under custom­
ary law, although both are linked together. At this juncture, 
it will be useful to distinguish between (i) which Courts can 
exercise jurisdiction over a customary marriage? (ii) which law 
will the Courts apply? (iii) which law governs a party or trans­
action in a given legal relationship?
(i) Which Courts can exercise jurisdiction?
As will be seen later, the general^law courts formerly had 
no jurisdiction in matters affecting customary marriage and divorce 
if the marriage was exclusively between "natives".1 The proper 
forum for these was a customary law court. Therefore, if such 
a matter was brought before a general-law court, it would not adju­
dicate but would refer it to a local court. Where oneparty to 
the customary marriage was a non-native, however, it would appear 
that the High Court had jurisdiction. For the Courts Ordinance, 
1946, which at present partly regulates the jurisdiction of the 
High Court, deprived the High Court of jurisdiction over ajcustomary 
marriage only where the marriage was exclusively between natives.
1. S.11 of the Courts Ordinance, 1946.
If one party was a non-native and the marriage took place in the 
Provinces, it is submitted that the High Court had jurisdiction 
under s.ll of the Native Court Ordinance, 1946.1
But this jurisdiction was concurrent with that of a local 
court which according to s.13 of the Local Courts Act, 1963, has 
jurisdiction in all civil matters governed by customary law be­
tween all persons within the limits of the courts jurisdiction. 
Now, under s.21 of the Courts Act, 1965, the High Court has lost 
its jurisdiction over any customary marriage whatsoever.
(ii) Which law will the Courts apply?
The question of choice of law generally has already been
2adequately discussed earlier in this chapter. Here, it will 
suffice only to determine which law, customary oir general, is 
applicable in the case of a customary-law marriage to which a 
party is a non-native. Before a general law court the applica­
tion of customary law will depend on two factors: (a) whether
the marriage took place in the Provinces, and (b) whether it ap­
pears to the court that substantial injustice would be done to 
any party by a strict adherence to the rules of any law other than 
customary law. Otherwise, it is the general law that will be
the law of the Court. If customary law applies it must be that 
of the native party to the transaction, In the case of a local 
court, if one party is a native and the other is a non-native, 
customary law would seem to apply in preference to the general law 
because s.13(2) of the Local Courts Act makes provision for the 
application of the general law in a local court only in the ab­
sence of any customary law. Where there is a native party,
1. This jurisdiction will, however, not extend to matrimonial 
causes since under s.2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, the High 
Court has jurisdiction in matrimonial causes only when the 
marriage is monogamous.
2. Ante, pp. SO — !0S
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there is customary law to apply, i.e. the customary law of the 
native party. But difficulty in connection with the interpre­
tation of s.13(2) of the Local Courts Act is envisaged where both 
parties to the purported customary marriage are non-natives. For 
example,Tom and Susan, both Creoles from Freetown, spent most of 
their lives at Gbendembu Village in the Bombali District where 
they became tribalised. Thirty years ago, they married at
Gbendembu according to what was purported to be Loko customary 
law. They are now living in Bo, and Tom has instituted divorce 
proceedings before the Kakua local court. Which law will the 
Kakua local court apply, customary law or the general law? If 
the parties are taken to have no customary law at all, the valid­
ity of the purported Loko marriage itself will be at issue; in 
which case the general law will apply. But if the court regards 
the Loko marriage as a marriage for the parties, it will apply 
customary law the only difficulty remaining being which customary 
law to apply - Loko customary law, the adopted law of the parties 
or Mende customary law, the territorial customary law of the Kakua 
chiefdom.
(iii) Which law governs a party or transaction in a given legal 
relationship?
In determining this question, regard must be paid to the 
intention of the parties. This is explicit in s.76(3) of the 
Courts Act, 1965, which states that no party shall be entitled to 
claim the benefit of any customary law if the intention throughout 
the transaction was that some law other than customary law should 
apply, i.e. the general law. Accordingly, if a native enters into 
marriage under the Christian Marriage Act, the law that governs 
that marriage will be the general law.'*' He cannot be heard to 
say that his personal law is customary law and that that law should
1. i.e. for purposes of matrimonial reliefs.
apply to that transaction. But does this option for a non- 
customary marriage mean that the native will cease to be bound by 
customary law in all other transactions into which he may enter 
subsequently, for example, a contract dealing with the transfer of 
property? It has been argued already in this chapter that he is 
not deprived of the privileges to avail himself of customary law 
insofar as other legal relationships are concerned.
Conversely, a non-native who contracts a customary marri­
age^  will be bound by customary law insofar as the essence of that 
marriage is concerned. For example, he can take a second wife 
under customary law without committing adultery. But customary 
law may not apply automatically in every other given legal rela­
tionship f
The social circumstances of the parties must be taken into 
consideration together with any assumed intention for the appi- 
cation of any law to a person other than his personal law*
The legislature must have been aware of this when it en­
acted in s.26 of the Christian Marriage Act that marriage between 
two parties, one of whom is a native, has no effect on the pro­
perty of such native.
In conclusion to this discussion whether a non-native can 
contract a customary marriage, it may be said that despite the 
opinion of legal writers and judges to the effect that customary 
law is by its nature primarily meant for natives, and that a per­
son whose personal law is English law cannot lawfully enter into 
transactions like marriage under customary law; in Sierra Leone 
where the present tendency is now to move from p ersonal law to 
territorial law, it is possible for persons to identify themselves 
clearly and lawfully with every aspect of their territorial law.
118.
Sphere of operation of customary law with respect to territory
In general terms, customary law applies throughout Sierra 
Leone. In specific terms, however, it is the particular customary 
law of an area that normally applies in that area. If no custom­
ary law operates at the venue of the court, for example, in the 
Western Area, it is the customary law of the parties that applies. 
This simple principle is difficult of application in practice be­
cause of (a) the frequent migration and admixture of tribal 
groups, and (b) the possibility that the two parties before the 
court may be subject to two different customary laws. We have 
already considered the way in which the courts deal with these 
conflict of laws problems.*
(*'*) Choice of Courts
This problem may be properly approached from the stand­
point of the jurisdiction of the Courts.
Jurisdiction of the courts in matrimonial and other matters 
connected with the family
In Sierra Leone, the original jurisdiction of the courts 
in matrimonial and other matters concerned with the family is 
vested in the Local Court, the Magistrates’ Court and the High 
Court.
Jurisdiction of the Local Court
2
According to s.13(1) of the Local Courts Act, 1963, a 
Local Court has jurisdiction, inter alia,
11 (b) to hear and determine -
(i) all civil cases governed by custom­
ary law ...
* Ante, pp.
2. Act No.20 of 1963.
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" (ii) all civil cases governed by the
general law where the claim, debt 
or matter does not exceed ...
Provided that jurisdiction shall not ex­
tend to any of the following cases -
(aa) cases relating to the civil status 
of any person ...
(dd) any action founded upon ... seduction 
or breach of promise of marriage.n
The jurisdiction outlined in s.13(1) may be subdivided in­
to two groups:-
(i) Jurisdiction over matters governed by customary law
Encompassed within it are actions dealing with customary 
marriage, divorce and other matrimonial causes arising from a 
customary marriage. This jurisdiction seems to be exclusive at
any rate where the marriage or divorce is. between parties who are 
natives and are' married under customary law. Where at least aie 
of the parties is a non-native it would appear that jurisdiction 
is concurrent with that of the High Court. But a later Act
completely deprived the High Court of jurisdiction in such a case. 
Apparently, questions concerning seduction, breach of promise of
marriage and cases relating to the civil status of a person fall
...........................3 ..............................................
outside the jurisdiction. It is not very clear what "cases
relating to civil status'* entail. Presumably9 legitimacy of a
child whether of a customary marriage or otherwise is a question
of civil status and cannot be decided by a local court. But
matters affecting the custody and guardianship of children arising
from a customary marriage do not affect the status of the children
as such; instead, they are rights possessed by the parents and
other claimants. They can, therefore, answer to the description
1. See the Second Proviso (a) (ii) of s.11 of the Courts Ordinance, 
1946, cap.7 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. S.21(a)(ii) of the Courts Act, 1965; Act. No.31 of 1965.
3. Ibid.
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of "claims founded on customary marriage" which are excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the High Court and which, therefore, fall 
within the jurisdiction of the local court
(ii) Jurisdiction over matters governed by the general law
Seemingly, the type of matrimonial matters that may come 
within this description are those normally vested in the Magi­
strates* Court for purposes of statutory marriages. This mach­
inery might have been contrived to enable the typically native 
women who marry under statute to obtain maintenance from their
husbands from Local Courts; but the class is not closed to any
2one married under statute.
In addition to the foregoing, a Local Court has jurisdict­
ion to try any matter referred to it by the High Court or the 
Magistrates* Court whenever it appears to either of them that pre- 
ceedings before it are properly cognizable by a Looal Court. 
Utilizing this, the High Court or the Magistrates* Court can 
transfer to a Local Court a matter which should have properly been 
instituted in the latter court.
Jurisdiction of the Magistrates* Courts
A Magistrate*s Court has power to order maintenance to be 
paid by a husband to a married woman whom he has deserted for the 
benefit of herself and her children.^ The Act which confers this 
power does not define a "married woman*1. However, in our sub­
mission, married woman in this context ought to mean a woman
1. This is because they come within the wide class of "civil cases 
governed by customary law"•
2. Though it is highly improbable that non-natives married under 
statute will seek redress in these courts.
3. In the exercise of their inherent powers.
4. Under the Married Women*s Maintenance Act, 1888, cap.100 of the 
revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
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married under a statute,'1' including a marriage under the Moham­
medan Marriage Act. Therefore, a woman who is customarily mar­
ried cannot invoke the aid of a Magistrate’s Court under the pro­
visions of the Married Women*s Maintenance Act. The Court also
has jurisdiction over the enforcement of maintenance orders made
2
in England or Ireland. Furthermore, it cam make enforcement
3
orders in bastardy proceedings.
Jurisdiction is expressly excluded in actions for seduct­
ion, breach of promise of marriage, in matters relating to divorce, 
matrimonial causes and succession to property and to the wardship
4
of infants and the care of infants’ estates. There is no defi­
nition in the Courts Act, 1965, or in any dher Sierra Leone enact­
ment for the term ’’matrimonial cause”, but the term has now got an 
established meaning since it was first defined by the English 
Supreme Court (Consolidation) Act, 1925, as ’’any action for div­
orce, nullity of marriage, j’udicial separation, j’actitation of
5
marriage, and restritution of conj’ugal rights.”
Special Magistrates’ Courts
This is a Court established by the Courts Act (Amendment)
f. Under the principle of Hyde v. Hyde (ante), a Magistrate’s 
Court being a general-law (English) court, its matrimonial 
machinery is unsuited for customary marriages. The position 
in Sierra Leone is not altered by s.76 of the Courts Act, 1965. 
The court can recognise a customary marriage without granting 
reliefs to parties to such marriage* But it would seem that 
since the Courts Act (Amendment) Decree, 1967, a Special Magi­
strates’ Court can now grant such reliefs.
2. Under the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Ordi­
nance, cap.101 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
3. Under the English Bastardy Act, 1872, and the local Bastardy 
(Amendment) Act, 19 613
4. Under s.7 and the Third Schedule of the Courts Act, 1965.
5. S.225.
Decree, 1967.* It should sit in the Western Area and have the j
j
same jurisdiction as a Local Court sitting in the Provinces. To 
exercise its jurisdiction it must be composed of at least two spe- j 
cial justices of the peace and two assessors who must be experts
in customary law. The assessors sit as an advisory body on j
l
customary law to the special justices. The court must adjudicate 1
solely on matters involving customary law.
Though provision is made by the Courts Act (Amendment) 
Decree for the application of customary law by a special Magistr-
* j
ate’s Court in the Western Area, no enthusiasm has been shown by
i
it to apply this law. Two reasons are responsible for this.
First, the Chief Justice has not, as yet, drawn up a list of ex­
perts in customary law as required by the decree. Secondly, the 
idea of establishing in the Western Area a Magistrate* s Court 
which is virtually a Local Court would appear to be strange to 
other Magistrate* s Courts which had been accustomed to "English11 
law. As the population of the Western Area is substantially 
native, such a Court will provide an answer to the problems of per­
sons married under customary law who, hitherto, seek in vain the 
help of the ordinary Magistrate*s Courts for the settlement of 
questions affecting their marriage.
Jurisdiction of the High Court
Generally, the jurisdiction of the High Court is regulated 
by ss.18 and 21 of the Courts Act, 1965.
S.18(1) states:-
2
"The Supreme [now High ] Court shall exer­
cise the jurisdiction and powers conferred
1. N.R.C. Decree No.56 dated 26 October, 1967. See Annual Survey 
of African Law, 1969, pp.53-54.
2. See s.66 of the Republican Constitution, 1971; Act No.6 of 
1971, which established a High Court, replacing the Supreme 
Court which existed prior to that Constitution. The new 
High Court possesses the same jurisdiction as the old Supreme 
Court as spelled out in the Courts Act, 1965.
123.
upon it by the Constitution and any other 
enactment.”
S. 18(2) provides that, except the jurisdiction is excluded 
otherwise,
”... The Supreme [ High ] Court shall exer­
cise unlimited original and supervisory 
jurisdiction in all cases and matters in 
the same manner and with the same powers 
and authorities as immediately before the 
commencement of this Act.11
There is no provision in the Constitution pertaining to
the High Court1s jurisdiction in family matters. The enactment
relating to such matters before the Courts Act, 1965, part of
which still applies by virtue of s.18(2) is the Courts Ordinance,
1946. S.11 of the Ordinance confers on the High Court:
”... all the jurisdiction powers and autho­
rities, which are vested in or capable of 
being exercised by Her Majesty’s High Court 
of Justice in England ... Provided further 
that nothing in this Ordinance shall be 
deemed to invest the Court with jurisdiction 
in regard to -
(a) any question arising exclusively between 
natives - ... (ii) relating to marriage 
or divorce by native customary law or any 
matrimonial claim founded on such marri­
age , or
(b) the administration of estates of deceased 
persons who are natives where such estates 
lie within the jurisdiction of any native 
court,
or to oust the jurisdiction of any native 
court in such matters.”
S.13 of the Court Ordinance gives a further power to the High
Court to appoint and control guardians of infants and their
estates.
Ostensibly, from s.11 the High Court has matrimonial 
jurisdiction as is possessed by the High Court in England.
Jurisdiction is excluded in the case of marriage and 
matters affecting it where the marriage is a customary one and 
contracted by two natives. The section, however, leaves open 
the question of a possible customary marriage where one of the
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parties is a non-native. If it is resolved that such a marriage 
is valid, which as we have argued earlier, ought to be the case, 
then two alternatives would seem to be open to the Court. It 
may either send the case to a local court or a special Magistrates’ 
Court or it can try it. But if it chooses the last course, its 
jurisdiction will be heavily curtailed. It can possibly grant 
the normal reliefs * that are granted by local courts under custom­
ary law, but it cannot grant reliefs under the Matrimonial Causes 
o
Act, because the reliefs obtainable under this Act is available 
only to persons married either under the Christian Marriage Act or 
under the Civil Marriage Act. This handicap, therefore, tends 
to show that the proper place for questions affecting such marri­
ages is customary courts. Probably, it was in recognition of 
this fact that the Courts Act, 1965, did not repeat the phrase 
’’any questions arising excludively between natives” but precisely 
excluded the High Court’s jurisdiction in matters affecting any 
customary marriage irrespective of whether or not the parties are 
natives. S.21(a)(ii) reads:
’’Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to 
invest the Supreme [ High ] Court with juris­
diction in regard to -
(a) any action or original proceedings -
(b) to establish the existence or dissolu­
tion of any marriage governed by custom- 
airy law or relating to any claim founded 
upon such marriage.”
1. For example, the Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of an 
aggrieved husband or the return of marriage consideration by 
the family of a wife who had left her husband on a number of 
occasions in Alpha Sulaiman v. Mballey judgment No.199 of 1943; 
Brown v. Jelaney, judgment No.362 of 1945; Jackson v. Weeks, 
judgment No.363 of 1945. All the judgments are unreported.
In each case, at least one of the parties was a non-native.
2. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
Conclusion
Because of the pluralistic nature of the Sierra Leone 
legal system, a discussion on conflicts of law is bound to occupy 
a great deal of space in a thesis on Sierra Leone family law* 
However, in order that this work may not be thrown out of balance, 
it is necessary to end at this stage the present discussion which 
is on a rather general basis* We should, nevertheless, inti­
mate that the instant discussion is not exhaustive and that there 
are many internal conflicts of law in specific aspects of family 
law which we have not discussed in this chapter because to do so 
will make the work incoherent. These internal conflicts will 
be considered in their respective places in subsequent chapters.
CHAPTERT 4
THE FAMILY AND FAMILY LAW
A* THE FAMILY
Definition of family
Family law being the subject-matter of this thesis, it is 
essential at this stage to attempt at a definition of the word 
"family11 as it is used in the Sierra Leone context* We shall 
try to do so from two standpoints: (a) the sociological stand­
point; (b) the legal standpoint,
(a) The sociological standpoint
When sociologists speak.of "family", they do not allude to
a single identifiable social institution which generally has the
same structural absolutes in every case. Basically, however,
a family is a kinship group marked by kinship relationships,*
If the group consists of a man and his wife and their
children, whether they are living together or not, Notes and
2
Queries on Anthropology calls it the elementary or simple
1, A possible schematic division of family groups in traditional 
society could be made along the following lines:-
RESIDENTIAL UNIT  .............. FAMILY,
Parental family (1, simple
(2, Compound/ 
polygamous
(1, Grandparental family, i,e,
( father1s father; father;
( children1 s children wives*
(2, Fraternal family - group of 
( full brothers with their own 
( parental families,
(3, Sororal family - group of 
( full sisters with their de- 
( pendants.
2, Sixth ed,, London, p,70.
(Nuclear family households) 
(Extended family households) 
based on lineage segments
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family;* where the group consists of (a) a man and two'or more
wives and their children (polygamous), or (b) a woman with two or
more husbands and her children (polyandrous), or (c) a married
widow or widower having children by a former marriage, it is
2
called a "compound" family*
Sometimes also, particularly in traditional societies, 
after setting up an elementary or compound family a man retains 
in his household his adult children and their respective spouses 
with their own children* For every purpose he is regarded as 
the head of the household and the members engage in communal labour 
on the farm under his guidance* This type of institution is 
named a patrilineal extended family.
Much terminological confusion has arisen between extended 
families and another institution whereby one of the types of family 
just described is augmented by relatives of the husband or wife, 
like younger brothers and sisters, the children of friends, or 
young and articulate men of the community who require the protect­
ion of an influential member of their community in return for 
their services* This institution is really an association of 
diverse families or groups of people with or without any kinship 
relationship who live together and form a functioning domestic
1* The term "elementary" family to describe this group is also
used by Radcliffe-Brown: African Systems of Kinship - and *Marr lage j 
London, 1950, p*4; P. Bohannan. Social Anthropology* l96i3,p*73* 
"Nuclear" family is used to define the same entity by Bohannan: 
ibid*, p*73, and G.P. Murdock, Social Structure * New York, 1949* 
J*A, Barnes, "Kinship" in Encyclopedia Britannfca* Vol*13, 1955, 
p*404, uses the preceding terminologies in slightly different 
situations. He says, "The association of a married couple with 
their young children is called a nuclear or parental family.
The elementary or simple family is the unit consisting of a man , 
and his wife and all their children, whether young or old, liv­
ing at home or outside it, married or unmarried*"
2* Notes and Queries on Anthropology, p.70. See also Radcliffe-
Brown* ibid*. p*5*
3. Radcliffe-Brown, op.cit** p.5.
unit* It is a conglomerate, enlarged household marked by propin­
quity and not necessarily by kinship relationship* If this re­
lationship is missing, it will be improper to call the institution 
a family even though the members regard themselves as such, be­
cause a family is a kinship group marked by kinship relationships* 
Only the elementary or simple family exists in a Christian 
and modern society such as England* But in Sierra Leone where
the society is not typically Christian, and less developed, the
other types can also be found*
In Sierra Leone, two groups of people normally set up ele­
mentary or simple families* One is the Christians who by reason
of their religious inclinations are obliged to practise monogamy. 
The other is the non-Christians whose initial economic situation 
does not allow them to acquire an additional wife* In the case 
of the latter group, the arrangement lasts as long as no improve­
ment in their economic position takes place*
The compound polygamous family prospers among the non- 
Christian natives and, in a modified form,* among the Muslims*
The reason for the existence of this type of family is highly 
debatable* One may argue that it is due to concupiscence, an­
other may contend that it is a means to the accumulation of wealth
2as a stepping stone to social prestige and political power. In 
the writer*s opinion, each case must be dcaLt with on its merits*
To some men the compelling force is concupiscence; to others it 
is wealth. For if concupiscence is the only rationale, how
1* Islamic law allows a Muslim to have a maximum of 4 wives*
2* L* Mair, New * Nat ions t London, 1963, p*69, suggests that one of 
the strongest reasons for polygamous marriages is the desire to 
be sure of progeny. For the view that plurality of wives is 
in a polygamous society a mark of importance and prestige; see 
E.Cotran: **The Changing Nature of African Marriage’* in Family 
Law - in As ia and Af r ica * ed. J.N.D. Anderson, London, 1968, p. 17* 
For the view that polygamy is a form of capital investment, see 
K. Little: The Mende of Sierra Leone* London, 1967, p*142.
Note: Polyandry is not practised in Sierra Leone*
would one explain a chief having up to 300 wives, most of whom he 
would not even see for years?* If, on the other hand, it can be 
explained solely in terms of wealth and its adjuncts, how can one 
account for the persistence of the practice today among poor men 
to whom a woman is economically more of a liability than an asset?
The extended family is an extension of the compound family 
and thus is found again among non-Christian natives end Muslims*
The group normally breaks up, and new groups of the same kind are 
formed, when a man obtains permission to leave his parents or 
parents-in-law, taking his wife end children with him*
In the Provinces, many families have lived as part of a 
household. A household may consist of elementary as well as 
compound polygamous families. To form a household the founder, 
usually a man, settled on a homestead either alone initially, or 
with a group of other interested people,usually young men. They 
married and their wives bore children and lived together with them. 
A distinctive feature of a household among the Temne, Limba, Susu 
and Yalunka is that it is usually a kinship group in which the 
head is caretaker of the family property and cares for and meets 
the needs of the younger members. A Mende household or mawei, 
however, is a social, and economic unit. It includes blood and 
affinal relatives and strangers to the kinship group* Formerly, 
slaves augmented the numbers. The members of the mawei work on 
the farm of the head, the mawe-wui; they are expected to collect
1* Tradition has it that one Mende Chief, P.C. Borbor Gbepka of 
Bumpe, Bo District, in the Southern Province, had more than 
300 wives.
2. What is normally called an extended family in Sierra Leone is 
an elementary or simple family, augmented by junior brothers or 
sisters and cousins of the spouses, and not what sociologists 
mean by the term.
3. They lived together in the same compound consisting of anything 
from a single house (partitioned into several rooms, each of 
which was apportioned to a male married member) to a main house
for the head of the household, and small out-houses for other 
male members and their wives and children.
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palm-fruit for him, hunt and fish for him, and also repair his 
house. In return, he provides them with the necessaries of life 
like food, clothing and lodging, and above all, takes responsibi­
lity for their behaviour in the community* The difference in 
the constitution of a household among, say, the Temne and the 
Mende, probably, explains the existence of the rule of exogamy 
among the former, and endogamy among the latter*
The household system, in Sierra Leone, as most inventions, 
originated from necessity* In the days when tribal warfare and 
civil strife were rife, people found it necessary to organize 
themselves into groups in order to ward off attack by an external 
enemy. Gradually, however, the system assumed social and eco­
nomic significance* Nowadays, with the impact of education and 
the quest for opportunities elsewhere, the structure of the house­
hold in the provinces is changing. As more and more people move 
into larger towns, the number in the household in villages is be­
coming smaller. Conversely, the elementary families in the 
larger towns are augmenting to include younger brothers, sisters 
and wards, and the structure of the household in those places is 
becoming large.
(b) The - legal -standpoint
From the legal point of view, the word "family" presents 
as much difficulty as it does from the sociological standpoint*
For example, in English case law, the attempts made by 
judges to arrive at a definition do not point in the same direct­
ion* In one case, family has been held to mean children;^ in
2 3another, heirs; and yet in a third, descendants* Each of
1. In re Terry* s Will,(1854) 19 Beav.580.
2. See dictum of Wiskens. V-C in Burt v* Hellyar (1872) L.R.14 Ety.
160 at 164.
3. Williams v. Williams (1851) 1 Sim (N.S.) 358.
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these cases fails to convey the fullest meaning of the word as is 
used in the phrase "family law", because each deals with only one 
set of situations, i*e. the disposition of property where a testa­
tor bequeathed or devised a piece of property to a family under 
such circumstances that either the husband or the wife, or both 
of them are intended to be excluded. As we shall see shortly, 
these decisions can be explained in some way or another.
For example, in re Terry* s 'Will,*’ the testator couched
his bequest in the following term:
"I give and bequeath to the three children 
of my late cousin Hannah Johnson, the sum 
of £1,000 to be equally divided between them, 
share and share alike and in case they should 
die before me I give and bequeath their re­
spective portions to their respective families."
One of the children of Hannaih Johnson predecased the 
testator. It was held that the children by the deceased child 
took the deceased’s share to the exclusion of any other relative.
Another illustration is afforded by Williams v. Williams.
In that case, the testator stated in a codicil in the form of a
letter to his wife:
"It is my wish that you should enjoy every­
thing in my power to give using your judgment 
as to where to dispose of it amongst your 
children when you can no longer enjoy it 
yourself: but I should be unhappy if I
thought it possible that anyone not of your 
family should be the better for what, I feel 
confident, you will so well direct the dis­
posal of."
It was held in this case that family included "descend­
ants" of the wife, and was not confined to children, and that the 
wife was entitled to the property absolutely.
In both cases cited, as we have seen, it is cleair that the 
family as a social unit consisting of at least a husband and a
1. (1854) 19 Beav. 580.
2. (1850) 1 Sim (N.S.) 358.
wife, with or without children, was not the one envisaged by the 
respective testators. For in each case, an important element in 
this unit was out of the picture* In the first case, the parent 
of the legatee, i.e. the deceased child of Hannah Johnson could 
not come within this type of "family”. In the second case, the 
testator himself was missing from the social unit.
While holding that the word "family” can mean one thing
in a given situation, judges have, nevertheless, been aware that
the meaning can vary as the circumstances change. In Williams v.
W i l l i a m s Cranworth, V-C, had this to say:
"The word * family* is one of doubtful im­
part, and majr, according to the context 
mean children, or heir, or next^of-kin."
2
In Blackwell v. Bull, Lord Langdale, M.R., outlined the possible
meanings of the word when he said:
"It is evident that the word ‘family' is 
capable of so many applications that if 
any one particular construction were attri­
buted to it in wills, the intention of testa­
tors would be more frequently defeated than 
carried into effect ... under different cir­
cumstances it may mean a man* s household, 
consisting of himself, his wife, children 
and servants; it may mean his wife and 
children, ot his children excluding his wife; 
or in the absence of the wife and children, 
it may mean his brothers and sisters, or his 
next-of-kin, or may mean the genealogical 
stock from which he may have sprung."
The conclusion to which these cases and obiter dicta may lead one
is that there is no single and final legal definition of the word
"family". The meaning, therefore, depends on the context in
which one desires to use it* Thus, in the preceding cases, the
Courts were concerned with the construction of wills and they
interpreted the ssord "family" in order to give effect to the
1. (1851) 1 Sim (N.S•) 358.
2. 1 Keen 176 at p.l8*l.
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testators* intentions*
English lav;, as we have seen in Chapter 2, is part of the 
general law of Sierra Leone* Therefore, the discussion which 
we have undertaken may be of relevance to the interpretation of 
the word "family” when it is used in Sierra Leone law* But 
Sierra Leone statute and case law have given their own interpre­
tation and meaning in certain situations and let us examine them* 
In re Bangura (deceased) in re the Workmen Compensation 
Ordinance; 1939^  the issue before the Supreme Court of Sierra . 
Leone in its appellate jurisdiction, was whether the applicants, 
who were the wives of the deceased, could claim compensation under 
the Workmen Compensation Ordinance as members of the deceased* s 
family in the absence of children of the deceased* S.3(1) of 
the Ordinance defined members of a family as:
**(a) when used in relation to a native, 
any one of those persons mentioned in 
the first schedule***
**(b) when used in relation to any person 
not being a native, wife, husband, father, 
mother, grandfather, grandmother, step­
father, step-mother, son, daughter, grand­
son, grand-daughter, step-son, step-daughter, 
brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister*1*
The first Schedule to the ordinance read:
"Mother, father, wife, sonc, daughter, 
brother, sister, father’s father, father’s 
brother."
Allowing the claim of the applicants, Brace, Ag. C.J. held that 
the fact that wife is used in the singular did not mean that only 
a wife of a monogamous union could claim under the First Schedule 
as a member of the family. Wives of a marriage under native law 
and custom could claim as well. In a judgment that amounts to 
a recognition by the general-law courts of a customary marriage
1* Unreported. Decided on 7 April, 1945.
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for certain purposes, the learned Acting Chief Justice had this 
to say:
"The percentage of marriages by native 
law and custom is overwhlemingly greater 
among natives in the Protectorate than 
by Christian marriage and that must have 
been in the minds of the legislature 
when this Ordinance was passed# In my 
opinion, for the purposes of this Ordi­
nance, marriages by native law and custom 
must be recognised in both Colony and Pro­
tectorate and I consider that these appli­
cants were legally wives and as such mem­
bers of the family of the deceased as de­
fined by section 3(1) of the Ordinance#1*
In three cases dealing with the recovery of possession
from a statutory tenant of a dwelling-house on the ground that
the landlord required the house as a residence for his family, the
Sierre Leone courts have also had to consider the content of the
word "family11# The cases deal with s#12(l)(d) of the Rent Re- 
1
striction Act, which provides as follows
,fWhere the rental value of any dwelling 
house or shop has been determined under 
this Ordinance or is in course of being 
so determined,no order or judgment for 
the recovery of possession of such dwell­
ing house or shop or the ejectment of a 
tenant therefrom shall be made or given 
by any court unless - in the case of a 
dwelling house, it is reasonably required 
by the landlord for occupation as a resi­
dence for himself or his family or for 
some person engaged in his wholetime 
employment ###"^
3In the first case, Benjamin v# Renner, Graham Paul, C#J# 
rejected the plaintiff’s plea that he wanted the dwelling house 
for the occupation of his married daughter whom he contended to be 
a member of his family# The plaintiff, who was the landlord, 
wanted recovery of his dwelling-house from a tenant for the
1. Cap#52 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960#
2* This section was formerlyr«5*12(l)(d) of the Defence (Rent Assess­
ment) Regulations, 1941#
3# (1950) 3 S.L. Law Recorder, 26#
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occupation of his married daughter and her husband* Giving
reason for his decision, the learned Chief Justice said:
"It seems clear to my mind that the 
daughter’s husband is not ad hoc a mem­
ber of the family of his father-in-law*
The father is not required to provide a 
home for the residence of his married 
daughter.- That is the obligation of the 
husband*"
2
The second case is Spencer v* Gibson* In this case, Dobbs, Ag*
P.J. held that the mother of a landlord who cooked for him and
took care of his house was a member of his family for the purpose
of recovering possession of the premises which the landlord re-
3
quired for the occupation of him and his mother.
4In the final" case, Mohyeddin v* Nicol* Massally, J. was 
of the opinion that "family" in law consisted of a parent and 
children, and he ruled that according to the evidence before him, 
the house was not required for a child or "anybody of that cate­
gory". The learned judge did not explain what he meant by the 
phrase, "anybody of that category" whichl he used in his judgment. 
After the judge had made it clear that family consisted of a 
parent and children, it will be unsafe to hold that by that phrase 
wards and dependants are envisaged* Probably, he had in mind per­
sons engaged in the wholetime employment of the landlord, for these 
are specifically mentioned in the Act as persons for whose occupa­
tion recovery of possession of premises could be sought and ob­
tained*
Our conclusion on the definition of the word "family" in
f . Ibid* * p.27.
2* (1962) 2 S.L.L.R. £.84.
3. Dobbs, Ag. P.J. relied on the Dictionary of English Law by Earl 
Jowitt, Vol.l, p.784, which states:- "In English Law the word 
"family" is a popular and not a technical expression: Burt v. 
Hellyar, (1872) L.R. 14Ei^.l60."
4. 1968-69 A.L.R. S.L. 247.
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the general law, therefore, is that there is no single definition. 
The use of the word varies with circumstances, namely: the con­
struction of wills, statutory definitions and common law presump­
tions other than the construction of wills*
Traditional customary laws also form part of the law of 
Sierra Leone. We must examine, therefore, the definition of 
"family" in customary law also*
The difficulties that attend the definition of the word 
"family" in the general law are: also present in the case of custom­
ary law* The difficulties under customary law are even more 
accentuated because, under the general law, only one form of family 
exists, i.e. the elementary family, whereas under customary law 
there are other types of family. The word "family" is a term 
conveniently used in Sierra Leone customary law to describe a 
variety of groupings which may fall into one of two main cate­
gories: (a) residential family units such as households; (b) uni-
lateral descent groups such as clans and lineages.
If one asks a Loko man, for example, who the members of his 
family are, his immediate reaction will be to find out whether one 
is referring to his close and immediate relatives, like father, 
mother and children (nindegai), or to members of his household 
(ndugai) or to his lineage (nyalehunblg.). For the same cate­
gories of persons, the Mende man would enquire about his bondesia, 
mabla and ndehun blaa. respectively, while the Yalunka man would 
think of his dembayana, tandena and kabila* The Limba call mem­
bers of their immediate family and lineage impo. and their house­
hold, bonsho. The Susu use kabile and dembaya for descent 
group and residential household respectively* The Temne and 
the Sherbro have a generic name, abonsho and ramde respectively
1* This is the same under African customary laws generally* See
A.M. Allott, "Family Property in West Africa: Its Juristic 
Basis Control and Enjoyment" in J.N.D. Anderson (ed.) Family Law 
in Asia and Africa. 121, 125*
whenever they refer to any family relationship*
In a rather loose connection, the word family is also 
used by some tribes to mean one particular descent group, the 
clan* Among some tribes, a clan consists of a group of persons 
with a commonrsurname, dispersed in wide geographical areas, who 
claim their descent from an eponymous ancestor* As a rule, any 
particular clan belongs to a specific tribe but where a clan be- 
longing to one tribe has the same name as a clan belonging to an­
other, the members of both clans regard themselves as one* Thus 
Sayers * points out that:
"apart from the importance of the family 
name from an historical point of view its 
main feature socially is the bond which 
it creates between all men possessing it*
It is stronger than nationality or speech.
A Temne Kamara, and a Koranko Kamara, feel 
at least as much sympathy for each other 
as would be a Temne Kamara for a Temne 
Bangura * * * All Kamaras regard them­
selves as members of a brotherhood*11
The clan system was a common feature among tribes settled in the
North, the Kono of the East, and the Gallina of the South.
The Temne call a clan abuna and it is known by such names
as Kamara, Bangura, Kanu, Sisi, Kuroma, Lugbu, Sahno, Yalu and
2
Ture, to name some of them.
The name of a clan in Limba, Yalunka and Koranko languages
3is sie (pi* sienu)* Thomas mentions some Limba clan names as 
Kamara, Kargbo, Konteh, Utari, Biyelimbe, Ninken, Ukoda, Obali, 
Umun, Dema, Karn, Kemoin and Ninka. Some of these names are the
1* E.F. Sayers: "Notes on the Clan or Family: Names common in the
Area inhabited by Temne-speaking People", S;L;S;(0;S;), No*10, 
1927, 14 at p*36*
2* See M. McCulloch: Peoples of Sierra Leone, International Afri­
can Institute, London, 1950, pp.56-57.
3. Anthropological Report on Sierra Leone, Part I, London, 1916, 
pp.139-14o*
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names of animals, each animal being the totem of its clan.
Yalunka clan names listed by the same author * are Kamara,
Dumbwiva, Sise, Yatara, Kwiate and Yatana. These too are asso-
o
ciated with animals - totems of the clans. Thomas also men­
tions Koranko clans as Sise, Kurumu, Kaire, Mara, Toli, Monko 
and Dau.
The Susu call clan siya. Common Susu clan names listed 
3
by Sayers are Bangura, Fofana, Dumbwiya, Sanu, Yare and Kaba.
4Thomas tabulates Loko clan names as follows:- Kiowa, Lobo,
Yahipomo, Bandea and Burebo. The name of a clan among the ICono
5 *is dambl. Langley gwes a list of them as Nyenij Komaj Sawa, 
Koawa, Tangoe; Mangfune, Kawi, Yimini; Foade, Yokone; Ymane, 
Mongone; Pengusa; Dumbia; Dai; Kamala; Gbense; Siloe; Konde; 
Sanoe; and Takoe.
The Gallina too, seem to have had clans. Despicht men­
tions that three most important clan names among the Vai (Gallina) 
are Massagupi, Kpaka and Rogers.
There are characteristics of clans which need mentioning 
here. One is the rule of exogamy* Formerly, among such tribes 
as the Temne, marriage was forbidden between members of the same 
clan. Nowadays, however, the rule seems to be relaxed among some 
abuna. The other is the retention of the clan name by a married
woman. For example, if Bangura, a Temne man marries Kamara, a
Temne woman, Kamara will retain her maiden iame and will be called 
and known by it for all purposes.
Despite the afbre-mentioned characteristics and the fact
1. Ibid., p.140.
2. Ibid., p&41.
3. Ibid., pp, 54-77.
4. Ibid., p.141.
5. "The Kono People of Sierra Leone", Africa. 5, 1 January, 1932. 
p.61 at |?p. 62,63.
6. "A Short History of the Gallinas Chiefdoms" in S :h;S. (O.S.)
No.21, 1939, p.5.
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that members of the same clan regard themselves as belonging to 
the same brotherhood, the clan is outside the scope of our dis­
cussion of Sierra Leone family law, since this law deals with the 
most intricate relationship of husband and wife or wives.
Legal identity of the compound and other corporate families
Now we have to examine whether the entities which we 
sociologically call by the generic name "compound family", "ex­
tended family", and the "household family" and which exist in 
Sierra Leone, are each a single or multiple families as recog­
nised by law.
The compound family
At first it would appear that what is sociologically a 
compound family is, in law, a group of separate families each of 
which having as its basis a common factorf i.e. the same husband. 
One may be encouraged in this belief by the fact that in each 
separate family unit, as in the elementary family, could be found 
well-defined rights and duties as between the husband and wife 
from the day the particular marriage is contracted to the day it 
is dissolved. Secondly, since the different marriage contracts 
do not usually take place together, one would also tend to think 
that whenever the husband takes a wife, a separate legal entity 
comes into being. Thirdly, the argument for legal separation 
gathers momentum from the fact that dissolution of a union with 
one wife does not result in the breaking of the husband1 s legal 
relationship withthe other wives. Nevertheless, for the union 
with one wife to possess a distinct legal existence, not with­
standing the children and privileges that are the normal concomi­
tants of that union, no third party should normally benefit or be 
subject to liability! in consequence of the relationship. It 
should be for all purposes, simply a legal edifice having as its 
component parts the husband, the wife, children and probably the
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respective families of the spouses, with the hisband and wife con­
stituting its foundation.
The Union with each wife is both socially and legally 
linked with the unions with other wives. One consequence of 
this web is that each wife owes to, and is owed by the others, 
certain duties. This is illustrated by the position which the 
senior wife occupies in a compound family. A junior wife must 
be consciously and reverently aware of the superior position of 
the senior wife whose commands she must obey. Flouting her 
authority amounts to a wrong not only against the husband but in 
a graver measure against the senior wife, so that before the wrong 
can be expiated the wrongdoer must assuage the senior wife, some­
times with an apology alone and at other times, with an apology 
coupled with a fine, depending on the gravity of the wrong. An­
other result is the position of the children of the compound 
family. In determining seniority in the family, the group is 
taken as a single unit and not as separate institutions. Thus, 
the most senior child is not necessarily the first-born surviving
child of the most senior wife but the first-born living child in
........ .............................  ■ r ........
the group, even if its mother is the most junior wife.
Because of this inter-relationship, it will be quite in­
appropriate to maintain that a compound family comprises separate 
families for all legal purposes. It is better to consider its 
legal identity in a given set of situations. Where the husband 
and wife relationship alone is at the fare, each marriage should 
be regarded as giving rise to a separate family. But where it 
is the group that is the focus of attention, the association is 
analogous to a corporation in English law with the husband
1. C/f the position of the eldest sone of the "great" wife in the 
tribal law of the Kgatla. See I Schapera, Married life in-an- 
African~Tribe, London, 1939, pp.105; 174*
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enjoying a position similar to that of a preference shareholder.
Other corporate families
As we have seen, each of the other corporate families con­
sists structurally of two or more compound families. They are 
legally regarded as such except in the one case where the corpor­
ate body is deemed to be wider than the normal compound family. 
This is where property rights are concerned. If property is 
given to, say, "the X extended family", that property legally 
goes to the lineage. To follow the legal concept of the family 
in the matter of distribution of the property would, of course, be 
chaotic as thousands of claimants would be involved. Usually, 
in the case of personal property, it is distributed among the 
nearest ascertainable relations. If the subject-matter is land, 
it is preserved for the use and enjoyment of all members of the 
lineage group.
We can now arrive at the conclusion that apart from the 
disposition of property, in which case family may include any kin 
whomsoever, family lav/ in Sierra Leone deals with elementary and 
compound families, and it is in this light that we shall discuss 
Sierra Leone Family Law.
The legal significance of the family
The legal significance of the family stems from the fact 
that important legal issues between husband and wife and their 
relationship with third parties are decided by reference to it.
In customary law, for example, marriage affects the acquisition 
or disposition of property by a woman, the consent of whose husband 
is generally required in order to give the transaction legal 
force. This was the same under the general law with a married 
woman before 1933.*
1. See the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act, cap.
18 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
A roan who inflicts a wrong on a woman may also find him­
self civilly liable to the woman* s husband or to her father if 
she is unmarried and she is living under her father*s protection. 
Under customary law, again, certain offences committed against the 
state by injury to an individual were formerly deemed to be legal 
injuries to that individual*s family, for which the wrongdoer must 
make recompence either with his own life or with material compen­
sation.
In the general law, because of family connections, certain
persons may be held vicariously liable for the offences of others.*
Examples of the significance of the family may also be
found in the law of evidence: thus, in appropriate situations, a
spouse may be incompetent or uncompellable to give evidence in a
2
case in which the other spouse is involved.
Succession to property on a person's death intestate pro­
vides another example of the importance of the family. The fact 
that the deceased belonged to a family would determine the distri­
bution of his estate. It is only in rare cases that an outsider 
succeeds to the property of a deceased who dies intestate, and
when this happens, it is in the absence of a living ascertainable
3
member of his family.
Finally, there are rights and duties in favour and owed 
by spouses inter se and in respect of their children, all of which 
result from the family relationship*4
There are other areas of the law in which the family
1* e.g. s.23 of the Childrens and Young Persons Act, cap*44 of the 
revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960. See further, Chapter 12.
2. See the Courts Act, 1965, and Chapter 8*
3. e.g. In the Estate of Jacob Wyse (dcd.)» unreported, decided by 
Supreme Court at Freetown on 12 February, 1957.
4. These are discussed at length in PartsTWo andTtffcee herein.
5. e.g. In questions of citizenship and nationality.
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plays a significant role, and we have mentioned only some of the 
principal ones. We intend, in this thesis, to highlight the 
most important of these areas.
B. FAMILY LAW
Definition of family law
Though in English law the word "family*1 used by itself may
have various meanings, yet in that law *£he phrase "family law** is
used to describe the field of law which concerns only the most
intricate domestic relations as between husband and wife, and
1
parent and child. Thus, it is the sociological elementary 
family with which English family law deals. Certainly, this is 
part of the family law that would be considered in Sierra Leone, 
but only part; for African customary laws present what are not 
found in England, namely, the compound family and the extended 
corporate groupings of relatives with separate legal identities, 
and this is equally part of Sierra Leone family law.
Family law or family laws?
As there are different types of families in Sierra Leone, 
so there are different types of laws that relate to them. The 
general law, for example, principally pertains to the English-type 
family - the elementary family - while customary law, in general, 
and Islamic law, in specified axeas, regulate the traditional type 
families: the compound and other corporate families.
Again, what we call by the single name "customary law** is 
in substance, customary laws of the various tribes in the country. 
Basically, similarities may be found in the principles of these 
customary laws, but marked differences may also be discernible in 
their institutions and procedures.
1, See Bromley, op.cit., p.l.
In particular, Mende family law has infiltrated a good 
many neighbouring tribes like the Sherbro, Krim, Gola, Gallina 
and the peoples of the lower Kono land* This is not so much 
by reason of territorial contiguity as by the fact that the 
Mende were in the past of warlike tendency and cultural imperial­
ists - characteristics which resulted in their infiltration into 
the lands of other tribes* But whereas the Mende actively en­
couraged am institution like marriage between a man and his 
mother’s brother’s daughter, the Sheirbro, for example, frowned 
upon it as incestuous.
Similarly, there are similarities in the family laws of 
the Temne, Susu, Limba and Yalunktt, all of whom belong to a wide 
linguistic group - the Mande-speaking peoples. These similari­
ties together with points of differences will be dealt with in 
due course.
One reason for the similarities may be the influence of 
the Temne who, like the Mende, were also warlike. Another may 
be the religious and cultural impact of the Mandingo tribe from 
neighbouring Guinea.*
Over the years, there has been tribal migration to the 
Western Area. The result is that as the peoples of these tribes 
intermingle and mix with the Creoles in a milieu which is by tra­
dition non-native, major differences in custom are lost in the 
process and the element that remains becomes coloured with Christ­
ian ideas coupled with Creole customs.
1. The religion mentioned here is Islam. On the influence of 
Islam in West Africa generally, see J.S. Trimingham: Islam in 
West Africa, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1959. On Mandingo influ- 
ence m  Sierra Leone specifically, see C.H. Fyfe, The Sierra 
Leone Inheritance, p.4* The Mandingo tribe with its emphasis 
on the practise of Islam has had a tremendous influence on the 
tribes originally settling in the North of Sierra Leone.
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Reference has been made here to Creole customs, a point 
which deserves elaboration. The Creoles have their own customs 
in marriage, funeral, and in many areas of family life. The 
question we are faced with is whether these customs, at least the 
ones that are regarded as binding, fall within the definition of 
customary law so as to be recognised also by the Courts or whether 
they are attended by merely social and moral sametions? The 
first answer that may come to mind is that they are of no legal 
relevance; for the Creoles are not natives, and in addition 
their family relationships are principally regulated by the gener­
al law.’1' The latter statement may be true where the Creoles 
concerned areChristians and choose to marry in the statutory man­
ner. But where the Creoles are non-Christians and choose to 
"marry" otherwise than in church, registry, or mosque, the answer 
is not easily ascertainable. Since, as has been argued earlier, 
there is no law to prevent a Creole from marrying in a customary 
manner, it is necessary to investigate whethet there is a Creole
customary law which, in this case, can apply as customary law as 
2we know it. Customary law as is applied in Sierra Leone is
3
defined by statute ass
"Any rule, other than a rule of general law, 
having force of law in any chiefdom of the 
Provinces ..."
Does a Creole customary law come within this description# 
The phrase "having force of law in any chiefdom of the Provinces" 
may be subject to two interpretations: first, it may mean that
the law must be one which is recognisecjby and identified with a
1. The general-law courts would, therefore, not recognise as bind­
ing on them any Creole customary law.
2. i.e. Such law that can have a binding force on a customary law 
court.
3. S.2 of the Local Courts Act, 1963, No.20 of 1968.
particular area in the Provinces; for example, Mende customary 
law with Mende land and Temne customary law with Temne land. In 
short, the law must be genuinely and traditionally connected with 
a specific area of the Provinces, not necessarily the lex situs of 
the tribunal. Secondly, it may mean any law other than the 
general law which a local court sitting in the Provinces recog­
nises as binding in the particular case before it. If the first 
interpretation is preferred, then it is submitted, "Creole custom­
ary law" is not customary law in Sierra Leone, because it has no 
reference to any particular area in the Provinces. If, on the 
other hand, the second interpretation prevails, then the answer to 
the question depends on what view the local court takes. It is 
highly improbable, in our submission, thaCt a local court will rule 
in favour of the application of Creole customary law. It is a 
law foreign to it and to its judges. If such a case occurs, the 
local court, if it assumes jurisdiction, will apply either the 
local customary law or the general law. This, it ought to do in 
the situation where a Creole chooses to marry according to some 
tribal law.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that "Creole customary law" 
is of no legal import, though its moral and social relevance are 
felt everywhere in the community.
We may also conclude that the different laws already men­
tioned, namely, the general law, Islamic law and the various 
customary laws of the tribes together form a single body of laws,
i.e. "the law of Sierra Leone". It is, therefore, not out of 
place to use a single term "family law" to signify this embodiment.
PART TWO
NGN-CUSTOMARY FAMILY LAW
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
In comparison with other Commonwealth African, countries 
such as Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania, there has been little local 
legislative activity in the family law field in Sierra Leone.
To a large extent, therefore, the applicable general family law 
in Sierra Leone consists of the received English law, statutory 
and common.
It would seem neither desirable nor useful to attempt to 
recapitulate here the whole of the English law relating to marri­
age, divorce, children and succession, within the family as it 
applies in Sierra Leone; not only is this not necessary, but it 
would throw the work seriously out of balance. I have, there­
fore, called attention to the more significant features of English 
common and statute law as it has been imported to Sierra Leone, 
and which applies to those areas where there is no local statute.
Where there is provision for the application of Islamic 
law, I have also tried to call attention to the more significant 
features of that law in accordance with the Maliki school of the 
Sunni sect to which the vast majority of Sierra Leone Muslims be­
long.
I have tried to consider the suitability of each imported 
law and how it fits in with the rest of the legal system and with 
the social background of the people of Sierra Leone.
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CHAPTER 5 
STATUTORY MARRIAGE
Statutory marriage is used in this context to describe a 
marriage which is celebrated in accordance with the following Acts 
in force in Sierra Leone
11. The Christian Marriage Act
2
2. The Civil Marriage Act
3
3. The Foreign Marriage Act
44. The Foreign Marriage (Recognition) Act
5
5. The Marriage of British Subjects (Facilities) Act
fL
6. The Mohammedan Marriage Act
The Christian Marriage Act provides for marriage services 
conducted in church, and the Civil Marriage Act for marriages which 
take place before a Registrar. Marriages under both Acts are 
monogamous and are designed essentially for citizens of Sierra 
Leone. The Foreign Marriage Act deals with marriages by parties 
of whom one at least is a British subject, and it ensures that the 
marriage so conducted is valid in law as if it had been solemnized 
in the United Kingdom. The Foreign Marriage (Recognition) Act 
gives recognition in Sierra Leone to marriages entered into abroad 
between parties, one of whom at least is a citizen of Sierra 
Leone, provided the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the 
provisions of the United Kingdom Foreign Marriage Act, 1892. The 
Marriage of British Subjects (Facilities) Act provides for cases 
in which British subjects resident in Sierra Leone wish to marry
1. Cap.95 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. Cap.97 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leoner, 1960.
3. Cap.98 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
4. Act No.29 of 1966.
5. Cap.99 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
6. Cap.96 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
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British subjects resident in the United Kingdom. Under this 
Act, a certificate for marriage obtained in the United Kingdom 
is valid in Sierra ^eone as if the marriage is going to be con­
ducted in Sierra Leone. The Mohammedan Marriage Act does not 
lay down any rules or procedures governing Mohammedan marriages, 
but merely recognises the validity of such marriages for all 
civil purposes and permits all courts in the Western Area, and 
any other judicial tribunal constituted by law or consent of the 
parties to receive in evidence proof according to Mohammedan Law 
of the existence of such marriage*
Our particular concern in this discussion is with marri­
ages taking place under the Christian Marriage Act and the Civil 
Marriage Act, as it is marriages under these Acts and their legal
effects on the parties thereto and their children that constitute
N o n -
the main body of Sierra LeonQ/Customox'j Family Law. Of marriages 
under the Mohammedan Marriage Act, quite apart from specific areas, 
such as married women1s maintenance and evidence of spouses, the 
emphasis is on customary law.
When the Mohammedan Marriage Act speaks of "proof accord­
ing to Mohammedan law of the existence of a Mohammedan marriage**, 
one would normally e^ qpdct to see proof of a marriage in accordance 
with the canons of the sharia as interpreted by the Maliki School 
of the Sunni Sect. Such proof, of course, would be readily avail­
able in a country where Islamic law regulates the day-to-day af­
fairs of persons professing the Mohauamedan faith.
Quite apart from the fact that there are no Kadi courts 
in the country manned by personnel knowledgeable in Islamic Law, 
and that no qualification in Islamic law is prescribed for a Regi­
strar of Mohammedan Marriages whose duty is to register a Mohammed­
an marriage after satisfaction that it is in accordance with Islam­
ic law, the vast majority of persons who profess the Mohammedan 
faith are natives, the Aku Mohammedan elite from Freetown notwith­
standing. The native Muslims regulate their marriages and family 
transactions to a great extent in accordance with native law and 
custom. With the more advanced Muslim communities in Freetown, 
like the Aku and Mandingo, many of whom are well grounded in 
Islamic education, one would imagine that strict adherence would 
be made to Islamic law in the contracting of marriages; but as 
one prominent Muslim told the present writer,"we cannot do so with
•t
utter disregard of our custom". An amalgam of the provision 
of Islamic law and the customs of a particular Muslim community is 
in practice what is always deemed as a Mohammedan marriage.
A. HISTORY OF STATUTORY MARRIAGE
From the beginning of the settlement in Freetown in 1787,
it was the policy of the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company to
2stamp out polygamy and encourage monogamy. To this end, a 
chaplain was always at hand to perform the ceremony of marriage 
according to the rites of the Church of England. This was the 
only marriage regarded then as legal. The experiment on the 
early settlers from England and Nova Scotia was successful. The 
reason was that they professed Christianity. But not so on the 
Maroons who, for some reason or other, at first, did not profess 
themselves to be of the Christian religion. A Maroon man would 
cohabit with one or more women without going through the pre­
scribed form of marriage ceremony.
So disappointed were the Directors of the Company that in 
1801, the Governor and Council expressed dissatisfaction at the 
way the Maxoons had been conducting themselves. A Resolution
1* Personal information from Alhaji Nasiru, Imam of Fourah Bay 
Mosque, Freetown.
2. See L.E.C. Evans, S.L;S. (O.S.), No.18, 1932, pp.26, 72.
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of that year provided that :
’’every marriage henceforth to be con­
tracted among the Maroons, be solemn­
ised by the Governor of this Presidency, 
or in his absence by the senior member 
of council on the spot during the vac­
ancy occasioned by the want of a chaplain.”
The Resolution continued that,
”no marriage henceforth contracted be valid 
or legitimate or communicate to the off­
spring of each marriage the rights of in­
heritance or succession, unless solemnised 
as stated above.”
The Resolution seemed to have had very little or no impact 
at all on the Maroons; for they ignored it and preferred to con­
tract marriage before a justice of peace. Up to 1808, although 
these unions were apparently monogamous, since a justice of peace 
would not tolerate any part^to a marriage who appeared to him to 
be already in cohabitation with another spouse, they were not re­
garded as legal.
Thus gave rise to the Act of 8 October, 18081' This Act 
is the first documentary evidence of the existence of a Marriage 
Act Ai :Sierra Leone. Though its objects were to legitimise 
children of Maroons born before the first day of December, 1808, 
and to regulate marriage among the Maroons, the Act for the first 
time recognised the existence of a legal marriage between the 
parties where after talcing an oath in the presence of credible 
witnesses that they had no lawful wife or husband living, the 
parties to the marriage were registered as husband and wife by 
the Justice of the Peace.
It can be seen from the above that up to 1808 a legal 
marriage could take place in only two sets of situations. First, 
where the marriage was celebrated in accordance with the rites of 
the Church of England. Secondly, in the case of Maroons, where
the parties acknowledged each other as husband and wife before a 
Justice of the Peace.
________ A marriage celebrated by a Christian Minister of Religion
t* Fot ^  ’faLL t^w-fc of th is  Bct> ante* ft*- I I I  ~ .
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other than a Minister of the established Church of England, was 
still not legally recognised. Nor was a de facto:; marriage be­
tween a man and woman, which to all intents and purposes was mono­
gamous, but which had not been formally celebrated in a public 
place or registered either because the parties had not received 
perfect instruction in the Christian religion as was required in 
the case of marriage in church, or because of some other reason.
An Ordinance to regulate marriages in the Colony of Sierra 
Leone and Its Dependencies passed by the Legislative Council on
10 March, 1859, brought these marriages within the class of legal 
1
marriages. The Ordinance validated retrospectively a marriage
performed by a Minister of Religion other than a Minister of the
2
Church of England, commonly known as marriages by Dissenters.
So far as a de facto marriage was concerned, it became 
legal if within a year from the coming into operation of the Ordi­
nance, the parties solemnized the marriage ceremony before a 
clergyman of the Church of England, or any other Minister of the 
Christian religion.
The 1859 Ordinance for the first time required parental 
consent in the case of marriage of persons under age. Such con­
sent could be given by the Chief Justice of the Colony upon peti­
tion to him on that behalf, where a parent or guardian was non 
compos mentis, or absent from the Colony or otherwise incapable in 
law or in fact of consenting^or induced unreasonably and impro­
perly to withhold the consent, or was dead. Under the Ordinance
1. Ordinance of 10 March, 1859. See A. Montague: The Ordinances
of the Colony of Sierra Leone, Vol.II, 1858-1860, p.#3.
2. The Ordinance followed in the wake of the St. Helena Marriage - 
Ordinance No.l of 1850^ which took the first step in the Colon­
ies to enable Ministers of other Christian religious persuasions 
to celebrate valid marriages in a form other than in accord with 
the rites of the Church of England. See Zabel, Shirley:
"The Legislative History of the Gold Coast and Nigerian Marriage 
Ordinances”, [l969]j.A.L. 64.
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persons under age could only marry by special licence.
The Ordinance also provided for the compulsory registra­
tion of all marriages talcing place before Ministers of religion.
A marriage register book was to be kept in every place of divine 
worship where marriages could be celebrated. A marriage entry 
in the register should stipulate whether the marriage was had by 
banns or licence, and if both or either of the parties married by 
licence was under age, and not a widow or widower, that the requi­
site consent was obtained. These particulars must be followed 
by the signatures of the officiating Minister, the parties married, 
and two attesting witnesses.
The immediate forerunner of the present Marriage Acts is 
the Protectorate Marriage Ordinance, 1903.* This Ordinance, 
which was designed to regulate the law of marriage between Christ­
ians resident within the Protectorate, did not apply to natives 
except those Christian natives who obtained special permission 
from the District officer of the district in which they were 
resident.^
The provisions of the Ordinance were far-reaching indeed.
In addition to the usual stipulations with respect to registra­
tion, it required one of the parties to an intended marriage to
give notice in writing to the Registrar of the district in which
3
the marriage was intended to take place. After being satisfied 
by affidavit that (a) one of the parties to the intended marriage 
had been resident within the town or village where the marriage 
was intended to be celebrated for a period of at least fifteen 
days, (b) the requisite consent had been obtained where necessary, 
and (c) there was no impediment or any lawful hindrance to the
1. Ordinance No.19 of 1903.
2. S.43.
3. S.6.
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marriage, the Registrar issued a certificate.^ A caveat could
be entered against the issue of a certificate by any person whose
consent was necessary for the marriage, but which had not been ob-
2tained, in which case a court order was necessary# As an alter­
native to the Registrar*s certificate, the Governor could issue a 
licence#^
Other innovations included grounds on which a marriage 
was rendered null and void# These were:- (a) where the parties 
were within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity 
in accordance with the law of England; (b) where both parties 
knowingly and wilfully acquiesced in its celebration under a false 
name or names, or without tie Governor*s licence or the Registrar’s
Certificate as the case might be, or by a person not being a
4 5licensed minister# Penalties were imposed for bigamy, and in
the case of an unmarried person, for knowingly marrying someone
v/ho was already married,^ and for procuring marriage by the making
7 3of a false declaration, or by personation#
The present Christian Marriage Act and Civil Marriage
Act were enacted in 1907 and 1910 respectively. The latter is to ■i
..............................g  i
be read as one with the former# The Christian Marriage Act, / 
applicable throughout the country, repealed the previous marriage 
ordinances# Its distinctive feature with respect to parties was ' 
that whereas a non-native could marry under it after either the 
publication of banns or the obtaining of a licence, it was
1. S.10#
2. S.13.
3# S.13.
4, S.30.
5. S.38#
6# S.39.
7. S.40.
8 « S #44 #
9. S.l3 C a p . ^ T -  o { t h e ^ S £ d  o - f  L e o n e ,  1 9 1 ,0  .
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obligatory on a native to have banns published before marriage 
could validly take place. Likewise the Civil Marriage Act was 
not formerly applicable to a native, probably because the Act did 
not require the publication of banns. The reasons for these dis­
criminatory provisions have been held to be two-fold.'*' First, it 
wai felt that marriage was a transaction which affected both 
Church and State, with the Church having a more vital role to play. 
A native who was a Christian could be a first generation Christian 
as Christianity went into the Protectorate at a much later date 
than it reached the Colony. The Church, therefore, sought to 
exercise as much control over the native Christians as it had al­
ready done over the non-natives. With this aim in view, it was 
believed that the period which elapsed between the publication 
of the banns could be used to meet the parties to the intended 
marriage and instruct them in the Christian doctrine in order to 
enable them to appreciate more fully their responsibilities as 
Christian families. Secondly, since the publication of banns 
allowed for greater publicity than the issue of a licence, it 
provided ample opportunity for notifying relatives or other inter­
ested persons of the parties to the intended marriage who might be 
living away from the place of the celebration of the marriage.
Whatever be the merits of these arguments, when the country 
achieved independence, with the institution of a common nationality 
status, the need arose for a unification of legal status and the 
accompanying privileges in all spheres but, more so, in regard to
the opportunities of marriage. The Christian Marriage (Amendment)
2 3(No.2) Act and the Civil Marriage (Amendment) (No.2) Act have
1. Personal communication: This is the view held by Canon H.A.E. 
Sawyerr, Principal of Fourah Bay College. Canon Sawyerr spent 
a good deal of his missionary life in the Provinces at a time 
when natives were obliged to publish banns before they could 
contract Christian marriages.
2. Act No.48 of 1965.
3. Act No.49 of 1965.
now put natives on equal footing as non-natives with respect to 
these opportunities*
B. PRELIMINARIES OF A STATUTORY MARRIAGE
The engagement
2
An enagement or a gage or "put stop" as it is commonly
known in Mohammedan and Creole societies respectively normally 
t
precedes a stautory marriage* It marks the readiness of the 
parties to enter into the bonds of marriage* Sometimes also, 
where there has not been a promise of marriage previously made by 
either side, the ceremony constitutes that promises*
(i) Time of engagement -
(a) Christian and Civil marriages
The engagement takes place only when the parties have 
reached marriageable age. In olden days, a girl and a boy must 
usually be 18 and 21 years of age respectively before either 
could marry. These were the ages at which a girl or boy was 
considered ripe for confirmation in the Christian Church. A per­
son who was thus confirmed could marry thereafter as confirmation 
was regarded as the advent to adulthood. In recent times, how­
ever, confirmation no longer marks the attainment of puberty 
since young persons are now confirmed at an earlier age than before< 
The minimum marriageable age limit, nevertheless, seems to remain
3
unaltered*
The Amendment Acts now make it possible for natives to marry 
after publication of banns and to contract? marriage under the 
Civil Marriage Act. See s.l of Act No.48 of 1965, and s.l of 
Act No.49 of 1965.
2. Gage is a Creole word, an abbreviation perhaps of the English 
word "engagement11*
3. This is not a legal rule but one of practice and it may vary 
in accordance with the circumstances of the parties.
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(b) Mohammedan marriage
The gage takes place about a week after the "putting of 
the Kola" * if the marriage is imminent*
Where for some reason, the parties are not yet ready to 
marry, it may occur after a longer period has elapsed after the 
ceremony of putting the Kola* What is important is that the gage 
should take place very close to the time at which the parties in­
tend to marry.
(ii) Procedure
(a) Christian or civil‘marriages
On the day agreed upon by the families of the man and the 
woman, a delegation is sent late in the evening from the man1s 
family to the woman1s house where representatives of the woman*s 
family will be waiting to receive them. A covered calabash is 
brought containing a bible, the engagement ring, bitter kola, 
needles, alligator pepper (ataray) and a bottle of brandy or 
whisky. In return, the woman*s family provides some drinks.
On reaching the hoisa, the delegation is deliberately kept waiting 
outside for a while whilst all doors leading to the house are 
firmly locked. After a barrage of knocks at the main entrance, 
the mission discloses its intention metaphorically, saying that 
it has been sent in quest of a beautiful rose in the garden of 
the premises.
1. This is a ceremony by which the man and his family express 
their intention to have the woman as wife of the man. It is 
similar to betrothal in customary law. It simply takes the 
form of a delivery of two or more kola nuts with the message
of iriention through a messenger sent by the man* s to the woman's 
family. _
2. In Sierra Leone, the rose is regarded as one of the most valu­
able flowers. The prospective bride is referred to as a "rose", 
probably because of her value to her parents. Giving a rose to 
a person is a sign of affection. This practice probably origi­
nated from the Creoles who were the first to have held contact 
with Western civilization where it is common for friends to give 
flowers to friends.
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At first the delegation is not let in, on the ground: that 
it may consist of enemies who have gone to cause harm to the occu­
pants of the house. The mission insists that it intends no 
harm but has come for a worthy cause. After much exchange of 
words in order to establish the friendly and harmless nature of 
the visit, the delegation is finally allowed into the house.
The visitors renew their request for the beautiful rose, 
and one teenage girl after another is presented to them and re­
peatedly asked whether they have seen the rose. Each time they 
reply in the negative.
Eventually, the woman, elegantly dressed, is presented to 
them, and they exclaim that they have seen the object of. their 
mission. After a short prayer, the bible and the ring are handed 
over to the young woman and the ceremony ends with a party.
(b) Mohammedan marriage
When the gage is in contemplation the same messenger whose 
services were enlisted for the ceremony of putting the kola, is 
usually again sent to the family of the woman, in order to have a 
date fixed for the wedding. A date is not fixed on the first 
visit but the head of the woman* s family tells the messenger that 
the paternal and maternal families of the woman must first be 
consulted. He is shown the day on which he should return.
Meanwhile, a representative of the man’s family, usually 
an elderly man of standing in the community, fixes the date before­
hand with the head of the woman* s family, so that on the second 
visit of the messenger, he is shown the date and he communicates 
it to the head of the man’s family. Sometimes, however, especi­
ally if the marriage is to take place within a short time from 
the gage, time is vital and the date for the engagement is agreed 
upon with the messenger on his first visit. Apart from the 
date, the messenger is also told of the venue where the two
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families should meet in order to perform the gage ceremony.
Against the appointed date, the manls family prepares the follow­
ing items which must be given to the woman’s family:-
<c **(i) The dowry: The amount varies in accordance with the
financial situation or importance of the man or his family* 
Formerly, it used to range from Le.10 to Le.40. Nov;, the mini­
mum is about Le.40 and a prosperous man can give Le.200 or more.
In the olden days, coins * must be given as dowry. Nowadays,
2bank notes are acceptable, but no cheques are allowed. The
<cdowry”is primarily meant for the equipment of the bride and the
purchase of the paraphernalia of the matrimonial home. (ii) A
sum of money intended for the woman’s familyi This amount, though
* *a token gift, plays a similar role as the mature cons/rftYat/o* customary
A
law marriages, (iii) A calabash, containing at least 100 kola 
nuts. (iv) A calabash containing bitter kola, and alligator 
pepper (ataray)♦ (v) A calabash full of cooked rice flour
(fura). (vi) Two packets of sweet biscuits. (vii) A mug of 
ginger beer, (viii) An envelope containing the •gage: ring.
The Mandingo Muslims omit items (ivy and (vii), and in­
stead of calabash as container they use an Indian mat - in which 
they wrap the above items. Items (iv)-(vii) are symbolic of 
the ambivalence of married life with its mixture of strains, 
stresses and happiness.
On the evening of the appointed date, a procession pre­
ceded by unmarried girls carrying the above items and singing 
songs in praise of Allah and the prophet Mohammed, leaves the 
man’s house. When the group arrives at the venue, the messenger 
asks for admission, which is not granted at the first request.
1. Half-crowns.
2. Cheques are not allowed probably because of fear of iJidhonour.
After mailing repeated pleas for admission, he is eventually allow­
ed to enter along with his train. As if he has no prior know­
ledge of it, a representative of the womans family enquires into 
the purpose of the mission. The messenger from the man’s family 
replies explaining why they have come. Speeches are delivered 
first by a female and then by a male representative of the woman’s 
family. The request is eventually granted and the floor is then 
open to everybody to comment on the qualities of the woman.
The items which have been brought are checked and certi­
fied to be correct by a female elder of the woman’s family, after 
which the leader of the whole assembly (usually an Imam) concludes 
the business of the day with a prayer for the couple and their 
respective families.
(iii) bcgal effects -of the engagement•
In regard to marriages under the Christian and Civil
Marriage Acts, the engagement constitutes the promise to marry,
if there l  has been no previous promise breach of which might give
rise to an action for damages.* For a Mohammedan marriage no
breach of promise lies. The difficulties surrounding the choice
of law in the event of an alleged breach where the parties to the
agreement had not stipulated beforehand under which particular
legal system they intended to marry, have already been discussed
2
earlier in this thesis.
Our concern here,therefore, is the legal effect of the 
engagement where it has been established that the parties intended 
to contract marriage under either the Christian Maxriage Act or 
Civil Marriage Act. An agreement to marry is at common law like
1. See s,29 of the Christian Marriage Act, cap.95.
2. Chapter
any other simple contract. Thus, in order for the agreement to 
be valid there must be offer and acceptance accompanied by lawful 
consideration, intention to create legal obligations and legal 
capacity. The agreement must not be vitiated by misrepresenta­
tion, mistake, duress and under influence, and the object must be
\s
lawful.
Of particular interest, a promise to marry may be oral
but no action for breach of promise lies unless the testimony of
the complainant is corroborated by some other material evidence.*’
2
Thus, in Williams v. Macfoy, the plaintiff alleged that the defend­
ant had asked her to marry him, saying he had conceived a genuine 
love for her and that she agreed* It was held that two pieces 
of evidence, namely, a letter written by the defendant to the 
plaintiff’s mother, in which he said ”1 shall marry her” and the 
evidence of a witness who saw the defendant four years later when 
he admitted the promise but put forward two reasons for not carry­
ing it out, namely, that she had been rude to his mother and had 
used fetish, were sufficient material evidence to corroborate the 
promise. Mere silence is not an admission unless it is reason­
able to expect that if the statement made about the promise to
3marry were untrue, it would be met with an immediate denial *
The mutuality of the promises by each party to marry the 
other constitutes the consideration, although some other kind of 
valuable consideration may be given than an express promise to
1. Basse la v. Stern (1877) 2 C.P.D.245.
2* Unreported. Decided by the then Supreme Court at Freetown on
3 December, 1937* See the Supreme Court Records, Vol*2, 1937, 
p.198.
3. See Bowen, L.J. in Wiedemann v. Walpole [ 1891 ]2 Q.B. 534.
marry* Thus, in the English case of Harvey v* Johnston*^  it was
held that the plaintiff1s going to Ireland at the request of the 
defendant to marry him was valuable consideration for the promise* 
Perhaps because infants cannot be properly said to have 
reached the age of discretion so as fully to appreciate the respon­
sibilities of marriage, the law affords them protection if they 
are reluctant to execute promises to marry entered into during 
infancy*
At common law, an infant can sue but cannot be sued upon
a contract to marry* S.2 of the United Kingdom Infants Relief 
2Act, 1874, goes further to stipulate that no ratification made 
by a person after reaching full age of any promise or contract 
entered into during infancy, whether or not there is new consider­
ation for the promise or ratification, shall give rise to a cause
3
of action* Thus, in the English case of Coxhead v* Mullis, 
the parties became engaged while the defendant was still an infant* 
When he came of an age they continued on the same terms, as before* 
Later, the defendant broke off the engagement* It was held that 
their relationship after the defendant’s reaching his majority 
was no more than a ratification of the promise made during infancy 
and the plaintiff could not succeed in her action for breach of 
promise.
On the other hand, a fresh promise made by a party after 
he has come of age is actionable. This was the case in Ditcham
v. Worrall4 where three months after the defendant’s 21st birthday,
1* (1848) 6 C.B. 295.
2* Applicable in Sierra Leone as a statute of general application* 
3* (1878) 3 C.P.D. 439*
4* (1880) 5 C.P.D. 410.
he requested the plaintiff to fix a date for the wedding and 
assented to the date suggested by the plaintiff*
On grounds of public policy, there are certain agreements 
pertaining to marriage which the courts have regarded as illegal* 
So would be the case if one of the parties to an engagement to 
marry is already married** But not so where the marriage still 
technically subsists, though in reality it is dissolved, as in
the case where an engagement takes place after a decree nisi has
2 3been obtained by one of the parties* In Macfoy v* Reffell*
the then Supreme Court of Sierra Leone was faced with the novel
situation whereby the defendant, James Ref fell, promised in 1935
to marry the plaintiff, Olive Macfoy, but only in consideration
of her allowing him to have sexual intercourse with her, and upon
the condition that such intercourse should result in the birth of
a child* The plaintiff agreed to the proposal and allowed the
defendant to have connec&on with her in 1935, as a result of which
a child was born in 1936. A year later, the defendant affirmed
his willingness to be bound by the agreement of 1935, but he never
fulfilled his promise*
Relying on the House of Lords decision in the case of 
4Fender v. Mlldmay* counsel for the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant’s clear indication that he regarded himself as bound by 
the agreement made in 1935, given in 1936 after the illicit inter-
i
course had taken place, was free from the taint of the original 
bargain and could be sued upon as the basis of the claim in this
case. The court rightfully rejected counsel's contention on the
«T —    r -- ------—  --- ~i  -- -— ---- n i~ i 11 ■ j i--
• 1* Wilson v* Carnley Jl908 ] 1 K.B. 729*
2. Fender v« Mildmay [1937 ]3 All E.R. 402*
3. Unreported. ‘Decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 14 
August, 1942. See the Supreme Court Records, Vol*3 (1942), 
p*304.
4. [1937] 3 All E.R. 402.
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ground that the factual situations in both cases were different. 
Whereas in Fender's case, the plaintiff made two promises to marry 
before divorce proceedings were instituted, which were obviously 
illegal, but after the decree nisi, instead of affirming the pre­
vious promises, he made a fresh promise that he would marry the 
defendant; in the present case, no fresh promise was made after 
the illicit sexual connection which resulted in the birth of the 
child, but merely an affirmation of the promise made before the 
illicit sexual relations began. In the law of contract, a clear 
distinction is drawn between a fresh promise made after one taint­
ed with illegality and an affirmation of a promise that is origi­
nally illegal.* The former is enforceable, provided a fresh 
consideration is given for the fresh promise, whereas the latter 
is void and unenforceable even though a fresh consideration may 
be given for it. The Court, therefore, had no hesitation in 
holding that Macfoy failed in her action, though considering the 
justice of the case, Graham Paul, C.J. opined that the defendant 
had a moral obligation to provide some compensation to the plain­
tiff, since to her detriment she had relied on the defendant's 
word of honour.
This case serves as a warning to young women who, being 
desperate to marry, easily fall prey to the dictates and amorous 
blandishments of unscrupulous men. Socially, extra-marital inter­
course resulting in the birth of a child is not as reprehensible 
in present-day Sierra Leone as it migtt appear to have been twenty 
years ago. Evidence of the change of outlook could be seen in 
1965 when it was sought by legislation to make all children born
to a citizen of Sierra Leone, whether married or not, as legiti- 
2
mate. One may submit that the interests of society would be
1. See Anson's 'Lav? of "Contract (23rd ed. by A.G. Guest), 1969, 
pp. 364Q367.
2. For details, see Chapter 12, p
166*
better served if legal validity were afforded to contracts such 
as the one in Macfoy&s case than if they were totally disallowed. 
This is not, of course, a plea for the encouragement of promis­
cuity and immorality* Where it is found, sis in Macfoy* s case, 
that the parties’ avowed intention is to marry - which could have 
been upheld but for sun immoral condition attached to it - the 
condition ought to be declared void without prejudice to the valid­
ity of the contract itself based on the mutual promises to marry* 
Miss Macfoy was surely by any standards more virtuous than a 
woman who, without any such condition being imposed upon her, 
voluntarily gives herself to a man after mutual promises of marri­
age have been made,and who must succeed in law in an action for 
breach of promise if the man later refuses to marry her.
(iv) Remedies"for-breach
A breach of promise occurs where one party unjustifiably 
refuses by words or conduct to marry the other after the making of 
the contract to marry. A promise to marry which does not ascer­
tain the time is a promise to marry within a reasonable time
1 . . .upon request. The breach may also be anticipatory as m  the
case where one party marries someone else other than the plaintiff
2
whom he had promised to marry. No specific performance but
only damages axe awarded for a breach of promise of marriage. In
this regard, s.29 of the Christian Maxriage Act provides:
T,In no case whatsoever shall any suit or 
proceeding be had in any court or before 
any jurisdiction whatsoever to compel the
celebration of any maxriage by reason of
any promise or maxriage contract entered 
into, or by reason of seduction, or of 
any cause whatsoever which shall arise 
after the passing of this Ordinance, any 
law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding*
7--------------- :------------------------- :----------------------
* Harrison v. Gage (1698) 1 Ld. Eaym. 386.
2. Short v. Stone (1846) 8 Q*B. 358.
Provided always that nothing herein con­
tained shall prevent any person aggrieved 
from suing for, or recovering, damages in 
any court, or by any proceeding wherein 
and whereby damages may be lawfully re­
covered for breach or promise of marriage 
or for seduction or other cause as afore­
said."
(v) Justification for breach
A person against whom a breach of promise action is taken 
is entitled to two types of defence. First, he can set up any 
general defence available to a defendant in an action for any 
breach of contract, namely, incapacity, misrepresentation, mistake, 
duress, undue influence and illegality, or he can plead that be­
cause of what had transpired between him and the other party after 
the agreement came into force, he ought to be exonerated if he 
now refuses to execute his promise. Thus, in the English case 
of Davis v. Bomford it was held a good defence and evidence of 
discharge by agreement where the plaintiff and the defendant had 
discontinued correspondence for a long time. Such discontinuance 
of correspondence, it is submitted, must occur through the deli­
berate act and intention of the parties, so that if the parties 
stop seeing or writing to each other for some extraneous reason 
as, for example, one of them is on an expedition in a distant or 
remote place from where it is impossible to communicate with the 
other, an agreement to discharge each other cannot be inferred 
however long the break in correspondence may be particularly if 
the defendant is still single.
The defendant can also plead that before the defendant 
issued the writ,' he, the defendant offered to perform the con-
2tract of marrying the plaintiff but that the plaintiff refused.
1. (1860) 6 .H & N 245* _
^aylor v. Davies. 1950-56 ALR S.L. 124 per Kingsley, j; approv­
ing Halsbury* s Laws of England, 2nd ed., Vol.16, p.558*
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Secondly, the defendant can show that since his entry into the 
agreement with the plaintiff, he has discovered a special pecu­
liarity with the plaintiff which justifies him in refusing to 
1
marry her* Thus, one party may prove that the other suffers from
some moral and physical infirmity which makes him or her unfit to 
2marry. At common law, it would also be a good defence if the 
plaintiff is insane. It is doubtful, however, whether in Sierra 
Leone, insanity would be a good defence since it is not a ground . 
for divorce under the Christian and Civil Marriage Acts.
(vi) Damages for breach of promise
The common-law position on the question of damages for 
breach of promise of marriage was put quite succinctly by Wills ,J.
3
in the case of Berry v. Da ’Costa:
f,The jury are not limited to the mere 
pecuniary'loss which the plaintiff has- 
sustained, but may take into consider­
ation'her injured feelings and wounded 
pride.”
Thus the damages recoverable may go far and beyond what a 
plaintiff in an action for breach of other contracts would be 
entitled to. These may be classed under two heads, namely,
4
general damages and special damages.
Under general damages would fall claims for loss of con­
sortium and in the case of the woman, for deprivation of the 
status of a married woman. In assessing these damages, regard 
will be had to the position of the offending party, usually the 
main, in the community; for a man of standing who has promised
1. See Bromley, 3rd ed., p.21* , _
2. See Jefferson v» Paskell [19163"1 K.B. 57, direction of Philli- 
. more, L.J. C;A. at pp.70 and 73.
3. (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 331, 333.
4. On the common law position for damages for breach of promise of 
marriage generally, see Bromley, Family’Law, 3rd ed., 1966,
pp.23-25.
his hand in marriage to a woman, should expect the woman to live 
up to the expectations of both the man and other members of the 
society. So that a man who lives in grand style and who jilts 
his fiancee would be expected to leave her, as fair as monetary 
compensation is concerned, in no inferior situation as she would 
have been if the marriage had taken place. The position of the 
woman and her prospects of marriage^insofar as they are affected 
as a result of the breach, are also important factors in deter­
mining the quantum of damages. A virgin who has been seduced and 
abandoned is likely to receive more by way of damages than a com­
mon prostitute finding herself in a similar position. Punitive 
damages may even be awarded in the former case, whilst in the 
latter only a solation for the treatment meted out to her will 
be awarded. Thus, in Williams v. Macfoy.* Macquarrie, J* re­
fused to award purftive damages in a case where the defendant re­
fused to marry the plaintiff who had had two children by different 
men. Special damages may be awarded to recover expenses incurred 
by the plaintiff in contemplation of the marriage. Thus, the 
engagement ring, bible, furniture to be used in the matrimonial 
home and financial transactions entered into for the purchase of 
the bridal dress and household paraphernalia are items recoverable 
under this head. So would be expenses incurred on the hiring 
of halls for the entertainment of guests at the wedding feast, the 
printing of invitation cards for the wedding, and the purchase of 
provisions and refreshments for the celebration. It is doubtful 
whether a claim for special damages would lie for the maintenance 
and education of an illegitimate child who is a product of an
1. Unreported.* Decided on 3 December, 1937, by the‘Supreme Court 
at Freetown. See the Supreme Court Records, Vol.2 (1937^, p.198,
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intimacy between the plaintiff and defendant in contemplation of
■f 1marriage; In Macfoy v* Ref ell a claim for special damage tinder
this head was made in the pleadings but was dropped by the plain­
tiff1 s counsel before consideration could be given to it by the
2court. Also in Williams v. Macfoy the court did not give a 
ruling on the issue since it was found as a fact that the defend­
ant was given adequate financial assistance to the plaintiff in 
order to maintain the two children born of their intimacy. On a 
balance of probabilities, however, it would be safe to assume that 
Sierra Leone courts would not award damages in such a case. A 
proper remedy, in my submission, would be for the mother to seek 
and obtain an affiliation order against the putative father in 
bastardy proceedings.
Gifts: Generally speaking, at common law, where a person
voluntarily and without fraud, duress or undue influence makes a 
gift of property to another, such gift is not recoverable if the
3
donor changes his mind. On the other hand, if the gift is not 
transferred to the intended donee but the donor merely promises to 
do so, the donee cannot succeed in an action for breach of con­
tract should the donor fail to transfer the gift, unless the 
promise was under seal or consideration for the promise has been
4
given by the donee. These rules apply with equal force to 
gifts between engaged couples but with one reservation. In the 
case of gifts which axe in contemplation of marriage, the English 
case law before 1979 seems to be that they are recoverable by the
1. Unreported. A decision of the Supreme Court at Freetown on 
. 14 August,*1942.
2. Unreported; Decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 
* 3 December, 1937*
3. Milroy v. Lord (1862), 4 De G.F. & J. 264.
4. Ibid.
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innocent party if the marriage does not take place*
But in Sierra Leone, the position is not so clear-cut*
2In Cole v* Macauley the plaintiff's step-son was engaged to the 
daughter of the defendant. After the engagement, the relatives 
of the prospective husband sent money to the defendant for the 
purchase of the bridal dress* The prospective wife admitted that 
the money was paid to her and that she spent it* The marriage 
did not take place because the plairfcLff broke off the engagement. 
In the Magistrate's Court, judgment was given in favour of the 
plaintiff, but on appeal to the Supreme Court, Graham Paul, C.J. 
in reversing the decision, had this to say obiter: ’'There may be
or may not be some recourse against the prospective bride if she 
was to blame for the contract of marriage failing."
Apart from this case, there is a dearth of authority on 
the issue. The reason for allowing the recovery of these gifts 
is that they are conditional gifts which become absolute only on 
the celebration of the marriage. At times, it is difficult to 
draw a sharp distinction between a gift which is in contemplation 
of marriage and one which is not; for the question that Always 
comes to mind is whether one party would have given the other any 
gift whatsoever if marriage had not been in the contemplation of 
both parties. Pre-engagement i§ifts, of course, would steer 
clear of this doubt, as these are based on merely friendly con­
siderations, but not so with gifts sifter the parties have become
engaged. The answer has been sought in the nature and character
3
of the gift. Bromley suggests that if the gift is made to
Jacobsv. Davis [l917j 2 K.B. 532; Cohen v. Sellar fl926] 1 
K.B. 536; RoEinson v. Cummings -(1742)t 2 Atk. 409.
2. Unreported; decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 
- 6 August, 1940.
Family’Law. 3rd ed., p.28.
I
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the donee as an individual, then it is an ordinary gift and can­
not be recovered unless the giving was induced by fraud or undue 
influence, but if it is made as the donor's future spouse then it 
is one in contemplation of marriage and recoverable. Therefore, 
gifts such as an engagement ring and furniture for the matrimonial 
home could be gifts in contemplation of marriage* whereas gifts 
such as jewellery and clothes as ordinary gifts. This classi­
fication, it is submitted, is difficult to defend unless there 
is clear evidence that the donor did not contemplate marriage when 
making the gift. Since by their engagement the parties have 
shown a clear intention of their readiness to marry, every sub­
stantial gift that passes between them thereafter ought to be re­
garded as in contemplation of marriage, unless a contrary intent-
2
ion is shown by evidence to the satisfaction of the Courts. 
Conclusion
As with many areas of the general law, actions for breach 
of promise of marriage a place in Sierra Leone Family Law
as a result of the adoption of the English common law in Sierra 
Leone. In this conclusion, we shall examine whether there is 
justification for their continued existence in Sierra Leone Law. 
These actions have been abolished in England by s.l of
*  ,  7
the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, following 
the recommendation of the United Kingdom Law Commission. It is, 
therefore, an irony that they are still maintainable in Siena
1. Ibid.
2. English law on this matter is very much revolutionized at pre-' 
sent; S*3(l) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous ProvisionsJ; Act, 
1970, mow provides that "a party to an agreement to marry who 
makes a gift of property to the other party on the condition 
(express or implied) that it shall be returned if the agreement 
is terminated shall not be prevented from receiving the pro-
. perty by reason only of his having terminated -fche agreement."
3. Law Com. No.26 (Breach of Promise of Marriage), 1969.
Leone. We are not suggesting their abolition in Sierra Leone 
merely because they have been abolished in England. On the con­
trary, we intend to assess the arguments both in favour and 
against their retention before reaching a conclusion as to their 
place in Sierra Leone Family Law.
The main arguments in favour of their retention in Eng­
land were stated by the Law Commission as follows:- (i) the 
action provided a means whereby a girl who became pregnant during 
the engagement might be able to recover more from the main than 
she could obtain from affiliation proceedings alone;^  (ii) there
was the need for the law to provide a remedy for some of the finan-
2
cial hardships which might result from the ending of an engagement. 
The salient arguments for their abolition have been summarised by 
3
Cretney as being: (i) that it was contrary to public policy to
a^low the threat of legal action to force marriage on an unwilling 
4party; (±<i) that the threat of an action was sometimes used tfto 
compel overly-apprehensive and naive defendants into making settle­
ments in order to avoid the embarrassing and lurid notoriety which 
accompanied litigation."^
The arguments for the retention of the actions sure, in our 
submission, completely inapplicable to Sierra Leone. Firstly, in 
the few actions for breach of promise of marriage that have been 
tried in Sierra Leone, general dsimages have not been awarded. On 
the contrary, the courts have shown a tendency to depart frm the 
principle for the award of general dsimages as established by
1. Ibid., para.13.
2. Ibid., para.18.
3. 33 M.L.R. 534.
4. An early statement to this effect was made by Lord Mansfield 
in Atchinson v. Baker (1796) Peake Add. Cas.103.
5. Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 136 A 2d.127 (1959) edited by Cretney, 
op.cit.T p.534.
1 2 Willis, J* in Berry v. Da Costa* Thus in Taylor v. Davies,
Kingsley, J* showing a distaste for the action, said:
"There has long been a school of thought 
which has held that breach of promise 
actions should be abolished, the argument 
being that the plaintiff has invariably 
escaped to her benefit, of course, what 
must have turned out a disastrous marri­
age* I am satisfied that this is the 
case here, so that even had I found for 
the plaintiff the damages.on a general 
score, at any rate, would have been 
purely nominal*"
That the attitude of the Sierra Leone courts remained the same
even where a child was born to the engaged couple before the man
was in breach of promise to marry is evidenced by the judgment of
Graham Paul, C.J* in Macfoy v* Reffell, to which case we have al- 
3
ready referred.
Secondly, as to the financial hardship which may result 
from the ending of the engagement, a party can, if she is able to 
prove damage and that there was an intention to create legal re­
lations, sue in contact for the recovery of such financial loss; 
but a blanket action for breach of promise of marriagewould not 
be an appropriate remedy*
We, therefore, submit that actions for breach of promise 
of marriage ought to be abolished in Sierra Leone since they do 
not seem to be serving any useful purpose* We adopt the main 
arguments for the abolition of the actions in England and^in par­
ticular, we stress the idea of public policy* Experience has 
shown that marriage is one institution into which people should 
not be forced to enter if they are not fully prepared or have the
1* (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 331, 333; see ante, p
2. 1950-56 A.L.R. S.L. 124.
3, Ante, p./6S^
slightest disinclination for it; it will not be in their own 
interest and in the interest of society. In this regard, Sierra 
Leone customary law seems to be far ahead of the general law. In 
customary law, the parties are free to break off their betrothal 
at any time without incurring liability for breach of promise.
We must, however, concede that although we advocate the abolition 
of the breach of promise of marriage action, a party in breach 
ought not to benefit from his conduct to the financial disadvan­
tage of the innocent party* Therefore, gifts and presents given 
in contemplation of marriage by the innocent party to the party in 
breach ought to be refunded.
CHAPTER 6
THE ESSENTIALS OF A VALID STATUTORY MARRIAGE
A. MARRIAGE UNDER THE CHRISTIAN AND CIVIL MARRIAGE ACTS
(i) Preliminary Formalities
In Sierra Leone, the degree of state control which is 
exercised over the preliminary formalities of marriage under the 
Christian Marriage Act is very slight. Religious bodies enjoy 
a considerable amount of latitude in this respect. Unlike other
L
British ex-dependencies like Nigeria, where the parties to an 
intended marriage must obtain either a certificate from the Regi­
strar of Marriages or a licence from the Governor of a region, 
in Sierra Leone, the parties to an intended marriage have a choice 
either to obtain a licence from the Registrar of Marriages, or to 
have banns of marriage published. Banns may be published in a 
public place of worship, but such a place need not be officially 
approved for the purpose.
If the parties elect to have banns of marriage published, 
one of them must, two days at least before the first publication 
of the banns, supply to the minister, who ordinarily officiates at 
the place of worship where the publication is to take place, full 
names of the parties intending to marry together, with a descrip­
tion of their respective places of residence.* Banns must be 
published in a place where the parties have resided for at least
15 days before the first publication, and if they have resided
2in different places, banns must be published in these places.
If the parties are of different persuasions, then banns must be 
published in each of the public place of worship of their respect-
3
ive religious denominations. The publication of banns must
1. S.4 of the Christian Marriage Act.
2. Ibid _... s.5(1).
3. Ibid.
take place on three successive Sundays during divine service and 
before the congregation.*
Where the parties choose to marry after obtaining a li­
cence, one of them must appear personally before the Registrat- 
General, if in Freetown, or a District Commissioner, if in the 
Provinces or Sherbro Island, and must make a statutory declara- 
with respect to the absence of an impediment of consanguinity or
affinity or any other lawful hindrance to the marriage and that
2the necessary consents have been obtained, where necessary.
Upon satisfied with the facts stated in the declaration, the 
appropriate issuing authority grants the licence.
As can be seen, it is more expeditious to marry after ob­
taining a licence than after publication of banns, since in the 
former no residential qualification is required. The publicity 
that attends the publication of banns is also absent in the case 
of the licence.
The maxriage may be celebrated within three months of the 
date of the last publication of banns or of the date of the li­
cence, and the celebration must take place in the presence of at 
least two witnesses. S.9 of the Christian Marriage Act provides 
that it shall be lawful for a minister of a Christian denomination 
to celebrate the marriage within three months of the date of the 
licence. It is interesting to note that marriage celebrated 
after the expiry of the period is none the less valid, though 
the celebrant will be guilty of an offence under s.15 of the Act. 
But a marriage that is not celebrated in the presence of two wit­
nesses at least is void. Bvery marriage that is celebrated in 
a place of public worship must be registered by the officiating 
minister in a maxriage register book kept in that place for that
1. S.5(2).
2. S.6f»)*&>
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purpose.* Non-registration does not invalidate the marriage.
It is inconceivable, however, whether this will ever occur since
"signing11 of the marriage register by the parties to the marriage,
their relatives and close friends has^in Sierra Leone, become
fashionable and a prominent feature of Christian marriage cele- 
2
brations.
Marriage under the Civil Marriage Act takes place after
the obtaining of either a Registrars certificate or Presidents
licence. For the purpose of the certificate, the country is
3
divided into districts, each having a Registrar of Marriage.
The Western Area constitutes a district and its Registrar is the 
Registrar-General. The District Commissioners in Sherbro Island
and the Provinces are the Registrars in their respective districts.
A party to an intended marriage must give a signed notice 
of intention to marry to the Registrar of the district in which he
4
or she wishes to marry. After receiving the notice, the Regi­
strar must enter it in a Marriage Notice Book and must display a 
copy of the notice on the outer door of his office, where the 
notice should remain until the certificate has been granted, or
5
until a periodcf three months has elapsed.
In order to obtain the certificate, one of the parties 
must appear personally before the Registrar and swear an affida­
vit admitting the following facts j- (a) that one of them has
1. S.11.
2. The custom is prevalent in Sierra Leone, whereby relatives and 
close friends of a bride and bridegroom,who attend the marriage 
ceremony in the church, sign the marriage register immediately 
after the couple. To those who are called upon to sign, it
is an indication of their closeness and importance to the fami­
lies of the bride and bridegroom.
3. S.3 of the Civil Marriage Act.
4* S .4.
5. S.6.
179
resided within the district where the marriage is to take place 
for at least 15 days before the granting of the certificate;
(b) that (i) in the case of a party to the intended marriage 
whose personal law is customary law, he or she is not less than 
18 years of age; (ii} in every other case, he or she is not less 
than 21 years of age; (c) where one of the parties is under the 
age of 18 or 21^ as the case may be, that the necessary consent 
has been obtained or dispensed with; and (d) that there is no 
impediment of consanguinity or affinity or other lawful hindrance 
to the marriage
The Civil Marriage Act does not specify what is any!,other 
lawful hindrance to the marriage" on account of which the Regi­
strar can refuse to issue his certificate* As this Act is not 
intended to be self-sufficient, reference should be made to the 
Christian Marriage Act in order to ascertain what any other lawful 
hindrances axe* It is submitted that they axe grounds on which a
marriage is rendered void* Commenting on an identical phrase
2appearing in the Nigerian Marriage Act, Kasunmu and Salacuse 
maintain that the grounds are not necessarily grounds which would 
render a marriage void, since the Registrar could refuse a certi­
ficate on the grounds that the residential requirement under 
s*ll(i)(a) of the Nigerian Marriage Act has not been complied with 
and non-compliance with that section does not invalidate the mar­
riage. It is submitted that this interpretation cannot apply to 
the Sierra Leone situation* Whereas, the phrase is used alone 
in s*ll(0fe)of the Nigerian Marriage Act so as to render such 
interpretation reasonable, in the Sierra Leone Civil Marriage 
Act the phrase is used after the express mention of impediments
1 *S.?c^ ftH&)*amended by s*2 of Act No*48 of 1965*
2. Niger ian ~Family -Law, London, Butterworths, 1966, pp.64, 65.
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of consanguinity and affinity which are grounds that render a 
marriage void. It is a principle of statutory interpretation 
that where a particular class is spoken of and general words 
follow, the class first mentioned is to be taken as the most 
comprehensive and the general words treated as referring to
i
matters eiusdem generis with such class. "Any other lawful
hindrance", therefore, would be a hindrance that makes a marriage
void in the same manner as. consanguinity or affinity. Since the
grounds stated in the Civil and Christian Marriage Acts which can
invalidate a marriage are: (a) non-obtaining of the Registrar’s
Certificate; (b) impediments of consanguinity or affinity; (c)
the existence of a previous marriage between one of the parties
to the intended marriage and a third party; (d) celebration of
marriage under a false name or false names with the knowledge of
the parties; and (e) celebration in the presence of less than 
2
two witnesses; and (a) is not a necessary prerequisite for a 
Registrar’s certificate,whilst (d) is inapplicable to the issue 
of the certificate^' it is submitted that "any other lawful hindr­
ance" would be (i) the parties knowingly giving a false name or 
names, and (ii) one of the parties being already married.
Before he issues the certificate, the Registrar must see 
that no objection to the maxriage has been filed in the Marriage 
Notice Book. S. 10 of the Civil Marriage Act empowers any person
who objects to the marriage to enter a caveat against the issue 
of the Registrar’s certificate by writing the word "Forbidden" 
opposite the entry of the notice in the Marriage Notice Book.
The person who enters the caveat must state in the book his name 
and address and the grounds on which his objection is founded.
1. See Maxwell: The - Interpretation of Statutes. 12th ed*. London, 
1969, p.297.
2. S.10 of the Christian Marriage Act, and s.15 of the Civil Mar­
riage Act.
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When this happens, the Registrar must refer the matter to the 
Chief Justice who examines the justification for the caveat by 
calling upon the person who enters it to show cause why the Regi­
strar’ s Certificate should not be issued. Upon being satisfied 
that the objection is groundless, theChief Justice must order the 
removal of the caveat and the Registrar becomes free to issue the 
Certificate.1,
The Certificate must be issued, if at all, not before 21 
days and not after 3 months from the date of the notice. The 
marriage must be celebrated within 3 months after the date of the 
notice. S.8 of the Civil Marriage Act provides that if the mar­
riage is not celebrated within 3 months of giving notice, the 
notice and all proceedings consequent thereupon shall be void 
and fresh notice must be given before the parties can lawfully 
marry. This section appears to be in conflict with s.10 of the 
Christian Marriage Act which, after enumerating grounds on which 
a marriage shall be void (not including celebration after a period 
of three months from obtaining banns or licence), provides that:
"Save as aforesaid every marriage celebrated 
under the provisions of this Ordinance shall 
be valid until it be lawfully dissolved."
It must be remembered that s.l of the Civil Marriage Act 
provides that that Act must be read and construed as one with the 
Christian Marriage Act, the latter being referred to as the prin­
cipal Act,
It is submitted, however, that since it is a principle of 
statutory interpretation that where two statutes are in conflict 
the latter prevails; s.8 of the Civil Marriage Act supersedes 
s.10 of the Christian Marriage Act since the Civil Marriage Act 
is the latter statute. The effect, therefore, is that whereas 
for marriages under the Christ ism Marriage Act celebration after
1. S.ll.
3 months from the date of the last publication of banns or licence 
is not fatal to the marriage, celebration of marriage under the 
Civil Marriage Act 3 months after notice of intention has been 
given makes the marriage void*
The President* s * licence may be obtained in lieu of the 
Registrar*s Certificate* No notice is required as in the case of 
the Registrar*s Certificate but before the licence is obtained, 
an affidavit must be sworn before the Registrar-General that there 
is no lawful impediment to the proposed marriage and that the 
necessary consent, if any, has been obtained* It is not clear 
whether only one party to the intended marriage should make the 
affidavit. Probably, the affidavit of one will suffice.
It is noteworthy that the affidavit must be sworn before 
the Registrar-General only and not before any of the other Regi­
strars in the other districts, although any one of them can be 
named in the licence as the person before whom the marriage can 
be lawfully celebrated*
For marriages under the Foreign Marriage Act, a notice of
intention to marry must also be given by one of the parties to
2
the Registrar-General. The party giving the notice must have 
had his or her usual place of abode in any town or village in the 
Western Area for at least one week* The notice must contain 
particulars with respect to the names of the parties, their mari­
tal status, occupation, age, residence and whether consent, if 
any, has been obtained* The usual procedure then follows as in 
the case of a Civil Marriage for the obtaining of the Registrar’s
1. £.9 of the Civil Marriage Act empowered the Governor to issue 
this licence* Because of the constitutional changes that 
have taken place since the passing of the Act, the power is 
now exercised by the President. See s.15 of Constitution 
(Consequential'Provisions) Act, 1971; Act No.9 of 1971.
2. S.2 of Cap.98 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
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Certificate.
How fax these formalities, apparently borrowed from 
English law, fit Sierra Leone circumstances is a question to 
which we should now address ourselves.
Firstly, the primary object of the introduction of these 
formalities in England was to avoid clandestine marriages which, 
in any event, are very rare indeed in Sierra Leone. In Sierra 
Leone, marriage is an elaborate social occasion and hardly can 
two people perform the ceremony without the knowledge of many 
people either in their neighbourhood or from fax away.
Secondly, the Registrar of marriage in the Western Area 
is the Registrar-General of Sierra Leone, and that of each dist­
rict in the provinces is the District Officer of each respective 
district* The duty imposed on the Registrar by the Marriage Act 
is just incidental to their numerous administrative activities 
and almost invariably, in practice, that duty is delegated by 
them, though unlawfully, to some junior officer in their depart­
ments since the Registrars themselves may be too busy on some more 
important matter in and out of their offices. Note that a dist­
rict officer is expected to make frequent tours throughout the 
chiefdom in his district. It is only in very rare cases, and 
there is evidence that they occurred only during the colonial 
period, that the Registrars were zealous that the formalities 
under the Marriage Acts were complied with.
One example in which an expatriate district commissioner 
in 1938 insisted that the letter of the law was complied with was 
an incident in which a Roman Catholic Priest was threatened with 
prosecution under the Christian Marriage Act, because he had cele­
brated a marriage at Bonthe Sherbro between two Syrian nationals, 
one of whom had not resided in Bonthe for at least fifteen days, 
as required by the Christian Marriage Act, and the banns of the
marriage had not been published on three consecutive Sundays but 
three times of which two were not on Sundays.
Replying to a query * on the issue, the Reverend Father
Bauman, the Roman Catholic Priest concerned, said:-
f,It is perfectly true that the said marriage 
took place on last Sunday, 9th instant, and 
the duplicate certificate has already been 
sent to the Registrar. In doing such, I
believed to be perfectly in the keeping of
the law. I had been told that the law re­
quires either a licence or three consecutive 
publications. These (publications) were 
given on New Year* s Day, the Sunday follow­
ing, and on Epiphany, last Thursday, the day 
of public worship. Such I had been told 
long ago was required and not necessarily 
three Sundays.
From the wording of s.5(2) of theChristian Marriage Act,
the information given to the Reverend Father on the publication
of banns was definitely wrong since that section specifically 
requires publication on "three successive Sundays" or "three 
Sundays following each other" on which church services sire held.
Not being satisfied with the explanation of Father Bauman, 
the District Officer, Bonthe, who seemed to have taken the correct 
view on the matter, appealed to the Honourable Commissioner, 
Southern Province, who, in turn, asked for a legal opinion from 
the Attorney General*s department.
The opinion contained very important points and it is
3
necessary to quote it in full:
The Solicitor-General advised as follows:
1. The query is contained in a letter written by Mr. D. Cox, the 
District Commissioner, Bonthe. The letter is dated 11 Janu­
ary, 1938.
2. Fatther Bauman* s letter is dated the same day, i.e. i’l January, 
1938. Both letters are found as Memo of P.2. file J.A/4 and 
Memo of P.3. file J .A/4 kept in the District Commissioner’s 
office, Bonthe Sherbro.
3. The opinion is Minute of P.9. file J.A/4 dated 25 January, 
1938.
11 In view of the explanation given by Father 
Bauman which would probably be accepted by 
the Court, I do not advise a prosecution*
With reference to the District Commissioner’s 
statement in paragraph 4 of his memorandum 
No.B 131/1938(4) of the 12th January, 1938 
that ’under cap*25 section 10, the marriage 
is obviously invalid’* this is not the case*
It is now settled law by a long series of 
decided cases that despite any statutory 
provisions to the contrary, a marriage is 
valid although solemnised without either 
banns or licence, unless both parties were 
aware of the defect at the time of the cere­
mony (Greaves v*. Greaves (1872) L.R.P.D.
423)* !rhe test as to validity in all - 
cases of alleged breach of statutory provi­
sions under the Marriage Acts is ’what did 
the parties believe at the time* as the 
following case will show:- where a ceremony 
of marriage between a Protestant and a Roman 
Catholic was performed by a Roman Chtholic 
man, according to the rites of his church, 
in the sacristy of a Roman Catholic chapel 
at four o’ clock in the afternoon in the pre­
sence of witnesses, but with closed doors; 
and no notice was given to the registrar, 
nor certificate issued by him: Held not
withstanding the absence of the statutory 
formalities the marriage was valid (In’rep 
Knox (27 English and Empire Digest, bS)
Sgd* A.R.W. Sayle,
Solicitor General
25/1/38 ”
The opinion of the learned Solicitor-General was, in our 
submission, wrong* He was obviously misled in his application of 
English law to the instant case, because he had no justification 
for the application of that law*
First, from the reception statute, which prevailed in 
Sierra Leone at the time when he wrote the opinion, English sta­
tues as at 1 January, 1880, applied in Sierra Leone only when
1* Now s*10 of the Christian Marriage Act, Cap#95 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, which states that marriage without 
the publication of banns or licence is invalid*
2. (1889) 23 L.R.Ir* 542.
3. Act No*9 of 1881*
there was no local enactment on the matter at issue* But
there was a Sierra Leone Act on the matter, i*e* the Christian
Marriage Act*
Secondly, the English statute on which the decision in
Greaves v* Greaves * was based was s*22 of the Marriage Act, 1823,
which provided that:
”If any persons shall knowingly and wilfully 
intermarry * * * without due publication of 
banns or licence *** the marriage of such 
persons shall be null and void*11
True, the Judge in the case of Greaves v. Greaves held
that the marriage was valid under this provision because one 
party was not aware that a licence was necessary and the marriage 
which was to have taken place after the obtaining of a licence 
was celebrated without it. But the basis of the judgment was 
that s*22 used the words knowingly and wilfully which indicated 
that both parties to the marriage must with knowledge wilfully 
marry without compliance with the said formalities*
But the Sierra Leone Act is couched in a completely dif­
ferent language* S*10 of the Christian Marriage Act reads
”No marriage celebrated in a public place 
of worship of a Christian denomination 
shall be valid -
(a) unless the parties thereto have caused 
banns of marriage to be duly published 
or herein before provided or have ob­
tained a licence **.”
It is quite clear from this provision that theSierra 
Leone Act does not use the words ’’knowingly** and ’’wilfully” and 
it will, therefore, be inaccurate to apply the decision in 
Greaves v* Greaves to its interpretation.
In English law, the absence of these words in a statute
1. (1872) L.R.P.D. 423.
have been held to mean that they should not be supplied by the 
courts thus demanding mens rea and attributing an intention to 
the legislature which it never possessed when passing the statute 
concerned*
11 If a statute contains an absolute prohi­
bition against the doing of some act”, ob­
served Lord Goddard, ”as a general rule, 
mens rea is not a constituent of the of­
fence.” 1
This has always been the rule in non-criminal cases* It 
is only in the interpretation of penal statutes that the require­
ment of guilty intention and knowledge has been emphasised even 
though a statute might be silent on the issue* In some penal 
statutes, one or more of the words ’’knowingly, maliciously, fraud­
ulently or negligently” are used, but in others the legislature 
may leave unexpressed some of the mental elements* In the latter 
case, the English courts have turned on the wording of the parti­
cular enactment or, where there is ambiguity, uponthe governing 
intention of the Act in which it is contained or the set of Acts 
relating to the subject matter* The reason why the court goes 
into all this trouble is to protect the liberty of the individual 
because of the punitive nature of a penal statute* As Goddard, 
L.C.J. put it:
”It is of the utmost importance for the 
liberty of the subject, that a court 
should always bear in mind that unless 
a statute either clearly or by necessary 
implication rules out mens rea **« the 
court should not find a man guilty of an 
offence against the criminal law unless 
he has a guilty mind.”2
But the general attitude of the English courts has been 
that even in the case of penal statutes, the courts should tread
1* Harding v. Price Il948 ] I.K.B. 695, 701* 
2* Brend v. Wood (1946 ) 62 T.L.R. 462, 463.
188.
warily in supplying mens rea when it is not stated by the legis­
lature* This point was made quite clear in R* v* Sleep:
"Mens rea may be dispensed with”, said 
Cockburn, C.J., "by statute, although - 
the terms which should induce us to in­
fer that it is dispensed with must be 
very strong."1 *
The recent tendency in England is to interpret the express words
of the statute without inferring an intention* Thus in Warner v*
Metropolitan Police Commissioner. Lord Wilberforce said:
"There is no need, and no room for an 
enquiry whether any separate requirement 
of mens rea is to be imported into the 
statutory offence. We have a statute 
absolute in its terms. No separate pro­
blem of mental elements in criminal of­
fences in my opinion arises: the statute
contains its own solution as to the kind 
of central penalties by the courts."2
We can give scores of examples in which the English
courts have interpreted even a penal statute as its words clearly
expressed and only inferred an intention of guilty knowledge,
where the statute does not express it, in order to safeguard
the liberty of the subject. But there is no example in which
these courts have applied the same principle of inferring the
presence of a guilty knowledge or intention in non-criminal cases
where the section of the statute or the necessary implication
from the statute as a whole does not warrant it*
Coming back to our main point, we observe that in s.10
of the Christian Marriage Act, the grounds on which a Christian
Marriage is void are clearly stated, and the section goes further
to say that the breach of no other matter not stipulated in that
section should invalidate the marriage. This is, of course, a
non-penal statute. It will, therefore, be wrong to infer words
like "knowingly" or "maliciously" into s*10* Consequently, in
1. (1861) L & C 44, 53.
2. [ 1968] 2 W.L.R. 1303, 1353*
that section, knowledge and wilfulness are irrelevant and marri­
age contracted without the formalities of publication of banns or 
obtaining a licence is void.
1
Similarly, the decision of In re Knox was misapplied by 
the learned Solicitor-General in his opinion on the Sierra Leone 
Act, because that case was concerned with the interpretation of 
s.39 of the United Kingdom Matrimonial Causes relating to Marri­
age in Ireland Act, 1870, in which it was stipulated that:
"... any marriage solemnized by a Protest­
ant Episcopalian clergyman between a person 
who is a Protestant Episcopalian and a per­
son who is not a Protestant Episcopalian, or 
by a Roman Catholic clergyman between a per­
son who is a Roman Catholic and a person who 
is not a Roman Catholic, shall be void to 
all intents in cases where the parties to 
such marriage knowingly and wilruliy inter- 
married, without due notice to the regi- 
ster, or,without a certificate of notice 
duly issued ...”
By coincidence, however, in Sierra Leone, a marriage 
contracted without notice to the Registrar or without a certifi­
cate of notice duly issued is not void, not because of the deci-
2sion in In re "Knox or the United Kingdom Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1870, but because that defect in formalities is not one of those 
recognised by s.10 of the Sierra Leone Christian Marriage Act as 
rendering a marriage invalid. But under s.22 of the Sierra 
Leone Christian Marriage Act, a prosecution would lie against the 
person responsible for such defect.
Our conclusion is that it was the District Commissioner, 
Bonthe, and not the Solicitor-General,that was right after all.
One other difficulty in applying English formalities to 
Sierra Leone is exemplified by what is meant by "a public place 
of worship” as is used in s.9 of the Sierra Leone Christian Mar­
riage Act. In England, the expression "registered building"
1. (1889) 23 L.R.Ir. 542.
2. Ibid.
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is used as including any place certified by a Registrar-General 
as a place of "religious worship"  ^and the Registrax*s Office.
In Sierra Leone, there is no definition in the Christian 
Marriage Act or by the Courts for the esqpression "public place of 
worship". One would probably think that it is a place where 
people usually meet in order to offer prayers in the manner of a 
particular religious denomination - what one would normally call 
a "church". But in Sierra Leone, though Christianity has perme­
ated most of the country, churches are not found in every town or 
village where there are Christians. It is of common occurrence 
that Christians living in a village spend weeks, or even months, 
without holding a church service because of the unavailability of 
a church in the area or of a resident priest. For sometime now 
the practice has been in vogue, whenever practicable, of holding 
religious services in ordinary places, like a house or even a 
court-barri in the Provinces*
In 1938 again, the District Commissioner of Kailahun
wanted to know the legal consequences of such practice and wrote
2to the Honourable Commissioner, Southern Province about it. The 
District Commissioner, as Registrar of marriages for the Kailahun 
district, had been asked to grant marriage licences for a Christ­
ian ceremony to be performed in one case in a room in a private 
house, and in another case, in a court-barri and he had accord­
ingly granted the licences.
3
The Honourable Commissioner, in his reply, could not 
find any law to disallow the licence to be granted in such circum­
stances but he. referred the matter for A n opinion to the 
Attorney-General•
1. Places of Worship Registration Act, 1855.
2. Memo of P.17 file J.A/4 dated 22 February, 1938*
3. Memo of P.18 file J.A/4 dated 27 February, 1938.
A. Selwyn Bodley, the learned Crown Counsel on behalf of
the Attorney-General advised that,
"A public place of worship is a building
or other similar structure or any part
thereof which has been specially desig­
nated sind set aside by a group of persons 
of the same religious denomination for 
the observance of religious rites and 
ceremonies and to which the public at 
large have access or axe accustomed to 
resort without interference.11
While we do not quarrel with the definition pxefferect by 
the learned Crown Counsel particularly when s.9 of the Christian 
Marriage Act contains,immediately following the phrase "public 
place of worship", the words "belonging to the said denomination",
we concede that in view of difficulties prevailing in Sierra
Leone, which we have already pointed out, adherence to this defi­
nition will reduce the celebration of valid Christian marriages 
to a minimum.
It is our contention that these difficulties can be cir­
cumvented if Ministers of religion would register certain places, 
like a private residence or a court-barri as places of public 
worship belonging to a particular religious denomination* This 
can be done under s.27 of the Christian Marriage Act, which states:
"Ministers who desire to celebrate mar­
riages under this Ordinance shall forward 
from time to time to the Registrar-General 
adequate descriptions of the place or 
places of worship wherein or in respect of 
which maffrage register books are intended 
to be kept "
If a religious service can be held in a private house or 
in a court-barri as it frequently happens now in Sierra Leone, 
should such places not be constituted ad hoc public places of a 
religious denomination for the purpose of marriage under the Act?
1. Minute of P.20 file J.A/4 dated 28 February, 1938*
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One may ask*
In conclusion, we submit that some of the present formal­
ities need re-thinking and that the local social conditions in 
Sierra Leone should be taken into consideration* For example, 
there is no justice in making a Christian marriage void on grounds 
of non-compliance with the formalities regarding publication of 
banns and obtaining of a licence* These formalities m?iy be neces 
sary in England because of the social background of the people 
and the large population of that country which make it possible 
for clandestine marriages to be contracted if the formalities 
were not followed* In Sierra Leone, however, with its small 
population and the social tendency of publicising marriages, 
the law ought not take the strict view as it does at present*
With this difference in social background which makes the law in 
regard to the formalities more suitable to England than forSierra' 
Leone, why should innocent non-compliance with the formalities of 
publication of banns or the obtaining of a licence render the 
marriage void in Sierra Leone but not in England?
There are many instances in Sierra Leone when one or 
other of these formalities has not been complied with, mainly 
through ignorance of the law on the parties concerned, and yet 
following the religious ceremony the spouses have lived together 
for yeaxs as married couples* Would it be just to invalidate 
such marriages because an unscrupulous spouse now finds in the 
non-compliance with the requisite formality a loop-hole for de­
claring the marriage void when it suits his convenience? This 
is a question for the consideration of the legislature and in a 
future law reform, retroactive validity ought to be given to such 
marriages*
( i i ) Capacity
(a) Age
The Marriage Acts do not contain any express provision 
as to the age of marriage* In the absence of such provision the 
English common Law rule would seem to be applicable in Sierra 
Leone by virtue of s*74 of the Courts Act, 1965*
At common Law, in order to contract a valid marriage, the 
parties must have reached the age of rationed consent which was 
fixed at 7 y e a r s T h e  marriage, nevertheless, remained void­
able until the parties reached the age at which it might be con­
summated, which was 14 years for boys and 12 years for girls* 
"Voidable" in this sense has a special meaning: it means that
either of the parties could avoid the marriage without taking 
any nullity proceedings in court. If the. parties cohabited to­
gether and consummated the marriage after attaining to the requi-
2site ages, then the marriage became valid.
A slight improvement on the common law for the marriage 
of females would appear to be made by the Prevention of Cruelty
.............. 3.......................  ................to Children Act. S.6 makes it a felony for anybody "unlaw­
fully" to have sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 
13, whilst s.7 creates a misdemeanour for a person "unlawfully" 
and carnally to know a girl under the age of 14. The effect of 
both sections, therefore, would seem to be the prohibition of 
"unlawful" sexual intercourse with a girl under 14 years of age. 
These sections, however, are open to three interpretations. 
Firstly, that sexual intercourse taking place within marriage is
1* See J. Jackson: The Formation and Annulment of Marriage.
London, Butterwortbs, 2nd ed., p.26,
2. For the age of marriage at common Law, see generally: J.Jackson 
op.cit., pp.25-26.
3. Cap.31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
not prohibited because this cannot be "unlawful", in which case, 
proof of marriage between a man and a girl under 14 negatives an 
offence* Secondly, that the sections do not prohibit marriage 
with a girl under the age of 14, but the marriage cannot lawfully 
be consummated until the girl has reached that age* Thirdly, 
that marriage with a girl under 14 is prohibited since sexual 
intercourse is incidental to the status of marriage* It is sub­
mitted that the first interpretation is to be preferred otherwise 
there would not have been the need for the use of the word "unlaw­
fully". If this view is correct, then the common Law position
%
with respect to the age of maxriage remains unaffected by thePre- 
vention of Cruelty to Children Act since this Act does not state 
a minimum age at which a valid marriage cam be performed.
( b ) Status
Under this heading will be discussed the types of persons 
who can validly contract a statutory marriage.
As we have seen in Chapter 5, before 1965, natives could 
not contract a valid marriage by licence under the Christian Max­
riage Act, nor could they marry at all under the Civil Marriage 
Act. The Mohammedan Marriage Act has always been open only to 
persons who profess the Mohammedan faith.
The 1965. reforms were aimed at the unification of the 
classes of persons who can validly contract maxriage under the 
Christian and Civil Maxriage Acts. S»1 of the Christian Marri­
age (Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1965, now extends marriage by licence 
to every ♦person* but makes it a condition to the issue of the 
Registrars certificate, for a party to the intended marriage 
whose personal law is customary law to make a statutory declara­
tion that he or she is not a party to a subsisting marriage 
whether by customary law or otherwise. The Civil Marriage 
(Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1965, also includes persons whose personal 
law is customary law in the class of persons who can contract
marriage under the Civil Marriage Act but, unlike the Christian 
Marriage (Amendment) (No*2) Act, imposes no obligation on them to 
declare that they axe not parties to a subsisting marriage* This 
condition is imposed in a previous amendment, i*e* the Civil Mar­
riage Amendment Act, 1965,* and no reason seems to be adduced for 
its being dropped in the later Act* The omission would probably 
have been due to an oversight* Since the Civil Marriage Act must 
be construed as one with the Christian Marriage Act, one can fore­
see that the Courts would read this condition within the provisions 
of the Civil Marriage Act*
S*1 of the Christian Marriage (Amendment) (No*2) Act does 
not state whether non-compliance with-its provision makes the mar­
riage void* This section repeals and replaces s*6 of the prin­
cipal Act and it consists of other grounds on which a marriage 
may be void or valid namely^ consanguinity or affinity (a diriment 
impediment) and non-consent where necessary (a merely prohibited 
impediment)* S*7(3) of the Christian Marriage Act and s*15 of 
the Civil Marriage Act are of some guidance here* These sections 
provide, infer alia; that no marriage shall be valid under the 
respective Acts "between persons either of whom is already married 
to some person other than a party to the intended marriage."
"Already married" in this provision would,before 1965, be
interpreted to exclude marriage under customary law because s*16
of the Christian Marriage Act states that customary marriage is
not a marriage on which the crime of bigamy can be founded. That
section provides that,
"Whoever is guilty of bigamy shall on con­
viction be liable to imprisonment, with or 
without hard labour, for any period not ex­
ceeding seven years. For the purpose of 
this section, a marriage made in accord­
ance with native law and custom shall not 
be deemed to be a marriage*"
Similarly, s.17 of the Christian Marriage Act imposes a
f- f re t  NO• 12 cr^  ( .
penalty on an unmarried person going through a marriage ceremony 
with a person whom he or she knows to be already married to an­
other person. This section, too, does not regard marriage in 
accordance with native law and custom as marriage for the purpose 
of an offence tinder that section.
The overall effect of ss.16 and 17, therefore, was that
before 1965, it was possible to marry by customary law and with-
*
out going through any special process of divorce, a party thereof 
could leave the other spouse and marry another in church; by banns, 
and the latter marriage wan legal and with impunity. By maiking 
marriage under customary law now a ground of prohibition from any 
other form of monogamous marriage, the Christian Marriage (Amend­
ment) (No .2) Act has, in our submission, set a customary marriage 
on the saime plane as a monogamous form of marriage insofar as a 
diriment impediment to a monogamous marriage is concerned. The 
position would, therefore, now appear to be that before a party 
to a customary marriage can validly contract a monogamous marri­
age, at any rate with a third person, he or she must first of all 
obtain the appropriate divorce from the spouse of the customary 
marriage; otherwise, the customary marriage will be a bar to 
any subsequent monogamous marriage as longas the customary mar­
riage subsists.
The Amendment Act in this respect hats been lamented an a 
serious threat to the effort of the Christian Church in eliminat­
ing polygamy. One prominent clergyman strikes a rather dis­
appointing note when he says :
"Here there is no room for a Christian 
marriage aifter marriage by native custom­
ary law. It seems, therefore, that at 
best the church is only able to bless 
the marriage, if the parties are Christ­
ians unless the proposed formula * I 
acknowledge thee* is adopted. In view, 
however, of the multiple valency of 
marriage by Native Customary law, the
Christian demands of marriage are seriously 
threatened. The protagonists of polygamy 
for African Christians will find much re- * 
lief in this aspect of the Amendment Acts."
It is now very clear from the above, that marriage con­
tracted with a third party under either the Christian Marriage Act 
or the Civil Marriage Act by one person during the subsistence of 
a customary marriage with another person, renders the subsequent 
statutory marriage void.
What, however, still remains uncertain is the fate of a 
statutory marriage contracted in accordance with either the Christ­
ian or Civil Marriage Act by the same persons aufter they have enter* 
ed into a customary union. This is of very common occurrence 
among natives in the Provinces who are Christians. Whenever they
wish to marry, they usually undergo the customary form first,
2atfter which they celebrate the marriage in church. Prior to 
the Christian Marriage (Amendment) (Ho .2) Act, 1965, marriage in 
accordance with the Christian Marriage Act preceded by a customary 
law marriage between the same parties was valid because for the 
purposes of capacity under the principal Act, a prior customary 
marriage was no marriage at all. What then, we may ask, is the 
effect of s.l of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act 
read in conjunction with s.7(3) of the Christian Marriage Act and 
s.15 of the Civil Marriage Act?
The three sections are open to two interpretations. One 
is that a subsisting customary marriage between the same persons 
is a bar to a subsequent marriage in accordance with the two
1. Harry Sawyer: "Sierra Leone's Marriage Laws: Amendment Acts,
1965", in The Sierra "Leone Bulletin of -Religion. Vol.7, No.l, 
June, 1965, p.22.
2. The illiterate natives regard the Church ceremony as a blessing 
of their customary-law marriage, whilst those who are educated 
regard the church marriage as the real marriage which is pre­
ceded by the customary ceremony only to please their relatives 
who may be illiterate.
Marriage Acts. The other is that so: long as the subsequent 
marriage is between the same parties the existing customary mar­
riage between them does not affect the validity of the subsequent 
statutory marriage. If the object of the amending Act was 
merely to give recognition under the general law to a customary 
marriage, the subsistence of which between, say, X and y makes 
it impossible for X to contract marriage under the Christian or 
Civil Marriage Act with Z but not to prevent X and Y from enter­
ing into such marriage, then the second interpretation is to be 
preferred. In our submission, this must have been the inten­
tion of the legislature since both s.7(3) of the Christian Marri­
age Act and s.15 of the Civil Marriage Act contain the phrase 
"other than a party to the intended marriage".* If the second 
interpretation is correct, then the possibility arises for two 
marriages between the parties to be subsisting side by side.
The Sierra Leone courts have not as yet ruled on the fate of the 
two marriages.
In a country like Nigeria where statutory law clearly 
states that a customary law marriage between two persons is a
bar to a subsequent marriage under the Marriage Act between one
2of them and a third person, it is possible for the same parties 
to a subsisting customary law marriage to contract a subsequent 
marriage under the Marriage Act. A case which was decided by 
the English High Court in 1960 is of guidance. In Qhochuku v. 
Qhochuku the parties were Nigerians who after contracting a 
customary law marriage in Nigeria went to London and married again
1. In order to remove all doubt the words "with a third party" 
should have been used immediately after the words "subsisting 
marriage" in s.l of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2)
Act j 1965.
2. Ss.11(a) and 33(1) of the Marriage Act, cap.115*
3. [i960] 1 All E.R. 253; [i960] 1 W.L.R. 183.
in a registry. There was no doubt as to the validity .
of the customary marriage^the parties entering into the registry 
marriage only for the certificate which the wife wanted as proof 
of her marital status while in England. When the wife later 
petitioned for divorce on the ground of the husband's cruelty, 
Wramgham J. dissolved the registry marriage, thus indicating 
that it was hitherto valid.
Much ink has been spilt over the correctness of this 
decision by writers,* and it is not our intention to join in the
o
debate beyond the extent that we are in agreement with Agbede, 
who has correctly pointed out that those who attack the decision 
do so from certain misconceptions. Firstly, the critics mis­
apply to the instant case decisions wherein the English courts 
have held a subsequent monogamous marriage void in one case when 
it was preceded by amother monogamous marriage, and in another 
case when a spouse already polygamously matrried purported to 
enter into a subsequent monogamous maurriage with a third person. 
Secondly, they assumex that a subsequent monogamous marriage can 
convert a pre-existing customary law marriage between the saune 
parties only when the maurriage takes place in Nigeria and not, as 
in the instant case, in England. Thirdly, they thtnfe that, 
by upholding the subsequent marriage, Wramgham J. recognized two 
inconsistent statuses of marriage created by the customary marri­
age and the registry marriage.
In fairness to the learned judge, the only conclusion 
that one can legitimately draw from his judgment is that he re­
cognized the subsequent monogamous marriage because the parties
1. Webb (1960) 23 M;L.R. 327; Griew, (1960) 9, I.C.L.Q;. 508; 
Furmston, (1961). I.C.L.Q;. 185; Kasunmu'& Salacuse, Nigerian 
Family Law. 95, 97; Agbede, 17, I.C;L.Q.. 735.
2. 0p;cit.. 736 et seq.
had capacity under English law to contract it since neither was 
a party to a pre-existing monogamous marriage with the other or 
to a potentially polygamous marriage with a third party. His 
Lordship left the fate of the customary marriage undecided though 
he commented that,from I)is information,that marriage too was 
dissolved automatically by his decree. The relevance of this 
decision to our instant discussion is the information which 
Wrangham J. received (probably from Dr. Elias, the expert witness 
in the case), that the court's decree would dissolve the custom­
ary marriage also. Recently, in Teriba v. Teriba & Rickett,* 
the Nigerian High Court, Aguda J* commenting on the effect of a 
customary-law marriage followed by a registry marriage between 
the same parties said:
"the true position is that the customary 
marriage is converted by the Act marriage 
which in effect supersedes it. Therefore, 
if the Act marriage is subsequently dis­
solved, the customary marriage cannot 
revive."
If the views in the Qhochuku and Teriba cases are cor­
rect, then the customary marriage would still be in existence 
during the registry marriage, but?instead of continuing to be 
polygamous potentially, it becomes monogamous as from the date of 
the registry marriage. This amalgamation or merger of the
customary marriage with the registry marriage is popularly refer-
o  3
red to as "conversion" or "monogamization". The result of
the amalgam is that so long as the pair ties remain married in
accordance with the law that provides for monogamy, they cannot
1. 1/211/67 of 2 July, 1969, cited in Annual Survey of African 
Law, Vol.3, 1969, p.37.
2. Danielsi op.cit., p.379; Higgins, 26 M;L;R;, p.205; Agbede, 
op.cit *, p.73^; Kasunmu & Salacuse, op.cit., p.90.
3. Webb, 12 I;C.L.Q.. p.672; Kasunmu & Salacuse, op.cit., p.90.
invoke their rights and liabilities under the customary marriage, 
but when the monogamous marriage is dissolved they can invoke 
rights which are consequent upon the termination of the customary 
law marriage. Thus, in the Southern Rhodesia case of Mchenje v. 
Kunake,* the right of a husband - party to a monogamous marri­
age - to sue his father-in-law for refund of dowry after the dis­
solution of the monogamous marriage with a wife with whom he had 
a pre-existing customary-law marriage was recognised.
It is our contention that the conversion theory subsumed 
in the Qhochuku and Mchenje cases and recently upheld by the 
Nigerian High Count in Teriba^s case, ought to apply to Sierra 
Leone under similar circumstances. Therefore, the effect of 
s.l of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act, 1965, to­
gether with s.7(3) of the Christian Marriage Act and s.15 of the 
Civil Marriage Act ought to be that a customary law marriage be­
tween two parties is converted into a monogamous marriage if the 
same parties contract a subsequent marriage under the Christian 
or Civil Marriage Act. Our contention presumes that the subse­
quent mairriage is valid by itself, i.e. that the essentials for 
its validity are observed without reference to the pre-existing 
customary-law marriage* Otherwise, the church or registry 
ceremony would be regarded as a mere blessing or confirmation 
of the customary-law marriage.
(//#) Consent
Tied up with the question of age is that of consent*
As marriage is a contract between two parties, it is essential 
that such parties must give their free consent to the transact­
ion. Without this consent it will be impossible for the parties
1. [1912] S.K.L.R. , -107
to marry at all and any attempt by them to do so would amount to 
what one might term a matrimonium non existens. As has been dis­
cussed earlier, a boy and a girl under the ages of 14 years and 
12 years respectively were incapable of giving a rational con­
sent at common law to a valid marriage between them. Similarly, 
even though a perfect marriage could be contracted between a boy 
and a girl above the ages of 14 and 12, since until persons had 
reached their majority they would normally be under the titulage 
of another person, it has been quite usual from ancient times 
for parties to a marriage to have to seek consent from third 
parties, usually their parents or guardians.*
In Sierra Leone, the law is regulated by both the Christ­
ian and the Civil Marriage Acts as amended in 1965. Because of 
the difficulties that may attend the interpretation of the rele­
vant sections, it is necessary to set them down in extensos
5.1 of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act makes it a 
condition precedent to the granting of a licence that a party 
to an intended marriage should make a Statutory Declaration, 
inter alia,
"where either of the parties not being a 
widow or widower shall be under the age 
of twenty-one years in the case of a per­
son whose personal law is not customary 
law and eighteen years in the case of a 
person whose personal law is customary 
law, that the consent of the person or 
persons whose consent to the marriage 
as required by the appropriate law has
been obtained, or that there is no per­
son having authority to give such consent."
5.2 of the Civil Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act also makes it a
condition to the issue of the Registrar's Certificate that one
party to the intended marriage should swear an affidavit, inter 
alia,
1. Jackson, op;cit., p.24.
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11 that each of the parties to the intended 
marriage (not being a widower or widow) is -
(i) in the case of a person whose personal 
law is customary law not less than 
eighteen years of age; and
(ii)in every other case, not less than twenty- 
one years of age,
and when one of the parties is under the age 
of eighteen or twenty-one as the case may be, 
that the consent of the person or persons 
whose consent to such marriage is required 
by law, has been obtained.”
S.7(2) of the Christian Marriage Act as amended by the Christian
Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act, 1965, provides that no marriage
may be celebrated under the provisions of the Act
"between persons of whom each or either 
not being a widow or widower is under the 
age of twenty-one years in the case of a 
person whose personal law is not custom­
ary law and eighteen years in the case of 
a person whose personal law is customary 
law, unless the consent of the father, or 
if he should be dead or unable for any 
reason to give such consent, then, of the 
mother, or if both parents be dead or un­
able for any reason to give such consent,' 
then of the guardian or guardians, if any, 
of such person, or of a Judge of the Su­
preme Court or District Commissioner under 
section 8 hereof, be first obtained."
The most important feature of the above provisions is the differ­
ence in age of consent between persons having customary law as 
their personal law and those who do not. The reduction of the 
age of persons whose personal law is customary law to 18 years 
may be in recognition of the fact that according to theirscustoms, 
a person of 18 is considered mature enough to take care of his or 
her own affairs without parental intervention.*
Such an assumption would, in my submission, be based on 
wrong premises because in customary law, however old the parties
to a marriage may be, the consent of their parents is essential
2
to the validity of that marriage* The reverse situation would
1. But see in general, Chapter 19, pp. 6^3—6 ^
2. See Chapter 17, pp. 5’$7- S'5‘9 J
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have been more rational if it was the age of the party whose 
personal law is not customary law that was reduced for, but for 
the statutory provisions herein, the personal law of such per­
sons does not require any parental consent to marriage.
The consent required under s.7(2) of the Christian Mar­
riage Act is that of the father, or if he is dead or unable for 
any reason to give his consent, that of the mother. If the con­
sent of a parent cannot be given for any of the above reasons 
then that of the guardian or guardians should be obtained. S .8 
of the Christian Marriage Act provides further that if it is im­
possible to obtain the requisite consent because there is no 
parent or guardian or such parent or guardian is incapable of 
giving such consent, or unreasonably withholds such consent, then 
the consent in writing of a Judge of the High Court or, in the 
case of a marriage intended to be celebrated in a disttict in the 
Province?, of the District Commissioner of that district, will 
suffice. It is interesting to note that the right of a parent 
or guardian who unreasonably refuses to give his or her consent
i
is superseded by that of a Judge or a Disttict Commissioner.
S.l of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act re­
quires the consent of the person or persons whose consent is re­
quired by "the appropriate law", i.e. the general law, in the 
case of a person whose personal law is not customary law, and 
customary law for a person whose personal law is customary law. 
Since the persons who normally give their consents under the two 
systems of law are not necessarily the same, this provision is in 
conflict with s.7(2) of the Principal Act which stipulates the 
same persons whose consents are necessary whether or not the 
parties share the same personal law. The situation is rendered 
even more anbiguous by s.2 of the Civil Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) 
Act, which requires the consent of the person or persons whose
cpnsent is required by "Law"* This section drops the word 
"appropriate", which leaves it open under which law the consent 
is to be determined.
Under the rules of statutory interpretation, one could 
assume that the Amendment Acts being later statutes prevail over 
the parent Acts. But s.7(2) of the Christian Marriage Act is 
itself amended by s.2 of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) 
Act by the insertion immediately after the words "twenty-one 
years" of the words "in the case of a person whose personal law 
is not customary law and eighteen years, in the case pf a person
whose personal lav/ is customary law", and the quotation of that 
section above is in its amended form.
There are, therefore, in fact, three amendments, the 
latest of which is s.2 of the Civil Marriage (Amendment)(No.2)
Act. If this amendment is to prevail over the others, as it 
should, then the conflict still remains unresolved. But since, 
the Civil Marriage Act is to be construed as one with the Christ­
ian Marriage Act, it is submitted that an amendment to one Act 
should be construed as one with an amendment to the other. This 
being the case, Hie amendment to the Civil Marriage Act should 
read as if It relates to the Christian Marriage Act. The overall 
effect, therefore, is that s.7(2Ji of the Christian Marriage Act 
as amended by s.2 of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act 
prevails, as it is later than s.l of the Christian Marriage (Amend. 
ment)(No.2) Act.
(iv) Prohibited Degrees
A marriage celebrated under the provisions of the Christ-
1 2 ian Marriage Act, and the Civil Marriage Act, between persons
who are related within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or
1. S*7(1)
2. S.15(b)
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affinity according to the Law of England is void* Consanguinity 
is blood relationship either in the direct or collateral line* 
Affinity is the relationship which arises through marriage and ■ 
exists between one spouse and the relations of the other spouse** 
Because of the use of the phrase: "according to the Law 
of England", the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity 
that would make a marriage void in Sierra Leone become a matter 
for speculation.
At this stage, it might be useful to give a brief out­
line of the development of English Law on marriage between kind­
reds and affines.
Down to the Marriage Act of 1835, Lord Lydhurst’s Act, 
marriage between persons within the prohibited degrees oftconsan­
guinity and affinity as laid down in a table prepared by Arch­
bishop Parker in 1563, was only voidable and annullable by a 
decree of an Ecclesiastical Court* After the Act, such a mar­
riage became void.
In this century, perhaps because of social pressures, 
Archbishop Parker’s list has been subject to a number of modifi­
cations. Thus, in 1907 marriage was permitted between a mam
2and his deceased wife’s sister. Later, a man could marry his
3
deceased’s brother’s widow. Further, the Maniage (Prohibited 
Degrees of Relationship) Act, 1931, permitted marriage between 
persons and their deceased spouses* nephew, niece, uncle or aunt 
and between persons and their deceased nephew’s niece’s uncle’s 
or aunt’s widow or widower. The 1907 and 1921 Acts have been
1. Affinity must be created by marriage and carnal knowledge 
without marriage is insufficient. See Pa. gani v. Pa gani 
L.R.l P & D 223. Wing v. Taylor (F.C. Wing ) , £ / 2  Sui'+Tr, . 
X ) %
- • ♦
2. The Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act, 1907.
3. The Deceased Brother’s Widow’s Marriage Act, 1921.
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repealed and replaced by Marriage Act, 1949.* The 1949 Act 
itself has been amended by the Marriage (Enabling) Act, 1960, 
making it possible for persons to marry within the degrees of 
affinity permissible under the 1931 Act if, death apart, the 
former marriage came to an end by a decree of divorce or nullity*
This Act repealed the 1931 Act.
This brief survey shows that English law on prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity and affinity has not been static*
In the application of English law to Sierra Leone in re­
gard to kindred and affinity, therefore, three questions have to 
be examined. Should it be English law as at the reception date,
i.e. 1st day of January, 1880? Or English law at the date of
the Christian Marriage Act, i.e. 1 April, 1907? Or the current 
English Law?
(a) English law as at 1st day of January, 1880
Read with s.74 of the Courts Act, 1965, s.7(./:.) of the
Christian Marriage Act seems to allow the application of English 
law at a date other than that stipulated in the Reception Statute, 
S#74 of the Courts Act, 1965, which provides for the residual
1. The prohibited degrees of relationship specified'in s.1(1) and 
Part 1 of the First Schedule to the Marriage Act, 1949, areas 
follows:- -
Mother-Father; Daughter-Son; Father’s mother-Father’s father; 
Mother’s mother-Mother*s father; Son’s daughter-Son’s son; 
Daughter’s daughter-Daughter’s son; Sister-Brother* Wife’s 
mother-Husband’s. father; Wife’s daughter-Hiisband’s son; 
Father’s wife-Mother’s -husband; Son’s wife-Daughter’s husband; 
Father’s father’s wife-Father’s mother’s husband; Mother’s 
father*-s wife-Mother’s mother’s husband; Wife’s father’s 
mother -Husband* s father’s father; Wife’s mother’s mother- 
Husband*s mother’s father; Wife’s son’s daughter-Husband*s 
son’s son; Wife’s daughter*s daughter-Husband’s daughter* s 
son; Son’s son’s wife-Son’s daughter’s husband; Daughter’s 
son’s wife-Daughter*s daughter’s husband; Father’s sister- 
Father’s-brother; Mother’s sister-Mother’s brother; Brother’s 
daughter-Brother’s son; Sister’s daughter-Sister*s son.
Part 11 of the First Schedule has been repealed by s.l and 
Schedule of the Marriage (Enabling) Act, 1960.
law of Sierra Leone, makes English law at 1880 applicable subject, 
inter alia, to any other enactment.* The Law of England, there-
fore, as provided for in s.7(l) of the Christian Marriage Act 
cannot be properly interpreted by reference to 1880 otherwise one 
would not be adhering to the provisions of the Reception Statute.
(b) English law at • the date of the Christian Marriage Act j 
i^e. 1 April, 1907.
Where, as in this case, no date is fixed for the appli­
cation of English law, the rule is usually followed that a stat-
2
ute is presumed to speak from the date of its enactment*
In the East African case of Hassanali R. Dedhar v.
3
Special Commissioner, etc. of Lands, Briggs, J.A. delivering 
the first judgment of the Court of Appeal held that where a 
local ordinance makes provision for the application of "the prin­
ciples of English law and the doctrines of equity", English law 
to be applied is the law in force at the time when the ordinance 
came into force. "If the intention were otherwise", he opined, 
"one would expect to find words such as ’applicable from time to 
time* or ’for the time being in force’."
If this view is correct, then in the absence of Sierra 
Leone case law on the point, the prohibited degrees of kindred 
and affinity according to English law that is applicable to 
Sierra Leone should be the law as at 1 April, 1907* Thus, in 
Sierra Leone, a statutory marriage between a man and his deceased 
wife’s sister or between a man and his deceased’ brother’s widow 
would be void. So would be one between a man and the divorced 
wife of his brother or the sister of his divorced wife.
1. i.e. any other.enactment in Sierra Leone.
2. See Lord'Esher, M.R. in Sharpe v. Wakefield (1888) 22 Q.B.D.
239 C.A., at p.242. See also the Nigerian case of Johnson v.
■ U;A;C; Ltd. (1936) 13 N.L.R. 13.
3. [1957] E.A. 104, C.A.
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(c) Current English law:
Phillips * has suggested that from the wording of s*7 of 
the Christian Marriage Act, the intention was probably that the 
local law should be linked with the law for the time being in 
force in England, not with English law as it was at the date when 
the Act was passed. Two cases from Malawi and Nigeria do not 
appear to lend support to this view and they indicate how the 
courts of those countries may react if faced with the task of 
interpreting this provision,
oIn the Malawi case of Mtemanyama Estate; v, Kitty, the 
High Court of Nyasaland was faced with the interpretation of s,40
(a) of the Nyasaland Marriage Ordinance, 1902, which provided
that the estate of an African married under the Ordinance should 
be:
"distributed in accordance with the provi­
sions of the law of England relating to the 
distribution of the personal estate of in­
testates,"
This was what Southworth J, had to say in connection with this 
provision:
"Apply the normal rules of interpretation, 
when reference is made in section 40(a) to 
the law of England, this can only be inter­
preted as a reference to the law of England 
as it stood at the time when the Marriage 
Ordinance, 1902, was passed,"3
A similar provision as s,40(a) of the Nyasaland Marriage Ordinance 
appeared in the Nigerian Marriage Act, 1914, S*36 of the Niger­
ian Act stipulated that the distribution of a deceased* s estate 
was to be in accordance with the law of England, In Johnson v*
4
U;A;C;, Butler Lloyd J, was of the opinion that the Ordinance
1* Marriage Laws in Africa, p.161, nil,
2, 1957 R. & N* 234.
3 * $ P *244 «
4. (1936) 13 N.L.R. 13.
210*
spoke from the date of its enactment, namely, 1914*^
In order to support Phillips1 view, the West African
Court of Appeal has held that the phrase "for the time being in
force" should be used in the statute concerned when reference is
2
made to the application of English law* It is quite clear, 
therefore, that since this phrase is not used in s*7 of the 
Sierra Leone Christian Marriage Act, judicial opinion outside 
Sierra Leone is diametrically opposed to Phillips1 suggestion*
As there has not been as yet any Sierra Leone decision on the
interpretation of the Sierra Leone provision, it is difficult to
dismiss Phillips outright particularly when his suggestion was
merely a speculation. Because of the tendency of the Sierra
Leone courts to apply the current English law when there is doubt
about time limitation, a typical example being the way they have
used the reception statute in relation to the applicable English
3
common law and doctrines of equity, it is quite reasonable to 
assume that they will apply the current English law in their in­
terpretation of s*7 of the Christian Marriage Act* This, in our 
submission, they ought to do despite the fact that we have decried
1* Doubt has been expressed by Kasunmu'& Salacuse, op.cit** p*61, 
on the correctness of this decision* Their doubt is based o/i 
the fact that s.33 of the Nigerian Marriage Act incorporated 
the substance of the provisions of the Deceased Wife1 s Sisters 
Marriage Act, 1907; The learned writers hold that if Butler 
Lloyd were correct, the 1907 Act would have applied automati­
cally instead of being expressly re-enacted in s*33* We may 
add that Butler Lloyd J. has never been consistent, in his view 
of the time limit of English law* See Oodwin v* Crowther 
(1934) 2 WACA, p.Ill at p.112; Taylor v. Taylor (19^5) 2 WACA 
348, in which cases Butler Lloyd J, took completely different 
views on the same matter * For a discussion of these cases,
. see Chapter 2, pp.#7-30.
Taylor v* Taylor, (1935) 2 WACA 348.
3. See Chapter 2, p.
their tendency of doggedly following English law in aspects of 
Sierra Leone law where it is inappropriate to do so* The reason 
for our present contention is that developments in English law 
on the topic under review since the passing of the Sierra Leone 
Christian Marriage Act reflect the social background and atti­
tudes of the Sierra Leone peoples, although these were never in 
the mind of the English legislature when the amendments to English 
law were made. Marriage between a man and his deceased wife*s
sister or between a man and his deceased brother*s widow or be­
tween a man and the divorced wife of his brother or the sister of 
his divorced wife - such marriages made permissible in England by 
Acts since 1907 - are recognised under the existing customary laws 
of Sierra Leone. If the general law of Sierra Leone were to take 
a different view, the dissatisfaction that was expressed in Eng­
land against the pre-1907 stringent rules relating to affinity 
would surely be felt in Sierra Leone as well.
(v) Proper Names of the Parties
Before publication of banns, a notice of the full
names of the parties to the intended marriage must be given to
the Minister who publishes the banns.* Likewise, in order to
obtain a licence one of the parties to the intended marriage must
give the Registrar of the District in which the marriage is to
take place, notice of marriage which, inter alia, should contain
2
the names of the parties*
Ss.10(c) and 15(c) of the Christian Marriage Act and
Civil Marriage Act respectively provide that marriage contracted
under the Acts shall be voidy
"if celebrated under a false name or 
false names with the knowledge of 
both parties."
1. Si4 of the Christian Marriage.Act.
2. S.4 of the Civil Marriage Act.____
The sections do not demand that the true Christian names and sur­
names by which the parties are born should be stated. The ob­
ject of the sections probably is to ensure that the parties are 
sufficiently identified by the public at large* Therefore, what 
seems to be required is the name by which the party is generally 
known to the public.
An assumed Christian name or surname should suffice
1provided it is not used for a fraudulent purpose. But diffi- 
t
culy may arise where the person is known by one name in the local
community where the marriage is to take place, while the public at
2large knows him by another. Sir William Scott suggests that, 
in such a situation, the marriage should be in the true name of 
the party* One would add a proviso that the party should not 
intend any concealment. To remove all doubt, therefore, it is 
submitted, the party ought to use both sets of names.
In order to invalidate a marriage because of its celebra­
tion in a false name or names, both parties must know the true 
facts at the time. If one party knows of the falsity but the 
other does not, such knowledge on the part of the guilty alone
does not invalidate the marriage, but he will be guilty of an
3
offence under the Acts.
The Acts also require the status of the parties to be in­
dicated upon publication of banns or in the notice of marriage 
prior to obtaining a licence. A wilful misdescription of a 
status even by both parties does not, however, nullify the marri­
age, though it may result in a criminal offence punishable under
1* See R v. Billingshurst (18f 4) 3 M & S 25D. See also Dancer v. 
Dancer [1948] 2 All 'E.R. 731 C/f Chipchase v. Chipchase [l94l]
. 2' All' E.R. 560} [1942] P.37.
2. See Pougett v. Tomkyns (1812) 3 M & S 262, at 263, n.
3. Ss. 18 & 20 of the Christian Marriage Act andCivil Marriage Act 
respectively.
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the Acts.’1'
(vj) Marriage Must be Celebrated Before Two Witnesses
For a marriage before a Minister of Religion or a Regi­
strar to be valid, it must be celebrated in the presence of at
2
least two witnesses. It is not clear whether the Minister or
the Registrar, as the case may be, can be a witness of a marriage
in which he officiates. The intention probably is that-there
should be at least two witnesses besides the Minister or the
3
Registrar, but this is not borne out by the Acts.
B. MOHAMMEDAN MARRIAGE
As we have seen earlier, courts in the Western Area are 
enjoined by the Mohammedan Marriage Act to receive in evidence 
proof, according to Islamic law, of the existence of a Mohammedan 
marriage, but not necessarily to rule whether a marriage consider­
ed as such conforms with the tenets of the Sharia. It is, there­
fore, here intended to give an outline of the essential require­
ments of a valid marriage in Islamic law and to show the extent 
to which Sierra Leone Muslims comply with these requirements.
1. Ss.17 & 20 of the Christian Marriage Act and Civil Marriage 
- Actj respectively.
2. Ss.10(d) 54; 15(d) of the Christian Marriage Act and Civil 
. Marriage Act, respectively.
3. See s.14 of the Christian Marriage Act, c/f s.22 of the Eng** 
lish Marriage Act, 1949, which reads: "All marriages solemn­
ized according to the rites of the Church of England shall be 
solemnized in the presence of two or more witnesses in addi- — 
tiaito the clergyman by whom the marriage is solemnized.1* Un­
like the Sierra Leone provision, which makes the marriage void 
for lack of the requisite witnesses, the position in England 
is that the section is merely directory and not mandatory so 
that a marriage that is witnessed by only one person besides
a clergyman is valid. See Wing v. Taylor (1861), 2 SW. & Tr. 
278.
214*
Before we do so, however, it is necessary to discuss two prelimi­
nary questions: (a) Who is a Mohammedan? (b) Which Mohammedan
law is envisaged by the Mohammedan Marriage Act?
(a.) Who is a Mohammedan?
By way of convenience, it is worth while to repeat the
relevant provision of the Mohammedan Maxriage Act* S*2 states:
"Every marriage entered into and subsist- — 
ing between persons professing the Mohamed- 
dan faith and domiciled in the Colony or 
Protectorate which is valid according to 
Mohammedan law .** shall be valid for all 
civil purposes."
A Mohammedan is a person who professes the Mohammedan
faith which implies the acceptance of the Unity of God and the
prophetic character of Mohammed. There are in the world a
wide variety of Mohammedans. There are the Sunnites divided
2
into four schools, and the Shiites. Consequently, stricto 
sensu, all these should be considered when reference is made to 
Mohammedans, in the Mohammedan Marriage Act. What is essential 
is the practice of the religion. Therefore, a child of Moham­
medan parents who converts to Christianity cannot during that 
period contract a Mohammedan maxriage while a Christian who be­
comes a Muslim can vail idly enter into a Mohammedan maxriage if at 
the time he professes the Mohammedan faith.
The section also requires that the Mohammedan must be domi­
ciled in Sierra Leone. Consequently, a staunch Muslim mission- 
airy from Pakistan or any country outside Sierra Leone, living in 
this country cannot enter into a valid Mohammedan marriage
1. See Ameer Ali, Mohammedan Law, Calcutta, 1912, Vol.II, (5th 
ed.), 22.
2. The Hanaufij, Shafii, Maliki and Hanbali.
3. See the Indian case of Jlwan Khan v. Habib (1933) 14 Lahore 
518, in which it was held that the term covers all Sunnites 
as well as Shiites.
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cognizable by the courts nor can he avail himself of the other
provisions of the Mohammedan Marriage Act unless and until he
acquires a Sierra Leone domicile. Similarly, a Muslim who is a 
Sierra Leone citizen domiciled abroad who is temporarily resident 
in Sierra* Le-one^  finds himself in the same disadvantageous posiv- 
tion as a non-citizen domiciled outside Sierra Leone.
(b) Which Mohammedan Law?
The Mohammedan Marriage Act does not make reference to any
particular Mohammedan law. As there are important points of
difference between the laws of the four schools of the Sunni sect, 
as well as between those and the laws of the Shiites, the question 
"which Mohammedan law" becomes capable of a variety of answers. 
Probably, compliance with the laws of any school or sect is suffi­
cient as there is no officially established school or sect in 
Sierra Leone. This, in fact, resolves a possible question of 
conflict of law that may arise where two Mohammedans of different 
sects or schools marry.
Even though no school or sect is officially established in 
the country, the vast majority of its Muslims regard themselves 
as belonging to the Maliki School of the Sunni sect. For this 
reason it will be in order in discussing Islamic law in Sierra 
Leone to lay emphasis on the Maliki School.*
1. Reference to Islamic law, hereafter, unless otherwise stated, 
is reference to that law according to the Maliki School and on 
this generally* see T.P. Hughes: A Dictionary of Islam. Lon-'
don, 1895; Al-Haj Fazlul Karim: Al Hadis, Book IIa Calcutta,
1939; A.A.A. Fyzee: Out 1 ines • of Muhammadan Law. 3rd ed., —
O.U.P., 1964. Note that there is in Sierra Leone a few for­
eign Muslims said members of the Ahmaddiya sect. To deal with 
the law of the minority group in detail will throw this work 
out of balance. Nevertheless, where there sire striking 
differences between Maliki law and the other schools, these 
will be pointed out from time to time.
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The Essentials for a Valid Mohammedan Marriage
Marriage (nikah) according to Islamic law is simply a 
civil contract and its validity does not depend upon any reli­
gious ceremony* It, therefore, requires no priest (Imam) and 
no sacramental rites. In Sierra Leone, however, a religious 
ceremony dhould, as a social practice, always take plane, usually 
in a mosque before an Imam.
The contract need not be in writing. Its validity de­
pends on the capacity of the parties; their consents; permis­
sible degrees of consanguinity, affinity and fosterage; the pre-
1
sence of witnesses, and proclamation. It is essential that 
dower is paid to the bride, otherwise the marriage is irregular 
if it is not consummated. But the marriage is ratified by con­
summation.
(i.) Capacity
(a) Age
Islamic law stipulates that a Muslim of sound mind who
has attained maturity can enter into a Contract of marriage*
Maturity is reached at puberty, which is marked by the first
2appearance of ihtilam. If ihtilam does not appear, the pre­
sumption, among the Shiites and the Hanafi, is that maturity is
3reached at the completion of the 15th year. It is generally 
supposed that ihtilam cannot take place below the age of 12 years 
for a boy and 9 years for a girl.
A minor, i.e. a person below the age of puberty,, cannot
1. Witnesses are not necessary in Miliki law, but the other 
- schools require them.
2. In the case of a boy ihtilam is the ejaculation of semen; for 
a girl it is the' appearance of the menstrual blood. See Al-
. Haj Fazlul Karim, op.cit., pp.724-5.,
3. Karim, op^cit.. pp.724-5; and Hughes, op;cit.. p.315.
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by himself * enter into a valid contract of marriage, but his
2
guardian can do so on his behalf.
Among Sierra Leone Muslims there is no ascertainable rule 
with regard to the age of marriage. But it is settled practice 
that both parties should reach puberty* For a girl, puberty is 
determined either at her first menstruation or when she has under­
gone clitoridectomy, usually at 15, which takes place upon initi- 
ation into the Sande or bondo society. A male must be dLrcum- 
cised but since this may occur at a very early age it does not 
mark the state of puberty. Ability to maintain oneself and a 
wife is always regarded as a prerequisite for marriage. Sierra 
Leone Muslims steadfastly adhere to this practice even though the 
parents or relatives of the bridegroom are wealthy and magnani­
mous enough to assume the economic responsibilities of the bride- 
4groom. In practice, therefore, men do not normally marry be­
fore the age of 21, at which age they are considered to be on the 
threshold of the ability to pursue some trade or profession from 
which they can earn their living.
( b ) Number
A Muslim man may marry not more than four wives but a 
Muslim woman is allowed only one husband.
This rule is of rigid application only among the stricter 
Muslims in Sierra Leone, more particularly among the Aku Muslims
1. The male here includes the female.
2. The KaLnafi School holds that a minor given in marriage by a 
father or grandfather-can repudiate on reaching puberty. This 
is known as Khiyar al-bulugh or the option of puberty. See 
Fyzee, opicit.. p.91.
3. This is a secret society in which a girl is taught the art of 
womanhood. The Mende call it sande while the Temne call it
* kondo•
4. This seldom happens as a man is expected to undergo his own 
marriage expenses to show that he is able to maintain another 
person.
in Freetown and among the native Muslims in the Western Area and 
in the Northern Province. In the South, however, the rule is 
more relaxed and many a man who professes Islam may be found with 
more than four wives. The reason may be that, in the South,
Islam is not as deep-seated as in the other parts of the country.
( C ) Differences of^Religion
Islamic law stipulates that a woman who is a Jewess or 
Christian can lawfully be taken in marriage, but no Muslim woman 
can be given in marriage to a man who is a Jew or Christian.*
Stricter Muslims in Sierra Leone are in this regard more 
inflexible than their law. Maxriage is completely discouraged
even between a Muslim man and a Christian woman unless the latter
2 ~ converts to Islam before the marriage. Small wonder, there­
fore, that the Mohammedan Marriage Act recognises as valid only 
those Mohammedan marriages which are between persons professing 
the Mohammedan faith.
( d ) cIdda
Idda is the period during which a woman whose marriage 
has been dissolved by death or divorce is prohibited from re­
marrying. It lasts for four months and ten days in the case of 
death. For divorce, it lasts for three menstrual cycles. In 
either case, if the woman is pregnant^ until delivery.
There is on record that among the Susu, a devout Muslim 
tribe in Sierra Leone, cidda was observed for four months and six
1. Jews and Christians are referred to as the "people of the Book’1 
■ (Ahl^kitab). See Karim, op^cit.. pp.638, 639.
2. In which case she is already a Muslim before the marriage^ 
Among tribal peqpLe, however, a Muslim marriage can be con­
tracted by a Muslim man and a non-Muslim girl, but the latter 
is compelled to practice Islam, at least the religious ordi­
nances, after she has become a member of the man1 s household.
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months in the cases of death and divorce respectively.
Nowadays, however, only the cidda of death appears to be 
observed in the country, and even that is limitedAthe period of 
the funeral obsequies which lasts for forty days. The cidda of 
divorce is commonly ignored even by the stricter Muslims*
(1/) Consent
Both the bride and bridegroom, if of full age, must be
consenting parties to their marriage. In the case of a minor 
girl or a woman who has not married before, she can be given in 
marriage by her father or her executor (wasi) without her consent. 
In Maliki law, the consent of an adult virgin must be accompanied 
by that of her guaxdian and that law insists on the presence of 
the guardian and his actual participation in the giving of con-
2
sent. Among the Hanafis and the Shiites no guardian is required.
Consent must be given by a declaration (ijab) made by one 
contracting party or his agent followed by an acceptance (qabul) 
from the other or her agent at the same meeting.
The requirement of consent is zealously met by all Mus­
lims in Sierra Leone. As marriage does not usually occur during 
the woman1 s minority, her consent is always solicited and obtain­
ed. This is now true even for the native Muslims who, in the 
olden days, gave their young daughters in marriage without their 
consent. Apart from the consent of the bride and bridegroom, 
that of their respective families must also be given. For this 
reason, a family gathering consisting of representatives of the 
two families must be summoned at which the final arrangements axe
settled and the marriage consideration is paid.
- - -   -   - - — - - -    —  -   _   - - - - _ . _ _ —
1. M.Aubert: "Laws and Customs of the Susus", S;L;S. (O.S.) No.
20, Dec. 1936, .&7 at pp.70, 71.
2. Hughes, opjcit., 315.
(Hi) Degrees of consanguinity, affinity and fosterage 
(cl) Consanguinity
1 2A man is prohibited from marrying his mother, daughter,
3
sister, paternal aunt, maternal aunt, brother’s daughter and 
sister’s daughter*
(.b ) Affinity
Persons prohibited within the, degrees of affinity include 
mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, wife’s sister during the subsist­
ence of the marriage, son’s wife and step-mother*
(• ° ) Fosterage
A mani cannot marry his foster mother, i*e* mother that 
has suckled him, nor foster sister unless the foster brother and 
sister were nursed by the same mother at intervals widely sepa­
rated* For the fosterage to be a bar, the child should have
been suckled at least fifteen times or for a day and night*
Among the Shafi, it is necessary that it should heve been suckled 
four times* The Hanafi require suckling only once*
Most of the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affi­
nity as entrenched in Islamic law herein mentioned are recognised 
by Sierra Leone Muslims in general* Specifically, however, a 
Mende Muslim man can marry his mother’s brother’s daughter or 
the widow of his f-ather other than his own mother - a practice
that is abhorred by the Temne and Susu Muslims* Also, among the
Kono, a man is allowed to marry the sister of his wife during the 
subsistence of the first marriage. This departure from the
1. Mother includes all female ascendants both in the male and 
. female line.
2. Daughter includes all female descendents whatsoever, i.e.
- daughter of son or daughter of daughter.
3. Paternal aunt "includes grandfather’s and grandmother’s sisters*
Sharia is a manifestation of the strong influence of tribal 
custom#
The prohibition on the ground of fosterage is generally 
limited to the foster mother alone and in this case there is no 
laid down period during which the suckling should have taken 
place#
(iv) Witnesses
The Quran prescribes that two male witnesses (or one
male and two female witnesses) must always be present at a Mus-
lim marriage# But according to Maliki law, a marriage con­
s ’
tracted without witnesses raises a shubha and is merely defective#
Sierra Leone Muslims adhere fervently to the presence of 
witnesses. The Ahmadiyya, a minority group,require two males, 
one from the woman’s side and the other from the man’s. The 
Maliki prefer two male representatives from each side. In 
addition, there are also a god-father and a god-mother drawn 
from outside the two families. These play a more vital role 
during the life of the marriage for they act as custodians to 
whom all disputes during the marriage between the spouses are re­
ferred before ever divorce is pursued.
(v) Proclamation
A Muslim marriage cannot take place in secret. It must 
be publicly proclaimed otherwise it will be regarded as a clan­
destine sexual relation amounting to fornication. Proclamation 
is done by the delivery of a sermon (khutbah) to the couple in
1. 2:282 Q.
2. For more information on this point, see Chapter 10, pp.332-337
the presence of witnesses, the beating of drums and the holding 
of a marriage feast (walimah).
The proclamation of a Muslim-maxriage is, in Sierfca 
Leone, a very impressionable affair* On the morning of the 
wedding, the bridegroom and his party walk their way to the mosque 
singing Arabic songs. They are followed by the bride’s party
dressed in colourful attire (ashobi). The bride and bridegroom 
sit in separate parts of the mosque* The custom of the Aku 
Muslims at Fourah Bay in Freetown is for the bride and the bride­
groom to occupy separate mosques. The officiating Imam sits in 
the male mosque from which he communicates with the female mosque 
through a crier.
The Imam delivers a sermon to the couple in which he ad­
vises them as to their marital responsibility and their rights 
and obligations towards each other.
Verses are read from the Quran after which the godfatjier
of the bridegroom hands over the wedding ring to the Imam and
the Imam back to him. The ring is finally taken to the bride by
the Registrar of marriages. As soon as it is delivered, the
mosque drum (tabuli) is beaten seven times for a man’s first
7 2
wedding or five times for a subsequent one, each stroke delivered 
at systematic intervals. After the prescribed strokes, the 
bridegroom may request a repetition of the strokes.
When the ceremony is over, the husband meets his wife for 
a short while outside the mosque and they depart for their re­
spective homes,eanh accompanied by relatives, friends, well- 
wishers and dancers. Late in the evening of the wedding day, 
the husband and his party call at the houses of the wife’s
1. For a description of celebration among a Freetown community, 
see O. Bassir: "Marriage rites among the Aku (Yoruba) of 
Freetown", Africa, Vol.24, 1954, p.251.
relations where the wedding feast will be in full swing and they
give money to these relations. Finally, the wife is brought
to the husband1 s house escorted by her god-mother and her train.
Another aspect of the proclamation of a Muslim marriage
in Sierra Leone is registration. Islamic law itself does not
require marriages to be registered by certificate but the general
law of Sierra Leone makes provision for such registration of the
marriage.* For this purpose, every mosque keeps a register in
the custody of a registrar appointed by the local janaat. He
issues the marriage certificate which must contain the names of
the parties to the wedding, their addresses, age and father’s
names and occupations. A certified copy in English and Arabic
of the certificate must be sent to the Registrar-General of
2
Sierra Leone within a week of the making thereof.
(v?) Dower
At the time of marriage, Islam requires a marriage settle­
ment, i.e. dower (Mahr or sadaq) to be made upon the wife. The
3
minimum laid down by Maliki law is 3 dirhams.
The object of the dower is that the wife should have an
independent proprietary position and should be free to spend 
charitably or make gifts to her relations out of her separate 
property. The institution of the dower is a practical acknow­
ledgement by the prospective husband of the independent proprie­
tary position of the future wife and her right to maintain and 
acquire separate property which the husband cannot bring to his
1. S.5 of the Mohammedan Marriage Act, cgip.96. .
2. S.6(2) of the Mohammedan Marriage Act, cap.96.
3. According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam by M.T. Houtsma & Ors,
Leiden-London, 1913-1937, Vol.I, p.976", a dirham is a silver 
coin 2.97 grammes in weight. -Three dirhams have been valued 
at 2/- sterling. See S. Ves6y-Fitzgerald: Muhammadan Law.
An Abridgement. O.U.P. London, 1931. p.63.
own use.
Among many Sierra Leone Muslims dower and the marriage 
consideration, i.e. payment made or services rendered by the 
bridegroom and his family to the family of the wife, are hardly 
distinguishable. The marriage consideration is usually regarded 
as taking the place of the Islamic dower.
Where money is paid, part of it is expected to equip the 
wife in preparation for her marital role. But the stricter 
Muslims do draw a line of distinction between the two payments. 
Alhaji Gibril Gadri Saccoh, Imam of the Mandingo Muslim community 
in Freetown, reports that whenever a marriage consideration is
paid the wife’s parents always ask the husband’s parents: ”Is
everything all right?". This question is answered in the affir­
mative only when the dower has accompanied the marriage consider­
ation.
In the olden days, the dower, where separately paid, did 
2not exceed 70 cents. Today, there is no fixed amount. It
is discretionary depending upon the financial circumstances of 
the prospective husband and his affection for the wife. It now 
usually takes the form of gold, oxen, houses, or money, ranging 
from Le.200/00 to Le-*300/00 among the well-to-do Muslims.
Conclusion
To sum up, Muslims in Sierra Leone comply with some but 
not all the requirements of a valid marriage as laid down by the
1. Personal communication.
2. 100 cents =* one leone; 2 leones = one pound sterling. A 
leone is abbreviated "Le."
MbS.
Sharia.* The reason is partially the strong influence of 
customs and partially the lack of knowledge by the vast majority 
of them of the rules of the Sharia.
Judicial notice is commonly taken of this influence and 
the general law oourts are always accommodating in accepting as 
a Mohammedan marriage one that is represented to them as such. 
There has not been any reported instance when the validity of a 
Mohammedan marriage has been questioned before the Sierra Leone 
courts but the possibility of such occurrence should not be ex­
cluded.
Diehard Muslims nay justifiably deprecate the practice of 
misrepresenting as Muslim marriages ones which do not conform 
with the Sharia and they may argue that the Islamic law of marri­
age must be strictly observed by all Muslims in the country.^
They are right legally insofar as the Western Area is concerned, 
but such a step, in our submission, will be both a complicated 
and retrograde one to take. First, the majority of Muslims are 
tribal people and illiterate in Islamic law and, except for the 
ritual ordinances of their religion, they conduct their daily 
lives in accordance with customary law. It will, therefore, be 
impracticable to compel them to comply with a jurisprudence which 
is quite alien to them and to their courts. Secondly, the 
introduction of a third system of law in its strict form, as 
Anderson rightly concedes, will retard the eventual fusion of
customary law and the general law which must surely be the ulti- 
3mate goal. If individual Muslims so desire they are always
1. For the legal effects of non-compliance, see Chapter 10, 
pp. 33?-33*7
2. See "A jutting submitted to the Constitutional Committee of 
the Sierra Leone Muslim Congress" by Alhaji Sheik Gibril 
Sesayj unpublished. .
3. Islamic Law in Africa, p.299, footnote 5.
free to follow the dictates of Islamic law in their personal 
lives or even in family matters if the family consents*
The only appropriate and desirable reform insofar as 
marriage is concerned is the extension of the jurisdiction of 
the High Court to hear matrimonial causes in accordance with the 
relevant principles of the Sharia* This will meet the needs of 
the stricter or better educated Muslims* At present, the High 
Court has jurisdiction to hear matrimonial causes in respect of 
only Christian and civil marriages and there are no Qudi Courts 
in the country so that the only avenues open to the stricter or 
educated Muslims are ad hoc arbitral tribunals or customary law 
courts, but to appear before the latter they consider it as 
infra dignitatem*
1. Ibid*
CHAPTER-7
MATRIMONIAL RELATIONS I 
A. INTRODUCTION
In this and the next chapters of this Part, except as 
otherwise stated, husband and wife relationship is that created 
under the Marriage Acts (including the Mohammedan Marriage Act). 
For we have seen that once a marriage is proved to be in accord­
ance with Islamic law its incidents are governed by the general 
law except for divorce and intestate succession.
The general law on husband and wife is mainly the re­
ceived common law and local statutory modifications that Irve been 
made of it.
At common law, a husband and wife were regarded as one 
1
legal person. This was, however, an imperfect unity since, as
2between the couple, the husband in some cases occupied a posi­
tion higher than that of the wife; and vis-a-vis third parties, 
the husband had a right to sue for certain wrongs inflicted upon 
his wife while the wife had no corresponding right. Lush J. 
gave a very stimulating and succinct exposition of this legal 
unity when he said:
11 It is a well-established maxim of the 
law that husband and wife are one person.
For many purposes, no doubt, this is a 
mere figure of speech, but for other 
purposes, it must be understood in its 
literal sense."3
Unity indeed was a mere figurative expression when it 
came to the ownership of property. The husband was at the same
1. Blackstone, Commentaries, 1, 442.
2. e.g. property.
3. Phillips v. Barnett (1876) 1 Q.B.D. £*36,4-40,
time absolutely entitled to his own property and possessed an 
absolute interest in his wife* s chattels and choses in possession 
and had power to dispose of her leasehold interest in his life­
time. In Sierra Leone, it was not until the Married Women*s 
Property0rJiVwHt^ l875,^  that the Sierra Leone married woman gained 
absolute control over certain properties acquired by her. Ihey 
included earnings, deposits in savings banks, stocks and shares, 
and, in limited circumstances, property devolving on her own 
intestacy.
In 1907, the Sierra Leone Christian Marriage Act went a 
step further to allow a native woman married according to Christ­
ian rites a free hand in the enjoyment of her property so long as
her personal law permitted her to hold it independently of her 
2
husband.
It was in 1932 that the last link of proprietary depend­
ence was broken with the passing of the Imperial Statutes (Law of
3
Property) Adoption Act. This Act gave capacity to a married 
woman to deal with her property as if she were a femme sole.
The legal indivisibility of husband and wife, in the com­
mon law, results in the acquisition of rights over each other’s 
person which, if invaded, gives rise to remedies in favour of the 
spouse whose right had been so infringed. These rights are 
(a) the right to consortium, and (b) the right to maintenance.
The right to consortium is one exercisable against third parties 
by either spouse as the case may berwhilst the right to mainten­
ance is one enforceable by the wife against the husband.
The relationship of husband and wife also affects rights
1. - No.7 of 1875.
2. See s.26 of the Christian Marriage Act, cap.95 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
3. Cap.18 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
and duties in areas of private and public law* The treatment of 
these will be postponed to the next Chapter* It is intended in 
thisChapter to examine the right to consortium and the right to 
maintenance *
B* RIGHT TO CONSORTIUM
Consortium has been described by one learned judge as a 
"bundle of rights some hardly capable of precise definition"  ^
arising from the fact that the spouses live together as husband
and wife. The emphasis is on conjugal society and services "or
2
comfort and services". Thus the spouses have mutual rights to 
sexual intercourse, protection, and the enjoyment of each other*s 
company. The husband has right to the domestic services of the 
wife, while the wife is entitled to the use of her husband’s name, 
rank and title, and to be maintained by him. Though cohahita- 
tion is the visible sign that consortium is subsisting it is 
nevertheless not essential, since in this modern age circum­
stances such as the quest for occupation or education may force a 
husband to live apart from his wife. For example, H (husband), 
a civil servant, living with his wife and family in Freetown, is 
transferred to Kenema; W (his wife), who is employed as a teacher 
remains in Freetown with the children who are attending school.
If the separation is mutual and there is the intention of resum­
ing cohabitation whenever circumstances permit, there is no break 
in consortium.
During cohabitation, the spouses are expected to treat
1. Lord Reid in Best v* Samuel Fox & Coi Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 
394, 401; [l§53j A.C. 716, 736. *
2. See A Century of Family Law. London, 1957, edited by Graveson 
and Crane, p.lOlv
3. Lord Goddard, Best v. Samuel Fox & Co. Ltd. [1952] A.C. 716, 
733-734.
each other with the utmost civility and gentleness. Thus, a 
husband has no right to inflict corporal punishment on his wife 
or to restrain her movements without resorting to due process of 
law.'*' The demands for sexual intercourse must be reasonable;
one spouse cannot insist on having sexual intercourse when the
other is in poor health or when the method employed is unnatural 
(e.g. coitus interruptus), nor may a husband insist on sexual
intercourse with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
3
venereal disease.
Breach of Consortium
(i) Breach by one spouse
The duty to cohabit was at common law never enforced 
through a legal remedy by a wife against her husband. Apart 
from petitioning for judicial separation or divorce, which is 
not a step to bring, the spouses together, a deserted wife was 
not able by means of legal sanction to force the husband to con- 
tinue to cohabit with her. But the husband could. The 
Sierra Leone Matrimonial Causes Act, 1949, now puts the husband 
5and wife on the same footing. Either spouse is permitted to
1. Lord Leigh*s Case (1674) 3 Keble 433; R. v. Jackson £l89l] 1 
Q.B. 671; and the Sierra Leone unreporlTed case of Elliott v. 
Elliott decided by the Supreme Court on 1 April, 1948.
2. See Bromley, op^cit., 96.
3. Foster v. Foster £l92l] P.438, C.A.
4. This was by a petition for restitution of conjugal rights made 
to the common law courts.
5. Husband and wife here are probably those arising as a result— 
of a Christian or Civil Marriage, because s.2 of the Matrimo­
nial Causes Act defines marriage as f,the union of one man and 
one woman for life to the exclusion of all others.11 Mohammed­
an marriage, therefore, which is potentially polygamous, would 
seem to be excluded, and the common law position stands with 
respect to such marriages.
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petition for restitution of conjugal rights where the other is in
breach of duty to c o h a b i t T h e r e  is no penalty for disobed­
ience but where the petitioner is the wife, she can apply to the
High Court to order the husband to make such periodical payments
2 3to her as may be just, and to order the.payment of alimony.
If the applicant is the husband, the High Court has power to 
order a settlement of the wife* s property to be made for the bene­
fit of the husband and of the children of the marriage, or to 
order part of the profits of the wifeTs trade or earnings to be 
periodically paid to the husband for his own benefit or to the
husband or a third party for the benefit of the children of the 
4marriage.
Diligent research has not revealed any instance when the 
right to petition for restitution of conjugal rights has been in-
5
voked before the Courts in Sierra Leone. In many cases, the
aggrieved party who wants the other spouse back resorts to re­
conciliation and negotiation through friends and relatives. If 
social pressures prove futile, the party contents himself with 
either remaining aloof or seeking a remedy for judicial separa­
tion or divorce when the appropriate time comes.
1. S.17.
2. S.18.
3. S.21(4)
4. S.22(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102.
5. Throughout its long history, the remedy was seldom used in 
England. For example, in the three years 1965-1967 there 
were 105 petitions (60 by husbands and 45 by wives) and 31 
decrees made (11 granted to husbands and 20 to wives); see 
the Great Britain Law Commission Published Working Paper No.22 
dated 17 February, 1969, p.3. For the abolition of the rem­
edy in England and reasons for its continued existence in 
Sierra Leone, see Chapter 10, pp*3^J-3^3.
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The existence of the right to petition for restitution 
of conjugal rights is, nevertheless, in Sierra Leone, of especial 
significance for the deserted wife who wants to be properly and 
adequately maintained but who does not wish to take proceedings 
for divorce and judicial separation. True, she can apply for 
maintenance to the Magistrate’s Court, but she may require main­
tenance above the limit which Magistrates’ Courts are entitled to 
order. Since the High Court has no power to make an order for 
maintenance except consequentially to other proceedings, she must 
first apply for an order for restitution of conjugal rights and 
upon disobedience of it by the husband she can apply to the High 
Court to make an order for periodical payments.
(ii) Breach by a third party
A third party’s invasion of the right to consortium be­
tween a husband and wife gives rise to certain causes of action. 
They are (a) damages for loss of consortium, (b) damages for 
harbouring the wife, (c) damages for enticement and (d) damages 
for adultery. All except damages for loss of consortium can­
not now be recovered in English law.* But being common law 
remedies, in the absence of local statutory provisions^ they are 
still recoverable in Sierra Leone.
(a) Damages for loss of consortium
A third party may deprive one spouse of the consortium
oof the other by the commission of a tort or a breach of contract 
against the plaintiff’s spouse.
1. By ss.4 and 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 
1970.
2. See the English case of Jackson v. Watson & Sons [1909] 2 K.B. 
193 in which a husband recovered damages for the loss of his 
wife through food poisoning after eating salmon sold to her by 
the defendants.
However, where interference with consortium does not 
result in the death of one spouse or the cessation of cohabita­
tion the common law rule is that the husband can recover damages 
for wrongs inflicted on the wife, but the wife has no similar 
right. This was established in the case of Best v. Samuel Fox 
& Co. Ltd.* In that case, the husband^ through the negligencd 
of the defendants, sustained serious injuries which rendered him 
sexually incapable. For these injuries he recovered damages.
Six mohths later, his wife brought an .action for the loss of her 
husband’s consortium with the allegation that though her husband
was so young - thirty years old - she had been deprived of the 
opportunity of having further children, It was vehemently argued 
on behalf of the wife that it was anomalous in modern times to 
deny to a wife a legal remedy which in identical circumstances 
was open to the husband. The House of Lords unanimously held 
that an action could not lie at the instance of the wife. The 
Board opined that if there was to be equality of rights among the 
spouses the husband* s right should be extinguished instead of 
extending it to the wife.
The raison d’etre for allowing the husband a right while 
denying it to a wife is that historically a husband had a quasi­
proprietary interest in his wife. Any interference therefore 
with his wife - his property - became actionable. But the wife 
never had any proprietary right in the husband and she^  therefore 
had no action.
(b) Damages for harbouring a wife
On the same historical grounds as with actions for loss 
of consortium, a wife cannot recover damages if a third party
1. [1952] 2 All E.R. 394, H.L.; [l952] A.C. 716.
harbours her husband.1 But the husband* s right to do so was
2recognised in the case of Philp v* Squire in which the plaint­
iff* s wife went to the house of the defendant to whom she was re­
lated by marriage and represented herself to have been ill-used 
by the plaintiff. The defendant received her and allowed her 
to live with him after he had been notified by the husband not to 
harbour her. The claim failed on some other ground but^holding 
that such action was known to the common law, Lord Kenyon C.J. 
said:
"The ground of this action is that the 
defendant retains the plaintiff* s wife 
against the inclination of her husband, 
whose behaviour he knows to be proper; 
or from selfish and criminal motives.
But where she is received from prin­
ciples of humanity the action cannot
be supported."3
Since 1791, there seems to be no English case on the sub­
ject. Small wonder, therefore, that Devlin J. (as he then was)
4
took the opportunity in Winchester v. Flemming of regarding
such action as obsolete. In holding that the action had no
place in present-day England, the learned judge had this to say:
**The reason why harbouring was considered 
objectionable was because it interfered 
with the economic process by which a wife, 
refused food and shelter elsewhere than in 
the matrimonial home, would eventually be 
forced to return to it. This is no longer 
an accepted method of effecting a matrimo­
nial reconciliation ... What if she was 
driven to seek public assistance? Would 
the Crown or some local authority then be 
liable for harbouring? In a society that 
is organised on the basis that everyone is 
in the last resort to be housed and fed by 
the State, the bottom has dropped out of the 
action for harbouring."3
1. Winchester v. Flemming [1958] 1 Q.B. 259.
2. (1791) Peake 114, 115.
3» Ibid., 115.
4. [1958] 1 Q.B. 259.
5. Ibid., p.265.
The sentiments expressed by Devlin J. clearly represent 
the social and economic positions in England for which they were 
intended. Considering the Sierra Leone situation, however, where 
there is no welfare state as in England, the last resort of a run­
away wife is the house of a relative or a lover. Actions for 
harbouring wives ought, therefore, to be entertained by the High 
Court even though at present their occurrence may be negligible, 
if any at all. The only reported Sierra Leone case is Demby v. 
Bishop in which the plaintiff1 s claim was dismissed because be­
ing already married to one woman under the Christian Marriage Act, 
he instituted an action for harbouring a second woman married 
under customary law.
/^defendant sued for harbouring has the same defence avail­
able as a defendant sued for enticement and this will be consider­
ed shortly.
i
(c) Damages for enticement I
A person is liable on the tort of enticement who without 
lawful justification procures, persuades or entices one spouse I 
or is in some way positively responsible for that spouse leaving 
the other. The essence of the wrong is the deliberate breaking 
up of the marriage by a stranger through his persuasion or other
positive inducement. Sexual misconduct with the spouse or the j
2 'mere alienation of affection are not necessary ingredients.
Thus, in the West African Court of Appeal case of Sharpies v.
3
Barton in which a wife voluntarily left the matrimonial home
1. (1950) 3 S;L; Law Recorder,.p.7.
2. In Gottlieb v. Gleiser [1958] 1 Q.B. 267, 268, Denning L.J.
(as he then was) said that though an action for alienation of 
affections was allowed to be brought in most of the States in-, 
the United States of America, the law of England does not per­
mit such actions.
3. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 198.
and went away with her lover, with whom she had committed adultery,
it was held that the plaintiff husband could not succeed in an
-fie-
action for enticement against the lover inAabsence of proof that
the lover had procured, persuaded, or enticed the wife into leaving
the plaintiff. But in the English case of Place v. Searl, where
the defendant said to the plaintiffs wife, "Come on, Gwen, we will
go", following a dispute between Gwen and her husband before she
left the matrimonial home, the Court of Appeal in England was of
opinion that the words were capable of amounting to enticement.
Until 1923, it was established common law that a husband
2
could bring an action for enticement, but it was doubtful whether 
there was a converse right. In that year, Darling J* sitting in 
the Queen* s Bench Division of the High Court of England, in the
3
case of Gray v. Gee 9 ruled that a wife could bring such an action
4
just as the husband. Giving reasons for his opinion, the learned 
judge said that the married woman had always been possessed of the 
right to sue but because of procedural difficulties before 1882 she 
could not sue in tort in her own name. These difficulties having 
been removed by the Married Women* s Property Act, 1882 j[which does
5
not apply in Sierra Leone ) she was now free to bring the action.
fL
The opinion of Darling J. has been approved in subsequent cases
without the reasons adduced by him. But in Best v. Samuel Fox &
7
Co; Ltd., the House of Lords refused the wife* s claim for loss of
1. [1932] K.B. 497.
2. Winsmore v* Greenbank (1745) Willes 578.
3. (1923) 39 T.L.R. 429..
4. The plaintiff, however, lost the action on the facts stated be­
fore the jury.
5. The Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act, 1932, cap. 
18 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, i960, allowed the mar­
ried woman to sue or be sued in her name.
6. Place v. Searle [1932] 2 K.B. 497, and Best v* Samuel Fox & Co; 1 
Ltd. [1952j A.C. >716^
7. [1952] A.C. 716, 731-2, 735, 736.
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consortium, one of the reasons being that such a claim was allowed
the husband on the ground that historically he had a quasi-proprie-
tary right in his wife but not the converse situation* On the
other hand, Darling J* in Gray v. Gee supported his opinion on the
ground that historically
!lin this country (England) a woman was never 
the chattel of her husband* He had 'potestas* 
over her and the children but *potestas* and 
*proprietas* were very different things.11*
His Lordship came to the conclusion that there was no distinction
to be drawn to the effect that the husband could bring the action
for enticement because his wife was his property and that the wife
2could not because her husband was not her property*
The opinion expressed in Gray* s case and Best* s case on the 
married woman* s position vis-a-vis her husband are diametrically
opposed to each other but they are the grounds on which, on the one
hand, she has been given the right to sue for enticement and^on 
the other, she has been refused the right to sue for loss of con­
sortium and for harbouring the husband*
The English courts have now lost the opportunity of recon­
sidering the wife*s position in respect of the torts of enticement
3
and harbouring* The duty now rests on the shoulders of the 
Sierra Leone judges* In carrying it out they have one of two
choices to make* Either to raise the wife to the level of the
husband and allow her to sue for every interference with her con­
sortium or to take the advice of the House of Lords in Best* s case 
that the husband* s right is an anomaly and should be extinguished
1* (1923) 39 T.L.R. 429, 431.
2. Denning J* in Gottlieb v. Gleiser [1958] 1 Q.B. 267, 268 held 
the view that historically the wife was considered to be the 
property of her husband.
3* The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, by its 
S.5, has abolished them in England*
instead of extending it to the wife if there is to be equality be­
tween the sexes*
1
In Gottlieb v* Gleiser Denning L.J. described an action 
for enticement as "not in keeping with the times’* and tefused to 
extend it to permit a husband to sue his mother-in-law who had sub­
stantially interfered with his marriage to the point of breaking it 
down resulting in the wife returning to hei: parents*
"When a man takes to himself a wife1*, he 
said, "he takes her parents to be his 
parents and they become his parents-in- 
law; he becomes part of their family*"
This statement is practically as true for Sierra Leone as 
it is for England. in the Sierra Leone society, though on marri­
age a wife theoretically abandons her family to set up a new one jI
with her husband, it is socially recognised that she can resort to i
her parents in times of hardship and the parents have a social re-
2sponsibility to receive her. Thus, in Antoh v. Crowther an
action by a husband against his father-in-law failed. The wife
had originally left the matrimonial home with the husband* s consent
to reside with her father for the observance of a funeral ceremony
for an aunt but later refused to return to her husband alleging,
which was false, that he lived on her immoral earnings.
It will be a defence to an action for enticement as well as
for other offences against consortium that the plaintiff ill-treated
the other spouse and that the victim was forced to leave the
3plaintiff through fear of bodily injury* The defence is based 
on the principle of humanity* Hbnest belief by the defendant that 
ill-treatment had been meted out to one spouse by the other is
1. [1958] 1 Q.B. 267, 268, 269.
2* Unreported; decided by the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone in 
1949.
3* The English cases: Philp v. Squire (1791) Peake 114; Berthon v.
Cartwright (1796) 2 Esp. 480.
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1
probably sufficient. It is also probably a defence that the
2
defendant did not know that the plaintiff* s spouse was married*
(d) Damages for Adultery
According to s*20 of the Sierra Leone Matrimonial Causes 
Act, a husband can sue independently for or include in a matrimon­
ial suit for divorce or judicial separation a claim for damages 
against another man who has committed adultery with the petitioner* s 
wife* A claim for damages under this provision is based on tort
and is not a matrimonial relief and is maintainable even after the
3
death of the wife.
Such claims are frequently included in petitions for divorce 
or judicial separation, but^until recently>there was doubt whether 
they could be made in an independent action in tort. In Wilson v.
4
Genet and Wilson the High Court of Sierra Leone ruled that the 
claim can be made independently, though Forster J* refused to award 
damages on the ground that the alleged adultery occurred when the 
spouses were separated, the wife being as if she were a femme sole
during the period of separation* The learned judge professedly
................................   5
relied on the decision in the English case of Gardner v* Gardner *
Granted that in Gardner* s. case the jury awarded no damages. But
they declined to do so not because there was separation simpliciter
between husband and wife but because the wife was of very little
value to the husband from the inception of the marriage, since she
had developed irregular and intemperate habits soon after the
1. Ibid.
2. McCardie, J. in Butterworth v. Butterworth & Englefield [l920j
P.126, 151 C/f Sir Henry Duke, P, in Smith v. Smith & Reed [1922] 
P.l.
3. Tambiah, J.A. in Wilson v. Genet and Wilson, unreported, a deci­
sion of the Sierra Leone Court of Appeal dated 11 May, 1970.
4. 1968-1969 A.L.R. S.L. 53.
5. (1901) 17 T.L.R. 331.
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marriage and long before she had met the co-respondent or sepa­
rated from her husband. The legal position in that case was 
stated clearly by Gorell Barnes J. approving the opinion of the 
President in Evans v. Evans and Platts,^  when the President sum­
med up to the jury as follows:
"It cannot be denied that there have been- 
thrown out at different times and in vari­
ous cases suggestions tending to show that 
where a husband and wife have become sepa­
rated the husband cannot afterwards claim 
damages. That, however, is not the law.
No doubt the fact of separation having 
taken place is an element, but is only 
one among several elements to be con­
sidered ... If you think that separation 
took place before any adultery was commit­
ted ... it is quite right to take that in­
to account as a very important element 
operating in diminution of the damages 
... The breaking up of the matrimonial 
home is not by any means the only element 
to be considered in such cases as this.”
According to the above authority, therefore, a husband is 
not precluded from recovering damages because there has been a 
separation between himself and his wife before the adulterous asso­
ciation occurred. Separation may be relevant only when consider­
ing the quantum of damages.
When Wilson* s case went on appeal, theSierra Leone Court of
o
Appeal in fact, though without citing the foregoing authorities, 
awarded damages to the husband/petitioner. In the opinion of 
the Court, the first defendant, Genet, was responsible for the 
separation between Wilson and his wife and adultery had taken 
place after the separation.
The principles on which damages are awarded in such cases 
were summarised by Tambiah J.A. as follows: only compensatory
1. [1899] P.195.
2. Wilson v. Genet and Wilson, Civ. App. 25/68. Unreported, de­
cided by the Court o£ Appeal of Sierra Leone on 11 May, 1970.
but not punitive damages are recoverable, and two main considera­
tions apply to arrive at an assessment; first, the financial 
value of the wife to the husband depending on her fortune and her 
ability and assistance in the home or business; secondly, the 
injury to the husband1s feelings, the blow to his marital honour 
and the hurt to his matrimonial and family life. Damages under
this head are, however, moderate and the use of wealth or status
2by an adulterer is not a factor to aggravate them.
As we have seen, the right to recover damages for adultery 
is available only to the husband. A wife does not have a corre­
sponding claim of this kind against a woman who has committed 
adultery with her husband.
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Maintenance of a wife by a husband is a universal concept 
which is known to every legal system. The reverse situation is 
known, though only recently, to only few countries like England. 
Sierra Leone law differs from English law in this respect, although 
provision is made in Sierra Leone law whereupon on dissolution of 
marriage or decree of judicial separation or upon an order for 
restitution of conjugal rights, settlement of the wife*s property 
on the husband or children of both can be made.
When it comes to the question of maintenance while husband 
and wife are cohabiting, Sierra Leone law adheres strictly to the- 
common law principle that it is the husband* s duty to provide his
wife with the necessities of life. This principle was echoed by
3 4Lord Hodson in McGowan v. McGowan and summarised by Bromley in
1. Approving McCardie J* in Butterworth v. Butterworth and Engle- 
field [l920f] P.126.
2. Approving Diplock J. in ' pitchard v* Pitchard £19663 3 All E.R. 
610.
3. [1948] 2 All E.R. 1032, 1034.
4. Op.cit., 402.
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the following terms:
"The husband* s duty . to provide his wife 
with the necessities of life is prima facie 
complied with if he provides a home for her*
The wife has no right to separate mainten­
ance in a separate home unless she can 
justify living apart from her husband* A 
man may fail to maintain his wife even 
though he is cohabiting with her, and he 
must still provide her with necessities, 
for example, food and clothing ... His 
obligation remains if the spouses are 
obliged to live apart, for example, owing 
to the illness of one of them,provided 
that the wife is not in desertion.11
In Sierra Leone, both the common law and statute law pro­
tect the married woman* s right to maintenance on condition that
j
she remains faithful whatever be the conduct of the husband.
(i) Common Law
At common law this protection is afforded by the doctrine 
of agency by presumption of law.* It is a doctrine under which 
a husband is held liable for the debts incurred by his wife on the 
presumption that he has authorised her to pledge his credit. The 
obligation of the husband to support his wife arose from the fact 
that until the late nineteenth century, in England, women could not 
own any separate property at law and so could not be made liable 
for debts.
The common law does not, however, provide maximum security 
for the wife as would be expected, for the concept of the wife* s 
presumed authority is severely curtailed. Thus, if she is pro­
vided with necessaries according to the station of life of the
2husband, or if the husband expressly forbids her to pledge his
3credit eren if she has not been provided with adequate maintenance,
1. See the standard works on Agency, particularly Bowstead, Frid­
man and Stoljar.
2. Phillipson v. Hayter (1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 38.
3. See Fridman: Agency. 3rd ed., p.83.
or if she commits adultery even though the husband remains ignorant 
of it,* she is deprived of the right to maintenance* The autho­
rity to pledge the husband* s credit also depends on the fact that
2
both husband and wife are cohabiting in a domestic establishment.
If there is a cessation of cohabitation, the agency by 
presumption of law comes to an end but if the wife is deserted, 
another agency relationship arises by operation of law, i.e.
3
agency of necessity. Through this doctrine, a deserted wife
can pledge her husband* s credit even though she may be expressly
forbidden to do so. But agency of necessity also lasts as long
as the wife remains chaste.
Developments in social security and the amelioration of
' the wife’s 'economic'position in'the event'of desertion by her * * * -
husband have resulted in the abolition by statute of the concept
4of the wife’s agency of necessity in English law, but as the com­
mon law is part of Sierra Leone law the doctrine is still appli­
cable in Sierra Leone. The retention of the doctrine in Sierra 
Leone law is justifiable since there is no social welfare state 
in the country.
(ii) Statutory law
Under statute law there is no provision in Sierra Leone 
whereby a married woman, during cohabitation, can apply to the 
courts for an order for maintenance where the husband has wilfully
1. Gpvier v. Hancock (1796) Term. Rep.603. But if the husband 
connives at or condones the adultery the wife will continue to 
have the authority; Wilson v. Glossop (1885) 20 Q.B.D. 354; 
Harris v. Morris (1801) 4 Esp. 41.
2. Debenham v. Mellon (1880) 6 App. Cas. 24, H.L.
3. Fridman, op.cit., pp.70-73.
4. S.41 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1870.
neglected to provide reasonable maintenance for her without insti­
tuting proceedings for divorce or judicial separation* It is the 
deserted wife, the divorced or j’udicially separated wife and the 
one whose marriage has been annulled, that ave’protected. Sierra 
Leone law, in this regard, corresponds to English law before 1949.*
The deserted wife in Sierra Leone has two options open to 
her. Apart from invoking her common law right as agent of neces­
sity, she can apply to a Magistrate’s Court for maintenace under
2
the Married Women’s Maintenance Act; or she can petition the High 
Court, first for an order for restitution of conj’ugal rights and 
upon a decree thereof being disobeyed by the husband, for a subse­
quent order for periodical payments to be made to her by the hus­
band.^
These provisions are, with respect, grossly inadequete 
even for the persons intended to be benefited.
First, the effort of the wife to invoke her common law 
right can be severely forestalled by a recalcitrant husband.
While in law he cannot withdraw the wife* s assumed authority as 
agent of necessity, he can, in practice, prevent tradesmen from 
carrying on business with the wife. This is frequently done by
f. By s.5 of the United Kingdom Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provi­
sions) Act, 1949, it became possible for the first time in Eng­
land for a married woman to petition for maintenance on the 
ground of the husband* s wilful neglect to maintain her or their 
children without her having to institute some other matrimonial 
proceedings.
2. Cap.100 of the revised edition of the Laws of Sierra Leone,1960. 
The application can be made by a wife, including a Muslim wife, 
married under statutory law. See Mustapha v. Mustapha (1950) 3
S.L. Law Recorder, p.20.
3. S.18(l) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960. Note that a Muslim wife is de­
prived of remedies under this Act.
announcements in newspapers that the wife has left the matrimonial 
home (which may not be the case) and that anybody who wishes to 
give her credit does so at his own risk,
1
Secondly, under the Married Women*s Maintenance Act, 
maintenance depends upon proof of desertion. This may be a colos-. 
sal task for the wife to undertake if she has been separated from 
her husband in circumstances in which it may be difficult to cast 
the blame on the husband. In such a case, only.the chivalrous 
magistrate would strain the law and bend it in the wife*s favour, 
with the threat of the appeal court hanging over him like the 
sword of Damocles,
2
In Elba v, Elba, one of the issues before the Sierra 
Leone High Court in its appellate jurisdiction was whether a Magi­
strate's Court was right in finding that a husband had deserted 
his wife, so as to make a claim to maintenance available to the 
wife under s.2 of the Married Women's Maintenace Act, The facts 
were that the husband and wife were living together when the hus­
band, having had notice to quit his home, moved to another. The 
wife did not go with him nor did she raise any objection to going 
with the husband to live in the new premises. The summons was 
taken out on 5 March, 1965, and it was during the course of the 
proceedings that the husband moved to the new premises on 29 June, 
1965, The magistrate, in the course of his judgment, stated that 
he came to the conclusion that the husband did not want the wife 
any more, and ruled that the husband deserted the wife on the day 
that he changed residence. On appeal to the High Court, Harding 
J* held that the evidence before the magistrate did not amount to
1, S,2 of cap.100 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. 1967-1968 A.L.R. S.L. 74.
1
desertion on the part of the husband.
Thirdly, the jurisdiction of the Magistrates* Courts is
limited to ordering a maximum of Le 8 (four pounds) a week for
2the maintenance of the wife and the children of the marriage*
If, as the law suggests, the wife is entitled to be maintained in 
accordance with the station of life of the husband, that status 
cannot be maintained by the wife of a husband in the higher income
q
group if the wife is deserted and has no occupation or profession 
upon which to embark* The situation cam be saved by either ex­
tending the jurisdiction of the Magistrates* Courts or granting 
jurisdiction to the High Court to order maintenance while the mar­
riage subsists without first going through the cumbersome proced­
ure of petitioning for an order for restitution of conjugal 
rights.^
Fourthly, the machinery for the enforcement of maintenance 
orders is not very helpful to the wife. Under the Married 
Women* sMaintenance. Act,”* if the husband is in default he can be 
brought before a Magistrate* s Court on a warrant for his arrest 
for contempt. The Magistrate may direct the amount due to be re­
covered by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the
11 However, earlier in his judgment, Harding J. expressed the opi- 
ion that on the evidence before the Court, the Magistrate could 
have found that the husband was guilty of constructive desertion. 
It is difficult to figure what he meant by this statement since 
he took the contrary view in his final decision.
2. S.2(«)of the Married Women* s Maintenance Act, cap.100 of the re­
vised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960.
3. The top-ranking civil servants and men in commerce and industry 
and the professions earn a minimum of Le 4,000 per annum.
4. For details of financial provisions consequent upon a petition 
for restitution of conjugal rights, see further Chapter 10, 
PP.SW-'SV-S.
5. S.4 of the Married Women*s Maintenance Act, cap.100 of the re­
vised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
husband, if he has any, or may commit him to prison for any term 
not exceeding three months. In many instances, however, the pro­
perty of the husband is not available for distress to be levied 
upon; nor is he brought before the court as the process servers 
always complain that he cannot be found.
In the case of default to make"periodical payments subse­
quent upon a petition for an order for restitution of conjugal 
rights, even the perfunctory enforcement provision as in ordinary 
maintenance orders is not available. Instead, the wife is left 
with the alternative of pledging the husband* s credit for neces­
saries supplied to her  ^which, as we have said earlier, is not so 
satisfactory.
Where proceedings are instituted for the dissolution or
annulment of the marriage or for judicial separation, there are
provisions for the maintenance of the wife. First, in the case
of a decree for judicial separation, the court can order the hus-
2band to pay alimony to the wife. Secondly, in the course of
proceedings for divorce or nullity, the wife can be paid by the
husband alimony pendente lite which the court can make permanent
4
after the appropriate decree. This will take the form of a 
gross sun of money or annual sums of money for any term, not ex-
ceeding the wife’s life* and/or a monthly or weekly sum during
the joint lives of the husband and the wife.
1. S.15(l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the re­
vised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. Ibid.
3. S.21(3): But it was held by Webber C.J. sitting in the Supreme
Court in Dove v. Dove, unreported, that if it appears that the 
husband has no means or very small means, the Court may refuse 
to grant alimony either pendente lite or permanent* See 
Supreme Court Records, Vol.II (1933),pi•
4. S.21(1) and (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap* .^02 of the 
revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
5. S.21(1) •
6. S.21(2).
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The nearest that Sierra Leone statutory law has gone to 
provide maintenance through the High Court for a married woman 
without going through the process of terminating the marriage or 
seeking judicial separation is s*4 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amend­
ment ) Act, 1961.* That section allows a married who has
grounds for judicial separation and whose husband has wilfully 
neglected to provide reasonable maintenance for her or the infant 
children of the marriage, to apply to the Court for periodical pay­
ments which may be secured or insecure depending on the discretion 
of the Court. It must be emphasised that application can only 
be made under this section if the wife has grounds to be judici­
ally separated from her husband, otherwise the Court cannot be of 
any assistance to her even though it may be proved that the hus­
band has wilfully neglected to provide reasonable maintenance.
As with maintenance orders in the case of desertion, these 
provisions are inadequate, since there is probably no attachment 
of the earnings of a defaulting husband. In petitions for judi­
cial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, and applications 
under s.4 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961, the
position appears to be put quite clearly and succinctly by s.15(1)
2(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act which reads:
”If alimony has been ordered to be paid 
and has not been duly paid by the husband 
he shall be liable for necessaries sup­
plied for the use of the wife.’1
S.15(l)(b) applies to judicial separation but S.18M) of
the Matrimonial Causes Act and s.4 of the Matrimonial Causes
(Amendment) Act, 1961, provide that the same method for the en­
forcement of an order for alimony in the case of judicial
1. Act No.16 of 1961.
2. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
separation shall apply to restitution of conjugal rights and appli­
cation under s.4 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act respect­
ively.
For petitions for divorce or nullity, however, statutory 
law remains silent on the issue of enforcement. Vigilant and 
discreet legal practitioners have, therefore, interpreted this 
silence to mean that the methods of enforcement open to a judgment 
creditor under the general law, i,e, fi fa, sequestrate9 charging 
order and garnishee order, are also available to a wife whose 
husband has defaulted on an order to maintain her. In one case, 
Bangura v, Bangura; the wife/applicant successfully obtained a 
garnishee order from the High Court against the banker of her 
husband and received arrears of maintenance ordered by the High 
Court under s.21 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, This was, how­
ever, only possible because the husband operated a bank account 
into which his salary was paid monthly, and because the solicitor 
of the bank in question was also the solicitor of the wife. Other 
wives may not be so fortunate; for invariably, as aoon as it is 
suspected that garnishee proceedings are to be instituted, the 
husband withdraws every single cent he may have at the bank.
So far, in our present discussion, we have seen that the 
maintenance provisions both at common law and statutory law are 
not as satisfactory as they should be. The enforcement provi­
sions are inadequate; a maintenance order is not available in the 
Magistrates Court or High Court unless a matrimonial offence has 
been committed by the husband, or proceedings are under way for 
the termination of the marriage; and in the case of the Muslim 
wife, the rights open to other wives married under statute given
1. Unreported, decided by the High Court at Freetown on 21 December 
1971.
by the Matrimonial Causes Acts, are closed to her, A bid for 
law reform in Sierra Leone should, in our submission, take these 
shortcomings into consideration. Maintenance during cohabitation 
should be ordered by both the Magistrate1s Court and the High
Court for all wives married under statute, including a Muslim wife, 
on the ground of the husband1 s wilful neglect to provide reasonable 
maintenance without the obligation on the wife to prove that the 
husband has committed a matrimonial offence.
At present, an attempt is made to fill this lacuna in the 
law by the Social Welfare Department, Wives of sill marriages 
who cannot make out a case under the existing laws in order to be 
entitled to a court order against their husbands for maintenance 
and whose husbands neglect them and their children, frequently 
appeal to the Social Welfare Department where, sifter hearing the 
husband and wife, the officer may make an award in favour of the
i
wife. Compliance with the award depends on the goodwill of the 
husband because there is in this process also no enforcement 
measure. Moreover, the making of the award depends on the 
attendance of the husband before the Social Welfare Officer so 
that if the husband is not available, as happens very frequently, 
the wife goes without a remedy.
The same maintenance provisions open to other wives mar­
ried under statute law who obtain divorce or judicial separation, 
or whose marriage has been annulled should be available to Muslim 
wives as well. At present, as the Muslim wife cannot proceed 
under the Matrimonial Causes Acts on divorce, though the general 
law recognises such divorce as valid "for all civil purposes", 
she is left without a court order for maintenance against the
1, This action taken by the Social Welfare Department has no 
statutory authority and it is extra-judicial.
husband and must content herself with any provision that a magna­
nimous husband may make on her behalf, which he is not obliged to 
make under either Islamic law or the general law.
Furthermore, one of the sanctions for disobedience of a 
maintenance order ought to be the attachment of the husband1 s 
salary. This will be a very effective weapon because in Sierra 
Leone the average working husband has an employer.
So far, we have dealt with the maintenance of the married 
wife. This discussion will be incomplete if it fails to make 
observations on the maintenance of the married man as well.
In Sierra Leone today, unlike in the olden days, there is 
equality of opportunity, educational as well as occupational, for
•i
both men and women. This egalitarian attitude is reflected in
the incomes earned by both sexes, A working woman is not paid 
less because of her sex; the emphasis is on educational attain­
ment and experience. Consequently, there are many working wives 
in the country who receive large incomes and in some families, 
even earn more than their husbands. In short, the wife has over­
stepped her traditional place in the family, which was the home.
In these circumstances, one would wonder whether the time is not 
ripe for making a wife with the means, contribute to the upkeep 
of the family or maintain her husband if he happens to be indigent 
and destitutes Of course, there are a good many wives who are 
the real breadwinners in their families, but they are so out of 
their own volition and humanity and not from any legal compulsion. 
Traditionalists may argue that in the African context,
1. Though education is not free, a bright and intelligent boy or — 
girl can be sure of pursuing his or her education from the pri­
mary school level to university on government or other scholar­
ships, Though nepotism and corruption cannot be ruled out in 
every case, an educated woman can acquire the same kind of job 
and the salary as a man of the same educational standard.
marriage brings about a relationship whereby there is as if it 
were a division of labour: the wife to serve the husband faith­
fully and the husband in turn, to provide her with food, clothing 
and shelter; that whatever be the circumstances, it is the husband 
who is in duty bound to maintain the wife and children of the 
family and that there is no reciprocal obligation on the wife.
Perhaps it is a reflection of this awareness that in Sierra 
Leone^in the general law, there is no provision for ordering a wife 
to maintain her husband. Such a possibility had never existed
even at common law.
But statute law, although it does not make maintenance 
possible during cohabitation, nevertheless provides for the settle­
ment of the wife1s property where a wife refuses to resume cohabi­
tation after an order for restitution of conjugal rights has been 
made against her or where the High Court grants a decree for di­
vorce or for judicial separation. The relevant statutory provi- 
sions contained in the Matrimonial Causes Act are as follows:
"22(1), If it appears to the court in any 
case in which the court pronounces a decree 
for divorce or for judicial separation by 
reason of the adultery, desertion or cruelty 
of the wife that the wife is entitled to any 
property either in possession or reversion, 
the court may, if it thinks fit, order such 
settlement as it thinks reasonable to be 
made of the property, or any part thereof, 
for the benefit of the innocent party, and 
of the children of the marriage or any or 
either of them,"
"22(2), VJhere the application for resti­
tution of conjugal rights is by the husband 
and it appears to the court that the wife 
is entitled to any property, either in pos­
session or reversion, or is in receipt of 
any profits of trade or earnings the court 
may, if it thinks fit, order a settlement 
to be made to the satisfaction of the court 
of the property or any part thereof for the
1, Cap,102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960,
benefit of the petitioner and of the child­
ren of the marriage of either or any of 
them or may order such part of the profits 
of trade or earnings, as the court thinks 
reasonable, to be periodically paid by the 
respondent to the petitioner for his own 
benefit, or to the petitioner or any other
person for the benefit of the children of
the marriage, or either or any of them,"
The cumulative effect of the foregoing provisions is that 
they protect the innocent husband where the wife ia wholly respon­
sible for the breakdown of the marriage. The object, perhaps, is 
to compensate the husband for the loss of consortium deliberately 
brought about by the wife.
We have seen that though an attempt is made by statute to
alleviate the proprietary condition c£ the husband where the mar­
riage breaks up without his fault, there is still disparity between 
the position of the husband and that of the wife regarding mainten­
ance generally.
In 1966, the legislature saw the need for achieving uni­
formity and extending the existing maintenance provisions to the
husband when it proposed the Maintenance of Dependants Bill,
2Owing to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, the Bill 
never became law, but because of its importance in the history of 
maintenance law in Sierra Leone it is worthwhile to comment on its 
relevant articles.
The Bill, inter alia, sought to repeal the Married Women*s 
Maintenance Act.
3
Article 1 defined marriage to include a Mohammedan marriage
1. No.71 dated 15 September, 1966. See the Sierra Leone Gazette, 
Vol.XCVII, dated 15 September, 1966.
2. A general election came in March 1967, in which the government 
was defeated. The Bill was not adopted by the military govern­
ment which followed.
3. Mohammedan Marriage was added as a matter of emphasis and clari­
fication; since the Married Women* s Maintenance Actfc was passed 
on 3 July 1888, and the Mohammedan Marriage Act on 3 August 1905 
it was not clear whether the provisions of the 1888 Act applied 
to Mohammedan marriage, though in practice Magistrates enter­
tained applications from Muslim wives. .
while article 2(i) imposed a legal obligation on parties to a
marriage to maintain each other, provided that if 'the wife was to
maintain the husband he must be !tincapable of maintaining himself” ,
Article 3 stated that:
"any persons entitled to maintenance may 
apply by summons to a Magistrate for an 
order for payment to him (or her) of a 
monthly sum for maintenance «•• The Magi­
strate shall fix a monthly sum having re­
gard to all relevant circumstances includ­
ing in particular (a) the means of the 
person or persons liable to provide the 
maintenance; (b) the earning capacity 
of and any other means which the persons 
entitled to such maintenance may have for 
his support."1
The Bill was not as far-reaching as would be expected be­
cause no spouse was entitled to maintenance under it
"who shall be proved to have committed a 
matrimonial offence unless2such offence 
was condoned or forgiven,"
Moreover, the amount payable as maintenance did not exceed Le. 25
(twenty-five leones) per month. As with previous legislation,
the Bill also failed to provide proper and effective enforcement
action against a defaulter.
Nevertheless, the Bill was a milestone in the history of 
the husband1 s claim to maintenance by the wife. However, what­
ever was meant by the phrase "incapable of maintaining himself" 
remains a matter for speculation. Clearly, it would include in­
capability arising from sickness or personal injury, but it is 
debatable whether it would include incapability arising from 
drunkenness, drug addiction or unemployment, Any future legisla­
tion on this matter must, therefore, define the phrases with exact­
ness and clarity.
1. Art.3(2).
2. Art.2(2).
3. The schedule to the Bill.
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CHAPTER 8
MATRIMONIAL RELATIONS II 
A. CONTRACT
It is convenient to begin this heading by posing a series 
of questions. If a married woman obtains credit from a trades­
man for goods supplied to her and she defaults in payment, what 
are the courses open to the tradesman? Can he sue the husband or 
the wife or both of them? Does it make any difference if the 
credit was obtained before the marriage took place? What is the 
position if the husband takes a loan of, say, Le 100 from his wife 
and later refuses to pay? Can the wife sue him for the recovery 
of the money?.
Satisfactory answers to these questions depend on three 
issues: (i) the husband*s liability for the debts, contracts and
obligations generally of his wife before marriage; (ii) the wife’s 
capacity to contract in her own name during marriage; and (iii) 
the effect of contracts, debts and obligations between husband and 
wife.
(i) The husband*s liability for his wife*s ante-nuptial contracts
At common law, a husband was liable for his wife’s debts 
and contracts entered into before marriage whether or not the hus­
band knew about them or acquired any interest in them.'*' His lia­
bility was joint with that of the wife. This was one result of 
the doctrine of marital unity. Thus, he could not tbe sued alone 
if the wife was alive nor could he be sued at all if the wife was 
dead. In England, the common law position was modified by
1. See C.A. Morrison in A Century of Family Law, 1957, pp.117, 
118.
statutes between 1870 and 1935, In Sierra Leone, however, the 
first step was taken in 1875, While retaining the husband’s lia­
bility for his wife’s ante-nuptial contracts, the Sierra Leone 
Married Women’s Property Ordinance., limited it to (i) the value
of the wife’s personal estate in possession which shall have vested 
in the husband; (ii) the value of the choses in action of the wife 
which the husband shall have reduced into possession or which with 
reasonable diligence he might have reduced into possession; (iii) 
the value of the chattels real of the wife which shall have vested 
in the husband and wife; (iv) the value of the rents and profits 
of the real estate of the wife which the husband shall have re­
ceived; (v) the value of the husband’s estate or interest in any 
property which the wife, in contemplation of her marriage with him, 
shall have transferred to him or to any other person; (vi) the 
value of any property which the wife, in contemplation of her mar­
riage with the husband, shall, with his consent, have transferred 
to any person with the view of defeating or delaying her existing 
creditors,
The position in Sierra Leone remained unaltered until
1932 when s,4 of the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption 
2
Act enacted that:
”So much of English law as specially re­
stricts the acquisition holding or dis­
position of real or personal property by 
a married woman as such, whether on her 
own behalf or as executrix, administra­
trix or trustee, or limits her capacity 
to sue or be sued in her own name, shall 
have no force or effect in the Colony,”
1, TheOYciinamce. combined the English Married Women’s Property Act, 
1870, and its Amendment Act of 1874, The Sierra Leone Ordinance
vetained the liability of the husband for his wife’s ante-nuptial 
contracts which was abolished by the English 1870 Act, but re­
vived by the English 1874 Act,
2, Cap,18 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960,
The preceding legislation, it is conceded, did not affect 
the husband’s liability for his wife’s ante-nuptial contracts.
All it did was to permit a married woman to acquire, hold or dis­
pose of property as if she were a femme sole, and to render her 
capable of suing or being sued like any single woman.
In 1949, however, the husband’s responsibility for his 
wife’s pre-marital contracts was terminated. From then onwards, 
onJ.y the wife could sue or be sued on them. S.2 of the Imperial 
Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption (Amendment) Act, repealing 
and replacing s.6 of the principal Act provided that:
nThe husband of a married woman shall not, 
by reason only of his being her husband, 
be liable -
(a) in respect of any tort committed by 
her whether before or after the marri­
age or in respect of any contract 
entered into or debt or obligation 
incurred by her before the marriage, or
(b) to be sued, or made a party to any legal 
proceedings brought, in respect of any 
such tort, contract or obligation.11
The 1949 Act presumably had a retroactive effect in respect of
contract, even if proceedings thereof were pending on the date
 -  2 ................................................................
that the Act came into operation. The present position, there­
fore, is that a husband is not liable either jointly or severally 
for contracts entered into by his wife before they are married.
(ii) The wife’s capacity to contract in her own name
The doctrine of marital unity of husband and wife coupled 
with the fact that the wife had no property made it impossible for
1. No.14 of 1949. This was achieved in English law by s.3 of the 
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935. _
2. The proviso to the new s.6 of the Imperial Statutes (Law of Pro­
perty) Adoption Act as contained in s.2 of the Amendment Act,
No.14 of 1949, is retroactive with respect to torts unless pro­
ceedings had been instituted before 31 December, 1949. The 
proviso makes no mention of contracts.
a married woman to contract on her own behalf at common law* At 
equity, however, since property settled on her was regarded as her 
separate property, she could contract but only in reference to
that separate property. Even in respect of such property, she
2
did not bear personal liability* If there was a breach, re­
course had to be made to the trustees of her estate* It can be 
seen, therefore, that though in equity a married woman had rights 
as if she were a single woman, she did not thereby become a 
tfemme sole having full capacity to contract.
The Married Women* s PropertyQrdmatfce,enabled a married 
woman in Sierra Leone to sue or be sued on a contract involving an 
employment, occupation or trade she carried on separately from 
her husband, as if she were a femme sole*
We have seen that it was the Imperial Statutes (Law of 
Property) Adoption Act that made a Sierra Leone married woman a 
femme sole with full capacity to sue or be sued in her own name. 
Therefore, since that Act, if a married woman obtains credit from 
a tradesman, she must be personally liable independently of the 
husband, unless it can be proved that she acted as her husband* s 
agent *
£iii) The effect of contracts between husband and wife
At common law, ante-nuptial contracts made between husband
4
and wife, when single, were discharged upon marriage. So far as 
contracts during marriage were concerned, because of the doctrine 
of legal unity a maun could not contract with his wife for
1* Owens v. Dickenson (1840) Gr. & Pk. 48, 54.
2. Durrant v* Ricketts (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 177.
3. Ss.8 and 9 Ordinance, NoS7 of 1875*
4. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book I, cap.15, 1st ed. (1765) p.442; 
18th ed. (1821) p.504.
nto covenant with her would be to cove­
nant with himself.”1
Consequently, it was impossible for husband and wife to sue each
other.
o
Equity took a rather flexible line. In Butler v. Butler 
a wife^who was carrying on a business of her own as a provision 
dealer, obtained loans; at her request, from her husband in order 
to pay her debts incurred in the course of her business. The 
husbAnd lent her the sums of money both before and during their 
marriage. Deciding the case at first instance, Wills J. held 
that in respect of the ante-nuptial liabilities of the wife to the 
husband, the action could not lie but that he had a right of action 
against her for the post-nuptial loans. On appeal against that 
part of the judgment with respect to the payment of the post­
nuptial loans, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that an 
action was maintainable in equity, but only to the extent of the 
wife1s separate property.
"Where a wife was not protected by a 
restraint upon anticipation, she could 
give her separate property to her hus­
band and could contract with him as to 
it^ as if she were a femme sole, her 
husband could sue her in a court of 
equity, and she as plaintiff might sue 
him by her next friend.”3
This equitable rule was anticipated in Sierra Leone by
Lf.
the Married Women’s Property Ordinance,; 187S\
Thus stood the position until the passing of s.4 of the 
Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act. As we have 
seen earlier, this section did away in Sierra Leone with English
1• Ibid.
2. (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 374.
3. Ibid., per Cotton L.J., p.378.
4. Ss. 8 and 9.Thc Dvdfnance allowed a married woman to sue her hus­
band or be sued by her account of her separate property.
law that restricted the acquisition, holding or disposition of 
property by a married woman or which limited her capacity to sue 
or be sued in her own name*
Commenting on the effect this provision on the ability of 
husband and wife to sue each other it would be inaccurate to say 
that,
"today in Sierra Leone, a wife is a femme 
sole but as between husband,and wife there 
are no remedies for the protection of the 
property of either spouse."
The Supreme Court of Sierra Leone had at least on one
occasion interpreted the section to mean that a married woman now
has full capacity to sue or be sued by her husband* In Smythe v*
2 3Smythe and Cole, a married man took out a writ of summons
against his wife and the wife made an application for the writ to 
be set aside on the ground that a husband could not take civil 
proceedings against his wife in Sierra Leone* Counsel for the 
wife argued that s*4 of the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) 
Adoption Act did not mean what it said and that the Act could not 
expel English law from Sierra Leone by a simple statement that it
shall have no force or effect thereon. Holding that theaction
was maintainable, Aitken, acting C.J., rightly exposed the absurd­
ity of this contention when he said:
"Section 4 of the Imperial Statutes (Law 
of Property) Adoption Act provides that 
so much of English Law as limits the 
capacity of a married woman to sue or 
be sued in her own name shall have no
force or effect in the Colony (Sierra
i
* See Marcus Jones: The Aureol Review* Government Printer, Free­
town, Vol.l, No*2, dated 15 April, 1969, p.33.
2. Unreported, decided by the Supreme Court on 20 June, 1933. See 
the old Supreme Court Judgment Book, Vol.l, p.609. _
3. The judgment did not specify the cause of action but the deci­
sion is based on capacity to bring civil actions between hus­
band and wife. The action was definitely not about a matri­
monial relief.
Leone). It seems to me, therefore, 
that unless we find some local enacts 
ment which limits the capacity of a 
married woman to sue or be sued in her 
own name, her capacity to sue or be 
sued is just the same as that of any 
femme sole ... If an Ordinance does not 
mean what it says then by what process 
of ... divination can we discover what 
it does mean.?11
Smythe* s case, therefore, decided that whatever that was 
in English law that prevented a married woman from rsuing or being 
sued by her husband was abolished in Sierra Leone law by the 
Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act. English law 
on this point consisted of the common law, equity and modifica­
tions made thereon by statutory law before the passing of the 
Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act in 1932. By 
doing away with English law, therefore, the 1932 Act completely 
displaced from Sierra Leone law any provision of English common
law, equity and statutory laws * that prohibited a married woman
2from suing or being sued by her husband or third parties.
One might ask the question why was it necessary for the 
Sierra Leone legislature to enact in 1949 the Imperial Statutes 
(Law of Property) Adoption (Amendment) Act if, since the 1932 Act, 
a married woman could bring actions in contract against her hus­
band or third parties in her own name? The answer is that the 
1932 Act dealt merely with difficulties in the way of a married 
woman with respect to her capacity to contract, but it did nothing 
to affect the husband*s common law liability for his wife's ante­
nuptial contracts entered into with third parties. The object
1. Generally, English statutory law after the 1st day of January, 
1880, does not apply in Sierra Leone. See s.74 of the Courts 
Act, 1965.
2. The Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act, however,
is not of retrospective effect: Bankole-Bright v. Bankole-
Bright (1950) 3 S.L. Law Recorder, p.23.
1
of the 1949 Act was to abolish this liability*
Under Sierra Leone law, therefore, a married woman now has
full power to enter into a contract with her husband or with a
stranger* But agreements between spouses must be viewed with
caution* If an agreement savours of a mere domestic arrangement
without an intention to create legal obligations, it will not be
2enforceable between a husband and wife*
B* TORT
As in the case of contracts, the common law imposed limit­
ations on a married woman’s liability to her husband and to 
strangers in tort. A married woman could sue or be sued in tort
by a stranger only if her husband was joined as plaintiff or de-
3fendant with the wife. No tortious liability could arise be-
4tween spouses and neither spouse could sue the other in tort 
during marriage or continue during marriage an action started 
when they were single*'5 Thus, if a husband, in a fit of jealousy
grabbed his wife’s dress and tore it, suspecting that it was a 
present from a lover, the wife could not sue him at common law in 
tort, not even after the marriage had been dissolved.
The first statutory advance in Sierra Leone law was made 
by the Married Women’s PropertyQrdhanic2,J%15 which enabled a wife 
to maintain an action for the recovery of her separate property
1. The Liability was abolished in English law by s.3 of the Law 
Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935*
2. See the English case of Balfour v. Balfour £1919} 2 K.B. 571*
3. Bromley, op.cit*, p.124.
4. Phillips v. Barnett (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 436,
5. Lush, Husband and Wife, 4th ed, (1933) pp.573 et seq*; Kahn 
Freund: ”Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband 
and Wife”, 15 M.L.R. (1952) 140-154,
6. S ^8 of.Chdinunce. of 1875.
against anyone including her husband. No corresponding right, 
however, was given to the husband to sue his wife in tort with 
respect to his own separate property.
As we have argued earlier, the Imperial Statutes (Law of 
Property) Adoption Act removed every restriction placed on a mar­
ried woman at common law in respect of dealings with property, and 
made her a femme sole capable of suing and being sued in tort by 
her husband and strangers. In this respect, Sierra Leone law 
went ahead of English law since under the latter law, actions in 
tort between spouses were not possible until the Law Reform (Hus­
band and Wife) Act, 1962.
But as with contracts, English law preceded Sierra Leone 
law in abolishing the husband’s liability for torts committeed by 
his wife.*
On the authority of Smythe v. Smythe and Cole, therefore, 
the law is that in Sierra Leone husband and wife can sue each 
other in tort. And, on the basis of the Imperial Statutes (Law 
of Property) Adoption (Amendment) Act, 1949, a husband is no longer 
liable for the torts committed by his wife nor can he be made a 
party jointly with her in any proceedings in tort instituted by or 
against the wife by reason only of his being her husband.
C. CRIME
With certain exceptions,
’’The doctrine of unity has never applied 
generally in the criminal law so as to 
make a husband vicariously liable for 
his wife’s crimes or to prevent either 
of them from being liable in most cases
1. Abolished In English law by s.3 of the Law Reform (Married Women 
and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, and in Sierra Leone by the Imperial 
Statutes (Law of Property) Amendment Act, 1949, Act No.14 of 
1949.
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for a crime committed against the other.V 
These exceptions will be considered shortly. Before we do so,
however, it is necessary to clarify whether the criminal doctrines 
which we are about to discuss apply to spouses of any sort of mar- 
riage in Sierra Leone. As received common law, the criminal doc­
trines clearly apply to Sierra Leone. There is, however, no case- 
law in Sierra Leone to show that they apply to every type of marri­
age recognised as valid by Sierra Leone law. The decision of the
2Privy Council in the case of Mawji v, R. is, therefore, of some 
guidance here. In that case, one of the main points at issue was 
whether the English rule that a husband and wife cannot be con­
victed of conspiracy which was incorporated into the criminal law 
of Tanganyika was applicable ten the spouse of a polygamous marri­
age. The Board held that the rule applied to any husband and 
wife of a marriage valid under Tanganyika law and that a polygamous 
marriage being one of the marriages so recognised, the rule ap­
plied to it. Delivering the opinion of the Board on the issue, 
Lord Somervell of Harrow had this to say:
11 In the oriminal law of Tanganyika the 
words Husband and Wife if unqualified are 
- not restricted to monogamous unions. If 
it is desired to deal with monogamous as 
distinct from other marriages express 
words are used. For example, section 155 
of the Criminal Procedure Code deals in 
subsection (1) with the wife or husband 
of a person charged being a competent wit­
ness for the prosecution. Sub-section
(2 ) restricts the competence in the case 
of a wife or husband of a monogamous mar­
riage ... It is clear, of course, that 
the marriages primarily contemplated by 
the rule in England were monogamous mar­
riages, but the rule being now part of 
the criminal law of Tanganyika, their
1. Bromley, op.cit., p.128. For a fuller treatment of this topic, 
see Glanville Williams: "Legal Unity of Husband and Wife*1, 10
M.L.R. (1947) 20.
2. [1957] 1 All.E.R. 385, P.C.; [1957] A.C. 126.
Lordships are of opinion that it applies 
to any husband and wife of a marriage 
valid under Tanganyika law*”
The position in Sierra Leone is identical to that in 
Tanganyika then. Firstly, three forms of marriage are recognised 
by Sierra Leone law and they include both monogamous and polyga­
mous marriages. Secondly, except with regard to the competence
•t
and compellability of spouses to give evidence in criminal cases 
in which one of the spouses is an accused, the criminal law of 
Sierra Leone does not distinguish between the spouses of the 
different forms of marriage. It is, therefore, our contention 
that the criminal doctrines ought to apply to all sorts of marri­
ages valid under Sierra Leone law, except where provision is made, 
expressly or impliedly, in the law to prefer one form of marriage 
to another.
(i) Marital coercion
The common law doctrine of marital coercion provided that 
if a married woman committed a crime other than treason or murder 
in the presence of her husband, there was a rebuttable presumption 
that she committed it under the husband’s coercion and he and not 
she was prima facie liable on it. Thus, the burden was cast on a 
husband whose wife committed a criminal offence in his presence to 
prove that she did so of her own volition and independently and 
not through any force on his part.
The doctrine was abolished in English law by the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1925. This Act is of no application in Sierra Leone 
and there does not seem to be any local legislation directly on
1. Under the Sierra Leone Criminal Procedure Act a spouse of a 
customary marriage is competent and compellable to give evi­
dence against the other but spouses married under the Christian, 
Civil and Mohammedan Marriage Acts are generally not competent 
and compellable. For details, see pp.$77- •
the matter. Strictly speaking, therefore, as the English common 
law is the basis of the Criminal law of Sierra Leone, in the ab­
sence of any local legislation to the contrary, it would appear 
that the doctrine subsists as part of Sierra Leone law. However, 
despite diligent research, the present writer has not been able to 
discover any case in which the doctrine has ever been invoked in 
Sierra Leone. It probably became obsolete long before Independ­
ence.
Though there does not seem to be a direct legislation on 
marital coercion, a provision in the Sierra Leone Constitution 
would appear to suggest that the doctrine cannot any longer be in­
voked in the country. S* 9(4) of the Constitution states
that:
"Every person who is charged with a crimi­
nal offence shall be presumed to be inno­
cent until he is proved or has pleaded 
guilty."
In short, the onus of proof of every crime is on the pro­
secution and not the accused. Thus, if a husband is charged with 
a crime committed by his wife in his presence, if there is any 
allegation of coercion on the part of the husband, it is the pro­
secution that must prove it and not for the husband to prove the 
contrary. If this interpretation is correct, then the rule of 
marital coercion no longer obtains in the law of Sierra Leone.
(ii) Conspiracy
At common law, a husband and wife could not be convicted 
of the crime of conspiracy if they are the sole conspirators.*
If a third party joins them, all of them could be convicted of 
the crime. Glanville Williams limits the extent of the rule
1. Glanville Williams traces the origin of the rule to the doc­
trine of unity or to the doctrine of the wife’s subordination; 
see: "Legal Unity of Husband and Wife", 10 M.L.R. (1947) 20.
2. R. v. Cope (1718/19) 1 Str. 144.
that spouses cannot commit the crime of conspiracy only to incho­
ate crimes, and argues vehemently that the rule cannot apply if 
the crime is consummated.
While admitting that a husband and wife can be guilty of 
a consummated crime, it is submitted that none of the authorities 
cited by Glanville Williams supports a conviction on the ground of 
conspiracy. The reason for each conviction could be explained
2otherwise than on account of conspiracy. Thus in R. v. Abbott 
husband and wife had planned to commit suicide, and the husband 
bought poison some of which the wife gave to him and took the 
rest herself. The wife died but the husband lived. The hus­
band was convicted of murder. It is submitted that the husband’s 
conviction arose from the fact that he was an accessory to the 
fact of his wife’s self-murder (suicide) and not because of any 
agreement between the spouses to die. If, for example, there 
was no such agreement but the husband bought the poison knowing 
that his wife intended to kill herself by it, the husband would 
still have been guilty of accessory before the fact. These views
seem to . be accepted by Glanville Williams himself who, when
3
commenting on another case, R. v. Croftsa sav/s.:
"The decision seems to involve the propo­
sition that every conspirator who is ab­
sent when the crime is committed becomes 
when the crime is committed, an accessory 
before the fact.11
Indeed, a conviction for conspiracy would lie not because the
crime has been consummated but because of the mere agreement to
carry out the criminal intent.
1. Glanville Williams, op.cit., 22-24.
2. (1903) 67 J.P. 151.
3. [1944] K.B. 295.
4. Glanville Williams, op.cit., 23, 24.
(iii) Accessory after the fact
Another exception to the rule that marital relationship 
does not affect crimes committed by spouses is the rule that a 
wife cannot become an accessory after the fact to a felony com­
mitted by her husband, even if she received him with full know­
ledge that he had committed a felony; nor does she become a 
principal offender in the case of treason** This rule is one­
sided and does not provide a corresponding protection for the 
2husband.
( v^) Rape and Indecent Assault
3
In his Pleas of the Crown, Hale was of the opinion that
a husband cannot be guilty of rape upon his wife
•'for byl their mutual matrimonial consent 
and contract the wife hath given up her­
self in this kind unto her husband, which
she cannot retract.11
This statement has been generally accepted as the correct position 
at common law, but with the condition that the act of sexual inter­
course takes place at a time when the husband is entitled to his
4
wife1s consortium. Thus, if they are separated either judici­
ally or by a deed with a non-cohabitation or non-molestation 
clause, the husband loses his right to consortium and will be 
guilty of rape if he has intercourse with the wife without her
5
consent. Though a man cannot be guilty of rape on his wife as
1. See Hale, I Pleas of the Crown, 47, 621; Coke, 3rd Institute 
108.
2. Ibid*
3. Vol.l, p.629.
4. See obiter dicta of the judges in the English case R. v. 
Clarence (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23. The Court was constituted by 
Lord Coleridge, C.J., Pollock and Huddleston, B.B., Stephen, 
Manistry, Mathew, A.L. Smith, Wills, Grantham, J.J. (Field, 
Hawkins, Day and Charles J.J. dissented).
5. The English case of R. v. Clarke [1949] 2 All E.R, 448.
principal in the first degree, it would appear that he can be
1
guilty as an accessory to a rape on his wife.
The same legal position between husband and wife as re-
2gards rape applies in case of indecent assault. In either case, 
although a husband may be entitled to an acquittal on the offence 
of rape or indecently assaulting his wife, he cam be convicted of 
assault upon her if the facts so warrant. Thus, he cam be guilty 
of assault if he uses unreasonable force or violence to have sexual
3
intercourse with his wife, or if he shaves the pubic hairs of his
4wife without her consent,
(v) Criminal Libel
5
The case of R v. Lord Mayor of London established the 
common law rule that a wife cannot prosecute her husband for defa­
matory libel upon her. In that case, one Emma Vance laid an in­
formation before the Lord Mayor of London upon an application for 
a summons against Alfred Vance, her husband, for maliciously pub­
lishing in the Daily Telegraph that she was in no way related to 
him or his family, meaning thereby that she was not his wife. Re­
viewing the authorities, Smith J, was of the opinion that libel 
was not one of the offences for which statute had modified the 
common law that husband and wife could not take criminal proceed­
ings against each other. It is submitted with respect, that in 
holding;that prosecutions could not be between spouses for libel, 
Smith J, established an exception to the rule of criminal liabi­
lity between husband and wife. As has been seen earlier, the
1, Alawusa v, Odusote (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 140, 141, a decision of 
the West African Court of Appeal,
2,Ibid,
3. The English case of R. v. Miller [1954] 2 All E.R. 529,
4. Alawusa v, Odusote (ante),
5. (1886) . 16 Q.BJ>.772,
doctrine of marital unity has never applied generally in the 
criminal law to prevent either spouse from being liable for a 
crime against the other.
(vi) Larceny
It is in the crime of larceny that the doctrine of conju­
gal unity is most apparent. At common law, as the property of 
the wife passed into the possession of the husband, and the wife 
was regarded as having some interest in her husband1s property, 
husband and wife were incapable of stealing from each other. 
According to statutory law, also, spouses cannot in general still
i
steal from each other. S.36(l) of the Larceny Act, while em­
powering a married woman to protect her property under the Act is 
if she were a femme sole provides that:
"no proceedings under this Act shall be 
taken by any wife against her husband 
while they are living together as to or 
concerning any property claimed by her, 
nor while they are living apart as to or 
concerning any act done by the husband 
while they were living together concerning 
property claimed by the wife, unless such 
property has been wrongfully taken by the 
husband when leaving or deserting or about 
to leave or desert his wife."
S.36(2) makes a wife criminally liable to her husband in respect
of his property in circumstances similar to those in which the
husband may be liable to the wife.
From the foregoing statutory provisions, it is quite clear 
that so long as the spouses are cohabiting one cannot commit a 
criminal offence against the property of the other* Even after
1. The Imperial Statutes (Criminal Law) Adoption Act, cap.27 of 
the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960. This vas the English 
Larceny Act, 1916, and it applies in Sierra Leone as adopted 
law.
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cohabitation has ceased, a prosecution cannot be maintained for an 
act of interference with property which occurred during the period 
of cohabitation unless the property is wrongfully taken away at the 
time that cohabitation is about to come to an end.
The section suggests that there may be wrongful dealings 
with each spouse1s property with impunity while the parties "are 
living together" which if done by a stranger may amount to an of­
fence or offences under the Act. The parties would be deemed to 
be "living together" even though they are temporarily separated 
from each other so long as the intention to occupy the same domes- 
tic establishment whenever possible is there.
The meaning of the phrase "when leaving or deserting or 
about to leave or desert" is one that also calls for comment. At 
what appropriate time during the course of living together can it 
be said that one spouse is about to leave or desert the other so 
that a wrongful misappropriation of the other*s property amounts 
to an offence under the Larceny Act? For example, is a husband 
"about to leave or desert1* who after spending money yesterday en­
trusted to him for safe-keeping by his wife, today sees another 
woman who takes his fancy and elopes with her without any intent­
ion of returning to his wife? It is necessary that there should 
be an intention to "leave or desert** at the time that the wrongful 
dealing with the other’s property occurs before a prosecution 
would lie at the instance of the spouse whose property has been 
interfered with? There is no known Sierra Leone decision on this 
point, but in English law from which the provision is borrowed, 
it has been held that the interpretation of the phrase is a
question of fact for the jury and it depends upon the circum-
2
stances of each case. In R. v. King, the prosecutrix who was a
1. See the English case R. v. Creamer [1919] 1 K.B. 564.
2. (1919) 10 Cr. App, R. 44.
widow with two children and who had a house full of expensive 
furniture, got married to the accused. After the marriage, the 
parties lived together at a house to which the furniture was 
transferred. Some time afterwards, the wife became ill and went 
to live with her parents, leaving the matrimonial home locked up 
with the furniture. Later, she was joined by her husband at her 
parent1s house. While they were there the husband sold all the 
wife* s furniture without her authority, and against her wish, and 
six weeks afterwards ceased to reside with his wife. Throughout 
the time they were living with the wife’s parents, the husband 
would stay away during the day and join the wife at night time.
On these facts, the jury convicted the husband of larceny, thus 
maintaining that when he sold the furniture the husband was"about" 
to leave his wife. The Court of Criminal Appeal refused to set 
aside the jury’s finding on the ground that the word "about” had 
no special legal meaning, and that the jury were entitled to bring 
the verdict which they did after considering the position in life 
of the parties, the amount and value of the furniture and the cir­
cumstances in which it was disposed of. According to King’s 
case, therefore, the test for determining when one spouse is leav­
ing or about to leave the other is an objective one.
If the circumstances attending the departure can be con­
veniently linked with the act of appropriating the other’s pro­
perty, then the perpetrator did so when he was about to leave. 
Sometimes it is not easy to discover this link. In King’s case, 
the fact that the husband sold the furniture which was to be used 
in the matrimonial home without providing a substitute showed 
clearly that he had formed the intention to leave long before he 
actually did. It was from the date of that intention that he 
was about to leave, not a few minutes before the physical leaving
But in the example we gave earlier about the eloping
husband, more information must be elicited before we can conclude
whether or not he converted his wife* s money when he was about to
leave. The history of the marriage generally must be taken into
account. If the marriage had been a happy one until the day of
the elopement, the departure must probably be due to the frailty
of human nature and would not be linked with the conversion so as
to show that the crime was committed when the husband was about
to leave. But if the marriage has been unhappy or the husband
has been in the habit of forming illicit associations with other
women, then the conversion would be linked with his departure and
he would, therefore, be deemed to have committed the crime with a
view to leaving and so he did when leaving or about to leave.
It is of great importance to be able to discover this
link otherwise the line between wrongful acts committed by a
spouse while ’’living together” and those committed when leaving
or about to leave would be blurred*
*
Since, as we have seen, one spouse cannot steal the pro­
perty of the other while they are cohabiting, a question which 
needs investigation is whether a third party can be convicted for 
receiving property alleged to have been stolen by one spouse from 
the other.
The position at common law is exemplified by the case of
•i
R. v. Kenny in which it was held that since a wife could not
steal her husband’s goods, an adulterer receiving from her the
goods which she had taken from her husband, could not be guilty
2
of receiving stolen goods. A later case, R. v. Payne, however, 
decided that an indictment which charged, as a common law mis­
demeanour, the unlawful receiving by a person of money stolen by
1. (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 507.
2. [1906] 1 K.B. 97.
the wife of the prosecutor was good.
Since the passing of the Larceny Act, 1916, however, it
would appear that a person can be guilty of receiving goods stolen
1
by one spouse from the other under s.33 of the Act.
D. EVIDENCE
The competence and compellability of one spouse to give 
evidence in proceedings in which the other is a party depends on 
whether the proceedings are civil, criminal or matrimonial.
(i) Civil
In the absence of local legislation on the issue, English
statutory law as at the reception date, i.e. 1 January, 1880, ap-
2plies in Sierra Leone. The relevant statute is the Evidence
Amendment Act, 1853. S.l of that Act provides that the husband
or wife of parties to a civil suit is a competent and compellable
witness to give evidence on behalf of either or any of the parties
to the suit. But with regard to communications between husband
and wife, s.3 of the Act states:
"no husband shall be compellable to dis­
close any communication made to him by his 
wife during the marriage and no wife shall 
be compellable to disclose any communica­
tion made to her by her husband during the 
marriage."
The effect of these provisions is to enable one spouse to give 
evidence in a suit in which the other is a party either for the 
plaintiff or the defendant and to render communication between 
spouses privileged.
The interpretation of the expression "husband and wife" 
in the Sierra Leone context is fraught with problems. Should it
1. See Russell on Crime, 12th ed., London, 1964, Vol.2, p.1030.
2. S.74 of the Courts Act, 1965; Act No.31 of 1965.
275.
include spouses to the four forms of marriage recognised by law,
1.e. Christian, civil, Mohammedan and customary, or should it be 
confined to only the first two categories, since these would have 
been intended when the Evidence Act, 1853, was passed in England? 
There is no legislation in Sierra Leone, like the Criminal Proced­
ure Act, 1965, in regard to evidence in criminal matters, exclud­
ing spouses of a customary marriage from enjoying this privilege 
in civil proceedings. In our submission, therefore, the prin­
ciple enunciated in Mawji1s case  ^ought to apply in civil cases 
and spouses of a customary marriage should be included in the 
interpretation of "husband and wife" in s.3 of the Evidence Act, 
1853.2
With regard to Muslim spouses, it is submitted that they j 
too enjoy the privilege provided by the Evidence Act, 1853. A 
Mohammedan; marriage is valid for all civil purposes under the gen­
eral law, and>there being no rule of law to exclude them, the spou< 
ses are subject to the general law of which the Evidence Act is a 
part.
Now that we have concluded that the Evidence Act applies 
to spouses of all sorts of marriage recognised by law in Sierra 
Leone, the next question is whether the expression "husband and 
wife" includes a widow, widower or divorced person. Here,
English law will be of invaluable help to us. The case of
3
Shenton v. Tyler decided that the words "husband and wife" 
do not include a widow or widower or
L. [1957'] 1 All E.R.385; P.C. fl957‘I A.C.126. See p.264 herein.
2. The statutes of various East African countries make the spouses 
of the parties to civil proceedings competent witnesses. See, 
for example, the Kenya Evidence Act, cap.80,s.127(1); Zanzibar 
Evidence Decree, s.120 of cap.5; See further H.F. Morris: Evi­
dence in East Africa. Sweet & Maxwell, 1968, p.186; J.S. REad: 
"When is a wife not a wife?", Journal of the Denning Law Soci­
ety , University College of Dar-Es-Salaam, Dec.1966, pp.46-75.
3. fl939] 1 Ch.620.
divorced person. In that case, a widow refused to answer interro­
gatories on the ground that they concerned matters which had pass­
ed between herself and her deceased husband and were, therefore, 
privileged. Simonds J. in the court of first instance , ruled 
that every communication between husband and wife made during mar­
riage was privileged to a widow after the death of her husband*
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Simonds J* 
and held that the Act related only to husbands and wives during 
the subsistence of the marriage, and not to widowers, widows or 
divorced persons.
Another matter which needs consideration is the extent of 
the privilege during the subsistence of the marriage. English
case-law again suggests that the privilege is that of the parties
2and they can waive it, and that it does not extend to a third
3person who overhears the communication between husband and wife. 
Such third persons can give evidence of what occurred between the
4
spouses. Thi^ s, in McTaggart v. McTaggart, husband and wife had 
an interview with a probation officer and later in proceedings 
between them gave evidence about it. It was held that the proba­
tion officer could give evidence of what was recited to him by the 
husband and wife.5
With their well-established practice of accepting English 
decisions on the interpretation of English statutes applicable to 
the country, Sierra Leone Courts will probably take the same view
1. i.e. Chancery Division of the High Court.
2. McTaggart v. McTaggart [1948] 2 All E.R. 75ty.
3. Hamp v. Robinson (186. ) 16 L.T. 29 cf. Denning J. in Mole v. 
Mole [l950] 2 All E.R. 328.
4. [1948] 2 All E.R. 75^ ..
5. c/f Mole v. Mole [l95o] 2 All E.R. 328, in which Denning J.
said that if the parties had not given evidence as they did in 
McTaggart v. McTaggart there would have been privilege.
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as the English Courts in interpreting the Evidence Act.
(ii) Criminal
At common law, one spouse could not give evidence against 
the other except in the case of offences against the person or
•t
liberty of the other party to the marriage. In such cases, a
spouse is both competent and compellable.
TheSierra Leone statute on the subject is the Criminal
)
2Procedure Act, 1965.
As to criminal proceedings generally, s.86 states that:
’’where a person charged with an offence is 
married to another person by a marriage
other than a Civil or Mohammedan marriage,
such last-named person shall be competent 
and compellable witness on behalf either 
of the prosecution or of the defence.”
With regard to a spouse who is the accused either solely 
or jointly with other persons, s.87 stipulates that the wife or
husband of the person charged is a competent witness for the de­
fence, provided
”(c) the wife or husband of the person 
charged shall not, save as in this Act 
mentioned, be called as a witness in 
pursuance of this Act except upon the 
application of the person so charged.”
On the same point of giving evidence in criminal cases,
s.90(a) says:
’’the wife or husband of a person charged 
with an offence under sections 48 to 55 
of the Offences against the Person Act,
1861, (i.e. offences relating to rape, 
abduction and defilement of women) may 
be called as a witness either for the 
prosecution or defence and without the 
consent of the person charged.”
1. Phipson on Evidence, 11th ed., 1970, p.603
2. Act No.32 of 1965.
The effect of s.86 is to draw a sharp distinction between 
spouses whose marriage is civil or Mohammedan and those who under­
go some form of marriage other than by civil or Mohammedan rites. 
The second category of persons obviously refers to persons married 
under customary law, for this Is the only form of marriage other 
than "civil” or Mohammedan recognised by Sierra Leone law.
"Civil”, as used in this context, includes a Christian marriage 
for, s.91 of the Criminal Procedure Act clarifies the position by 
providing that:
"for the purposes of section 86 to 90 
(which deal with evidence of husband 
and wife) ’civil marriage* means a mar­
riage which is recognised by the law of 
the place where it is contracted as the 
voluntary union for life of one man and 
one woman to the exclusion of all others.”
Therefore, according to s.86, while spouses to a customary 
law are competent and compellable witnesses for the prosecution 
or the defence, parties to a civil or Mohammedan marriage (as de­
fined by s.91) are neither competent nor compellable.
Perhaps quite contrary to the intention of: the legislature 
only spouses of a "civil marriage” as defined by s.91 are covered 
by the provisions of s.87 and 90(a) because s.91 further defines 
"husband and wife” as meaning "a husband and wife of a civil mar­
riage as defined in this section”. S.91 raises doubt as to the 
fate of a Mohammedan marriage for the application of ss.87 and 
90(a).
Clearly under s,87(c), except as provided in s.90(a), a 
spouse of a Christian or civil marriage is neither a competent 
nor a compellable witness for the prosecution where the other 
spouse is an accused but is a competent : Witness for the defence 
upon the application of the person charged, S.87(c)^ however, 
does not give any indication whether or not the spouses are also 
compell&ble witnesses. They are probably not since the word
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"compellable” is not used in this section. This means that an 
unwilling spouse cannot be compelled to give evidence for the 
defence even if it may be the wish of the other that he or she 
should do so.
Since Mohammedan spouses are apparently not included in 
s.87,the privilege permitted to an accused who is a spouse to a
Christian or civil marriage, is not open to them. Thus, the MoC 
hammedan spouse of a person charged is not competent to give evi­
dence for the defence nor can he or she be called to testify in 
offences mentioned in s.90(a).
If the legislature did not intend this situation to exist 
in respect of a Mohammedan marriage but wanted the spouses of such 
marriage to be on the same plane as spouses of civil and Christian 
marriages, the definition of "husband and wife” in s.91 would have 
been wide enough to include husband and wife of a Mohammedan mar­
riage. This intention can be subsumed from s.86 but is rendered 
negative by s.91. According to the canons of statutory inter­
pretation, s.91 being the latter provision prevails over s.86.
Though, in general, spouses to a civil or Christian marri­
age are not competent and compellable witnesses for the prosecu­
tion or defence when their spouses are charged with an offence, 
they are competent but probably not compellable if the offence is
•i
one of rape, abduction or defilement of women, or an offence of
personal violence by one spouse ,to the other for which at common
2law the spouses are both competent and compellable. To these 
must be added offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
1. S.90(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1965; Act No.32 of 
1965.
2. See s.90(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Act and the schedule to that Act**
In order to be competent under s.90(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, it is submitted that the offence need not be com­
mitted against the spouse of the accused; it is sufficient if 
the offence is against any woman whomsoever* Moreover, under 
the section, the consent of the person charged is unnecessary.
There is a lacuna in the law with regard to offences 
against the property of one spouse committed by the other, for 
which a prosecution may lie* There is no indication either in 
the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1965, or in the 
Larceny Act, 1916, whether if a person is charged with an offence 
against the property of his or her spouse the latter is a compe­
tent and compellable witness for the prosecution. Strictly 
speaking, the cumulative effect of the provisions in the Criminal 
Procedure Act is to render such a spouse incompetent and uncompel­
lable.
If this interpretation is correct, then the hazards of 
failure in a prosecution for an infringement of a proprietary 
right of one spouse by the other are great because invariably the 
key witness for the prosecution will be the spouse whose property 
has been interfered with. If he or she is to be excluded from 
giving evidence, the prosecution becomes impracticable. An en­
actment making spouses competent and compellable witnesses under 
such circumstances is therefore desirable.
With regard to communications between spouses, s*87(d) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act states:
1. See s.29 and the Schedule of the Act, cap.31 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
281.
’’Nothing in this Act shall make a husb- 
band compellable to disclose any communi­
cation made to him by his wife during the 
marriage, or a wife compellable to dis­
close any communication made to her by 
her husband during the marriage.”
The privilege herein mentioned persists in trials in 
which one spouse is charged and'the other is competent to give 
evidence either for the prosecution or for the defence. The 
effect of the section is that an unwilling spouse cannot be com­
pelled to give evidence for or against the other spouse if the 
object is to reveal some oral or written information made to him 
or her by the other spouse during the marriage.
Whatever is the precise meaning of the word ’’communication” 
as used in s.87(d) is a matter on which one can merely speculate. 
Undoubtedly, it includes oral or written information between 
spouses intended to be for each other. It is submitted that if
one spouse received information from the other intended to be 
passed on to a third party or if the information, though primarily 
intended for the spouses alone, is intercepted by a third person 
in the course of its communication between the spouses, it is not 
privileged.
The meaning of ’’husband and wife” here too requires some 
clarification. From our discussion earlier, it is submitted that
j
it means ’’husband and wife” of a Christian or civil marriage.
Should the marriage be in existence for the spouses to avail them­
selves of this privilege or does the privilege continue where the 
marriage has come to an end through divorce or nullity proceedings 
or by the death of one of the spouses? Contrary to what has been 
held in civil proceedings, there is an inference in English case- 
law for the proposition that in criminal cases the privilege con­
tinues even though the marriage has been terminated. In R. v.
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Algar * a husband was prosecuted for forging his wife’s signature 
on cheques drawn on a bank. Before the prosecution occurred 
the marriage was annulled on the ground of the husband* s impotence. 
The ex-wife was called as a witness for the prosecution during the 
trial for forgery. The former husband was convicted but his 
conviction was quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal because the 
ex-wife was held to be incompetent to testify to things which 
occurred during their marriage.
The Appeal Court in Algar* s case did not examine the argu­
ment that undoubtedly existed in favour of competence without 
compellability. It, therefore, exceeds what statutory law stipu­
lates here in Sierra Leone with regard to communications between 
spouses. As can be seen, the decision is in conflict with s.87(d] 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. While that section speaks of un­
compellability without mentioning incompetence which leads to the 
assumption that spouses are competent witnesses to disclose com­
munications between each other if they wish, Algar* s case decides 
against competence. It is now left to Sierra Leone Courts to 
choose which way to follow. It is submitted, however, that the 
correct way is to follow what s.87(d) says and nothing more, 
otherwise the Courts will be taking upon themselves the. functions 
of the legislature.
2(iii) Matrimonial
Generally speaking, matrimonial proceedings between
spouses are subject to the rules of other civil proceedings. Thus 
a husband and wife of parties to matrimonial proceedings are
1. [1954] 1 Q.B. 279.
2. "Matrimonial” is used here to mean proceedings between husband - 
and wife or prospective husband and wife consequent upon marri­
age or its breach.
competent and compellable witnesses on behalf of either or any of 
the parties to the suit. . In special situations, however, there 
are limitations to matrimonial proceedings which are not found in 
ordinary civil actions. These relate to evidence with regard to 
breach or promise of marriage, adultery and marital intercourse.
(a) Breach of promise of marriage
Concerning breach of promise of marriage, s.2 of the 
English Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869,^ requires that the 
evidence of the plaintiff must be corroborated by "some other 
material evidence in support of such promise". The other mater­
ial evidence need not go to the length of establishing the con-
2
tract: ‘if the evidence supports the promise it is sufficient.
(b) Adultery
In respect of adultery, s.28(1) of the Matrimonial Causes
3Act states:
"The parties to any proceedings insti­
tuted in consequence of adultery and 
the husbands and wives of the parties 
shall be competent to give evidence in 
the proceedings, but no witness in any — 
such proceedings, whether a party there­
to or not, shall be liable to be asked 
or be bound to answer any question 
tending to show that he or she has been 
guilty of adultery unless he or she had 
already given evidence in the same pro­
ceedings in disproof of the alleged 
adultery,"
There is no reported case law nor has the present writer 
been able to discover any unreported decision in Sierra Leone law 
on the construction of this section. We may, therefore, again
1. Which applies in Sierra Leone as a statute of general applica­
tion in England before 1 January, 1880.
2. See Williams v. Macfoy, ante, Chapter 5, pp./62, no,
3. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
1
have recourse to English law which contains a similar provision 
by way of guidelines to possible interpretation by Sierra Leone 
Courts*
The English Courts have rigidly confined the provision to
cases in which the proceedings can stricto sensu be said to have
been instituted as a result of adultery. These include peti­
tions for divorce or judicial separation founded on adultery and 
petitions for damages against a male adulterer, but not to pro- 
ceedings concerning the maintenance and status of a child, an 
action by a wife against another woman for loss of her husband*s 
consortium due to enticement, and an intervention by the King*s
4
Proctor on the ground of condonation of adultery.
The "alleged adultery" used in the section has been inter­
preted to have a wider meaning than the adultery alleged in the
petition* It means the adultery which the question tends to
5
show and to which objection is taken.
Other phrases in the section which have received the attend 
tion of the Courts are (i) "shall not be liable to be asked",
(ii) "tending to show", and (iii) "given evidence is disproof".
In Dobbs v. Dobbs and Savage. Donovan L.J. held that the 
phrase "shall not be liable to be asked" contemplates questions by 
or on behalf of a party other than the party by whom the witness 
is called. In the same case, the learned Lord Justice impliedly
1. S.43(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965, formerly s.32(3) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950.
2. Nottingham Guardians v. Tomkinsoft (1879) 4 C.P.D. 343; Evans v* 
Evans and Blyth [l904] P.378.
3. Elliott v. Albert [1934] 1 K.B. 650.
4. Sneyd v. Sneyd and'Burgess -(1925) 42 T.L.R. 106.
5. See Wilmer L.J. in Dobbs v. Dobbs and Savage [1962] 2 All E.R. 
900, 901.
6. [1962] 2 All E.R. 900, 902. j
interpreted the term “tending to show" to mean revealing to the 
tribunal of fact for the first time, when he opined that the 
section ceases to operate if the witness personally or through 
his counsel volunteers the evidence that he has committed adultery, 
In Boothroyd v. Boothroyd and S l a t e r it was held that 
evidence given in disproof of adultery is not confined to one 
which is a simple denial of adultery. In that case a husband 
petitioned for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the re­
spondent wife’s adultery with the corespondent. The wife in 
her examination-in-chief was not asked whether she had committed 
adultery but in her examination on behalf of the co-respondent, 
without testifying that she had not committed adultery with the 
co-respondent, she gave an innocent explanation of the presence 
of the co-respondent’s car outside her flat at a late hour. In 
cross-examination on behalf of the husband, a question put to her 
directed to supporting an inference of adultery was held to be 
admissible on the ground that she had given evidence in disproof 
of adultery.
...............    - . ■  o . . .
S.28(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act relates to pro­
ceedings 'before the High Court. So far as the Magistrates*
Courts are concerned, the relevant provision is s.3 of the Evi-
3dence Further Amendment Act, 1869, which reads as follows:
’’The parties to any proceeding insti­
tuted in consequence of adultery, and 
the husbands and wives of such parties, 
shall be competent to give evidence in 
such proceeding: Provided that no wit­
ness in any proceeding whether a party 
to the suit or not, shall be liable to 
be asked or bound to answer any question 
tending to show that he or she has been
1. [1963] 3 All E.R. 625; [l964] P„82.
2. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960. _
3. Which applies in Sierra Leone as a statute of general applica­
tion in England as at 1 January, 1880.
guilty of adultery, unless such witness 
shall have already given evidence in the 
same proceedings in disproof of his or 
her alleged adultery."
The sense of this provision is practically the same as 
that of s.28(l) of the Matrimonial Causes Act.
It is apparent that under the existing law this provision 
cannot be invoked before the Sierra Leone Magistrates* Courts.
This section too speaks of "proceeding instituted in consequence 
of adultery". Unlike England, summary proceedings for separation 
or maintenance orders on the ground of adultery which are "pro­
ceedings instituted in consequence of adultery" are unknown in 
Sierra Leone. The only matrimonial proceeding likely to arise 
before the Magistrates* Courts between spouses is in respect of 
maintenance under the Married Women’s Maintenance Act. Such pro­
ceeding , however, is in consequence of desertion. The only 
reference to adultery is where the Court can refuse to make a 
maintenance order against the husband on the ground that the wife 
had committed adultery which must be proved by the husband. It
is submitted that this power exercisable by the husband is a 
shield and not a sword and the proceeding is, therefore, not one 
in consequence of adultery.
The preservation of this privilege in English law has been
*»
open to criticism from both the Royal Commissions and learned 
2
jurists. Basically, the privilege found a place in English law 
as one of the heads of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Arguing for its abolition, Rosen says that:
1. The Gorrell Commission Report (1912) Cmd. 6478 paras. 381-386; 
The Denning Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes (1947) 
Cmd. 7024 paras. 70-74; The Royal Commission on Marriage and 
Divorce (1956) Cmd. 9678, paras. 933-935.
2. L.Rosen: "The Privilege against self-incrimination as to adult­
ery should it be abolished", 23 ML.R. 275; J.A. Andrews: "Evi­
dence of Adultery", 77 L.Q.R. 390; Cross on Evidence, London, 
3rd ed., 1967, 237, 238.
11 it has no basis in reason, it is ano­
malous, an -anachronism, operates capri­
ciously and unjustly.”
One way in which the privilege can lead to injustice is illu-
•i
strated by Haynes v. Haynes and"Sawkill. In that case, a hus­
band petitioned for divorce on the ground of the wife’s adultery. 
The wife in her answer alleged cruelty on the part of the husband. 
During the trial, the husband was asked a question which tended to 
show that he had been guilty of adultery. It was held that an 
objection to the question was proper.
Despite the tremendous move for abolition, the privilege 
still subsists in English law. But this is no reason why one 
should plead for its continued existence in Sierra Leone law.
So far as the Magistrates* Courts are concerned, it is completely 
useless; and in respect of the High Court it would appear that 
very little, if any, attention is paid to it in the course of 
litigation. The existence of it in Sierra Leone law can only 
be explained from the habit of transplanting English statutes to 
the country without consciously weighing their effect and practic­
ability. This is one area in which the Sierra Leone legisla­
ture can tidy the law in the event of law reform.
(c) Marital intercourse
This is governed by the Evidence (Marital Intercourse)
2
Act, s.2 of which states:
"Notwithstanding any rule of law, the 
evidence of a husband or wife shall be
admissible in any proceedings to prove
that marital intercourse did or did not 
take place between them during any 
period: Provided that a husband or
wife shall not be compellable in any 
proceedings to give evidence of the 
matters aforesaid.”
1. [i960] 2 All E.R. 401.
2. Cap.103 of the revised Laws of Sierr.a Leone, 1960.
Again, this rule is identical with s.43(1) of the (English) Matri-
1
monial Causes Act, 1965* It abolished the rule in Russell v.
2Russell, which laid down that neither a husband nor a wife was 
permitted to give evidence of non-intercourse after marriage to 
bastardize a child born in wedlock. The statutory provision 
goes beyond cases in which the legitimacy of children is involved 
and covers any other case to which marital intercourse may be 
relevant, for example, proceedings for nullity on the ground of 
non-consummation of the marriage or for divorce or judicial sepa­
ration in which condonation is an issue.
3
Though this rule also is under fire from jurists, it is 
submitted that no substantial reason has been advanced for its 
abolition. It saves spouses from the embarrassment and distaste 
of having to go into and be cross-examined on matters of such pecu­
liar intimacy in a court of law unless he or she is willing to 
undergo the ordeal. It should, therefore, remain intact.
E. NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF A MARRIED - -.WOMAN 5
Unlike domicile, marriage does not automatically confer 
the nationality or citizenship of a husband on his wife. In
1. Formerly s.7 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 
1949,. and s,32(l) and (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950.
2. [1924] A.C. 687, H.L,
3# Cross, op.cit., p.240.
4. See Evershed, M.R. in Re Jenion (deceased) Jenion v. Wynne 
[1952] 1 All E.R. 1228, 1233.
5. Married woman, in this context, is a woman married according to 
any form recognised as valid by the law of Sierra Leone. It, 
therefore, includes the wife of a customary marriage.
6. In Sierra Leone, as in many other countties, there is no distinc 
-tion between nationality and citizenship. Both terms are 
used interchangeably and are synonymous. Howe^e^ ’national­
ity* is commonly used in the event of a conflictA an individual 
of one state and another state whilst "citizenship” is of com­
mon usage in the municipal law context*
all respects, the wife retains her own nationality unless some 
positive step is taken by her to acquire the nationality of her 
husband. Thus if a Sierra Leone man marries a Sierra Leone 
woman both of them retain their Sierra Leone citizenship inde­
pendently of each other. Similarly, where a marriage takes 
place between a Sierra Leone man and a Ghanaian woman the woman 
remains a Ghanaian until she has fulfilled the statutory condi­
tions for the acquisition of Sierra Leone citizenship. We are, 
therefore, only concerned here with the acquisition of Sierra 
Leone citizenship by a non-Sierra Leone woman who marries a Sierra 
Leone man.
•t
It has been thought by some people that with the adopt-
2ion of a Republican Constitution on 19 April, 1971, which re­
placed the Independence Constitution of 1961 but which contained 
no provision for citizenship law, there is no law in Sierra Leone 
on citizenship which means that it is now impossible to talk in 
terms of who are Sierra Leone citizens and who are not. This 
thinking is, in my submission, the result of a mere cursory 
glance at the numerous pieces of legislation that ushered in the 
Republican era. A close analysis of these enactments, however, 
will reveal quite the opposite.
Granted that the Republican Constitution contains no law 
on citizenship and that the Constitution (Consequential Provi- 
sions) Act, 1971, repealed the 1961 Constitution which had pro­
visions on the matter. But s.96 of the Republican Constitution 
contains the following statement:
1. Personal communication from some Sierra Leone lawyers.
2. Act No.6 of 1971.
3. Act No.9 of 1971.
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"The provisions of the Constitution (con­
sequential Provisions) Act, 1971, and of 
any Act relating to citizenship shall not 
be amended, repealed, re-enacted or re­
placed unless the Bill incorporating such 
amendments repeal, re-enactment or replace­
ment ‘is supported at the final vote there­
upon by the votes of not less than two-thirds
of the members of Parliament."
In short, s.96 retains every legislation on citizenship 
in force before the declaration of the Republic until it is alter­
ed by an Act of Parliament with at least a two-third majority.
No such Act has as yet been passed. We shall, therefore, look 
at the acquisition of Sierra Leone citizenship by a non-Sierra 
Leone wife from the viewpoint of the current law which is the law 
as it was before the country became a Republic. These are con-
1
tained in the Sierra Leone Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1962,
2
and the Constitution (Consolidation of Amendment) Act, 1965.
Both statutes make the acquisition of Sierra Leone citizenship 
dependent upon registration on application.
S.3(3) of the 1962 Act stipulates that
"Subject to the provisions of sub­
section (4) any woman who is or has 
been married to a citizen of Sierra 
Leone may, on making application there­
for to the Minister in the prescribed 
manner, be registered as a citizen of 
Sierra Leone whether or not she is of 
full age and capacity."
Under this section a woman of any nationality other than Sierra
Leone nationality, married to a Sierra Leone citizen, may upon
application be registered as a Sierra Leone citizen.
According to subsection (3) mentioned above, such woman 
cannot be registered until she has made a written declaration in
1. Act No.10 of 1962.
2. Act No.52 of 1965.
the prescribed form of her willingness to renounce her present 
nationality and has taken an oath of allegiance to the President 
and the Constitution of Sierra Leone*
The combined effect of subsections (3) and (4) is to make 
the only qualification by! a married foreign woman for the acqui­
sition of Sierra Leone citizenship, the fact of being married to 
a Sierra Leone man* Unlike other foreigners who wish to natural­
ise, she need not be of full age and capacity** Thus, a married 
woman who is under the age of 21 or who is a lunatic cam be regi­
stered as a citizen but a spinster or a male subject to the same 
disabilities is disqualified.
The above statutory provisions deal with married women 
other than persons who were British subjects and British pro­
tected persons tafore the date of Sierra Leone independence.
As regards British subjects and British protected persons 
fcefore the 27th April, 1961, s.3 of the Constitution (Consolida­
tion of Amendments) Act, 1965, provides that:
"any woman who on the 26th day of April,
1961, was a citizen of the United Kingdom 
and Colonies or a British protected per­
sons and who is or had tfaeen married to a 
person (a) who becomes a citizen of Sierra 
Leone by virtue of section 1 of the Consti­
tution 5 or (b) who, having died before the 
27th April, 1961, would, but for his death, 
have become a citizen of Sierra Leone by 
virtue of that section, shall be entitled, 
upon making application in such manner as 
may be prescribed, to be registered as a 
citizen of Sierra Leone.”
The section contains a proviso similar to that of s.3(4) of the 
1962 Act with respect to the renunciation of some other citizen­
ship.
1. With respect to age and capacity for registration as a Sierra 
Leone citizen generally, s.2(3) of the Sierra Leone National­
ity and Citizenship Act says: "A person shall for the purposes
of this Act be of full age if he has attained the age of 
twenty-one years and of full capacity if he is not of unsound 
mind."
Within the class of persons for whom provision is made by 
s.3 of the 1965 Act would be a married woman born in Sierra Leone 
of Sierra Leone mother and foreign father, but who is not auto­
matically a Sierra Leone citizen because her father or father1s
•f
father is not a negro of African descent.
Under the foregoing Acts, it would appear that it is im­
material whether the husband is alive or dead or that the marriage
has been dissolved by divorce or nullity at the date that the wo-
2
man applies to be registered as a citizen. It is submitted,
however, that a woman whose marriage is void ab initio cannot 
register under the provisions of the Acts because there being in 
law no marriage at all from the beginning she cannot be considered 
as a married woman.^
1. There are many people in the country who fall in this category. 
In 1967, a test case was instituted on their behalf, i.e. Akar 
v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone £1970] A.C. 853, with a 
view to the automatic acquisition of^Sierra Leone citizenship 
by birth. The Privy Council gave the opinion that those who 
had become citizens on 27 April, 1971, could not be deprived — 
thereof by the 1965 Act on the ground that it was a discrimina­
tory piece of legislation on the basis of race. At the time 
that the opinion was delivered, the country was still a monarchy 
and the highest court of Appeal was the Privy Council. The 
decision was obviously ignored by the Executive as no step was 
taken to implement it. Fov debuts of tkn c^ ie.) .
2. S.3(3) of the 1962 Act and s«3 of the 1965 Act speak of a woman 
who "is or has been married".
3. Quaere: whether a woman whose marriage is void but who obtains 
Sierra Leone citizenship before the fact is discovered can re­
tain it. This would depend on whether or not she knew at the 
time of application that the marriage was void. See s.9 of Act 
No.10 of 1962.
CHAPTER 9
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
A. CONFLICT OF LAWS
A discussion of matrimonial property law in Sierra Leone 
must begin with the examination of two questions. Firstly, what 
type of marriage did the parties contract as a result of which 
they are husband and wife? Secondly, what is the non-marital 
legal status of the parties; is one or both of them a native or 
natives? When the answer to these questions are ascertained, a 
question of conflict of law arises which : requires especial treat­
ment.
If the answer to the first question is customary marriage, 
then the second question does not arise, for customary law would
A
apply to determine the property rights of the spouses. So would 
the general law cover those issues emanating from a Mohammedan 
marriage.
But if the marriage is under the Christian or Civil Mar­
riage Acts, one must look at the personal legal status of the
parties. If one or both of the spouses is or axe a native or
natives, their rights in property would appear not to be governed
by the general law by reason only of the fact that the marriage
is one under the Marriage Acts. Customary law would seem to
apply to the property of the native, while the general law governs
that of the non-native. This is the conclusion one would arrive
at after a cursory glance at s*26 of the Christian Marriage Act,
which says that:
MA marriage celebrated under this Ordi- 
nancel to which one of the parties is a
1. S.26 is enacted under the Christian Marriage Act, but it is 
submitted that it applies to marriage under the Civil Marriage 
Act as well, since the two Acts are to be construed as one:
See s.l of the Civil Marriage Act.
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native shall not have any effect on the 
property of such a native; Provided that 
nothing herein contained shall have the 
effect of preventing the parties to such 
marriage from coming to an agreement with 
respect to the control and enjoyment of 
their respective properties or of prevent­
ing such parties from disposing, by legal 
procedure and means, <£ their respective 
properties after their respective deaths.
The property of parties to a marriage cele­
brated under this Ordinance shall, if both 
be natives, be subject in all respects to 
the laws and customs of the t ribe or tribes 
to which the parties respectively belong•**
The foregoing principle is very clear on the question of
which law to apply in cases where the properties of the spouses
are defined with sufficient and reasonable certainty. We may give
hypothetical examples by way of illustration:
(a) X, while a spinster, inherited two houses in Freetown and 
in the Provinces from her father. She later married Y and 
during the marriage she received a gift of Le 400 from her 
mother with the knowledge of her husband. Y, too, before 
and during the marriage bought properties consisting of 
furniture, a house and a boat. X was a Loko (native) and 
Y a Creole (non-native). The marriage took place in 1930 
and in the same year the husband claimed part of his wife* s 
properties as of right.
(b) A, a Kono man (native) married B, a Limba woman (native), 
under the Christian Marriage Act. On the eve of the 
marriage B received Le 20 from her father with which she 
does petty trading during the marriage. Out of the pro­
ceeds she buys utensils for use in the matrimonial home. 
Assume that there is a custom among the Limba that if a 
woman is possessed of such property, the beneficial 
ownership vests in her husband, but such custom is un­
known to the Kono.
(c) C and D are both Mende and they marry. C is given 
jewellery by her father, the fact of the gift being
unknown to D at the time that the gift was made*
Assume that among the Mende the husband is entitled 
to the" property under such circumstances*
Under illustration (a), Y would have no interest in Xfs 
inherited lands and the legacy despite the fact that under the 
general law, as we shall see later, a husband before 1932 had 
beneficial interests in his wife's property, both real and per­
sonal, except what was termed her "personal estate". X*s pro­
perty would be subject to her customary law alone, under which, 
among many Loko, a husband possessed no greater interest in the 
property of his wife than that of a trustee*
With respect to (b), as the spouses belong to two differ­
ent tribes, A1s property is subject to Kono customary law, while 
Bfs will be governed by Limba customary law. According to B*s 
customary law, the utensils belong to the husband* It is sub­
mitted that A will become entitled to them even though his own 
customary law takes the contrary view on the matter. That law 
is relevant only when dealing with his own property.
As regards (c), D becomes beneficially entitled to Cfs 
jewellery.
Doubt may, however, arise in a case of disputed owner­
ship of property as to the applicable law where one or both 
spouses are natives. An illustration may again be of some 
help to us here.
(a) H (husband) gives W (wife) Le 1$000 with which 
to trade. W opens a shop and in the space of 
5 years produces a profit of Le 4,000ij with some
of which H buys furniture, spending the balance 
on completing a house which he has started to 
build before the marriage. H is a Temne.
Assume that there is a custom among the tribe 
that, so long as a husband has properly main­
tained his wife, any property bought or acquired 
under those circumstances, belongs to the husband. 
Throughout the marriage H spends lavishly on W*
Now, does customary la?; apply in such a case? Our sub­
mission is that it cannot, because this is a case of disputed 
ownership which is not covered by s.26. That section states, 
inter alia, that:
"marriage shall not have any effect on 
the property of such native."
The application of this part of the section assumes that there
must first of all be property belonging to the native. It does
not envisage questions relating to disputed ownership ?/here the
Court has to decide who the owner is.
But if the parties are both natives, it is submitted, the
issue is determined by customary law for, the section says that
the property of the parties, if both are natives, is
"subject in all respects to the laws and 
customs of the tribe or tribes to which 
the parties respectively belong."
The phraseology of this part of the section suggests that the 
general law cannot apply at all. Consequently, proprietary 
questions like ownership and occupation of the matrimonial home, 
gifts, and the effect ofcfeath, separation, divorce and nullity 
on the property of native spouses to a Christian or civil marri­
age would appear to come under the purview ofcustomary law in­
stead of the general law.
This viewpoint, resulting from the present state of the
297.
lav/ does not reflect the social, political and economic position 
of many natives in present-day Sierra Leone.
The last 40 or so years have seen a revolution in the 
position of natives in the Sierra Leone society. At the time of 
the passing of the Christian Marriage Act in 1906, very few 
natives were educated and enjoyed social and economic amenities 
open to their non-native counterparts. Their properties did 
not go beyond domestic paraphernalia, trade implements and the 
farm and its proceeds. For those who married as Christians, 
the ceremony was probably only an expression of the dictates of 
their religion and they entered into it merely to demonstrate to 
their religious superiors that they were following the teachings 
of Christ. Property and religion, for these native Christians, 
were not synonymous and they did not allow their marital status 
to interfere with the proprietary rights.
But today, a number of indigenous Sierra Leoneans now 
have as high a standard of education and standard of living as 
many non-natives; the sharp separation of cultural tenets upon 
which the section was predicated no longer exists. It is true 
that there are still in the Sierra Leone society many natives 
who marry in church but who lead an entirely native form of life. 
If the law is to serve the purpose of all members of the society 
equitably, property rights should be determined not by reference 
to personal law alone - native or non-native - but by reference 
to the educational, social and economic standing of the indivi­
dual in the community. In short, the yardstick should be the 
individuals way of life.
B. THE GENERAL LAN ON MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
The move towards equality of the sexes among the non­
natives has been one major factor underlying the evolution of 
the general law of matrimonial property* To understand the pre­
sent law, it is necessary to outline its doctrinal development.
From the outset, Sierra Leone law incorporated the in­
equalities of the position between husband and wife which English 
law developed through the common law for, the residuary law of 
the country includes the common law of England and the doctrines 
of equity.
(1) The Common Law
At common law, a husband became on marriage for most pur­
poses the absolute master of his wife’s property.* Shakespeare 
viewed the position lightheartedly when Petruchio said of his 
wife, Kate,
”1 will be master of what is mine own; 
she is my goods, my chattels; she is my 
house, my household stuff, my field, my 
barn, my horse, my ox, my ass, my any­
thing.
This dominion over the wife produced the following re-
3
suits in the field of property. While the husband was entitled 
to his own property absolutely independently of his wife, except 
a life estate in a third of his freehold property in possession 
to which she became entitled as dower if she survived him, he had 
certain rights over his wife’s property.
1. Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol.(i), p.442; Vol.(ii), pp.433- 
435; Dicey: Lav; and Public Opinion in England (2nd ed.), 1962, 
pp. 371-395.
2* The Taming of the Shrew, Act III, scene 2.
3. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject, see Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, Vol.(ii), pp.433-435; Dicey, op_.cit., pp.371- 
395 .
So far as pure personality was concerned, he was entitled 
to it absolutely. Other items of the wife1s personality over
which he couid exercise the power of ownership were choses in
action which he had taken step to reduce into possession. In 
respect of leasholds he had the power to receive the income there­
from and to dispose of them inter vivos but not by will, and if
2the wife died before him, he became absolutely entitled to them.
As regards the wife*s freeholds, the estate by the cover-
3
ture gave him the rents and profits arising from it, while his 
tenancy by the courtesy entitled him to a life estate if he sur­
vived her and there was a child of the marriage who couiLd inherit 
from her. Apart from the foregoing property rights, gifts be­
tween the spouses were void.
(2) Equity
Equity partly rescued the wife from the dilemma into 
which she had been placed by the common law with the development
of two doctrines. One was the doctrine of the equitable sepa­
rate estate through which property could be given to the wife by 
the husband or outsiders for her "sole and separate use". The 
effect of this was to put the property beyond the reach of the 
husband. The other was the doctrine of restraint upon antici­
pation. Under this doctrine, property could be given to the
1. See statement to the effect by Aitken, Ag* C.J. in Foster v. 
During, unreported, a decision of the Supreme Court of Sierra 
Leone, dated 3 July, 1933, mentioned in Vol.I of the old 
Supreme Court Records, p.613.
2. See the English cases: Bracebridge v. Cook (1572) Plowd* 416;
Re Bellamy (1884) 25 Ch. D. 620.
3. The English case Robertson v. Norris (1848) 11 Q.B.D. 916 de­
cided that the husband could dispose of the rents and profits 
without the wife* s concurrence and that his estate lasted only 
for their joint lives.
wife in a will or by a settlement with a clause preventing the 
property from being alienated by way of sale, gift, or mortgage 
or any future liability by the wife whilst allowing her to re­
ceive the income derived therefrom*
(3) Statutory Reform
The first statutory intervation in Sierra Leone came in
1858. The Matrimonial Causes Ordinance  ^of that year extended
the concept of the wife*s separate property to any property she
acquired during the period of a judicial separation or after a
protcrection order has been made against the husband on the ground
of his desertion*
A second local Act was the Married Women*s Property Ordi- 
2nance, 1875. The Ordinance conferred on the wife an independ-
3
ent beneficial interest in all her earnings, in deposits in
4banks and investments in public securities made in her name, in
the rents and profits of any freehold property descending to her
5 !as heiress or co-heiress of an intestate, inany personal property 
devolving on her as next-of-kin of an intestate,^ and in any am­
ount not exceeding £100 to which she became entitled by deed or 
will*7
Q
In 1881, the United Kingdom Conveyancing Act made gifts
1. No.7 of 1858* See Montague: Ordinances of the Colony of Sierra 
Leone, 1858-1860, Vol.II, p.28. 'this Ordinance substantially 
bad tne same provisions as the United Kingdom Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1857.
2. No.7 of 1875.
3. S.2.
4. S.3.
5 . S. 6.
6 . S . 5.
7. S.5.
8. S.50. This Act applies to Sierra Leone as an Imperial Statute 
See the Schedule to the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) 
Adoption Act, cap.18 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone,1960.
between husband and wife effective at law and in 1887 the local 
Intestates Act  ^abolished both the wife*s right of dower and 
the husband1s tenancy by courtesy.
Power to a married woman to dispose of by will as effect­
ually as if she were a femme sole of any land or estate or inter­
est in land which she was seised of in her own right was confer-
2
red by the same Intestates Estates Act. Hut there was a proviso 
to the effect that it must be acknowledged by a judge.
Finally, the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property)Adoption 
Act, 1932, abolished in Sierra Leone all that was in English law 
before the Act came into operation which restricted the acquisi­
tion, holding or disposition of any property by a married woman. 
This is a very important piece of legislation in that it brought 
the married woman, at least the one married after the date on 
which the Act came into force, into equality with her husband 
insofar as property rights were concerned. Thus, the husband 
no longer has any estate or interest in her property qua marriage 
and she becomes free to deal with her property in any manner she 
likes. Since this Act, there is no longer any distinction be­
tween what is her separate property and what is not. Any pro­
perty that she acquires or is given to her becomes hers inde­
pendently of any interest of the husband.
Significantly, although this goal had been achieved in
3
English law when the Married Women*s Property Act, 1882, was 
passed, the Sierra Leone Imperial Statutes (La w of Property) 
Adoption Act, 1932, in a way, forged the married woman in Sierra
1. No.8 of 1887.
2. S.50. S.7 of Act No.23 of 1938 abolished the requirement of 
acknowledgment before a judge, for marriage before 1933.
3. This Act does not apply in Sierra Leone.
Leone ahead of her counterpart in England* Restraints upon 
anticipation were impliedly totally abolished in Sierra Leone 
since 1933, whilst English law had to wait until sixteen years 
later*'*'
However, there is a degree of uncertainty as to the ex­
tent of the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act* Is 
it retroactive or not? Does it apply to women married before 
the Act as well as those married after? Does it cover property 
acquired after the Act where the woman was married before the Act 
came into force? These questions have seized the attention of 
the judges and the decided cases thereon are conflicting* The 
earlier decisions tend to show that the Act is not retroactive, 
whilst the latter decide the opposite*
2
( In Bankole-Bright v* Bankole-Bright, Macquarrie Ag* C*J.
held that the Act was not retroactive and ruled that real pro­
perty acquired before 1932 by a woman married in 1911 was not 
separate property and was governed by the law before the 1932 
Act came into force so if the disposition by her of such property 
was to be effective, it must be done with the husband’s concur­
rence and the deed must be acknowledged by her under the Fines 
and Recoveries Act, 1833.
This case was followed by Lane Ag* C.J* in two subsequent 
cases affecting the properties of the same married woman, namely
3
Bright v. Palmas and Bankole-Bright v. United African Company
4Ltd * and Bankole-Bright * The first requires elaboration*
1. By the Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act, 1949.
2. Unreported: A decision of the Supreme Court at Freetown on
5 April, 1937* See the Supreme Court Record, Vol.II (1937), 
p *163 *
3. Unreported: Decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 22
September, 1939*
4* (1950) 3 S.L. Law Recorder, p*23*
Ill Bright v. Palmas 9 without the concurrence of the plain­
tiff and without an acknowledgement by her before a judge as was 
required by law before the 1st day of January, 1933, the plain­
tiff1 s wife in December 1933 sold to the defendant her share in a 
house to which she became entitled in 1915* The plaintiff1s con­
tention was that the amendment to the law did not affect his 
rights of disposition of his wifefs property which had vested in 
him prior to the amendment being brought into force* On these 
facts, the learned Acting Chief Justice found for the plaintiff, 
one of his reasons being that:
"the title (to the property) was not one 
that she acquired after the amendment to 
the law, her interest having persisted 
throughout ."
In short, property acquired after the Act by a woman married be­
fore the Act would be subj’ect to the law after 1933* In this 
case, non-retroactivity means that the Act will not apply to pro­
perty acquired before its date but will do so to property obtained 
thereafter. In either case, the date of the marriage is pro­
bably irrelevant; what is important is the time that the married
  1 ..........................
woman acquires the property.
2
In a more recent case, however, Bairamian C.J., without 
any reference to the former cases, held that the Act was retro­
active. In that case, the plaintiff made an application to the 
SupY^Court in order to reseal in Sierra Leone a grant of probate 
issued in England. The defendant and the testator married in 
1911 and separated in 1932. Before the separation the testator
1. $ee also In the Estate of Sybil JuiLia Hamilton (deceased)
Lewis and Anor v. Gill: Unreported. Decided by the then
Supreme Court at Freetown on 6 January, 1950, in which Beoku- 
Betts J. held that the Act was not retroactive. The property 
involved was one acquired by the married woman before the date 
of the Act.
2. In the Matter of the Estate of A.M.B. Bright (deceased),
Bright and Bright v. Bright, 1957>-60, A.L.H* S.L. 102.
was entitled to two houses in Freetown which she later purported
to dispose of by will to her children, the plaintiffs, whom she
named as executors. She died in 1956. The defendant resisted
the application and counterclaimed the houses on the ground that
they belonged to him or that he had an estate by the courtesy
which he acquired in them before the Imperial Statutes (Law of
Property) Adoption Act, 1932, came into operation*
Finding in favour of the plaintiffs, on the issue of the
retroactive effect of the Act, the learned Chief Justice said:
t!No distinction was made in section 5 be­
tween women married before and women mar­
ried after January 1st 1933, any more than 
in section 4, or between property acquired 
before and property acquired after that 
date* Consequently, if a married woman 
disposed of her property by will the dis­
position wouiLd take effect at her death 
and the property would go at once to her 
executors without being subjected to an 
estate by the courtesy for the remainder 
of her husband1s life should he survive 
her*"2
3
On appeal, the West African Court of Appeal decided in 
favour of the plaintiff but for reasons quite different from 
that adduced in the Court, below. The Court held that by vir­
tue of s.4 of the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption 
Act, the deceased wife could have made a will at any time after 
1932 disposing of property and she made her will in 1956* Thus 
the case lays down the principle that property acquired by a 
married woman before 1932 could effectually be disposed of by 
will by her without the intervention of her husband. But there 
is a dictum to the effect that the principle wouiLd not apply in
1. The contention that the husband had acquired an estate by 
courtesy was abandoned on appeal, probably because it was - 
later discovered that this estate was abolished by the Inter- 
states* Act, 1887.
2. At p.107.
3. Bright v. Bright1s Executors t 1957-60, A.L.R. S.L. 182.
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the case of dispositions made by her inter vivos» for Hearne, Ag* 
P* said:
"But how could the deceased dispose of her 
properties by will, it was asked, if she 
could not dispose of them during her life­
time? The ansv/er is that she could not 
do so during her lifetime independently 
of her husband1s rights, but she could do 
so by will because his rights were deter­
mined by her death."1
Why the Court drew a distinction between a disposition 
by will and one inter vivos in determining whether or not the 
1932 Act was retroactive is difficult to explain. If the raison 
d* etre, as would appear, is that the husband1s rights are termi­
nated by the death of the wife in the case of a will, are these 
rights not very much alive before that date, which puts them in 
the same position as those rights affected by a disposition 
inter vivos?
As we have seen, the opinion of the highest court on the 
point of retroactivity is that of the West African Court of 
Appeal; and, on the issue of property acquired by a married 
woman before 1933, it is that it is subject to the law before , 
the amendment and that a married woman could not even after the 
amendment dispose of such property inter vivos without the com­
plicity of her husband.
In deciding what the correct view is in regaxd to the 
retroactive effect of s.4 of the Imperial Statutes (Law of Pro­
perty) Adoption Act, it is submitted that two questions must be 
investigated: (a) when was the property acquired? (b) When was
it disposed of? The exact time of the marriage of the woman may 
the relevant, but the process by which the property is disposed of 
should be irrelevant. It is a canon of statutory interpretation 
that a retroactive operation is not to the given to a statute so
1. At p.187.
as to impair an existing r i g h t I f  the property was acquired 
before 1932 but disposed of after that date, in the case of a 
woman married before 1932, her husband1s interest in it, which 
he acquired before the Act came into force, should not be extin­
guished. But if the property is acquired after 1932 and dis­
posed of, whether or not the woman was married after 1932, the 
property ought to be free from any interest of the husband. 
Similarly, if the property is acquired by the woman before 1932 
but she marries after that date and disposes of the property, her 
husband should have no interest in it. Our conclusion, there­
fore, is that none of the decided cases which we have considered 
here is satisfactory.
(4) The Present Law
The present law on matrimonial property is the law since
1 January, 1933, and it can be summarised as follows:-
Marriage as such does not now affect the proprietary
rights of the parties. If the marriage is celebrated after
1932, whatever a spouse owns at the time of its celebration or
2thereafter prima facie continues to be his or her property.
Where, however, the marriage was celebrated before 1933 and the 
wife becaune entitled to property before that date, it is subject
to the husband1s common law rights unless the wife disposes of
the property by will, in which case those rights will be extin­
guished.”^
The basic rules outlined above are of easy application
1. The English case: In re Athlumney £1898] 2 Q.B. 547 at p.552.
2. Bankole-Bright v. Bankole-Bright (supra)» unreported; Bright 
v. Bright, 19.57-60, A.L.R. S.L. 102; Hankole-Bright v.
U.A.C. and Bankole-Bright (1950) 3 S.L. Law Recorder, 23.
3. Bright v. Bright * s Executors, 1957-60, A.L.R. S.L. 182.
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where the property rights of the spouses are clearly defined or 
where the marriage subsists as a successful union, in which case 
questions with regard to who owns what may never arise# But 
when an item of property is communally used, jointly acquired or 
is regarded as forming part of the household property, for example, 
the matrimonial home and presents given to the spouses at and 
during the marriage, if the marriage later breaks down, a dispute 
as to ownership is bound to arise and the aforementioned rules 
become difficult to apply. In this case, it is the duty of the 
courts to formulate principles in order to resolve any conflict#
We shall now examine how the courts do or ought to resolve 
questions of conflict between spouses in given situations#
(a) The Matrimonial Home
In Sierra Leone, the acquisition of a freehold estate in 
real property by young people is virtually the reserve and privi­
lege of the professionals, top civil servants, successful business­
men and the children of the wealthy# These are in the minority# 
As the mortgage system, on the scale that is practised in Western 
countries like England, is unknown in this country,* the majority 
of married couples live in rented houses or rooms as the matri­
monial home# Those from this group who manage to build houses 
have to do so on a stringent budget and the building is not com­
pleted until later in life, years after they have married#
Questions regarding ownership (but not possession) of the matri­
monial home are, therefore, infrequent# Nevertheless, it is 
necessary here to deal with the law on the ownership of the 
matrimonial home aa it is an important element of matrimonial 
property law.
1. Except for an influential few who may receive bank loans to
build their houses#
(i) Ownership
There is a dearth of Sierra Leone case-law on the matter* 
We may, therefore, yet again resort to English case-law for 
guidance. It is safe to do so because English law on the issue 
is to a great extent case-law which may be relevant to Sierra 
Leone not withstanding the fact that the procedure by which the 
spouses can invoke the Court1s jurisdiction in England arose from 
statute law * which is not applicable in Sierra Leone.
The English courts have formulated two principles which 
govern not only the matrimonial home but also other property 
which the spouses may acquire in circumstances which make it im­
possible to determine who contributes what. One is that if 
there is evidence of an agreement between the spouses with re-
o
spect to the property in question, the agreement is conclusive.
The other is that in the absence of an agreement, the respective
proprietary interests of the spouses depend upon their inferred 
3
intention. This intention is subject to a presumption of 
advancement where the husband purchases property in the name of 
the wife solely, and to the presumption of a resulting trust if 
the purchase is by the wife in the name of the husband.
By applying these principles the courts have rejected the 
claim of one spouse who makes no direct contribution to the pur­
chase of property but who might have contributed indirectly with 
her services.5 For example, the wife may have, over a period of
1. The Married Women1s Property Act, 1882, s.17.
2. Pettitt v. Pettitt [l97p] A.C. 777.
3. Re Roger1s Question £1948] 1 All E.R. 328 C.A.
4. Per Lord Upjohn in Pettitt v. Pettitt Cl970] A.C. 777, 813.
5. The House of Lords in Gissing v. Gissing £l970], 2 All E.R.780; 
c/f Denning L.J. in Fribi.ance v. )Frib::ance [1957] 1 All.E.R. 
357, 360 C.A.
years, contributed to living expenses such as buying food, cloth­
ing the children and paying the house boy or by services in a 
manner that makes it possible to say that she has enabled the 
husband to accumulate savings from his own earnings with which he 
buys the property in dispute.
It is submitted, in this case, as Bromley has rightly
put it:
"an equitable knife must be used to sever 
the Gordian knot and an equal division
will be the only possible solution.’**
>
In this regard, Sierra Leone courts ought not to be 
guided by the English superior courts. As we have pointed out 
earlier, the acquisition of a house in Sierra Leone in many cases 
requires a great deal of sacrifice. In families where the wife 
does not earn and the husband is the sole breadwinner, all the 
domestic chores are the responsibility of the wife and without 
her diligence the husband will not be able to make savings in 
order to build a house. Similarly, in families where both the 
husband and wife go to work, it has become the practice for the 
husband and wife to share the domestic responsibilities. Under 
these circumstances, therefore, property acquired by either and 
intended for common use, for example, the matrimonial home and 
furniture, should belong to them equally.
2(ii) Occupation
The position at common law which, in our submission, is 
the law applicable in Sierra Leone, is that whoever is entitled 
to the beneficial interest by virtue of the right to the other*s 
consortium arising from marriage, each spouse is entitled to
op•c it., 382.
2. For a more intensive treatment of the spouses* occupation of 
the matrimonial home, see Bromley, op.cit., 386 et seq.
occupy the matrimonial home at any rate during the subsistence of 
the marriage unless the spouse who claims the right of occupancy 
has lost his right to consortium through his or her conduct.
The wife’s position is even more secured in that if she is de­
serted by the husband, she can continue to remain in the matri­
monial home unless she loses her right to maintenance by commit­
ting adultery. This right, however, has been held both in Eng­
land and Sierra Leone to be a mere equity which does not protect 
the wife from eviction by a bona fide purchaserfor value with 
notice.^-
This statement of the law has been applied in Sierra 
Leone in both the case where the mattimonial home is owned by one 
of the spouses and where the house is rented from a landlord.
In the latter case, there axe numerous instances when a 
husband who is a tenant deserts the wife and leaves the matri­
monial home and the landlord gives notice to the wife to quit the 
premises even though the wife is prepared to pay the rent and she 
has not done any unlawful act to warrant her eviction. The 
courts have applied the "mere equity” rule with the utmost 
stringency and have given possession to the landlord. There is 
nothing in the existing law to protect such a wife. It is sub­
mitted that a law which gives a spouse in such a case equal pro­
tection to that afforded a statutory tenant would obviate some
2of the injustices which may currently occur.
1. See the English case, National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Ains­
worth [1965] 2 All E.R. 472; Taylor v. Hogan, 1957-60 A.L.R.
S.L. 2S0. The headnote of the latter case, a Sierra Leone ~ 
case, states that a deserted wife in occupation of the matri­
monial home, has the right to remain in occupation as against 
a purchaser of the home from her husband, the owner, who does 
not give strict proof of title.
2. English law protects such a wife by giving her rights of occu­
pation: See ss.l(5) and 7 of the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967.
(iii) Choice and location 
A decision with regard to the choice and location of the 
matrimonial home is one which must be made by both spouses 
jointly* The opinion of each spouse must be respected by the 
other and each must act reasonably* This was the principle 
enunciated by Bankole Jones Ag* J* (as he then was) in Jones v. 
Jones*^  In that case the parties lived with the husband’s 
mother in Freetown soon after the marriage* Later they lived 
at Makeni, where the husband was employed as a civil servant*
On leaving the civil service while at Makeni, the husband had to 
give up government quarters and he requested the wife to return 
to his mother’s house where they had previously lived in Freetown 
to wait for him. The wife went back to Freetown and looked for 
other accommodation, refusing to join her husband at his mother’s 
house on his return* Thereupon there was no resumption of co­
habitation between the parties, but the wife sent one of the 
children of the marriage to the husband’s mother to be looked 
after by her* No satisfactory reason was given by the wife, in 
the Court’s opinion, to justify her refusal to join her husband 
at his mother’s house. In fact, the wife struck the learned 
trial acting judge as:
”a woman of the world who is only out to 
have a good time, a woman of extremely 
good looks and seductive charms caring 
not one whit about seriously setting up 
a home with her husband and always ready 
and willing to shove off her maternal 2 
duty in the bringing up of her children.”
On these facts, the Court found the wife guilty of desertion and
on the choice and location of the matrimonial home, the learned
Acting Judge adopted with approval the opinion of Denning L.J. 
in Dunn v. Dunn,* where the learned Lord Justice said:
"The decision where the home should be is 
a decision which affects both the parties 
and their children. It is their duty to 
decide it by agreement, by give and take, 
and not by the imposition of the will of 
one over the other. Each is entitled to 
an equal voice in the ordering of the
affairs which are their common concern ...
If such an arrangement is frustrated by 
the unreasonableness of one or of the 
other, and this leads to a separation — 
between them, then the party who has pro­
duced the separation by reason of his or 
her unreasonable behaviour is guilty of 
desertion."2
(b) Wedding presents and gifts to a married couple
Whether the gift is by one spouse to the other or by a
third party to the spouses, the intention of the donor is vital
in deciding to whom the gift beneficially belongs. If the in­
tention is expressed, then ownership vests in accordance with 
that intention.
If no intention is expressed, then there should be an 
inferred intention depending upon the nature of the gift and 
the donor.
Gifts of a personal nature, for example, dresses and 
jewellery, are obviously intended for the spouse with whom they 
are connected by reason of sex. Thus, items that are tradi­
tionally for the use of a male alone given by third parties will 
go to the husband. Similarly, gifts which are purely feminine
3
will be the property of the wife.
1. [l94S] 2 All E.R. 822.
2. Ibid., p.823, 824.
3. Despite the modern practice among young people of one sex 
wearing clothes that are traditionally used by the other.
But if the gift is one of a non-personal nature, for 
example, real property, asset and household paraphernalia, given 
by a third party, it ought to tie the property of both spouses 
equally irrespective of whether or not the donor is a friend or 
relative of one spouse and not the other* English law allocates 
a gift in these circumstances to the spouse whose relative or
i
friend was the donor* It is submitted that the intention here
is misplaced if applied in Sierra Leone* Whenever a third party 
makes a gift of such a nature to a wedded couple without.express­
ing to whom it should belong, the experience of everyday life in 
Sierra Leone indicates that it is a means of setting up the 
couple in life as a single unit and not as individuals* An in­
ferred intention should, therefore, reflect this experience.
As for acquisitions by one spouse in the name of the 
other, they are subject to the doctrines of equity. If a hus­
band acquires property in his wifeTs name, he will be taken to
2
have intended to make a gift of that property to the wife. This 
is because he has a common law duty to maintain the wife. But 
if the wife acquires property in the husband’s name, there is a 
resulting trust in her favour* In either case, evidence may be 
adduced in rebuttal of the presumed intention.
(c) Protection of property rights between spouses
Certain remedies are available for the infringement of 
proprietary rights by one spouse or by a stranger against the 
other. Thus an action for damages in tort for conversion, 
detinue and trespass, or proceedings for an injunction may be 
at the instance of the aggrieved party.
1. Samson v, Samson [i960] 1 All E.R. 653*
2. i.e. by the presumption of advancement*
3i£j-
Formerly, while a married woman could maintain a civil 
action or criminal prosecution against her husband-or a third 
party for interference with her separate property,* no corre­
sponding remedy was available to the husband against his wife*
The position of both husband and wife is now the same* As we 
have indicated earlier, both can now sue each other and third 
parties in contract and tort* So far as criminal liability for 
larceny and kindred crimes is concerned, however, as we have
seen, one spouse cannot prosecute the other for acts committed
3
"while living together". But he or she can do so in respect 
of other crimes, in particular, for malicious damage to property.
Conclusions
Though it would appear that matrimonial property law in 
Sierra Leone is very much simplified, the new Supreme Court, the 
highest court in the country, has yet to rule on the extent of 
the Imperial Statutes (Law of Property) Adoption Act, 1932, in 
order to resolve the differences of opinion among the lower 
courts. Moreover, because of the lack of local judicial 
authority o *t legislation covering specific areas like the owner­
ship and occupation of the matrimonial home and gifts to a marriec 
couple, there is a degree of uncertainty as to what the law is, 
and there seems to be a great area of speculation. In the event 
of a dispute between spouses concerning property, too much reli­
ance cannot be put on English law in determining the intention 
of the donor, in the case of a gift from an outsider. This 
should be resolved by taking into consideration the social
1. S.8 of the Married Women’s Property Q-rdmance. yl87b y  No.7 of 
- 1875.
2. Chapter 8, pp.2.70-A7V-
3. S.36 of the Larceny Act, 1916.
condition of the country.
There is no justification in present-day Sierra Leone for 
applying solely a person1s pre-marital personal law to the owner­
ship and disposition of property. That personal law may be rele­
vant but other factors like the type of marriage contracted and 
the spouses1 way of life should be taken into consideration.
Finally, the present procedure for the protection of their 
proprietary rights inter se whereby the spouses resort to open 
court in the same manner as any other litigant in respect of all 
actions, is undesirable. Provision should exist whereby matters 
affecting matrimonial property can be heard on summons by a judge 
in chambers. This will prevent disclosure to the public at large 
of intimate matters affecting marriage.
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CHAPTER 10 
MATRIMONIAL RELIEFS
A, NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
(1) Nullity of Marriage under the Christian and Civil 
Marriage Acts
Nullity distinguished from Divorce
A decree of nullity may be either a declaration that a 
marriage has never existed in law, though it may have Ifeeen so in 
fact, or a declaration that a subsisting marriage should cease 
to exist. The former is appropriate though unnecessary where 
the marriage is void; the latter is essential for the termina­
tion of a voidable marriage. Nullity proceedings differ from 
divorce in their effect. Where a decree of nullity is granted 
as in voidable marriages, the marriage is for certain purposes 
regarded as never having been its existence, whereas divorce does 
not relate back but affects only the present and future status 
of the parties.
Distiriction between Void and Voidable Marriages
The distinction in the common law between void and void­
able marriages was originally blurred. For instance, in an 
earlier edition of Rayden on Divorce, a voidable marriage was de­
fined as one
"declared to have been and to be abso­
lutely null and void to all intents and 
purposes in the law whatsoever, and the 
petitioning spouse declared to have been 1 
and to be free from all bonds of marriage.”
As one commentator rightly puts it, if the marriage has been
absolutely null and void and the spouse has been free from the
1. 4th ed., Form 95, p.705.
bond of marriage there is ground for suspicion that the marriage
was not voidable but really void ab initio** She distinction
has now been clearly defined by Lord Green M*R. in the English
o
case, De Reneville v. De Reneville when he said:
"A void marriage is one that will be re­
garded by every court in any case in which 
the existence of the marriage is in issue 
as never having taken place and can be so 
treated by both parties to it without the
necessity of any decree annulling it; a
voidable marriage is one that will be re­
garded by every court as a valid subsist­
ing marriage until a decree annulling it 
has been pronounced by a court of compe­
tent jurisdiction*”
It is important to know whether a marriage is void or 
voidable because certain legal consequences flow therefrom which 
depend on the character of the marriage* First, for a voidable 
marriage, there must always be a decree of nullity before the 
marriage can come to an end, and the decree must be obtained 
during the lifetime of both of the parties; so that, if one
3
spouse dies before the decree, the marriage can never be avoided*
In the case of a void marriage, a nullity decree is not necessary, 
though it is desirable as evidence that the marriage is not in
existence at all, and a decree can be obtained even when one party
is dead* Secondly, a voidable marriage must be annulled before 
a subsequent marriage can be validly contracted, whereas a party 
to a void marriage can enter into another marriage validly without 
taking steps to terminate the first marriage* Thirdly, only the
A
spouses can challenge the validity of a voidable marriage* On 
the other hand, a stranger who has sufficient interest can
1* F.H. Newark, "The operation of Nullity Decrees", 8 M.L.R. (1945) 
203, 204* —
2. [1948] 1 All E.R. 56, 60.
3* A v. B (1868) 1 P & D. 559 (voidable marriage)*
4. Ibid.
1319.
institute proceedings to declare a marriage null and void.*
Grounds on which a statutory marriage is void
Under this heading, by statutory marriage is meant marri­
age under the Christian and Civil Marriage Acts. It may not 
serve a practical purpose to consider a Mohammedan marriage as 
such because, as we have seen, proof according to Islamic law of 
the existence of such marriage is conclusive evidence before the 
Sierra Leone courts. Such proof is usually afforded by the pro­
duction of the marriage certificate or the register of marriage 
of the particular jamaat (Muslim community)where the marriage 
took place. Once a Mohammedan marriage has been proved to be 
in existence, past or present, the Sierra Leone courts do not in 
practice, enquire into its validity. For purpose of complete­
ness, however, we shall at the end of this Chapter outline the 
grounds on which a marriage may be annulled in Islamic law and 
examine the views which Sierra Leone Muslims take of nullity of 
a Mohammedan marriage.
We have already discussed in detail in Chapter 6 the 
essentials of a valid statutory marriage. In this Chapter, 
therefore, we shall merely outline those essentials, the absence 
of which make the marriage void. The relevant statutory pro­
visions are s.10 of the Christian Marriage Act and ss.8 and 15 
of the Civil Marriage Act. Under these provisions, a statutory 
marriage is void on the following grounds:
(i) Non-publication of banns of marriage or marriage con­
tracted without obtaining a licence or Registrar's 
Certificate:
1. Faremouth v. Watson (1811) 1 Phil. 355 (void marriage).
Where the marriage is to be celebrated in church, failure 
to have banns published on three successive Sundays or three Sun­
days following each other in which services are held or to obtain 
a licence from the appropriate Registrar will invalidate the marri< 
age* Similarly, for a civil marriage before a Registrar, the 
marriage will be null and void if the Registrars Certificate or 
the President’s licence as the case may be, has not been obtained*
(ii) Marriage within the prohibited degrees:
There is no indication about the knowledge or intention 
of the parties* Probably, a marriage between persons within 
the prohibited degrees without knowing the facts as such will, 
nevertheless, be void since the policy would appear to be the 
prevention of such marriages*^
(iii) Marriage between persons either of whom is already married
to some person other than a party to the intended marriage:
o"Already married” in this context, as we have seen,
formerly meant already married in accordance with Christian or 
Muslim rites or under the Civil Marriage Act, so that a customary 
marriage did not bar a party thereto from contracting a subse­
quent Christian or Civil marriage with a third party* Since the 
Christian Marriage (Amendment) (No*2) Act and the Civil Maxriage 
(Amendment)(No*2) Act, both of 1965, however, a previous custom­
ary marriage is now a bar to a subsequent Christian or Civil 
marriage with a party other than the spouse of the customary 
marriage*
1* This is an interesting point but the position does not seem 
to be very clear, even in English law* The present writer 
searched in vain for a decision of the English courts wherein 
this issue has been discussed and settled*
2. Chapter 6*
(iv) Marriage celebrated under a false name or false names with 
the knowledge of both parties:
As we have said earlier, knowledge of the falsity by both 
parties is vital in order to invalidate the marriage* Therefore, 
if only one party has been fraudulent in concealing her correct 
name whilst the other party knows nothing about the concealment, 
the marriage will be valid though the fraudulent spouse will be 
guilty of an offence under ss*18 and 20 of the Christian Marriage 
Act and Civil Marriage Act respectively*
(v) Marriage not celebrated in the presence of two witnesses*
(vi) Marriage not celebrated within three months after the date 
of not ice:
It should be remembered that the first step to be taken
in order to contract a marriage under the Civil Marriage Act is 
that one of the parties to the intended marriage must give a 
written notice to the Registrar of the district in which the i
marriage is intended to be celebrated, and the notice should 
state, inter alia, that the marriage will take place within three 
months from the date of such notice* All necessary steps must 
be taken to contract the marriage within this time limit other­
wise a marriage contracted thereafter will be void* It is signi­
ficant to note that this provision is in respect of a civil mar­
riage only. A marriage under the Christian Marriage Act cele­
brated after the expiry of three months from the date of the 
licence or the date of the last publication of banns is neverthe­
less valid though the Minis ter concerned will be guilty of an 
offence under s*22 of the Act**
1* Whereas s*8 of the Civil Marriage Act expressly states that 
marriage not contracted within the stipulated period is void, 
s*9 of the Christian Marriage Act merely provides that, it 
shall be lawful for a Minister to ceitibrate marriage on any 
day within the period of three months from the last publica­
tion of banns or the date of the licence*
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The above are the only grounds provided by statute on 
which a statutory marriage contracted in Sierra Leone will be 
rendered void* Both the Christian Marriage Act and the Civil 
Marriage Act make this clear when their ss.10 and 15 respectively, 
after stating the grounds on which a marriage is void, provide 
that:
"save as aforesaid every marriage celebrated 
under the provisions of this Ordinance shall 
be valid until it be lawfully dissolved."
Thus grounds like fear, consent, mistake and lack of consent 
(not mentioned by the Acts) on which marriage being a contract 
may at common law, be rendered void, would not seem to invali­
date a statutory marriage in Sierra Leone. It is difficult to 
defend the absence of these grounds. How can a marriage be 
valid without the consent of the parties or if the consent is 
induced by mistake, fear or duress? Can it be argued that the 
grounds mentioned in the Acts rendering marriage void are not 
exhaustive but supplementary to other grounds at common law?
An affirmative answer to the last question would have been cor­
rect but for the preceding quotation from the Marriage Acts 
which contains the phrase "save as aforesaid". Ss.10 and 15
categorically state that in the absence of any of the elements 
stated in the Acts that would render a marriage void the marriage 
will otherwise be valid until it is by law dissolved.
Sierra Leone is unique as being the only ex-British West 
African dependancy with such a provision in both Marriage Acts
enacted during the colonial era. The Christian Marriage Act of
1 2 the Gambia, and the Marriage Acts of the Gold Coast, and
1. S.14 of the Christian Marriage Act, cap.23 of Vol.I of the 
1966 edition of the revised Laws of the Gambia. But note 
that s.16 of the Civil Marriage Act, cap.27 of the Gambian 
laws, has the same provision as the Sierra Leone Acts.
2. S.42 of the Marriage Ordinance, cap.127.
Nigeria * all left the door open for the entry of common law 
grounds where statutory law was silent on the issue* For ex­
ample, both the Gold Coast and Nigerian Marriage Acts after enu­
merating the grounds on which a marriage is void merely conclude:
"But no marriage shall, after celebration, 
be deemed invalid by reason that any pro­
vision of this Ordinance other than the2 
foregoing has not been complied with*"
In short, a marriage is not rendered void because the
provisions of the Act other than the ones specifically mentioned
in the respective Acts have not been adhered to* Small wonder
3
therefore that Kasunmu and Salacuse rightly argue that the re­
quirements of a valid statutory marriage in Nigeria are not spelt 
out in the Marriage Act and that other grounds known to the com­
mon law on which a marriage would be invalidated ought to be read 
into Nigerian law* In the present state of the law such a 
plea cannot be made for Sierra Leone*
Grounds on which a statutory marriage is voidable
S*3^of the Matrimonial Causes Act^provides that:
"in addition to any other grounds on 
which a marriage is by law void and 
voidable, a marriage shall be voidable 
on the ground of (a) non-consummation 
owing to wilful refusal; (b) suffer­
ing from a venereal disease in a commu­
nicable form at the time of the marriage;
(c) pregnant by some person other than 
the other spouse at the time of the 
marriage*"
3(dis quite precise on the grounds rendering a marriage 
voidable; it enumerates the statutory grounds and leaves the 
door open for the inclusion of common law grounds* These common
1* S*33(3) of the Marriage Ordinance, cap*113.
2* S.42 of the Ghana Marriage Ordinance, cap*127; and s*33(3) 
of the Nigerian, cap.115*
3* Op*cit*t p.161.
if-. Cutx^ >- l&VL o f the ^e-vtSexI f­
law grounds would be grounds on which a contract of such a
nature can be avoided. They are fraud, misrepresentation, duress
1 2fear and non-age. We shall now deal with the statutory 
grounds in detail because they raise issues which are of pecu­
liar interest to Sierra Leone. We must first of all begin by 
saying that this is an area in which there has not been found any 
Sierra Leone Court decision,reported as well as unreported, and 
because of the sociological factors inherent it will be. quite un­
safe to rely solely on English decisions as guide lines for inter­
pretation.
(a) Non-consummation owing to wilful refusal
(i) What is consummation?
Consummation of the marriage takes place when the spouses 
have sexual intercourse after the celebration of the marriage. 
According to Dr. Lushington in the English case in D-B v. A-G 
such intercourse must be ordinary and complete, not partial and 
imperfect. This opinion arose from a case where the wife's 
sexual organ was so deformed that complete, but not partial, 
penetration by the male organ became impossible. But it also 
implies that the husband himself must be sexually capable of fully 
penetrating the wife.
In an African society such as in Sierra Leone, the sexual 
act in marriage is of primary importance. In most of the. tribal 
languages marriage literally means sexual intercourse, so that if 
a man wants to ask for the hand of a woman in marriage he says it 
literally ”1 want this woman for sexual intercourse*1 (in Mende:
1. For a detailed analysis of these grounds see Bromley, op.cit. 
81, 82.
2. See Chapter 5.
3. (1845) 1 Rob. Eccl. 279, 298.
nya longo a nyahei ji soo va). The essential object of sexual 
intercourse in marriage is the procreation of children and it is 
believed that that aim can only be achieved if sexual intercourse 
is complete. This contrasts remarkably with sexual intercourse 
which forms the basis of an action for woman damage and adultery. 
In customary law, the mere expression of the desire to have sexual 
intercourse with another man's wife is regarded in many communi­
ties as sufficient to found an action for woman damage whilst 
under the general law, sexual intercourse, however slight it may 
be, by a married person with another to whom he or she is not 
married, amounts to adultery.
Because of the emphasis on procreation as the basis of 
marriage in the African context it is doubtful, though in English
law it is accepted, that coitus.interruptus * and intercourse
2with the use of contraceptives would amount to consummation of 
the marriage. If these practices are accepted as sufficient 
consummation in Sierra Leone society, it is an adoption of foreign 
attitudes without having regard for local social convictions.
In Sierra Leone, it is the ambition of every parent as well as 
friends and well-wishers of a newly married couple that a child 
should be born as soon as is biologically possible , so that a 
marriage which is fruitless after its first year becomes the sub­
ject of much gossip about the ante-nuptial promiscuity of the 
wife or the existing impotence of the husband. Of course, in
highly developed societies, it is possible to conceive a child
3without any act of sexual intercourse, but so far as my re­
searches go fecundation ab extra is unheard of in Sierra Leone.
1. Cackett v. Cackett [1950] 1 All E.R. 677.
2. See Baxter v. Baxter [l948] A.C. 274.
3. i.e. by fecundatio ab extra.
Therefore, unnatural sexual intercourse ought not to be accepted, 
at any rate for the purposes of consummation of marriage.
(ii) Wilful refusal
Any act on the part of one spouse, without just excuse, 
which makes consummation impossible would amount to wilful re­
fusal. Thus, if one spouse insists on using unnatural methods 
to effect intercourse, the other will be justified in refusing 
whilst the party who insists on the unnatural method will be wil­
fully refusing to consummate. Genuine sickness but*not mere 
malingering will be a just cause and so would be the suckling of 
a young baby.* If one spouse is living in adultery> the other
will be justified in refusing consummation for to agree to sexual
2intercourse would be condoning the other's adultery.
Impotence apart, it is inconceivable that a marriage in 
Sierra Leone will ever be non-consummated on the ground of wil­
ful refusal.
(iii) Impotence
Impotence is not mentioned in the Matrimonial Causes Act 
as a ground for annulling a marriage but is of relevance in de­
termining whether a marriage is consummated.
■
The impotence of a spouse, though a natural phenomenon, 
would in our submission, amount to wilful refusal in the Sierra 
Leone context because in this country sexual intercourse is the 
principal essence of marriage. In this regard, knowledge on
1. It is a common occurrence in the Sierra Leone society that 
many young women are pregnant by the prospective husbands be­
fore they are married,and the child is born within days or a 
few weeks after the celebration of the marriage. It is custom­
ary for women to suckle babies for at least nine months after 
birth, during which period the wife is not expected to have 
sexual intercourse allegedly for the health of the baby.
2. Because by contracting a monogamous marriage the parties are 
deemed to have opted out of polygamy.
3. Per Tejan-Sie C.J. in Cummings v. Cummings, 1968-9 A.L.R. S.L. 
44, 52.
the party's part of his unfortunate condition at the time he 
enters into the union means that from the outset he has formed 
the intention to deprive the other spouse of sexual intercourse. 
But if impotence intervenes after the consummation, the marriage 
cannot be annulled nor can itbe the basis of a divorce. Never­
theless, it will be conduct that justifies the other in being in 
desertion and will probably be regarded as conduct which conduces 
the other spouse to commit adultery.
What is the degree of impotence that is necessary for 
annulling a marriage? Should it be impotence with respect to 
every woman or impotence in respect of a particular woman, i.e. 
the wife? These questions are important because, owing to some 
reasons,mental and psychological, one spouse may be impotent in 
relation to the other but not so insofar as other persons of the 
opposite sex are concerned. In Sierra Leone, tribal societies 
whenever impotence is an issue, the guilty party, usually the man, 
must be given a woman other than the wife in order to test his 
virility. If he is able to have sexual intercourse with that 
woman but unable to have it with his own wife, various causes 
such as witchcraft by the wife or the husband's disability due 
to a curse may be attributed, and it will not be regarded as im­
potence. Such a test is not available in the case of monoga­
mous marriages as it amounts to adultery. There axe many in Me 
c Isone.
&eftixAcommunities who are of opinion, however, that a spouse of a 
monogamous marriage, at any rate, the husband, must be accorded 
this privilege. To do so, of course, will be giving vent to 
the inner consciousness of the people which according to Savigny 
should be the ultimate goal of law; but it is diametrically 
opposed to the monoganous character of a statutory marriage and 
ought, therefore, to be deprecated.
(b) Venereal disease in a communicable form
The presence of this ground in the Matrimonial Causes Act 
can only be explained by the fact that it is a relic of the colo­
nial era representing the social and the highly sophisticated 
hygienic ideas in England* In England the attitude taken towards 
venereal disease is not the same as that shown to the disease by 
the average Sierra Leonean* Unlike impotence, which strikes at 
the very root of the marriage, venereal disease contracted by a 
husband is commonly regarded as just another sickness like, say, 
malaria or cholera, and it frequently meets with the sympathy of 
the wife once she knows about it* The occasional temper may 
only run high when the wife is infected but cools down as soon as 
a cure is obtained* Married couples have always tried to keep
the sickness a secret to themselves^besides their doctor and re-
> >
gard it as shameful even on the part of the innocent spouse for 
third parties to know about it* This accounts for the rarity 
and almost complete absence of actions for nullity based on this 
ground even when the disease is rampant among men in the country*
(cl Pregnancy per alium
The law here speaks for itself and requires no further 
elaboration* By way of comment, however, it should be pointed 
out that the Sierra Leone society attaches enormous weight to a 
wife's fidelity which she must maintain right from the beginning 
of the marriage* A woman who, knowing that she is pregnant by 
one man, conceals thia fact and marries another, is held socially 
in the same estimation as a common prostitute* This factual
1* But the position is different if the dic&ease is contracted by 
a wife* It is regarded as evidence of infidelity if she does 
not contract it from her husband and she may be divorced under 
customary law on that ground* The scale of immorality, there­
fore, seems to tip heavily against the wife in this respect*
situation is frequent where there is pregnancy before marriage; 
but, if it is not the doing of the prospective husband, the pro­
spective wife is always careful to reveal it to the would-be hus­
band for fear of the social, apart from the legal, consequences 
when found out. In practice, therefore, it seldom happens that 
the husband does not know of the wife's situation at the celebra­
tion of the marriage. Moreover, the chances of a husband's be­
ing ignorant of a wife's pregnancy at the time of marriage cam, 
in Sierra Leone, be very slim because the parties would have had 
a long period of courtship before marriage. It rarely happens 
for a couple to know each other and marry within a very short time 
from the period of acquaintance. During that period of court­
ship, it is a social convention for the intended wife to refrain 
from having an affair with any member of the opposite sex other 
than the prospective husband.
Restrictions on decree of nullity
(a) Statutory
S.3f«}of the Matrimonial Causes Act * imposes three re­
strictions on nullity petitions based on the respondent suffering 
from venereal disease or pregnancy per alium. First, the peti­
tioner must at the time of the marriage be ignorant of the facts 
alleged; secondly, he must institute nullity proceedings within 
a yeax from the date of the celebration of the marriage; thirdly, 
voluntary sexual intercourse with the other spouse must not take 
place from the discovery by the petitioner of the grounds for a 
decree.
It is submitted that, in determining "ignorance" with 
respect to the first restriction, an objective test should
1. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960.
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1 2 apply, but a mere suspicion ought not to be stifficlent.
3
(b) Common law and equity
At common law and equity a petition for nullity based on 
wilful refusal will fail if the petitioner with knowledge of the 
facts and law entitling him to a decree annulling his marriage 
treats it as valid and subsisting before he takes steps to avoid
it. Thus, if he takes advantages or derives benefits from the
matrimonial relationship or lives for a long time together with 
the other spouse in the same house or family with the status and 
character of husband and wife after knowledge of everything which 
it is material to know, he cannot later seek to annul the marri-
4
age, for to do so would be unfair and inequitable.
Overt acts like obtaining a matrimonial order,5 and the
adoption of a child have been held by theEnglish Courts suffi­
cient approbation of the marriage to prevent a later decree for
nullity. It must be remembered, however, that knowledge of the
factual situation and an overt act alone on the part of the peti­
tioner will not deprive him of a nullity decree; he must also 
know the law entitling him to such decree. Knowledge of the law
1. See the English case of Smith v. Smith Cl947] 2 All E.R. 741,
C.A. in which the Court of Appeal held that a petitioner can­
not obtain a decree if he had intercourse with full knowledge 
of facts from which a reasonable man would conclude that he 
had grounds for a decree even though he personally refused to 
draw the conclusion.
2. See the English case of Stocker v. Stocker [1966] 2 All E.R. 147
3. For a fuller treatment of this see Bromley, op.cit.t 61-69*
4. See Lord Selborne, L.C. in G v. M (1889) 10 App. Cas. 171, 186
H.L.
5. Tindall v. Tindall [1953] 1 All E.R. 139, C.A.
6. W V W [1952] 1 All E.R. 858, C.A.
here, it is submitted, must be constructive knowledge which he 
will be deemed to have if he has pursued any prior legal action 
on the basis that he is married to the other spouse*
Jurisdiction of the courts to annul a marriage
(a) Statutory
The High Court has statutory jurisdiction to hear proceed** 
ings for a decree of nullity in every case in which it may pro-
i
nounce a decree of divorce* This will be discussed generally 
in the chapter on Divorce*
(b) Common law
The new section 30(2) of the principal Act contained in
s.5 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961, reads:
••Without prejudice to any jurisdiction 
exercisable by the Court^ apart from this 
section, the provisions of the preceding 
subsection 4 shall apply to proceedings 
for nullity of marriage*••
The effect of this section is, inter alia, to recognise 
grounds at common law on which the High Court possesses juris­
diction to hear nullity petitions* These can be categorised in­
to two* First, the basis of jurisdiction where the marriage is 
void* Secondly, the basis of jurisdiction if the marriage is 
voidable•
If a marriage is void the High Court has jurisdiction
• 5to annul it if (a) the marriage took place in Sierra Leone;
1* S*5 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961, Act No*
16 of 1961.
2. Act No. 16 of 1961.
3* i*e* the High Coulrt.
4* Which deals with jurisdiction of the High Court in proceedings 
by a wife for divorce*
5* Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1962] 1 All E.R. 344.
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(b) only the petitioner is domiciled in Sierra Leon e ( c ) both
paxties are resident in Sierra Leone at the time when proceedings 
2
begin* But if the marriage is merely voidable, only one grouid 
exists as the basis of jurisdiction, i*e* that both parties are 
resident in Sierra Leone* It has been held that residence of
the petitioner alone will not be sufficient to give jurisdiction
4
to the Court, but that residence of the respondent would suf­
fice since tie petitioner ipso facto submits to the jurisdiction 
by invoking it*^* ^
(2) Nullity of a Mohammedan Marriage
In Islamic law generally a marriage is either valid ab 
initio or valid^subject to ratification^or defective (invalid)* 
Under Maliki law particularly, a marriage is either valid or de­
fective*
A defective marriage is not one which might be classified 
as void or voidable as in the general law because the legal con­
sequences which follow a defective marriage in Islamic law are 
not the same as those which result upon a void or voidable marri­
age under the general law* The rules in Islamic law are rather 
difficult and complex* In Maliki law, some defective marriages
1* See Lord Green M.R. and Bucknill L.J* in De Reneville v* De 
Reneville [1948] 1 All E*R* 56, C*A* at pp.61, 64*
2* Ramsay-Fairfax v« Ramsay-Fairfax [1955] 3 All E.R. 695, C*A*
3* Ibid*
4* Per Lord Green, M*R. in De Reneville v* De Reneville (ante), 
at p * 62 •
5* Sim v. Sim [1944] 2A11 E.R. 344. This was a case on the 
jurisdiction of the Court to hear a petition for judicial 
separation but the statment of the law therein can apply 
equally to nullity proceedings*
6* The cases in Notes 5 (p*331), and 1-5 are English decisions 
but being common law decisions, they apply to Sierra Leone 
as the country*s residual law*
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raise a shubha, i.e. a semblance of validity, while others do 
not. A marriage which raises a shubha is perhaps equivalent to 
the Hanafi fas id marriage, the results of which is that the hadd 
penalty is not inflicted for zina. A marriage in Maliki law 
which has no semblance of validity may again be equivalent to
<f
the Hanafi batil which traditionally carried the hadd penalty.
There are two types of shubha in Maliki law: (i) shubha-
talmahall which exists as a result of differences of opinion 
among the schools or jurists in regard to impediment. It covers 
marriages without witnesses, marriage during pilgrimage, and 
shighax marriage; (ii) shubhat al-ishtibah in which there is 
uniformity among the sbhools that if the parties to the defective 
contract act in good faith in regard to an impediment and they 
are ignorant of the facts or of the law, certain legal conse­
quences may nevertheless follow the marriage.
o
Lapanne-Joinville has attempted to reduce the diffi­
culties in the classification of defective marriages under Maliki 
law and has put them under three categories: (i) defective mar­
riages which may be expunged only before consummation; (ii) 
those which are invalid ab initio but become valid after the mar­
riage is consummated followed by a period of married life; 
j(iii) those that are invalid irrespective of consummation and
cohabitation for any length of period. We shall now examine 
which marriage falls under which category.
1. D. Hinchcliffe, The Islamic Law of Marriage and Divorce in 
India and Pakistan States since Partition, an unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, London University, 1971, pp*6l- 35.
2. "Theorie des null it es de marriage en droit musulman malekite", 
Revue algerienne, 1951, f>p .92-102.
(i) Defective marriages which may be expunged only before 
consummation
These are of two types: (a) a marriage defective because
there is no dower or the property given as dower is not one per­
missible under Islamic law. Examples of the first type are:
where the marriage contract stipulates that no dower should be 
paid; Shighar marriage, i.e. one that contains a stipulation 
like: "give me your sister and I give you mine without a dower." 
Examples of the second type are: where property is given as dower
to which the donor has no legal right; where the dower consists 
of property forbidden by Islamic law, for example, wine, pork and 
impure oil; where the dower is an object which involves a great 
risk in its handling, for instance, a wild animal; and a promise 
to pay the dower without stipulating any precise time for its 
payment. (b) A marriage which is defective where two walis of 
equal rank each concludes a marriage between the woman and a 
different husband. In this case, the first marriage in time is 
presumed to prevail over the other, but if the second is consum­
mated first, the second becomes validated and the first is ren­
dered invalid.
(ii) Marriages defective ab initio but which are validated
by consummation followed by a period of married life.
These are also of two types: (a) Where a woman of high
social rank,who cannot be married without her consent has been 
given in marriage a wali lower in rank to the one to whom the 
hierarchy of guardianship confers the right, the higher wali or 
if he is absent, a judge, can have the marriage annulled if it 
is proved that the husband is not the wifefs social rqnk. But 
if the wali or the judge, as the case may. be, has not acted and 
the parties consummate the marriage and live together for about 
three years or have two children, the marriage is validated;
(b) If an orphan girl who has not reached nubile age and has not 
been promiscuous is married without the permission of a kadi, the 
marriage is invalid; but there is a difference of opinion among 
the Maliki jurists as to the effect of consummation on the marri­
age. Abu *1-Hassan says that the marriage cannot be validated, 
whilst Khalil (reporting Al-Mattiti*s opinion) concedes that if 
the defect is not revealed until a substantial length of time has 
elapsed, it is cured by consummation.
The two categories of defective marriages which we have 
dealt with so far are shubha. The result is that as long as the 
necessary procedure for their dissolution has not been undertaken 
before consummation, in the first case, and before consummation 
followed by a period of cohabitation, in the second case, the mar 
riage becomes validated and nothing can be done thereafter in 
order to invalidate it. But as we shall see shortly, the legal 
consequences of such a marriage are not exactly the same as those 
following a marriage which is valid ab initio.
(iii) Marriages invalid irrespective of consummation or a 
period of married life following consummation
These are marriages in which there is a defect in the 
contract to such an extent that the basic rules of contract are 
violated. For instance, where the prerequisite consent for the 
marriage was not obtained; where the marriage is between per­
sons who are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, 
affinity and fosterage; and marriages between a Muslim woman 
and a non-Muslim even if the latter is converted to Islam after 
the marriage.
The effect of a defective marriage
The effect of defective marriages can conveniently be 
reduced to two basic rules: some defective marriages may only be
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avoided by judicial cfecree. Others are invalid de jure without 
the pronouncement of a judicial talaq.
A judicial decree is necessary for marriages over which 
there is difference of opinion among the schools as to their de­
fect. Those for which there is unanimity of opinion as to de­
fect are null and void without a judicial intervention. We must 
now address ourselves to the specific defective marriages which- 
require a judicial repudiation and those that do not and what the 
legal consequences axe.
I. Defective marriages which require a judicial decree
These are of two kinds: (a) those which preserve the
right of inheritance to the surviving spouse; and (b) those 
which do not preserve such right.
(a) Marriages which preserve the right of inheritance
They sire as follows:- marriage contracted without wit­
nesses but which is consummated; marriage concluded during the 
state of ihram, i.e. during pilgrimage; Shighar marriage; a 
marriage kept secret; and a marriage in which a slave is given 
as dower.
(b) Marriage wbbh deprives the surviving spouse of the right 
to inheritance
These are:- marriage concluded while a party is in a 
state of sickness from which he is likely to die, such sickness
not lasting for more than one year; optional marriages which are 
(i) marriage concluded without the attendance of a wali; (ii) 
marriage concluded by a woman or slave acting as wali; (iii) 
Marriage concluded by a wali other than the father while the 
latter is absent but not far away; (iv) where two walis of equal 
rank marry the woman to two different husbands; (v) where two
marriages are concluded with the same woman and the second
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marriage is consummated first.
II* Marriages void de jure and which do not require judicial 
decree
These are as follows:- marriage between a Muslim and a 
non-Muslim; marriage by a woman when there is a pre-existing 
marriage to which she is a party; marriage with a woman in 1 idda; 
marriage of a man with a fifth wife during, the subsistence of 
marriages with four sives; marriage of a lover with his mistress; 
re-marriage with a woman who has been repudiated as a wife three 
times; marriage within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, 
affinity and fosterage; re-marriage with a wife on whom lian has 
been sworn; marriage with a condition suspending it for some 
time; marriage contracted for a period fixed in advance; marri­
age concluded at different times by two walis of equivalent rank 
both authorised by the woman on two different occasions; marri­
age concluded at the same time by these two walis to two differ­
ent husbands; marriage with a slave woman with a stipulation 
that the children of the marriage will be free. There are addi­
tional sanctions attending a marriage void de jure. Formerly, 
there was the penalty of hadd which was death of the parties to 
the marriage by stoning. Nowadays, the present writer is not 
aware that this penalty is used in any Muslim community. Next, 
there is a permanent bann on re-marriage in two cases: (i) mar­
riage of a seducer with his mistress; (ii) marriage with a woman 
in ' idda where the marriage has been consummated.
A significant legal consequence of a defective marriage 
of any type is that the children are regarded as legitimate; the 
defect affects only the parties to the marriage. In this respect 
Islamic law takes a very liberal view as compared with the gener­
al law.
Nullity of Marriage as known among Sierra Leone Muslims
One cannot say with certainty which of the grounds ren­
dering a marriage defective in strict Islamic law would have the 
same effect among Sierra Leone Muslims in practice, although the 
stricter Muslims allege that the same grounds stipulated by Is­
lamic law would apply toithem. When questioned about the legal 
sanctions that follow a defective marriage, these Muslims said 
that. a defective marriage is regarded as valid for
all legal purposes so long as the parties have been declared 
married by an Imam. In practice, however, the stricter Muslims 
abide by most of the rules imposed by strict Islamic law for the 
requirements of a valid marriage. But the more liberal Muslims, 
particularly some native Muslims, break the rules. Thus, a man
may marry his step-mother;* he may marry two sisters concurrent-
2 3ly; and marriage with a woman in 'idda is not forbidden. The
stricter Muslims deprecate these practices as not being in con­
formity with Islamic law and rightly so. Ih fact, the prac­
tices are indicative of tribal customs
Therefore, there is a struggle between strict Islamic 
law and local practice. The question now is which wins legally 
and why? Obviously, a Muslim marriage between persons one of 
whom is not a Muslim is not legally a Muslim marriage recognised 
even by the general law because the Mohammedan Marriage Act 
y&co^lsas Mohammedan marriages contracted by Muslims only. As 
regards the other conditions imposed by strict Islamic law, it
1. A practise common among the Mende.
2. A Kono and Kissi custom.
3. There is no evidence that the 1idda of divorce is observed.
The ' idda of death is observed only in a limited form lasting
in many cases from seven to forty days; but its observance
seems to be linked with tribal custom. On this, see further
Chapter 18.
is submitted that non-compliance with any of them should render 
the marriage defective and the usual consequences of such defect 
ought to apply as a matter of law. Note that under the Mohammed 
an Marriage Act, a Mohammedan marriage that is valid under the 
general law for all civil purposes is one "valid according to 
Mohammedan law". Though it is our contention that the law 
should be adhered to, where it works injustice then there is 
room for law reform. As we have said earlier, Sierra Leone 
Muslims are more concerned with the practice of their religion 
than with the niceties of their very much complicated law. 
Therefore, the law ought to take local conditions into consider­
ation. It will be very difficult to apply strict Islamic law 
in practice in Sierra Leone since, as we have mentioned earlier, 
the majority of the Muslims are not knowledgeable in that law 
and are governed by tribal law in most cf their affairs. The 
stricter Muslims, of course, would not admit that this is the 
state of affairs, but the dearth of nullity proceedings among 
even them for defective marriages, shows that their desire for 
the application of strict Islamic law to the affairs of their 
everyday life is just a demonstration to give respectability to 
their religion rather than to its jurisprudence.1
B. JUDICIAL SEPARATION
Judicial separation as a matrimonial relief was intro­
duced in Sierra Leone by the Matrimonial CausesQ-rdinaihce The
present legislation dealing with it is the Matrimonial Causes 
Act, 1949.3
1. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, pp. 297-300.
2. Act No.7 of 1858. See Montagu: Ordinances of the Colony
of Sierra Leone. 1858-1860, Vol.Ii, p.2&. -------
3. Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
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From the outset, it should be remembered that the relief
was commonly invoked by the wife ** before 1950 when, as will be
seen, the grounds for divorce were fewer than they are today, and
when either spouse could obtain a decree for judicial separation
o
on the grounds of the other1s adultery, cruelty, or desertion 
without cause for a minimum period of two years. Ever since 
the grounds of divorce have been increased, there is scarcely any 
case of judicial separation. However, in order to meet the 
needs of a spouse who has a conscientious objection to divorce or 
who, because of the conduct of the other spouse, wishes to remain 
judicially separated with the hope for an ultimate reconciliation,
the relief is still in existence and can be used in appropriate 
cases.
Under the present Matrimonial Causes Act, either spouse 
may present to the High Court a petition for judicial separation 
on any of the following grounds:-
i. any ground on which a petition for divorce might be pre­
sented.
ii. on the ground that the other spouse has failed to comply 
with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights,
1. There is no reported case in Sierra Leone on judicial separa­
tion. Of four unreported cases discovered by the present 
writer, all were petitions by the wife based on cruelty. See
. next note..
2. Richards v. Richards, unreported; a decision of the Supreme 
Court at Freetown dated March, 1932; see Supreme Court Records 
(1932) Vol.I, p.541; Crown v. Crown, unreported: decided by
the Supreme Court at Freetown on 28 July, 1948; see Supreme - 
Court Records, Vol*5, p.210; Weight v. Wright, unreported; de­
cided by the Supreme Court "at Freetown on 3 May, 1946; see 
Supreme Court Records, Vol*4, p.410. Nelson-Wi 1 liaras v. 
Nelson-Williams. unreported: a decision of the Supreme Court'
at Freetown, dated 11 April, 1945; see Supreme Court Records,
. Vol.4, p*284.
3. S.8 of Act No.7 of 1858.
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iii. any ground on which a decree for divorce a mensa et 
thoro might have been pronounced in England immedi­
ately before the commencement of the United Kingdom 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857.*
Where a decree of judicial separation has been granted,
2
the parties are no longer obliged to cohabit, but they remain 
husband and wife and none can remarry without having the marri­
age dissolved by divorce.
After a decree has been granted, upon the application of 
the spouse against whom it was obtained, theCourt may reverse it
on the ground that it was obtained in his or her absence or, 
where the decree was based on desertion, that there was reason-
o
able cause for the alleged desertion. Rights and remedies 
possessed by third parties remain unaffected by the reversal of
4
the decree. Thus, if a tradesman had supplied necessaries to 
the wife during a period of judicial separation, her husband is 
not liable for payment if the decree is reversed, and the trades­
man would have to proceed gainst the wife alone.
The same absolute and discretionary bars exist as in
5
divorce, but a petition for judicial separation tan be brought 
within three years since the celebration of the marriage.6
1. Before 1857 it was the Ecclesiastical Courts which had juris­
diction for divorce a mensa et thoro, and in addition to the 
present grounds for divorce, they could pronounce a decreecon 
the ground of attempted sodomy and attempted bestiality.
2. S.14(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
3. S.14(3)9 ibid.
4. S.14(4), 16(1) and (2), ibid;
5. S.14(1) ibid.
6. For property and maintenance provisions after a decree of ju­
dicial sepaxation, see Chapter 7.
c. RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS
Where one spouse has brought cohabitation with the other 
to an end, that other, if he or she wants the spouse back, may 
petition the High Court for a decree or restitution of conjugal 
rights.
The Court may pronounce a decree ordering the departed 
spouse to resume cohabitation, if satisfied that the allegations 
contained in the petition are true and that there is no legal 
ground why a decree should not be granted.* It would be a 
legal ground in opposition to the granting of a decree if the 
petitioner is guilty of a matrimonial offence entitling the re­
spondent to a decree of judicial separation or divorce or if the
petition*s conduct is such that it would be a just cause for the
2
respondent to desert her.
Disobedience to the decree is not punished by attachment 
but would entitle the petitioner to institute proceedings for 
judicial separation, and also to obtain some financial or
..........................  4
proprietary benefit from the respondent.
There is no record to show that the remedy of restitu­
te
tion of conjugal rights has ever been used in Sierra Leone.
1. S.17 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. See dictum of Tejan-Sie C.J. in Cummings v. Cummings, 1968-69, 
ALR S.L. 44, 50.
3. 14(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, I960.
4. S.18(1) and (2), 22(2) ibid.
5. It was seldom used even in England. For example, between 
1965-1967 there were 105 petitions out of which 31 decrees 
were made. See The Law Commission Published Working Paper 
No;22 dated 17 February, l£6£, p.3. In Ghana there is evi­
dencethat application has been made for the decree on one 
occasion, though it was refused becuase the petitioner had 
committed adultery. See Schandorf v. Schandorf & Cofie 
[1962J 1 G.L.R. 133.
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It would seem that whenever there is separation and one spouse 
wants the other back, he or she tries to achieve that purpose by 
reconciliation through their families and friends rather than 
make recourse to a court of law, for the latter method only 
exacerbates the already existing friction* In the Sierra Leone 
society an extra-judicial persuasion to resume cohabitation is 
bound to produce better results than one coming from a Court and 
whenever the former fails there is no prospect that the latter 
will succeed*
Arguments have been advanced for and against the reten­
tion of the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights,* end it
2
has been abolished in England* In Sierra Leone, however, 
there is one good reason why it should continue to exist: it is
q
the financial and proprietary provisions consequential upon it*
In thecase of the wife, as we have $een, it is the only method 
whereby she can obtain maintenance from her husband through a 
High Court order and in respect of the husband, it is the only 
situation where Sierra Leone law permits him to benefit judici­
ally from the property of his wife during the subsistence of the 
marriage* As soon as the proposals suggested in Chapter 7 are 
accomplished, the remedy will cease to serve any useful purpose*
1. The Law Commission Published Working Paper No*22» dated 17 
February, 1969, pp*4-7.
2* By s*20 of the United Kingdom Matrimonial Proceedings and Pro­
perty Act, 1970*
3* See Chapter 7,
4* Spouses have not invoked the financial provisions, probably 
out of ignorance of their existence*
D • JACTITATION OF MARRIAGE
Jactitation of marriage means a persistent boasting of a 
marriage, falsely alleged to have been celebrated between the 
boaster and the petitioner* In order to put an end to the 
allegation, the petitioner can pray the High Court for a decree 
that the respondent should desist from any further boast of a 
marriage between them and should remain in perpetual silence on 
the subject.
Authority that this remedy exists in Sierra Leone law is
r\ j * **derived from s.l of the Matrimonial Causes Urdinahc&^SSg which 
states:
"... all jurisdiction in respect of suits 
of ... jactitation of marriage ... shall 
belong to and be vested in Her Majesty and 
such jurisdiction ... shall be exercised
... in a court of record to be called The
Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes ..."
The present Matrimonial Causes Act makes no mention of 
the remedy but since the Act is only an amending Act, it is sub­
mitted that the relief can be obtained in Sierra Leone.
In order to succeed, the petitioner must prove the boast­
ing, the falsity of the alleged marriage, and lack of consent on 
his part to be represented as married to the respondent. If 
the respondent merely used the petitioners name, the latter can­
not obtain a decree preventing the former from using that name
3
because a person has no property in a name. Thus, a woman 
who has been divorced from a man cam continue to use the man* s
1. JRayden on Divorce, 11th ed., 1971, p.286.
2. No. 7 of 1858.
3. See the St. Lucia case of Du Boulay v. Du Boulay (1869) L.R.
2 P.C. 430 (J.C.P.C.)*
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name and title.*
Possible defences available to the respondent are first-
2
ly, a simple denial that the assertion was made; secondly, that 
the subsistence of the marriage is true; and thirdly, that the 
petitioner permitted the respondent to misrepresent them as 
married.4
Though it is primarily intended to check a person who 
falsely boasts of a marriage subsisting between him and the pe­
titioner, a suit for jactitation of marriage can be used by par­
ties who are de facto married but not sure as to its validity and 
therefore desire to obtain a decree that the marriage was valid.
As with restitution of conjugal rights, there is no re­
ported case indicating that this relief has ever been used in 
Sierra Leone.
ftiis relief too was threatened with abolition in England 
recently, as being inappropriate.5 Originally the suit was 
for the purpose of obtaining a remedy for the inconvenience to 
which an individual might be esqposed by the false assumption of 
the character of husband and wife on the part of another, be­
tween whom and the complainant no such relation existed.6
1. See the English case of Cowley v. Cowley [l90l] A.C. 450 in
which a petition for an injunction by a peer against his ex-
wife who married a commoner but continued to use the peer1 s 
title was rejected on the ground that though she had no legal 
right to the user, the woman couldnot be prevented from using 
the title.
2. See the English case of Hawke v. Corri (1820) 2 Hag .Con. 280.
3. See the English case of Lindo v. Belisario (1795) 1 Hag. Con.
216; (1796) 1 Hag. Con. App.7.
4. Ibid.
5. See The Law Commission Published Working Paper No. 34 dated 
22 January, 19^1 ♦
6. Poynter, Ecclesiastical Court, p.269, cited in The Law Com- 
mission Published Working Paper No♦ 331 p.7.
The Law Commission conceded that false assertions that people 
are married are embarrassing but that the suit for jactitation 
is not the right vehicle, and that if relief is needed against 
the spreading of such false rumours, it must come with the appro­
priate reform in the general law of tort or crime, and not in 
matrimonial law.* Impressive though this argument may be, 
curiously, the relief is still obtainable in English law.
1. Ibid., pp.7 and 8.
CHAPTER 11 
TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE 
A* MARRIAGE UNDER THE CHRISTIAN AND CIVIL MARRIAGE ACTS
A marriage contracted in accordance with the Christian or 
Civil Marriage Act may be terminated by either the death of one 
spouse, or by a decree in presumption that one of the parties is 
dead, or by a decree of divorce* The effect of cfeath or a decree 
in presumption thereof or of divorce is that the parties cease to 
be husband and wife from the date of death or of the decree abso­
lute* Neither death nor a decree is retrospective so that 
rights whichl had vested on the assumption of the matrimonial sta­
tus of the spouses before the date of the termination of the mar­
riage remain unaffected*
(1) Termination by Death or by Presumption of Death
Where one spouse dies, the marriage automatically comes 
to an end, and it is not necessary to dissolve it by judicial 
process. But where the spouse has disappeared in circumstances 
which make reasonable grounds exist for supposing that he is dead, 
the "surviving" spouse can petition the High Court for a decree 
of dissolution of the marriage.* The decree, in this case, is 
necessary because without it, if the "surviving11 spouse contracts 
a subsequent marriage on the presumption that her "former" husband 
is dead but later happens to be alive, the subsequent marriage is 
void and she runs the risk of a prosecution and conviction for 
bigamy* On the other hand, if a decree has been obtained upon 
the same facts, the subsequent marriage will be valid and the 
former marriage will be deemed to have been terminated at any
1. S*29(l) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap*102 of the revised
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
rate insofar as her capacity to enter into another marriage is con­
cerned*
In order to obtain a decree, the "surviving” spouse must 
satisfy the Court that she has reasonable grounds for thinking that
the other spouse is dead. If the other spouse has for a period
of seven years or more been continually absent from the petitioner
and the petitioner has no reason to believe that he has been living
within that time, the High Court will presume that he is dead un-
2less the contrary is proved. Mere absence for seven years is 
not sufficient to raise the presumption. If the absence can be 
explained otherwise than on the ground of death, the "surviving” 
spouse will not be entitled to a decree. It is submitted that 
even the circumstances surrounding the departure should be taken 
into consideration. Thus if the petitioner was in constructive 
desertion at the time of parting and the "dead" spouse left the 
country with a view to seeking his fortune in some other country, 
the court ought not to presume that he is dead even though circum­
stances like the outbreak in the country to which he went of civil 
war resulting in the loss of many lives may suggest that he is 
likely dead; for without these attendant circumstances prevailing 
in the country of his domicile of choice, he would not reasonably 
be expected to .contact the deserting spouse. Before the courts 
can presume death, it is submitted, they must be sure that the 
parting was not the fault of the petitioner and that the marriage 
was reasonably a happy one before the other spouse disappeared.
Instances in which one spouse disappears entitling the 
other to a decree of presumption of death seem to be rare nowa­
days in Sierra Leone. The country is small and though the means
1. Ibid.
349.
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of communication are not as advanced as those in highly industrial­
ised countries, a person can hardly live in isolation in one part 
of the country to the extent that his whereabouts would not be 
known by anybody* The only instance in which therwhereabouts 
of a person will not be known, with minimal search, is when he 
goes abroad without leaving a forwarding address. During war­
time, however, for example, the local Hut Tax War in Sierra Leone 
in 1898 and the World Wars, with conscription into the army, dis­
appearances were common and it was reasonable to assume that men 
who had not been seen at the end of hostilities had died in war*
(2) Termination by Divorce
(a) Historical background
For a better understanding of the present law of divorce, 
it is essential to begin with its historical background*
Before 1858, no court in Sierra Leone had jurisdiction to 
hear petitions for divorce, even though English lawvas then part 
of Sierra Leone law* There was no local equivalent of the Eccle­
siastical courts which in England dissolved marriages a mensa -et 
thoro**
The only avenue open to spouses to dissolve their marri­
age, leaving them free to enter into any subsequent marriage, was 
by an Act of the local legislature* It would appear that this 
process was even more expensive in Sierra Leone than it was in 
England for while in England^because of the prohibitive expense,
there were on the average less than two divorces a year by this 
2means, in Sierra Leone throughout its history there is on record
1• A divorce a mensa et thoro pronounced by the Ecclesiastical
courts in England relieved the parties from the duty to coha­
bit but they were not free to remarry.
2. Bromley, op.cit*, p.203, note 9*
only one statutory divorce.1
But the procedure in Sierra Leone was less cumbersome
than that which prevailed in England. After obtaining a verdict
in an action for the tort of criminal conversation against the
co-respondent - adulterer - the husband petitioner proceeded
straight on to obtaining the divorce a vinculo matrimonii without
2
having first to obtain a divorce a mensa et thoro. In the case 
of the wife she could obtain a statutory divorce only by proving 
that her husband had committed incestuous, bigamous or aggravated 
adultery or rape, sodomy or bestiality.
Sierra Leone has had only two Matrimonial Causes Acts. |
The first was in 1858. That Act, following in the wake 
of the English Matrimonial Causes Act of the preceding year and 
a carbon copy of it, established a Divorce Court in Sierra Leone
having the same jurisdiction as theDivorce Court established in
/
3
England. In addition to divorce, the court had jurisdiction
to hear petitions for judicial separation and for restitution of
4
conjugal rights.
Though it did not expressly say so, the Act impliedly 
replaced statutory divorce, and empowered the new Divorce Court 
to grant both a divorce a vinculo matrimonii ^ and judicial sepa­
ration, the latter having the same effect els a divorce a mensa et 
thoro which was before 1857 granted by the Ecclesiastical courts
1. "An Act to declare the Marriage of Stephen Gabbidon and Maria 
.Auf oinette dissolved" dated 14 July, 1829; see Montagu: op;1 
cit., Vol.I (1811-1857), p.22.
2. Because no Sierra Leone Court then had jurisdiction in respect 
of divorce a mensa et thoro.
3. S.l.
4 . S .9 .
5. Presumably, the intention was that the jurisdiction of the 
Court would co-exist with that of the legislature, but as the 
latter has been inactive ever since, it would appear that its 
jurisdiction is now obsolete.
in England.*
The Act did not affect the existing grounds of divorce ,
but made judicial separation obtainable by the husband or the
wife on the grounds of adultery, cruelty or desertion without
2
cause for two years and upwards.
3
The second is the Matrimonial Causes Act, which came in­
to force on 1 November, 1950, and it incorporates the present di­
vorce law of the country.
It is significant to note that the amendments made to 
4 5English law in 1923, and 1937, were not incorporated into Sierra 
Leone law until the 1949 Act which again, is essentially a carbon 
copy of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950.
This dogged addiction to English law by the Sierra Leone 
legislature is even more apparent on the part of the courts for, 
as we shall see shortly, they have reverently adopted almost in 
their entirety the decisions of English courts on, inter alia, 
concepts like adultery, cruelty and desertion.
Because cruelty and desertion in the case of husband and 
wife and simple desertion if the wife was the petitioner, became 
grounds of divorce only in 1949, there is almost a complete lack
of divorce cases prior to that date, and most petitions were for
Zudicial
/separation.
1. S.8.
2. Ibid.
3. Act No.9^of 1949.
4. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923.
5. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937.
6. There is only one case, and that unreported, which the present 
writer has been able to find, namely, Thomas v. Thomas, decided 
by the Supreme Court on 25 May, 1948; the Supreme Court Records 
Vol.5, p.156.
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(b) Grounds for termination of marriage by divorce
/
The grounds for the dissolution by divorce of a marriage 
contracted under the Christian and the Civil Marriage Acts are 
Jfound in s.5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1949. Except for 
the absence of insanity* as a ground in the Sierra Leone Act, 
these grounds are the same as those contained in the United King­
dom Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. The result is that in their 
interpretation of the provisions of both 1his section and other 
sections of the Act, the Sierra Leone Courts have relied heavily 
on English case-law.
Under s.5 of the Sierra Leone Act, a petition can be pre­
sented to the High Court by either the husband or the wife on the 
grounds of adultery by the other spouse committed since the cele­
bration of the marriage, desertion by the respondent without cause 
for at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of 
the petition or for cruelty to the petitioner by the respondent 
since the celebration of the marriage. The wife alone has a 
further ground, i.e. that her husband has, since the celebration 
of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality.
(i) Adultery
According to Rayden, adultery is defined as:
"consensual intercourse between a maxried per­
son and a person of the opposite sex, not the 
other spouse, during the subsistence of the 
marriage."!
For the purpose of Sierra Leone law, it is worthwhile to examine 
some of the words used in this definition whichobviously would be 
adopted by the Sierra Leone courts when the need arises.
1. Divorce, 11th ed., 1971, p.178.
First, "consensual11. This connotes that the act of 
sexual intercourse must be voluntary. Therefore, if there is 
any element like rape, insanity or drunkenness which negatives 
consent, the sexual intercourse by the involuntaxy party will be 
excusable, while that by the voluntary paxty will amount to 
adultery.
Secondly,"married". The marriage contemplated here is 
that in accordance with either the Christian Marriage Act or the 
Civil Marriage Act. Thus, a spouse of a statutory marriage as 
such having intercourse with a single person amounts to adultery. 
Similarly, if a spouse married in accordance with the Christian
and Civil Marriage Act thereafter "marries" another woman under
2 ~ customary law, or contracts a Mohammedan marriage, he will com­
mit adultery if he has sexual intercourse with the second "wife". 
But the converse situation, where a spouse married customarily or 
in accordance with Muslim rites, "marries" another spouse under 
the Christian or Civil Maurriage Acts, will not amount to adultery 
under the general law if the latter marriage is consummated, but 
the second marriage will be void and a ground for a conviction for 
bigamy.
Thirdly, "sexual intercourse". English cases have de­
cided that sexual intercourse to aumount to adultery may be partial 
and not necessarily complete; that what is important is penetra­
tion, however slight it may be. Thus, where there was an agree­
ment coupled with an attempt to have sexual intercourse, and the
parties undressed themselves and went to bed, but their effort did
3not materialise owing to a temporary impotence of the man, and
1. Ibid; __
2. See the unreported case of Josei v. Josei where E.Beoku-Betts, 
Ag. P.J. sitting in the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone, held 
that marrying a woman under native law and custom after an 
ordinance marriage amounted to adultery.
3. The English cane of Dennis v. Dennis (Spillett cited) [1955]
2 All E.R. 51.
where a wife masturbated the co-respondent,* it was held in both 
cases that there was no sexual intercourse and, therefore, no 
adultery.
The opinion of Karmiski J. in the latter case herein 
2
mentioned, that masturbation does not constitute sexual inter­
course to form adultery, has been adopted, obiter dictum,by Sir
Samuel Bankole Jones P* in the Sierra Leone Court of Appeal case
~  3
of Tuboku-Metzger v. Tuboku-Metzger and Pitierson, and there is
no doubt that if the facts of Dennis* s case should occur in Sierra
Leone, the Courts will arrive at the same decision as the English
court.
Whether the afore-mentioned decisions conform with the
mores of the Sierra Leone people is, however, questionable. As
4
we shall see later, any sexual advance made by a man to another 
man’s wife is in customary law regarded as adultery, sufficient
to base an action for "woman damage"* This also represents the
— £> 
views of many non-natives in Sietra* L&one . No average Sierra
Leone husband placed in the same situation as Mr* Dennis in the
above-mentioned case would regard such conduct of his wife with
another man as falling short of adultery*
Proof of Adultery
The burden of proof of adultery is on the person alleging 
the adultery, and there is a presumption of innocence on the part 
of the person accused of the adultery* The burden can be
1* The English case of Sapsford v. Sapsford and Furlado [1954] 2 
All E.R. 373.
2* Ibid* at p.374*
3. 1967-68, ALR S.L. 1.156, 160 C.A.
4. Chapter 17, pp.62./-6AA t 
5* Personal communication.
6. Elliott v. Elliott, unreported, a decision of the Supreme 
Court at Freetown, dated 25 September. 1953; Williams v. 
Williams,(1960-61} I S.L.L.R. 92. 98; Wilson V.' TOllgbn and 
CousinsT 1964—66, ALR S.L. 200, 202*
discharged by direct evidence of witnesses who actually saw the 
commission of the act. But as the parties are very rarely sur­
prised in the direct act of adultery in every case almost the 
fact is inferred from circumstances that lead to it by fair in­
ference and necessary conclusion.* In this regard, the courts 
usually look to evidence of association, coupled with opportunity
and evidence of illicit affection and familiarity. Thus, in
2Glover v. Glover, evidence that a wife and a co-respondent were 
seen in a room late in the night through a window in a comprom­
ising and suggestive position was held sufficient from which am
inference could be drawn that they had committed adultery. Simi-
3
larly, in Jones v. Jones where the co-respondent and a wife
were surprised in a room dressed in pyjama trousers with singlet
and "nightie11 respectively, coupled with evidence that both
slept in the same room, it was held that adultery could be
founded on these facts.
Proof of general cohabitation will be sufficient proof 
4
of adultery.
The conduct of one spouse may also tend to show that she 
has committed adultery, even though it cannot be proved with whom 
she committed the adultery. Thus, if a wife gives birth to a 
child and on registration omits to give information of name, 
surname and rank and profession of the father, there is evidence
1. Davies v. Davies, unreported, decided by the Supreme Court at 
Freetown in (Div.C 8/52); John v. John, 1957-60, ALR S.L.
77, 78.
2. Unreported, a decision of the Supreme Court at Freetown on 
17 February, 1949.
3. Unreported, decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 14 
February, 1945; see also Wilson v. Wilson and Genet, 1964-66, 
ALR S.L. 193, 197, and Wilson v. Wilson and Cousins, 1964-66, 
ALR S.L. 200, 202.
4. Wilson v. Wilson and Cousins, 1964-66, ALR S.L. 200, 202.
1
of adultery.
The burden of proof may be lightened where the spouse
charged with adultery admits or confesses it but this will be
evidence against that spouse alone and not evidence against the
2party cited or the co-respondent.
The evidence of one party, if believed, is sufficient to 
prove adultery, but the Court is loath to act upon the uncorrobo­
rated evidence of a single party, especially if such evidence is
3
contradicted in his presence.
The standard of proof of adultery is that required in
4
criminal cases, and where there is no direct evidence of adult­
ery, the inference should be fair on the evidence, and the con­
clusion necessary in the circumstances.5
1. Williams v. Williams. an unreported decision of the Supreme 
Court at Freetown, dated 10 May 1949, in which Tuboku-Metzger, 
Ag.P.J. applied the English case Mayo v. Mayo £1948] 2 All E.R. 
869. See also Matnbu'v* Mambu, unreported, decided by the 
Freetown Supreme Court on 5 June, 1970.
2. See dicta by Beoku-Betts Ag.C.J. in Shonubi v. Shonubi, unre­
ported, decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 7 June, 
1948, and in Glover v. Glover fcupyg.). See also Harding J.
in Mambu v. Mambu, unreported (case Div.V.19/69) decided by — 
the Supreme Court at Freetown on 5 June, 1970. But a confes­
sion of adultery by one party and the co-respondent constitutes 
evidence against them. See dicta of Boston Ag.J* in Jones v. 
Jones, unreported, a decision of the Supreme Court in Freetown 
on 18 December, 1953.
3. Dicta of Boston, Ag.J. in Elliott v. Elliott (supm) .unreported.
4. See Shonubi v. Shonubi (supro.); Wyse v. Wyse. unreported, de­
cided by the Supreme Court at Freetown, dated April, 1949;
Antoh v. Antoh, unreported, see Vol.7 of the old Supreme Court 
records, p.£95; Williams v. Williams and Pyne Bailey. 1960-61, 
I, S.L.L.R. 92; Wilson *v. Wilson and. Cousinst 1964-66, ALR
S.L. 200. All these cases are based on the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in Ginesi v. Ginesi [1948] 1 All E.R. 
373, and on earlier editions of Rayden on Divorce, e.g. 9th ed. 
(1964) p.149.
5. John v. John. 1957-60, ALR S.L. 77, 80, W.A.C.A.
(ii) Cruelty
Legal cruelty, to be a ground for divorce, has been de­
fined by Boston Ag. P.J. as:
"conduct of such a character as to have 
caused danger to life, limb or health, 
bodily or mental, or as to give rise to - 
a reasonable apprehension of such danger."
The test required in cruelty is subjective not objective;
2it is to be seen as "this conduct by this woman to this man".
In short, the gravity of the conduct of the respondent is to be 
judged on the effect it has on the petitioner, and not on a hypo­
thetical reasonable man.
A deliberate intention to injure the other spouse or 
malignity is not essential to establish legal cruelty. If the 
conduct of the respondent causes danger to the petitioner*s life 
or health, mental or bodily, or a reasonable apprehension of it, 
cruelty will be established even though the petitioner does not
3
intend the consequence of his acts. Thus, in Wright v. Wright, 
where the respondent was so insane that he did not realise the 
nature of his acts towards the petitioner, and so intend them, it 
was held, in the absence of insanity as a ground for divorce, 
that the life of the petitioner being in danger through the acts
1. In Cooks on v. Cooks on, unreported, decided by the Supreme Court 
at Freetown on 24 March, 1954. This decision adopted dicta 
by Lord Davey in the English case of Russell v. Russell [1897] 
A.C. 395 , 468 and dicta by Lord Stowell in the English case of 
Evans v. Evans (1790) 1 Hag . Con.35. All Sierra Leone deci­
sions on cruelty are in agreement with these dicta. For a 
more recent exposition see Macaulay v. Macaulay, 1967-68, ALR
S.L. 14, 18.   _ -
2. Per Ames P. in Davies v. Davies» 1964-66, ALR S.L. 187, 188 
C.A.
3. Unreported, decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 13 
June, 1952. In this case, Kingsley J. deplored the absence 
of insanity sis a ground for divorce in Sierra Leone suid felt 
constrained to decide the issue on the basis of cruelty.
of the respondent, she, the petitioner, had established cruelty 
in order to entitle her to a decree for divorce.
A single act has been held to be incapable of constitut­
ing legal cruelty. In Pratt v. Pratt,* during a quarrel, a wife 
bit the penis of her husband and hit him on the side with a stick. 
The husband thereafter instituted divorce proceedings on the 
ground of cruelty based upon the facts. Holding that the facts 
did not amount to legal cruelty, Boston Ag.J. took the opportun­
ity of interpreting s.5(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, which 
read as follows:-
f,A petition for divorce may be presented to 
the court either by the husband or the wife 
on the ground that the respondent (c) has 2 
since the celebration of the marriage treated 
the petitioner with cruelty.”
The learned acting Judge saidj-
”The word ’treat1 (in the section) conveys 
the idea of a course of conduct and not 
merely an isolated act which may have 
taken place in the heat of temper and may 
be in self-defence. In my view, it should 
consist of a series of acts constituting 
the conduct of the respondent towards the 
petitioner which could be regarded as 
cruelty.” 3
If the test for cruelty is a subjective one as opined by 
Ames P. in Davies v. Davies, it will be difficult in some cases 
to fit in with the requirement of a course of conduct on the 
part of the respondent. 'For the gravity and consequence of an
1. Unreported. A decision of the Supreme Court at Freetown, 
dated 15 March, 1954.
2. My underlining.
3. Boston J. applied the English case of Astle v. Astle [1939]
P.415. For cases where a course of conduct has amounted to 
cruelty, see: Leigh v. Leigh, unreported, decided by the
Supreme Court at Freetown on 3 March, 1952; Cookson v.Cookson 
(ante); Davies v. Davies, 1964-66, ALR S.L.8^. But where
petitioner depends on a series of acts, accumulated minor acts 
may amount to cruelty: Wellesley-Cole v. Wellesley-Cole, 1967-
68, ALR S.L. 65.
4. 1964-66, ALR S.L.187, 188.
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act may vary from one individual to another* On a sickly or 
hypersensitive person, only a single act by the respondent may 
produce such a result that the petitioner suffers injury or 
apprehends danger to a degree greater than that in respect of a 
normal person* If the test is correct, therefore, a single act 
will be capable of amounting to legal cruelty depending on the 
individual on whom it is inflicted,*
Though in general the Courts have required a series of 
conduct to amount to legal cruelty as a ground for obtaining a 
divorce, they have, nevertheless, accepted a single act as suffi­
cient to justify one spouse for leaving the other, making the
2
doer a constructive deserter* Thus, in Macauley v* Macau ley, 
where a husband got drunk at a dance which he had attended with 
his wife and fought the wife outside the dance hall, it was held 
that his conduct was cruelty justifying the wife in leaving him 
the same night and that he, but not the wife, was in desertion*
Proof of Cruelty
As in adultery, the burden of proof of cruelty is on the 
party alleging it. In discharging this, he must give evidence 
of acts which are grave and weighty and not merely what may be 
described as the "wear and tear" of married life* It has been 
held that indifference to the feelings of the other spouse is an 
act of great unkindness capable of reviving a condoned cruelty
4
but not grave and weighty to amount to cruelty by itself.
1. Thus in Macaulay v. Macaulay,- 1967-68, ALR S.L. 14, one act of 
the wife when she poured icy-cold water on her husband while 
the latter was fast asleep,was held to be cruelty upon which a 
decree of divorce was granted. Also in Harris v* Harris, (1962} 
2 S.L.L.R. 94, it was held to be cruelty where the wife placed 
juju in her husband* s bedroom.
2. FiLR
3* Macaulay v. Macaulay. 1967-68, ALR S.L. 14.
4* Ibid;, pp.19, 20.
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The standard of proof required to found cruelty sis a
basis for a decree of divorce is one that has given rise to con-
1
troversy. In Wellesley-Cole v. Wellesley"Cole, Beoku-Betts J.
in the then Supreme Court of Sierra Leone adopted the standard as
one on a balance of probabilities♦ In the Court of Appeal, Sir
Samuel Bankole Jones P., delivering the full judgment of the
Court, rejected the balance of probability rule and held that the
standard should be higher than that but not as high as in criminal 
2cases* The learned President based his view on the constructioz
which he put on s.7(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act which says:
ftIf the Court is satisfied on the evi­
dence that (i) the case of the petitioner 
has been proved* •*.,,
Inhis view,
"if the statute requires that the Court 
shall be satisfied before pronouncing a 
decree, it is clearly common sense that 
no court will be .satisfied if it harbours 
reasonable doubt as to whether the casd 
has been proved."3
And the learned President relied on the English case of Bater
4
v* Bater* where Bucknill, L.J. said:
'•If a high standard of proof is required 
because of the importance of a case to 
the parties and also to the community, 
divorce proceedings are the kind of case 
that requires that high standard*"5 
Samuel.
From this, Sir^Bankole Jones P* finally concluded that in cruelty 
charges, the standard of proof should be higher than one on a 
balance of probabilities though not as high as in criminal cases* 
This is judicial activism at its peak^but, with respect,
t. 1967-68, ALR S.L. 65, 69.
Z. 1967-68, ALR S.L. 210, 216.
3. Ibid., p.216.
It. [1950] 2 All E.R. 458.
5 * Ibid. p ttsq
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the creation is open to criticism.
First, the learned President, though favouring Bucknill 
J.» s opinion in Bater v. Bater, lost sight of the fact that that 
Judge accepted the standard of proof as that required in crimimal 
cases and nothing short of that.
Secondly, in practice, it will be difficult to establish 
a standard of proof intermediate between that required in civil 
cases and that for criminal cases. As the height of the new 
standards falls to be determined by the presiding judge, it is 
bound to vary from one judge to another, with the result that 
there will be no certainty about it. It will, therefore, be 
better to adopt either the balance of probability standard as in 
civil cases or proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal 
cases.
(i&i) Desertion
Desertion consists of the unjustifiable withdrawal from
cohabitation without the consent of the other spouse and with the
2intention of remaining separated permanently.
3
According to Bromley, four elements must exist before 
desertion can be proved, namely, (a) de facto separation,
(b) the intention to remain in permanent separation, (c) the 
absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse, and (d)
the absence of reasonable cause for withdrawing from cohabitation. 
We shall now examine each in turn.
(a) De facto separation
Separation denotes a break in cohabitation, i.e. ceasing
1. Earlier in his judgment at p.458.
2. See Bankoke Jones Ag.J. in Jones v. Jones, 1957-60, ALR S.L. 
287, 293; Beoku-Betts J. in Wilson v. Wilson and Genet, 1964- 
66, ALR S.L. 193, 195.
3. Op.cit., p.161.
to live together as husband or wife. Where the parties live in 
separate places this is evidence of separation, but they may 
still be regarded as separated for the purpose of desertion 
where they live in the same place but do not live as husband and 
wife.*
Desertion may be either simple or constructive* It is 
simple where one spouse moves out of the matrimonial home, leav­
ing the other spouse without that party1 s consent and with inten-
2tion of staying away permenantly ♦ Thus, in Wyse v. ~Wyse 
where a wife, during World War II, found she could do better with­
out her husband and not wanting him any longer, left the matri­
monial home, it was held that she was in desertion.
On the other hand, if the conduct of one spouse is such 
as to compel the other to leave the matrimonial home, it is the 
spouse who remains that is in desertion and it is constructive
3
desertion. Brown-Marke J. explained the issue quite vividly
in Coker v.Coker ^ when he said:
nIf without just cause or excuse one spouse 
persists in doing what he or she knows the 
other will not tolerate and that other 
leaves, the spouse who is so left is a 
deserter whatever his desire or intention 
may have been."
If the spouses are forced by circumstances to live apart,
for example, where because of education or employment, one lives
in one town and the other in another, so long as there is an
1. This is.known as desertion under the same roof.
2. Unreported, a decision of the Supreme Court at Freetown in 
April, 1953. See the Supreme Court Records, Vol.7, p.405.
3. Macaulay v. Macaulay, 1950-56, ALR S.L. 162.
4. Unreported, decided by the Supreme Cour*t at Freetown on 10 
August, 1970. In Boyle v. Boyle, 1964-66, ALR S.L. 46i^ , 467, 
Cole Ag.C.J. said that conduct to amount to constructive de­
sertion must be grave and weighty and one which could properly 
be regarded as expulsion in fact.
intention to come together again when circumstances permit, none 
will be in desertion. It is submitted that the position is the 
same where the circumstances that brought about the separation is 
the fault of one spouse, for example, where he is convicted of a 
crime and is undergoing a term of imprisonment.*
The period of separation must be three years at least 
preceding the date of the petition and it must be continuous.
Thus if there is break in separation, however short and for 
whatever reason, the period begins to run from the time of the 
final break.
(b) Intention
The deserting spouse must have the intention to bring
cohabitation permanently to an end. The test of intention is
objective. In the case of simple desertion, the mere separation
by the deserter without just cause or excuse will be evidence
that he intends to stay away permanently from the other spouse.
For constructive desertion, Brown-Marke J. has said that:
"one must look to the facts; intention may 
aggravate the facts but its absence will not 
defeat such a charge."3
Whatever the learned judge meant by this is a matter for specu­
lation. Probably, he meant that if the deserting spouse ex­
pressly states that his intention is to force the other spouse 
to leave the matrimonial home the charge against him will be 
aggravated, but if he does not give any such indication he can, 
nevertheless, be guilty of desertion if on examination of his
1. But it is also submitted that such conduct conduces to the — 
other1s adultery, if she is the wife and is left without ade­
quate maintenance.
2. S.5(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, I960.
3. Coker v. Coker, unreported, decided by the Supreme Court of 
^Freetown on 10 August, 1970.
conduct a reasonable conclusion can be drawn to the effect that 
it is his intention to drive the other spouse* If this inter­
pretation is correct, then the test for constructive desertion 
is also an objective one* Thus, in Macau ley v* Macaulgy. 1 it 
was held that a husband who beat up his wife at a dance, result­
ing in the wife leaving him that very night and never returning, 
was in constructive desertinn.
In cases where there is involuntary separation, one 
party may later intend to bring cohabitation permanently to an 
end, and so be guilty of desertion. In this case, an intent- 
ion cannot be inferred but must be proved as a fact.
(c) Absence of consent
If the parties have agreed to be separated there can be
t
no desertion. But if one party later withdraws his consent to 
the separation, and the other unjustifiably refuses to resume 
cohabitation, the latter will be in desertion, from the date that 
he makes the refusal. Thus, in Ant oh v. Ant oh,4 the wife had, 
with her husband* s consent, gone to her father’s home to partake 
in the funeral ceremonies of her step-mother. At the end of the 
ceremonies, she refused to return to her husband and cohabitation 
was never resumed. It was held that she was in desertion.
Furthermore, if one spouse turns out the other and the 
spouse who drove outi£ later makes a genuine effort to resume 
cohabitation, but the deserted spouse refused, without reasonable 
cause, desertion ceases on the part of the spouse who originally 
deserted, but begins on the part of the spouse first deserted
1. H r o - S t ,  S * L  M l . > _
3. Jones v. Jones, 1957-60, ALR S.L. 287, -293.
3. See Elba v. Elba, 1967-68, ALR S.L. 74.
4. Unreported, decided by the Supreme Court. See the Supreme 
Court Records, Vol.7, p.295.
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because the continuing break in cohabitation is without the con­
sent of the first deserter.
(d) Absence of reasonable cause
Before a spouse can be guilty of desertion, his conduct
must be unreasonable and unjustified* That is, it must be a
deliberate act on his part not precipitated by the conduct of the
other spouse. Conduct on the part of the deserted spouse which
constitutes reasonable cause for her being deserted must be either
a matrimonial offence,* or one short of it, but it must be grave
and weighty and such as to render it practically impossible for
2
the spouses to live properly together.
Thus, if one spouse associates herself with a person of 
the opposite sex, other than her spouse, to the extent that would 
lead any reasonable person to believe, in the absence of explana­
tion, and he does believe that she is committing some misconduct 
with that person, the other spouse would be justified in leaving 
her.^
Similarly, sexual intercourse being the principal essence
of marriage in Sierra Leone, as stated by Tejan-Sie C.J., if one
spouse wilfully refuses it to the other, there will be just cause
4
if she is deserted.
Another example is ill-treatment by one spouse of the 
other which is not sufficiento found a charge of legal cruelty as 
a ground for divorce, but one that puts the other spouse in appre­
hension about her personal safety. If she leaves the matrimonial
1. Williams v. Williams "Renner»(l960-6l) 1 S.L.L.R. 70.
But the matrimonial offence must be the cause of desertion so 
that if the deserting spouse was not affected by it he cannot 
make it an excuse for his desertion.
2. Cummings v. Cummings, 1968-69, ALR S.L. 44.
3. Ibid;
4. Ibid.
home on this ground, her desertion will be excusable.*
(iv) Rape, sodomy or bestiality
As we have seen, only the wife can petition forclivorce on
2
any of these grounds. The offence of rape or sodomy may be
committed against her or another person and she can succeed on 
3
either ground.
Bars to a Petition for Divorce
Even though a matrimonial offence has been committed by 
one spouse which normally entitles the other to bring a petition 
for the dissolution of the marriage, certain factors may debar a 
spouse from obtaining a decree. These may be considered under
three headings: (a) Restrictive, (b) Absolute, and (c) Dis-
cret ionary•
(a) Restrictive
S.4(l) of the Matrimonial Causes Act provides that no 
petition for divorce can be presented to the Court unless at the 
date of the presentation of the petition three years have elapsed 
since the date of the marriage. This means that the parties
must have married for at least three years before they can take a 
court action in order to dissolve the marriage. The Proviso to
1. Mustapha v. Mustapha (1950) 3 S.L. Law Recorder, 20. This 
case was one based on desertion as a ground for maintenance^ 
but, it is submitted that the law is the same for desertion 
as a ground for divorce.
2. But the offence of rape may only be committed by a man on his 
wife if they are separated and there is no obligation on the 
wife to cohabit with the husband. See dicta of Lynskey J. 
in the English case of R. v. Miller [1954] 2 All E.R. 529.
532. “
3. It is doubtful whether, if the wife is a consenting party to 
sodomy to her, she can petition on that ground. In English 
law she'cannot. See Donnovan, L.J. in T v. T [1963] 3 W.L.R.
261, 267. ~ ~ '
the section, however, stipulates that if, before instituting 
proceeding^ for divorce, the petitioner can prove to the court 
Exceptional hardship” suffered by him or "exceptional depravity” 
on the part of the respondent, the Court may grant him leave to 
petition for divorce before the three years have passed.
The object of the restrictive provision is to give a 
chance for the marriage to succeed. Though one spouse has com­
mitted a matrimonial offence,, if patience is shown by the innocent 
spouse, and contrition on the part of the guilty party, the marri­
age may succeed and it will be morally and socially wrong to ter­
minate the union at this early stage. The Courts must, there­
fore, tread warily in finding "exceptional hardship" and "except­
ional depravity". There is no reported case in which the Sierra 
Leone. Courts have given examples of these catch phrases; but the 
English Courts have found exceptional hardship or depravity in 
the following instances:-* (a) where during the first six weeks 
of marriage a husband treated the wife with cruelty and said to 
her "If I can get my han<i on you I will murder you"; (b) where 
one matrimonial offence is committed after the other; (c) in 
the case of adultery, if it is aggravated by some extraneous cir­
cumstance, for instance, the husband committing adultery within 
a few weeks of marriage, or committing adultery promiscuously 
with more than one woman, or with his wife* s sister or with the 
maid in the house; (d) where a wife as a result of her adultery 
has a child by another man; (e) cruelty coupled with aggravating 
circumstances, such as drunkenness and neglect, brutality and per­
verted lust.
Because of the difference in social background between 
the peoples of England and Sierra Leone, it is submitted that
1. These instances are mentioned in the judgments of Bucknill and 
Denning L.J.3I. in Bowman v. Bowman [1949J P.353, 355-7.
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only some but not all these pccurrences will be instances of ex­
ceptional hardship or depravity in Sierra Leone. Adultery by a 
man with any of the attendant circumstances mentioned above is, 
in the Sierra Leone society, not regarded as more outrageous than 
a simple adultery, when committed by a wife. In the instant 
examples, the blame for the adultery is heavier on the adulteress 
than on the man, and the husband is not regarded as more immoral 
than the one who commits simple adultery.
In order to grant leave for a petition to be presented be­
fore the expiration of three years from the date of the marriage, 
the Court will have regard to the interests of any children of the 
marriage and to the question of a reasonable probability of recon­
ciliation between the parties before the three years have elapsed!
Where leave has been granted, if at the hearing of the
petition it appears to the Court that the petitioner obtained it
by misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the
Court may either dismiss the petition without prejudice to any
petition that may be brought after the expiration of three years
upon the same ground, or pronounce a decree nisi subject to the
condition that it should not be made absolute until the three-year
2period has expired.
(b) Absolute
There are three absolute bars, namely, connivance, condon­
ation and collusion, the proof of any of which prevents the Court 
from pronouncing a decree. They are provided for by s.7(2)
of the Matrimonial Causes Act which enacts:-
1. S.4(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
369
11 If the Court is satisfied on the evidence 
that
(ii) where the ground of the petition is 
adultery, the petitioner has not in any 
manner been accessory to, or connived at, 
or condoned the adultery, or where the 
ground of the petition is cruelty the 
petitioner has not in any manner condoned 
the cruelty; and
(iii) the petition is not presented or pro­
secuted in collusion with the respondent or 
either of the respondents;
the Court shall pronounce a decree of divorce, 
but if the Court is not satisfied with respect 
to any of the afpresaid matters, it shall dis­
miss the petition.”
It is the duty of the Court to inquire into the question 
of connivance, condonation and collusion in addition to the facts 
upon which the petition is presented.*
(i) Connivance
As we have seen from s.7(2)(ii) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act, connivance is a bar only in respect of adultery. In peti­
tions based on adultery, the petitioner must state in his petition 
that he has not connived at the adultery of which he complains. 
Though of frequent use, however, the term "connivance” has not 
been precisely or comprehensively defined by the Sierra Leone 
Courts. It may, however, be said to occur when one spouse con­
sents to the adultery of the other spouse or corruptly end inten-
2tionally permits it. Thus, if one spouse expressly consents to 
the other committing adultery or being fully aware, stands by and 
permits the act to take place without taking steps to prevent it, 
he is deemed to connive at the adultery*
Where one spouse has not expressly given his consent to 
the adultery, it is not clear whether every omission on his part
1. S.7(i), ibid.
2. See Lord Merriman P. in the English case of Churchman v. 
Churchman [1945] P.44 at pp.51, 52, where an attempt at a 
def in it ion in English law has been made.
that results in the adultery makes him guilty of conniving at it* 
For example, having heard and suspected that his wife is commit­
ting adultery with the co-respondent, the husband sets a trap in 
order to prove that adultery has, in fact, taken place* His 
suspicions are based on reasonable grounds* Unfortunately, how­
ever, but for the trap adultery would never have taken place be­
tween the wife and co-respondent. The point may be illustrated 
as follows:-
On several occasions during the absence of H (husband), 
whose duty keeps him away from the matrimonial home for one night 
in a week, C (co-respondent) has been seen by a neighbour coming 
out late at night from Hfs matrimonial home in Freetown, and this 
has been reported to H* During this period, the relationship be­
tween w (wife) and C is cordial but has not resulted in adultery 
for fear that H might turn up at any time during the night. H, 
however, convinced that adultery has already taken place, wishes 
to prove it. He buys a return air ticket for Bonthe Sherbro, 
an island in Sierra Leone about thirty nautical miles from the 
nearest motorable coast and where aeroplane service connecting 
the mainland is twice a week, which means that H must be away for 
at least three days, as he does not like travelling by sea and 
this is well known to W* He is seen off by W at the air terminal 
but H comes down the bus at Wellington village about 11 miles 
from the airport and passes the night there. On the second 
night, convinced that H is at Bonthe, W and C commit adultery, 
for the first time, at the matrimonial home and are surprised by
H.
It is submitted that on these facts, H ought not to be 
deemed to connive at the adultery, for he neither expressly con­
sents to it nor can he be said to corruptly and intentionally 
permit it. All he has done is to make sure whether adultery,
which he had suspected, has in fact taken place. It will, how­
ever, be different if he throws the parties together before he 
believes that adultery has taken place*1 Thus if, professing 
to be a friend of the wife, C is in the habit of visiting the 
matrimonial home, uninvited by H, and taking out W for a ride 
without the consent or dissent of H, though in his presence, but 
doing nothing to discourage the relationship, if adultery ensues,
H will be deemed to have connived at it* The same result ought 
to be the case if adultery has already taken place before he 
knows of the relationship.
Connivance at adultery is based on express or implied 
consent* It is submitted, therefore, that once the conniving
spouse has withdrawn that consent, he cannot be guilty of conriiv-
2ing at any adultery subsequent to the date of his withdrawal.
Nor will connivance at adultery with one person amount to conni­
vance at adultery with another person unknown to the spouse against 
whom the bar is pleaded.
Although statutory law makes it a bar to divorce, hardly 
any petition has failed in Sierra Leone on the basis of conni­
vance. The reason is that both the Sierra Leone husband and 
wife, married monogamously, are so sexually possessive that it is 
inconceivable that one spouse can connive at the adultery of the 
other. This acounts for the almost complete lack of case-law,
reported as well as unreported, on the issue. In the unreported
3case of Antoh v. Antoh where a wife alleged that her husband 
compelled her to practice prostitution, Kingsley J. did not
1. For a similar view in English law, see Denning L.J. in 
Douglas v. Douglas [1950J 2 All E.R. 748, C.A. at p*758.
2. For the opposite view in English law, see Godfrey v. Godfrey 
[1964] 3 All E.R. 154, H.L.
3. Unreported. See Vol.7 of the old Supreme Court Records, p.295.
hesitate to dismiss the allegation as an abominable lie* Though 
he stated no reasons .for the rejection of the evidence of the 
wife other than that she was glamorous and a woman of the world, 
the learned Judge could have been very much aware of the fact 
that the Sierra Leonean main would be the last person to see his 
wife committing adultery and do nothing, let alone encourage the 
association*
(ii) Condonat ion
Condonation is a bar to both adultery and cruelty* As
with connivance, condonation, though widely used in petitions,
i
has not been clearly defined by Sierra Leone Courts* We may, 
therefore, use the definition afforded by Sir Jocelyn Simon P* 
in the English case of Inglis v* Inglis which appears to be a very 
good leaning of the term* He said:
I
"Condonation is the reinstatement of a 
spouse who has committed a matrimonial 
offence in his or her former matrimonial 
position in knowledge of all material 
facts of that offence with the intention 
of remitting it, that is to say, with 
the intention of not enforcing the rights 
which accrue to the wronged spouse in 
consequence of the offence*"2
In other words, before there cam be condonation, there
must be knowledge of the commission of the matrimonial offence
followed by forgiveness and the reinstatement of the offending
!
spouse to his or her prior position as husband or wife by the 
resumption of cohabitation* It has been held in the Sierra
1* But see Williams (S-T) v. Williams (L-A) and Sebastian, 1964- 
66, ALR S.L. 57, where Bankole Jones C.J. attempts a defini- 
tion relying on Rayden on Divorce, 8th ed., (1960) p*234, 
para.19*
2* [1967] 2 All E.R. 71, 79-80*
3* Forgiveness without reinstatement does not amount to condona­
tion so that if the spouse is not reinstated or refuses to be 
reinstated, there is no condonation: Williams (S.T.) v*
Williams (L.T.) and Sebastian, 1964-66, ALR S.L.57*
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Leone case of Wellesley "Cole v. Wellesley Cole.^  that the volun­
tary act of sexual intercourse, in the absence of fraud or con­
sent induced by fraud, is conclusive against a husband in sett­
ling the question of condonation. Whether this applies to a
2wife as well is undecided by the Sierra Leone Courts. But it 
is submitted that it should: for in Sierra Leone a wife has the
option to go to relations whenever it is intolerable for her to 
live in the matrimonial home. This is a socially recognised 
fact.
A matrimonial offence which has been condoned may be re­
vived by a subsequent act of the spouse who has been forgiven and
reinstated. A subsequent matrimonial offence revives the con- 
3
doned offence.
In the case of condoned cruelty, it has been held that any
act of great unkindness is sufficient to revive it; the graver
the matrimonial offence that has been condoned, the slighter is
4the act required to revive it. For adultery, however, it is 
submitted that the actcapable of reviving it should not fall short 
of a matrimonial offence. The reason is that in the case of 
cruelty, the health of the aggrieved spouse is at stake and a
1. 1967-68, ALR S.L. 65 at 69 per Beoku-Betts J. relying on ■* 
Hodson L.J • in'the English case of Benton v. Benton L1957]
3 All E.R. 544, 548.
2. c/f the English case, Keats v. Keats and Montezuma (1859) 1 
SW & Tr. 334, 347, where Sir Creswell Creswell held that sex­
ual intercourse by the wife is not conclusive evidence of con­
donation because she 11 is hardly her own mistress; she may 
not have the option of going away; she may have no place to 
go to; no person to receive her ...” See the Sierra Leone 
case of Macaulay v. Macaulay, 1967-68 ALR S.L. 14, where Cole 
Ag.C.J. found condonation when a wife had sexual intercourse 
after cruelty meted out to her by her husband. In this case, 
however, the wife admitted condoning: the cruelty.
3. Williams v. Williams and Pyne-Bailey,(1960-61j I, S.L.L.R. 92.
4. See Macaulay v. Macaulay, 1967-68 ALR S.L.14.
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slight injurious conduct on the part of the offending spouse is 
likely to aggravate it* The same argument cannot be sustained 
for adultery*
(iii) Collusion 1
Collusion is a bar to any of the matrimonial offences on
which a petition for divorce can be based, namely, adultery,
cruelty and desertion* What constitutes collusion has not as
yet been decided by the Sierra Leone Courts* We may, therefore,
once again resort to English law for guidance* Rayden defines
collusion as "an agreement or bargain between the parties to the
suit whereby the initiation of the suit is procured or its conduct 
2
provided for"* If one party merely stands by while the other 
pursues theproceedings as in the case of undefended suits, that 
party could be said to have impliedly consented to the other hav­
ing a decree but this, in our submission, ought not to amount to 
collusion* Before collusion can be established, the parties of 
their agents must take a positive step, orally or in writing, to 
effect an agreement which results in one of the parties making it 
easy for the other to obtain a divorce*
It is not every agreement, however, which is in contem­
plation of a divorce proceeding that should amount to collusion*
If a party who has a genuine ground for obtaining a divorce wishes
before taking out proceedings to settle questions affecting pro­
perty and to see whether an agreement could be reached extra-judi­
cial ly concerning the maintenance and custody of the children and 
an agreement is reached on these matters, it is submitted that
3
collusion should not lie* But it is prudent that these matters 
should be left to the Court to decide or disclosed to the Court in 
the body of the petition otherwise there should be a presumption 
of collusion and the burden will be cast on the parties to rebut
if
it, which will be a very heavy one indeed*‘
1* There is no Sierra Leone case law on collusion*
2. Divorce, lltjhed*, p*318*
3* See Rayden, ibid'. .
4* Collusion has been abolished in English law by schedule 2 of 
the Divorce Reform Act, 1969*
(c) Discretionary
The proviso to S*7(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act enacts
that:
"The Court shall not be bound to pronounce 
a decree of divorce and may dismiss the peti­
tion if it finds that the petitionerhas during 
the marriage been guilty of adultery or if, 
in the opinion of the Court, the petitioner 
has been guilty -
(a) of unreasonable delay in presenting or 
prosecuting the petition; or
(b) of cruelty towards the other party of 
the marriage; or
(c) where the ground of the petition is 
adultery or cruelty, of having without 
reasonable excuse deserted, or having — 
without reasonable excuse wilfully sepa­
rated himself or herself from the other 
party before the adultery or cruelty 
complained of; or
(d) where the ground of the petition is 
adultery or desertion of such wilful 
neglect or misconduct as has conduced 
to the adultery or desertion*"
From the above provision, the petitioner*s adultery, un­
reasonable delay and cruelty are discretionary bars to relief on 
any matrimonial ground on which the petition is based* In addi­
tion, if the ground is adultery, the petitioner*s desertion or 
wilful separation from the respondent or his conduct that con­
duced to the adultery may debar him from obtaining a decree* 
Furthermore, if the petition is based on cruelty, desertion and 
wilful separation may be additional discretionary bars* Fin­
ally, where the petition is founded on desertion, it will be a 
discretionary bar to relief if the petitioner* s misconduct con­
duced to the desertion*
(i) Adultery
Rule 28 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules * provides that
1* Cap*7 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone (Subsidiary Legis­
lation j[, I960*
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every party to a matrimonial cause praying to the Court for the 
exercise of its discretion to grant a decree of divorce notwith­
standing that party1s adultery should lodge in the Divorce Regi­
stry a discretion statement signed by him or his solicitor in 
which must be stated particulars of the acts of adultery com­
mitted and of material facts which the Court must know in order 
to enable it to exercise its discretion. Thus the mere fact
that a spouse has committed adultery will not completely prejudice
1
his chances of obtaining a decree, but he must make a clean breasli
of it, either in a discretion statement as provided for in Rule
228 or in the body of his petition or answer. If he does not
disclose it to the Court by either of the methods stated above, 
for example, after the intervention of the Attorney-General, the 
Court may not exercise its discretion in his favour.
The Court will exercise its discretion only when it is 
satisfied that the party seeking the discretion has made a case
4
entitling him to a decree for divorce.
In the exercise of its discretion, the Court is guided by
5
the following principles laid down in Decker v. D e c k e r and
- - _ . -  .V . . . . .. ■ . .
1. See Harris v. Harris, (l962j 2 S.L. L.R. 94, 97, where the 
Court described the adultery of the respondent praying for 
discretion as "bad” but nevertheless exercised discretion in 
her favour.
2. It is better to disclose particulars of adultery in a dis-
cretion statement rather than in the body of the petition be­
cause in the former case the particulars are known to the
. Court alone and not to the other party in the proceedings.
3. The Court may, nevertheless, exercise its discretion bearing 
. in mind the prinqiples_stated in the-next“paragraph but one.
4. Tipson y. Tipson, 1964-66, ALR S.L. 161, 163.
5. 1964-66, ALR S.L..334, where Cole,vAg. C.J. applied the prin­
ciples enunciated by Sir Jocelyn Simony P. in- the English case 
of Bull v. Bull [1965] 1 All E.R. 1057, 1063-4. Note that 
Simon P. mentioned all the principles herein stated.
Navo vt N a v o and which can be summarised as follows: (a) the 
position and interest of the children of the marriage; (b) the i
interest of the party with whom the petitioner has been guilty of 
adultery, with special regard to their re-marriage; (c) the 
question whether, if the marriage is not dissolved, there is a 
prospect of reconciliation between the petitioner and respondent;
(d) the interest of the petitioner, and in particular, the inter­
est that the petitioner should be able to remarry and live re­
spectably; (e) the interest of the community at large, to be 
judged by maintaining a true balance between respect for the bind­
ing sanctity of marriage: and the social considerations which
make it contrary to public policy to insist on the maintenance
2
of a union which has utterly broken down; (f) the interest of 
any children born of the adulterous connection between the peti­
tioner amd the person with whom he or she committed adultery;
(g) the interest of any children borh of any adulterous connection 
formed by the respondent; (h) whether the petitioner or the re­
spondent was the more responsible for the break-up of the marri­
age; (i) what was the nature of the misconduct which necessi­
tates the prayer for discretionary relief? Was it, for example, 
with more than one man or woman? Was it promiscuous? Were 
there mitigating or aggravating circumstances? (j) whether the 
party seeking the Court1s discretion was partly, and if so to what 
extent, responsible for the break-up of any other marriage;
(k) what was the general conduct of the party seeking discretion­
ary relief, for example, his or her conduct towards the children;
1. 1967-68, ALR S.L. 124* In this<tfcase, Browne-Marke, J. ap­
plied the principle stated by Viscount Simons, L.C. in the 
English case of Blunt v* Blunt [1943] 2 All E.R. 76, 78* Note 
. that Simons L.C. mentioned principles (a) to {e),herein stated*
2* See Williams (C.C.) v.Williams (V.E.S.), 1964-66, ALR S.L.
120, 123.
(X) on the successful intervention of the Attorney-General, would 
the Court have been likelyto have exercised discretion in favour 
of the party seeking the discretionary relief if the facts now 
known had been before it on the original hearing? (m) what were 
the reasons for the original, or indeed any subsequent, non-dis­
closure of adultery? (n) was there perjury on the part of the 
party seeking discretionary relief? (o) was the party seeking 
discretionary relief frank when questioned about the adultery and 
non-disclosure? (p) is the Court finally satisfied that it has 
been told the whole truth by the paxty seeking discretionary re- 
lief?1
In addition to the foregoing principles the Court will con-
2sider the discretion statement.
A discretion statement is not a weapon to be used against 
the person making it where the other has not grounded his peti­
tion on adultery and has not made out a case in support of it or 
of the respondents cross-pet it ion. In such a case, the Court
will not grant a decree to the petitioner against the respondent
3
solely on the admission of adultery in a discretion statement.
(ii) Unreasonable delay
Unreasonable delay by a petitioner to present a petition 
for divorce when he has a ground amounts to a recognition by him 
of the existence and validity of the marriage. On the grounds 
of equity and public policy, therefore, the Court will not exer­
cise its discretion in favour of the delaying party unless it is
1. For an earlier adoption by the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone 
of the afore-mentioned principles laid down by Viscount Simons 
L.C. in Blunt v. Blunt [1943] 2 All E.R. 76,77, see Thomas v. 
Thomas, unreported, decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown 
on £5 May, 1948; see the Supreme Court Records, Vol.5, p.156. 
Note that the above principles apply to adultery as well as to
. the other discretionary bars.
2. Harris v. Harris,(.1962} 2 S.L.L.R. 94, 97 per Bankol£ Jones J.
approving the English case of Anstey v. Anstey [1962J 1 All.
. E.R. 741, 748. . - - »
3. Tipsonv. Tipson, 1964-66, ALR S.L. 161, 163.
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satisfied as to the reason for the delay.*
Delay by itself raises doubts as to the reliability of the
evidence of the complaining party, but the doubts may be dis-
2pelled if satisfactory reason is given for the delay.
Therefore, if the complaining spouse gives a valid explana­
tion why he had not proceeded with the petition within a reason­
able time from the moment that he knew that he had a ground to do 
so, the delay would not be regarded as unreasonable, and the 
Court can exercise its discretion in his favour.
Delay will be regarded as reasonable if by the nature of 
his employment, the petitioner spends most of his time outside
3
Sierra Leone where he is domiciled. Thus, in Pratt v. Pratt,
H (husband) and W (wife) married in 1920; Two months later H, 
who was employed as a ship*s cook, went on a voyage overseas.
On his return, W refused to cohabit with him and shortly after­
wards he had to go out to sea again, and he repeatedly did so un­
til 1951 when he brought the petition. The Supreme Court, 
Kingsley J. held that the nature of H* s employment was reasonable 
ground for commencing proceedings about thirty years after obtain­
ing a ground, and he accordingly exercised his discretion in the 
husband*s favour. Similarly, delay will be deemed to be reason­
able if the petitioner had hoped that during the intervening
period a reconciliation with the respondent could be accomplished.
4Thus in Decker v. Decker, where the petitioner was deserted on 
19 December, 1949, but instituted divorce proceedings only on 18
February, 1964, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion in
-    -   ■ - -   —  ■   — - — ■      - ■■ ■ —  - — -
1. Decker v. Decker, 1964-66, ALR S.L. 334, 339 per Cole Ag.C.J.
2. Ibid;
3. Unreported, decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown in 1951. 
See the old Supreme Court Records, Vol.7, p.242.
4. 1964-66, ALR S.L. 334.
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her favour after the Court was satisfied that she had refrained 
from presenting the petition before then because her mother was 
trying her best to see if what was left of the marriage could be 
salvaged.
Another ground for reasonable delay is the petitioners 
financial inability to pursue the proceedings because in Sierra 
Leone there is no legal aid system and divorce proceedings are 
prohibitively expensive.
*»
In Harris v* Harris, Bankole Jones, C #J*, sitting in.fie 
Supreme Court, accepted the petitioner’s reason for nine years’ 
delay in presenting his petition that he never at any time earned 
very much and that he was a pastor of the Huntingdon Connection 
and a candidate-in-training for the ministry of religion.
The above-mentioned grounds of reasonable delay are not 
exhaustive and, in our submission, if for any reasonit is beyond 
the power and competence of the petitioner to present the peti­
tion within a short time, for example, if he is incarcerated, 
the period of unreasonable delay should begin to run against him 
from the time he regains his liberty and not during the period of 
his confinement.
(iii) Cruelty
Though cruelty is a discretionary bar to a petition based 
on any matrimonial offence, it is commonly invoked in cases where 
the petition is founded on desertion and adultery.
In order to prevent the petitioner from obtaining the re­
lief' sought, his cruelty must have both preceded and contributed
2
to the matrimonial offence of which he complains* Cruelty by
< >'. ■ ■ M .rfV .  —  ■ ■ i .     ■■  . . . . . . . . . . . .  j . —  ■■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■  ■ ■■■  .in . ■■■ ■■ — ■  i — —  ■  i ■ ■ ■  ■ ■ ■ — ■  i ■  ■■■ ■  m  ■ ■ ■ ■  n ,i >i i m m  i »
1.(l962) 2 S.L.L.R. 94.
2, Williams v. Williams and Renner,(l960-l) 1 S.L.L.R. 70.
the petitioner sifter the respondents commission of the matri­
monial offence upon which the petition is ba£ed would appear not
to be a bar to the petit ion j though it is a ground for cross­
ly
petition by the respondent*
(iv) Desertion or wilful separation
o 3
It is borne out by both statute and case law that de­
sertion or wilful separation if to operate as a discretionary bar 
must have taken place before the adultery or cruelty complained 
of* It is difficult to establish desertion or wilful separation 
by the petitioner after the respondent has committed a matrimonial 
offence upon which the petition is grounded for, if he decides to 
terminate cohabitation either temporarily or permanently as a re­
sult of the respondent’s conduct, he will be justified in doing 
so because to continue to live with the respondent may be evidence 
of condonation*
It is not clear what "wilful separation" means* Probably 
it is separation which is unjustifiable, and which is intended to 
last only temporarily. If there is an intention to stay apart 
permanently either before or during the de'facto separation^deser­
tion results*
As no period is stated in the^ Act during which desertioni
should last before it can be pleaded as a discretionary bar, it is 
submitted that any length of period less than the three years re­
quired in the case of a ground for divorce will suffice*
1« Ibid?
2. S.7(2) of Matrimonial Causes Act, Cap*102 of the revised Laws 
- of Sierra Leone, 1900? _ \
3• Williams v.Williams*(1960-61) 1 S.L.L.R. 70*
(v) Wilful neglect or conduct conducing
The Courts have tended to regard "wilful neglect” as wil­
ful neglect by the husband to maintain the wife and the children 
of the family and have also conceived such neglect as conduct 
conducing to the wife’s committing a matrimonial offence, parti­
cularly adultery**
In our submission, there is nothing in S*7(2) of the Matri­
monial Causes Act to warrant such narrow interpretation of the 
phrase "wilful neglect". If by deliberately failing to maintain
I
his wife a husband can be guilty of "wilful neglect", then, it 
is submitted, in a society such as Sierra Leone in which it is 
considered as a wife’s duty to carry out or supervise the perform­
ance <£ the domestic chores of the matrimonial home, if a wife 
fails to do so she is equally in wilful neglect of the husband*
The Courts have not distinguished "wilful neglect" from
"conduct conducing" and tend to regard the former as one example 
2
of the latter.
In general, a matrimonial offence by one spouse prior to
' 3the matrimonial offence of the other is conduct conducing to it,
but conduct that falls short of a ground for divorce will also
suffice. Thus, if one spouse behaves in a manner as to create
a reasonable cause for belief that she has committed adultery
with another party, though this may not be the catse_, and the other
spouse deserts ais a result, the conduct of the first spouse will
4conduce to the other’s desertion.
1. Thomas v. Thomas, unreported, decided by Supreme Court on 25 
- May. -1948; wiTTiams v. Williams9 1964-66, ALR S.L. 120.
2. Ibid.
3. Williams v.Tflilliaims, (1960-61} ,1 S.L.L.R. 70. __
4. Cummings v. Cummings, 1968-69, .ALR S.L. 44 wher# Tejam-Sie,
C.J. applied opinion of Lord.Merrian P. in the English case of 
Glenister v. Glenister [1945] 1 All E.R. 513, 519,and that of 
Willmer J. in another English case of Beer v. Beer £1948] p#
10, 13.
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It is the conduct of one spouse towards the other which 
conduces to the latter*s commission of a matrimonial offence that 
is a discretionary bar. Therefore, as in the case of delay, if 
circumstances beyond the spouse*s control, such as imprisonment,^ 
makes him neglect the other, it is submitted that his misconduct 
is not in relation to the other spouse and ought not to conduce 
to any matrimonial offence committed by the other.
(<0 Jurisdiction
At common law, the jurisdiction of the High Court in di-
2vorce or nullity is based on the domicile of the parties. Thus, 
if both parties to the marriage are domiciled in Sierra Leone at 
the time of the commencement of the proceedings, the Court will 
have jurisdiction to hear the petition.
However, because of the possibility that in case of the 
wife/petitioner, the husband may have abandoned his Sierra Leone 
domicile which at common law automatically terminates the wife’s 
Sierra Leone domicile, statutory law has made an inroad on the 
common law *
' 3
. According to s.5 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment)
4
Act, 1961, a wife whose husband has surrendered his Sierra Leone 
domicile may petition for divorce or nullity based on residence, 
providing the following conditions are fulfilled.
Firstly, she must be resident in Sierra Leone and must 
have been ordinary resident there for three years immediately
1. But the imprisonment should not be for an offence against the 
other spouse.
2. See tfie Privy"Council case of Le Mesufier-v, Le’Mesurier [l895]
A.C.517* ^
3. Amending s.30 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102 of the 
. revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960.
4. Act. No.16 of 1961.
preceding the commencement of the proceedings.^" Secondly, she
must have been deserted by her husband or the husband should have
been deported or expelled from Sierra Leone but immediately before
his deportation or: expulsion, he must have been domiciled in 
2
Sierra Leone*
These statutory provisions create as much difficulty as 
they seek to remove. Inasmuch as they protect a wife who has 
lost her Sierra Leone domicile as a result of a change of domi­
cile of the husband^ and enable her to petition for divorce or 
nullity by basing divorce jurisdiction on "residence” they create
3  ~
the possibility of "limping” marriages. To avoid this, a pro­
vision conferring a Sierra Leone domicile on the wife in such 
situations is necessary*
) Critique of the Divorce Law
As has j'ust been seen, the general law on divorce in 
Sierra Leone is, in many respects, modelled on pre-1971 English 
law. A prominent omission, however, from Sierra Leone law is 
"insanity” as a ground for divorce. This is probably because in 
many African tribal societies insanity is regarded as a sickness 
which must be treated with compassion. As we shall see in 
Chapter 18, in Sierra Leone tribal society, one spouse divorces 
the other on the "ground” of insanity only when the insane spouse 
is prone to violence and becomes a threat to the life of the other. 
Following the "Englishness” of the Matrimonial Causes
1. The new s.30 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap.102, intro­
duced by s.5 of the-Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961.
2. ibid. Note that s.5 of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act, 
1961, is the same as s.18(1) of the English Matrimonial Causes
- Act, 1950.
3. For the decree may not be recognised by the spouses1 lex 
domicilii.
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Act, Sierra Leone judges have used the same yardstick as 
English judges to measure concepts like adultery, desertion and 
cruelty*
We shall begin with adultery. In the African context, 
adultery could be a "reason*1^ for divorce when committed by a
wife but not so in the case of a husband, although an adulterous
connection by him with another man1s wife is an actionable wrong
to that man, usually resulting in damages. Thus, a wife is
generally expected to tolerate her husband1s occasional associ-
3at ions with single women, and more so, while the wife is a
4suckling mother and before the baby is weaned. in short,
adultery is more serious when committed by a wife than when it is 
the husband that is the guilty party. The general law, however, 
sets a different standard for spouses of a monogamous marriage. 
Therefore, while in favour of the retention of the practice of 
monogamy for spouses of a monogamous union, in our submission, a 
divorce law, even the general law, should be aware of social 
differences of people in an important matter like adultery, and 
should reflect it. Adultery should, therefore, be a ground for 
divorce only when its commission makes it intolerable for the 
parties to continue living together as husband and wife.
Secondly, there is no justification for desertion to last
1. The Sierra Leone Act is modelled on the United Kingdom Matri­
monial Causes Act, 1950*
2. Customary laws generally have reasons rather than grounds for 
divorce. For the Nigerian experience, see Kasunmu and Sala- — 
cuse,'op^cit., 175; Obi, op;cit.. 366. For the Kenyan exper-
- ience, see Read: Family Law m"Kenya.
3. Except women within the'prohibited degrees of consanguinity,
. affinity,and fosterage.
4. Formerly, a wife was expected to suckle a baby for three — 
years, during which period she must refrain from sexual inter­
course. Nowadays, the more liberal Sierra Leoneans allow at 
least 9 months.
for three years before a party can use it as a ground for divorce. 
The experience of fie Sierra Leone society shows that where one 
spouse deserts the other, if there is any prospect of reconcilia­
tion and resumption of cohabitation, friends and relatives of the 
spouses try to bring the parties together as soon as separation 
takes place. Where separation continues after their interven­
tion, it augurs the end of the marriage, and hardly will the 
spouses ever come together again. It is, therefore, unnecessary 
to keep the petitioner waiting for three years before he can in­
stitute proceedings for divorce. If there is to be any time 
limit at all, it would be better to add to desertion the phrase 
’’with no prospect of reconciliation”, instead of the three year 
period, and if there is no resumption of cohabitation for two 
years after every effort has been made to bring the parties to­
gether, itshould be conclusive that there is no such prospect.
Thirdly, certain acts such as drunkenness and beating up 
of a wife, which have been accepted as cruelty in English law 
ought not, per se, to be regarded as such in the Sierra Leone 
context•
No statistics are available but from personal observation, 
many Sierra Leone husbands who are not Muslims spend many an 
evening out with friends, drinking and chatting at local pubs 
while their wives stay at home looking after the children. Occa­
sionally, some do get drunk but the majority pretend to be so on 
their return home, probably as a method of disregarding any re­
proach coming from the wife. This is a habit that has become a 
socially recognised fact of life in the Sierra Leone society. 
Therefore, drunkenness by the husband in the absence of personal 
violence to the wife ought not to amount to cruelty as a ground 
for divorce.
So far as beating a wife is concerned, it is generally
accepted by the Sierra Leone tribal society, though not by the 
general law, that a husband has the right to administer reasonable 
chastisement to the wife. This is an acceptance of the husband*s 
position as head of the nuclear or compound family, with the right 
to administer instant justice when the occasion demands. This 
occasional chastisement, if reasonable and not brutal nor a fre­
quent show of force, should be regarded as legitimate and should 
not be an act of cruelty for the basis of divorce.
The test of cruelty should depend on the circumstances and 
the attitude <f society.
The Sierra Leone divorce law is based entirely on the
matrimonial offence principle.'*' The present trend in many 
2
countries, is in the direction of the breakdown principle, i.e* 
granting divorce upon proof that the marriage has broken down 
irretrievably. This could be a desirable step to take in Sierra 
Leone because the breakdown principle closely approximates to the 
African concept of divorce, whereby if for some reason the parties 
cannot continue living together as husband and wife, they bring 
the marital relationship to an end.
If the breakdown principle is adopted, then proof of any 
of the present matrimonial offences or, of grounds suchas two 
years* separation and wilful and persistent refusal of sexual 
intercourse, could be evidence of irretrievable breakdown of the
1. For criticisms-of this principle, see Putting-Asunder. London 
1966, paras.39-45; The United Kingdom Law Commission Report,
. Cmnd. 3121, para.25.
2. E.g. New Zealand: The Matrimonial Proceedings Act,-1963:';
Australia: s.28 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959-66;
England: s.l of the Divorce Reform Act, 1969; Canada: See 
Report on Family Law Study. Project I. Divorce, Final Reporty 
St. John* s, December 1967, p.14; Nigeria:*s.15 of the Matri- 
monial Causes Decree j 1970; See E.'Cotran, ’’The Matrimonial 
Qauses Decree, 1970”, [1972] J.A.L.; p.40; California: 
Governor*s'Commission on the Family, Report dated 15 December, 
1966, p.2d.
marriage* Thus, the offence itself will not per se become a
ground for divorce* In addition, as in the Nigerian Matri-
2monial Causes Decree, 1970, the importance of reconciliation 
must be emphasised. There should be provision whereby spouses 
seeking a divorce should show that they have exhausted the possi­
bility of a reconciliation through judicial or extra-judicial 
means* This is in keeping with divorce in the African context 
where it is normally granted or becomes operative, only when there 
is no longer any prospect of reconciliation.
With the advent of divorce as a result of breakdown of the 
marriage will inevitably go the present absolute bars for, as the
United Kingdom Law Commission rightly said: "There would be no
3
relevant offence to connive at, conduce to or condone." Alter­
natively, Sierra Leone could borrow from Ghana law and make the 
sole ground for divorce that the marriage has broken down beyond
4
reconciliation. Because of the facts which have to be proved 
in order to establish that the marriage has thus broken down, this 
principle is simpler and less fraught with problems than the 
usual breakdown principle and its concomittant modes of proof.
In the Ghana principle, one or more of the following facts must 
be shown in order to establish that the marriage has broken down 
beyond reconciliation: (a) that the respondent has behaved in
1. See the unreported case of Forster v.. Forster decided by the Pqu£ 
Supreme Court in Freetown on 7 September, 1^42, in which Graham 
C.J* seemed to be far ahead of his time when, even though L 
adultery was proved, he granted the decree only on the addition­
al finding that without it the marriage would not continuetc 
with happinesss
2. Ss*12, 13, 17(1) and (2) (Nigeria).
3. Law“Commission Report, para.108.
4. Ss.l(2), 2(1) and (3) of the Ghana Matrimonial Causes Act,
1971. See H.F. Morris, "The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971", 
[1972] J.A.L., p.71.
such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to 
live with the respondent; or (b) that the parties to the marriage 
have, after diligent effort, been unable to reconcile their differ­
ences, Furthermore, under the Ghana Law, even though any of 
the facts may be established, the court will not grant a decree of 
divorce unless it is satisfied, on all the evidence, that the 
marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. Thus, the pri­
mary motive is to grant a decree only when it is clearly esta- 
.
blished that at least one of the parties has formed the intention 
never to continue living together with the other as husband and 
wife, such intention formed as a result of the behaviour of the 
other *
At first sight, it would appear that such a law would per­
mit divorce on the cheap because a party seeking it may refuse to 
reconcile with the other merely on the ground of the other’s be­
haviour which on the application of an objective test would not 
be serious enough to afford a ground for a reasonable person to 
seek to terminate the marital relationship as a result. It has* 
however, been established in theGhana case of Mensah v. Mensah  ^
that in order to show that the respondent has misbehaved himself 
to an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to 
live with him* mere trivialities will not suffice and that the
conduct complained of must be sufficiently grave and weighty to
o ~~
justify such finding. In the words of Hayfron-Benjamin J.
"the parties must be expected to put up with the reasonable
3wear and tear of married life."
1. p.9723 2 G.L.R. 198.
2. Ibid. at 203, 204, per Hayfron-Benjamin J.
3. Ibid., p.204.
Such a reform,in our submission, does not make divorce 
relatively easy to the point of undermining the stability of mar­
riage as a central social institution. All it does is, when the 
marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, to enable
“the empty legal shell to be destroyed 
with the maximum fairness, and the mini- * 
mum bitterness, distress and humiliation.'1
As can be seen, it may be repeated that the Ghana principle
is a simpliiQed version of the irretrievable breakdown principle
*
as adopted in other countries. Whereas the breakdown rule admits 
of specific items of conduct on the part of the respondent which 
the petitioner must prove in order to show that the marriage has 
broken down irretrievably, Ghana law puts every conduct of the re­
spondent to the test and considers its impact on a reasonable per­
son who, in our submission, ought to be the average African man or 
woman with his or her peculiar social attitudes, idiosyncracies 
and complexities, placed in a similar situation as the petitioner.
B. TERMINATION OF A MOHAMMEDAN MARRIAGE BY DIVORCE 2
H&re again, we shall outline the Islamic law of divorce 
and compare it with the practice of the Sierra Leone Muslims.
Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to divorce his 
wife without assigning any reasons and without any fault on her 
part. A wife, on the other hand, has the privilege of divorcing 
her husband in a number of prescribed cases only, namely, divorce
 I ■ M ■!■■■■. I,  ■■■■ . ■■■ »■ ■■ ■ ■ — ■ ■—  — ■ n i i ■ i ■ i — ■  mm i «  in ■! I i ■—  murn ,
1. Ibid., p.204.
2. For a comprehensive analysis of divorce at Islamic law, see 
Hughes, op.cit., 87-90; Karim, op.cit.. 697-700; Fyzee, op. 
cit., 139-169; Coulson, N.J. a paper entitled "Islamic Law" 
contributed to a Colloquium on The Co-existence and Interaction- 
of Different Laws of Marriage and Divorce in the British Common­
wealth, held at Clare College, Cambridge, on 15 to 17 September 
1958, under the auspices of the U.K. National Committe of Com­
parative Law.
with the mutual consent of the husband (khulc); the husband1s 
failure to maintain her; cruelty; desertion; neglect; the 
husband1s affliction with a serious and contagious disease; in- 
sanity, and the husband*s impotence*
Procedure
Before a divorce is contemplated the spouses are enjoined
to effect a reconciliation and should break the marriage bond only
as a last resort when every effort at a settlement has failed*
For the purpose of settling their differences, the parties must
2
appoint two umpires, one from either side*
Divorce can be effected by judicial process, mutual agree­
ment or by talaq* The first two methods can be used by both 
husband and wife, but the last is the monopoly of the husband*
(a) Judicial process
This is the method commonly employed by the wife* It is 
also the usual procedure when a husband accuses his wife of in­
fidelity, whereby both parties are made to appear before a judge 
and take an oath, after which the marriage is dissolved*
(b) Mutual agreement
Where the parties do not want to continue the marital re­
lationship, they can terminate it by mutual consent (mubara* a)*
If it is the wife who wants the divorce but under normal circum­
stances cannot get it because the husband is not guilty of the 
prescribed offences, she can persuade the husband in order to
1* Impotence is the only ground upon which a wife may obtain a 
judicial declaration of divorce among the Hanafii*
2. This is not a legal necessity, but a matter of conscience as 
prescribed by the Quran*
3. The procedure is called Ii an*
release her by her paying an agreed price* This agreement for
cdivorce, is known as Khul * In Maliki law, there is a compul-
Q
sory khul when a dispute arises between the spouses which arbi­
trators are unable to settle and the fault is on the wife.
(c) Talaq *
A husband can at any time during the period after the 
wife* s menstruation (tuhr) repudiate her and the repudiation
amounts to divorce* This can be done in one of three ways. 
Firstly, by talaqu 11-ahsan* The husband makes a single decla­
ration of talaq during the woman’s tuhr followed by abstinence 
from sexual intercourse during the wife* s prescribed °idda which 
is three courses. The talaq is revocable until the period of 
cidda has expired* A divorce effected as such does not compel 
the divorced wife to mairry another man and be divorced before she 
can again become the wife of the first husband, but if the first 
husband wants her back there must be a remarriage* Secondly, 
talaqufl*hasan* This is a declaration of talaq repeated three 
times, one during three successive tuhrs* c There is the possi­
bility of revocation until the third pronouncement. It is the 
best form of talaq and is used by a man determined to be rid of 
his wife. Thirdly, talaquT*I-bida* The declaration is made 
three times in immediate succession or within one tuhr* The
triple talaq is effective immediately and is irrevocable. In 
the case of talaqu lfhasan and talaqu *1-bida* before a divorced 
wife can remarry the divorced husband, she must first marry an­
other man, consummate the marriage, and divorce him.
The practice of Sierra Leone Muslims
As a rule, either spouse can divorce the other if the 
marriage has irretrievably broken down and no reason need be
given. In practice, however, among the purists, some reason 
must be adduced acceptable to the Imam of the local community 
where the divorce is sought.
Among the Hausa community * in Freetown, a husband may 
divorce his wife if she posed as a virgin on marriage but the con­
trary is proved when the marriage is consummated, or if during the 
marriage she commits adultery three times after having been warned
on the first and second occasions. A wife, too, may divorce the
husband for his inability or wilful refusal to maintain her, or 
neglect, and for his mouth emitting a pungent smell at night.
In the latter case, however, the husband must first be warned*
2The Aku Muslims insist upon a ground at Islamic law be­
fore divorce is allowed. Nevertheless, sterility of the wife 
and adultery by either spouse are recognised reasons for divorce 
among them.
In addition to the grounds permitted at Islamic law, a 
Mandingo Muslim wife may divorce her husband for persistent bad 
breath and impotence and either spouse can divorce the other for 
showing by deeds or omission, utter disrespect of the spouse*s 
family. A husband cannot divorce a wife on the ground of her 
adultery, but such conduct is attended with severe punishment.
In the olden days, both the adulterer and the wife were tortured 
to death. Nowadays, however, both are given 100 lashes each, 
stripped naked, and the adulterer is banished from the local com­
munity. This happens extra-judicially.
^  —  —  - - — - - - -    - ■ - ■ ■ ■ - -  - —      ■■ ■ - —  - —  ■ ■ -  - ■
1. Personal communication from Alhaji Buhari, Imam of Hausa 
Mosque, Freetown.
2. Personal communication from Alhaji Nasiru, Imam of Aku Mosque, 
Freetown.
3* Personal communication from Alhaji Gbril Succoh, Imam of 
Mandingo Mosque, Freetown.
Among the rest of the tribal Muslims,* mainly in the Pro­
vinces, a husband can divorce a wife without assigning any reason 
but if she is faultless, he must accompany her with money and re­
turn her to her parents. For a wife, unkindness shown to her by 
the husband is a sufficient reason for divorce. One act of 
adultery by the wife is in general, insufficient to entitle the 
husband to divorce her without paying some amount of money to her 
parents. But if she persistently commits adultery after being 
warned and reported to her parents, she can be divorced without 
any financial benefit to her parents.
Apart from those stipulated by Islamic law, the accepted
2reasons for divorce among the Ahmadiyya include (i) the hus­
band* s persistent driving away of the wife with or without just 
cause; (ii) personal uncleanliness by either party; (iii) dis­
obedience to the husband by the wife; and (iv) wife’s wilful and 
persistent refusal of sexual intercourse. Adultery by the wife 
is not sufficient to divorce her but if she is manifestly immoral, 
testified to by four respectable residents of the locality, the 
husband must separate himself from her for four months after which, 
if she continues her conduct, she becomes liable to reasonable 
chast i s ement.
Procedure
As the HighCourt in Sierra Leone has no jurisdiction to 
dissolve a Muslim marriage and there are no Kadi’s Courts, di­
vorce by judicial process is virtually unknown. Nevertheless,
1. Personal communication from Alpha Ibrahim Koroma, Imam of the 
Ngiyeya Road Mosque, Bo.
2. Personal communication from Mohamed Lamin Njai, a prominent 
Ahmadiyya missionary.
the tribal Muslims in the Provinces do, from time to time, resort 
to the local courts, but what is dissolved by these courts is a 
customary marriage where the alleged Mohammedan marriage also 
conforms with the requirements of a valid customary marriage.
In the Western Areaj there are yet no established custom­
ary courts recognised by law. But the practice is prevalent 
whereby a Muslim who seeks divorce goes to the headman or a 
learned Imam (Alkali) who sits in a quasi-judicial capacity.
These ad hoc judges have no judicial capacity at law, but their 
decrees are respected by those who seek them and adhered to by 
the local community.
Divorces by talaq and by mutual agreement without arbitral
intervention are not in vogue at all despite the opinion of one 
oImam that an immediate divorce can be obtained upon one spouse 
pronouncing in a mosque in the presence of his or her parents, 
the Imam and the Muslim elders who witnessed the wedding that he 
or she is no longer married to the other spouse.
The usual procedure by which divorce is obtained seems to 
be as follows:
In case of a dispute the spouses first resort to the god­
parents of the marriage and if the dispute is not resolved, the 
godparents summon representatives of the families of the spouses 
and they try to strike out the differences and effect a reconci­
liation. Failing that, one or both of them goes to the local 
Imam or headman and indicates his intention of having a divorce.
The Imam or headman makes a final effort to salvage the marriage,
      -  . ...   - —   —  . - ------
1. See s.12 of the Tribal Administration (Colony) Act, cap*78 of 
the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. Personal communication from Alpha Ibrahim Koroma, Imam of the 
Ngiyeiya Road Mosque, Bo.
failing which he summons an ad hoc tribunal consisting of the 
elders of the local Muslim community (jamaat). If the tribunal 
is satisfied upon hearing evidence from both sides that one spouse 
has given sufficient reasons for a divorce, it pronounces a decree 
and communicates it to the Registrar who registers it. From the 
moment of the pronouncement of the decree, the marriage is legally 
dissolved, but registration is necessary as evidence of the dis­
solution. Divorce once effected as such is irrevocable, and in 
the event of a later reconciliation, the parties must re-marry in 
order to bring about the relationship of husband and wife. The 
stricter Muslims never contract a second marriage with a woman 
whom they have already divorced; but the more liberal native 
Muslims in the Southern and Eastern Provinces do.'*'
'
1. cf. Anderson, op.cit.» p.296.
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CHAPTER 13 
THE PARENT AND CHILD RELATIONSHIP
In this Chapter, we shall discuss parent and child rela­
tionship under the general law** A discussion of this rela­
tionship under customary law is deferred to Part III* Neverthe­
less, we shall make occasional excursuses into customary law here 
when the necessity arises*
The matters to which we shall address ourselves in this 
Chapter are legitimacy; nationality and citizenship; mainten­
ance; custody; offences against children and the vicarious lia­
bility of parents for the conduct of their children; and finally, 
the loss of parental rights and authority* Prom our list the 
absence of legitimation and adoption stands out conspicuously*
We shall not concern ourselves with them because under the general
2 3law of Sierra Leone legitimation, and legal adoption are un­
known*
1* Islamic law does not require any special treatment in a dis­
cussion of parent and child*relationship because in Sierra Leone 
Islamic law does not apply 'to that relationship* Apart from 
the question of the legitimacy of a child of Muslim parents, 
which may be decided under Islamic law if the parents were 
married in accordance with Mohammedan law at the time that the 
child was conceived, the relationship of parent and child is 
governed by the general law* Customary law may also apply 
where the purported Mohammedan marriage is recognizable under 
customary law*
2* Legal adoption is used here as opposed to a de facto adoption 
or foster-parenthood whereby a foster-parent lhas a de facto 
control of the foster child without the legal consequences of 
parenthood* The latter is common in Sierra Leone*
3* There is no statutory law in Sierra Leone on legitimation or 
legal adoption* Since these concepts did not exist in common 
law and the English legislation on the matter does not apply 
in Sierra Leone, there is, therefore, no law in Sierra Leone 
on them*
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A. LEGITIMACY
Conflict of Laws
We mast point out from the outset that Sierra Leone has 
no local enactment resolving conflict of law problems* As the 
English common law is the country*s residuary law we shall, there- 
fore, begin this discussion by stating one important common law 
rule of conflict of law* It is that the legitimacy of a child 
is determined by the law of his domicile of origin, that is, the 
law of the father*s domicile at the time of the child*s birth.*
In short, if the law of that domicile regards the child as legiti­
mate, then he is clothed with that status everywhere*
This common law rule is of easy application in resolving 
external conflicts of law when the country of domicile of origin 
of the child has a unitary legal system* But it is fraught with 
difficulty if the country has a pluralistic legal system because 
an internal conflict of law problem results* Sierra Leone is 
one such country with its tripartite legal system, at any rate, 
in certain areas of the field of family law*
The question then that is pertinent is as follows: Once 
it has been established that the country of domicile is Sierra 
Leone, by what law will the legitimacy of a child be determined? 
Will it be the general law, Islamic law or customary law? Before 
we can attempt an answer, we must consider the validity of the 
marriage of the child*s parents, for the issue of the child's 
legitimacy will depend heavily, though not entirely, on whether
1* See the English cases: In re Don's Estate (1857) 4 Drewry 194 
at p*297 per Kindersley V-C; Fenton v* Livingstone (1859) 3 
Macq 497 H,L. at p*532 per Lord Brougham; In re Goodman's 
Trust (1881) 17 CH.D* 285 at pp*292 , 296-7, per Cotton and 
James L.J.J* See also the Nigerian case: Re"Adadevoh"and
Ors (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 304 at pp*306, 308-9, per Verity," C.J.
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or not there was a valid marriage subsisting between the parents 
when the child was conceived or born, as the case may be, or in 
the case of customary law, whether a subsequent valid marriage 
took place between the father and mother of the child after its 
birth*
In the first place, a child cannot be legitimate in Sierra 
Leone if at some time or other his parents had not contracted a 
marriage which is valid either tinder the general law or Islamic 
law or customary law, or there has not been acknowledgment of 
paternity under the last-mentioned law.1 But as the require­
ments of a valid marriage are not the same for every branch of 
the Sierra Leone legal system, it is possible for a child to be 
regarded as legitimate under one law, for example, the general 
law, but illegitimate in accordance with another law, for example, 
customary law*
We shall consider two hypothetical cases:
(1) H and W, two natives aged 21 years, marry in accord­
ance with the Christian Marriage Act without H* s family paying 
any marriage consideration and without the consent of the parents 
of both* This marriage is valid under the general law but in­
valid at customary law, under which an essential requirement - 
consent of the parents - is absent* How then will the legiti­
macy of a child of such marriage be determined?
(2) H and W, two natives, contract a valid marriage under 
the Christian Marriage Act* During the subsistence of the mar­
riage, H purports to contract various customary marriages with
1* In Chapter 19, we discuss that a child can be legitimated 
under customary law without its natural father and mother 
having to marry each other*
other women* The marriage of H with W is valid under the general 
law, but H* s subsequent customary marriages are void under that 
law* In customary law, however, as we shall see in Part III, 
the subsequent marriages are regarded as valid if they complied 
with the requirements of a valid customary marriage* We may yet 
again ask, how will the legitimacy of children born of all the 
marriages be determined?
The marriage of the parents alone will not be sufficient 
to determine a child1 s legitimacy - a status cognizable by each 
and every branch of the Sierra Leone legal system -especially 
when a child may be legitimated under customary law without the 
need for its parents to marry each other* Note that the Sierra 
Leone Courts have not as yet ruled on the matter*
In a Nigerian case in which a similar internal conflict 
situation existed, the West African Court of Appeal resolved it 
on the basis of the parents* personal law, and held that if the 
father of the child was a person subject to customary law, then 
the law to be applied in ascertaining the legitimacy of the 
children is the customary law applicable to the father*1 Simi­
larly, if the father was a person subject to the general law, then 
it is that law that determines the children's legitimacy*2 With
the present trend in Sierra Leone to apply customary law on a
3
territorial rather than personal law basis, it is difficult now 
to pinpoint who are persons subject to customary law and who are 
not* Formerly, however, and at present in specific areas such 
as intestate succession, where a child's right to succeed to the
1* Re Adadevoh and Ors (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 304 at p*309 per 
Verity C.J.
2* So would Islamic law apply in the case of a person whose 
parents are Muslims*
3* See s*13 of the Local Courts Act, 1963, Act No*20 of 1963*
property of his parent depends upon his legitimacy, Sierra Leone 
law has recognised three classes of people, namely, natives, non­
natives and Muslims• To the first and second classes customary
1 2 law and the general law respectively apply, and to the third,
Islamic law, all irrespective of the marriage of the spouses*
If we were to apply the test in the Nigerian case herein 
already noted to all natives in Sierra Leone, the law that deter­
mines the legitimacy of their children will be their respective 
customary law, whilst the general law and Islamic law will apply 
to non-natives and Muslims, respectively* Indeed, this might 
have been the intention of the legislature when the various inte-
4
state succession statutes were enacted*
But the application of this test to our hypothetical 
cases mentioned earlier will, in our submission, produce the 
following alarming results:- In the first case, the children of 
the marriage contracted under the Christian Marriage Act will not 
be regarded as legitimate since the customary law of the parents 
does not regard them as such* In the second case, the children 
of the subsequent customary marriages of H will be regarded as 
legitimate whilst those of the marriage between H and W may be 
illegitimate according to the customary law of H and W if such
5
marriage does not also comply with that law* In either case,
1* See s*43 of the Administration of Estates Act, cap*45 of the 
revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960; s*26 of the Christian
Marriage Act, cap*95*
2* See the Administration of Estates Act, cap*45; s*26 of the
Christian Marriage Act*
3* S*9 of the Mohammedan Marriage Act, cap*96.
4* The Administration of Estates Act, cap*45; the Mohammedan 
Marriage Act, cap.96.
5. This point was not considered by the court in Re Adadevoh and 
Ors (1951) 13, W *A.'C%A. ’304, perhaps because the father, the 
"Tegitimacy of whose children was at issue, had no children by 
his Ordinance Marriage, and the children who were claiming 
were those of the customary marriages*
a non-customary marriage between H and W does not make their 
children legitimate unless it also conforms with their customary 
law* Consequently, children who would normally be regarded as 
legitimate under the general law would not succeed to their pro­
perty whilst those regarded as illegitimate under that law would 
because they are legitimate children under customary law*
Another possible solution is that laid down by Petrides J*
in the Nigerian case of Haastrup v* Coker,* the facts of which
o
were as follows: H contracted a Christian marriage in Sierra
Leone with one W, by whom he had a number of children, two of 
whom survived him* During his lifetime and after entering the 
Christian marriage, he contracted various customary marriages with 
other women in Nigeria and was also survived by nine children of 
these marriages* One of the children of the Christian marriage 
sold certain land which belonged to his father, who had died in­
testate* The plaintiff, one of the children of the customary 
marriages, sought to set the sale aside on the ground that the 
land belonged to all the children of the deceased* Petr ides J* 
dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiff had no
locus standi to dispute the defendant1 s title* The learned judge
made no express pronouncement on the status of the plaintiff as 
the deceased* s lawful child, but it must be assumed that he im­
pliedly ruled that he was illegitimate, for he said:
"I am of the opinion that, as it has been
admitted that there was a Christian marri­
age • •• and that such marriage was prior 
to the other marriages ••• the principles
1* (1922 ) 8 N.L.R. 68.
2* The nationality of H is not clear from the report* All that 
the report says is that he married according to Christian 
rites in Sierra Leone and went to Nigeria and succeeded his 
father* From his name, he could have been a Sierra Leone 
non-native*
laid down in the case of Cole v* Cole 
apply, and that this is not a case in 
which the court can observe the native 
law of inheritance*"2
This case can be assumed as holding that where a valid 
non-customary marriage precedes a customary marriage, the latter 
is invalid and only the children of the former would be regarded 
as legitimate* If this principle is applied to Sierra Leone, 
then in the case of a deceased native who had contracted marriage 
under the Christian Marriage Act, his legitimate children, for 
the purposes of succession, would be those regarded as such by 
the general law* It is doubtful how far this principle can have 
practical effect in Sierra Leone in the face of s*43(2) of the 
Administration of Estates Act, under which the Administrator 
General administrating the property of a native, has to ascertain 
from the local court of the area to which the deceased native 
belongs, the names of the persons entitled to the residue of the 
estate, after payment of debts and the costs of the administration
and pays that residue to such persons so ascertained* So far as
children who are claimants are concerned, the Local Courts would
not hesitate to nominate the children who are regarded as legiti-
3
mate under customary law*
1* (1898) 1 N.L.R. 15* The relevant principle herein referred 
to is that laid down by Griffith J* to the effect that a 
Christian marriage clothes the parties thereto and their off­
spring with a status unknown to native law, meaning thereby 
that subsequent to the marriage the legal rights and obliga­
tions of the parties inter se and in respect of their children 
are to be determined withouT"recourse to native law and custom* 
Note that this principle has not been followed by a number of 
Nigerian cases, notably Asiato* v* Goncallo (1900) 1 N.L.R. 42 
and Smith v .Smith (1924) 5 N.L.R. 102*
2. (1922) 8 N .L.R* 68 , 69.
3* Some local courts, however, in practice include children born 
of a marriage contracted in accordance with statute even when 
the marriage does not also comply with customary law* It is 
interesting to test the validity of such a practice* It is 
probably the influence of Western education as the present 
Court Presidents are now literate*
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Because of the succession laws in Sierra Leone, it seems 
that the Adadevoh rule is appropriate in determining the legiti­
macy of a child. As has been seen, however, the rule produces 
startling results and must be deprecated*
A more effective approach would be to determine legitimacy 
for the purposes of every branch of the Sierra Leone legal system, 
so that if a child is regarded as legitimate under one branch he 
should possess that status for the purposes of the other branches* 
Once the parents are validly married under one law, the nullity 
of that marriage under another law should affect only the parties 
thereto, insofar as that law is concerned, but not their offspring. 
Legislation on this point is, therefore, necessary* An abortive 
step in this direction was taken in 1965 when the government pub­
lished a Bill * declaring all children of any citizens of Sierra 
Leone born after its passing to be legitimate* The Bill went 
beyond what is contemplated here, since it proposed to make even 
children born out of lawful wedlock legitimate*
o
The Bill never became law, but because of its revolution­
ary nature it is worth mentioning its salient provisions here* 
Firstly, all children born of parents, one of whom was a 
Sierra Leone citizen^ after the commencement of the Act were to
o
be legitimate, whether or not they were born in wedlock*
Secondly, it provided for legitimation per subsequens 
matrimonium where the parents married under the Civil or Christian 
Marriage Acts after the commencement of the Act and the father
4
was or at the date of the marriage resident in Sierra Leone*
1* Dated 3 September, 1965*
2* The Bill came under heavy fire from Sierra Leone1 s National 
Federation of Women*s Organizations*
3. Art*2(l).
4* Art.2(2).
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Thirdly, a person legitimated under the laws of the mother 
country by the subsequent marriage of his parents was to be treat­
ed as legitimate in Sierra Leone if his father was domiciled in 
that country at the date of the marriage.^
Fourthly, a legitimated person was to be entitled to take 
any interest (a) in the estate of an intestate dying after the 
date of legitimation; (b) under any disposition coming into 
operation after the date of legitimation; (c) by descent under 
an entailed interest created after the date of legitimation; in
2
like manner as if the legitimated person had been born legitimate.
Fifthly, the spouse, children or remoter issue of an ille- 
3
gitimate person who diecf after the commencement of the Bill and 
before the marriage of his parents would, if living at the time 
of the marriage, have had the same interest of that deceased per­
son who, if alive, would have been legitimated by the subsequent
4
marfiage of his parents.
Sixthly, a legitimated person would have had the feame 
rights and be subject to the same obligations in respect of the 
maintenance and support of himself or of any other person as if 
he had been born legitimate, and subject to the provisions of the 
Bill, any law relating to claims of damages, compensation, allow­
ance, benefit, or otherwise by or in respect of a legitimate child
would have applied in like manner as in the case of a legitimated 
5person.
Finally, after the commencement of the Bill if the mother 
of an illegitimate child died intestate without legitimate issue
1. Art. 8(1).
2. Art. 4(1).
3. i.e. the illegitimate person.
4. Art.6.
5. Art.7.
surviving her, her illegitimate child would have been entitled to 
take any interest in her property to which he would have been en­
titled had he been born legitimate*^ Similarly, the mother of 
an illegitimate child would have been entitled to any interest in 
the property of that child dying intestate to which she would
have been entitled had the child been born legitimate, and she
2
was the only surviving parent*
The provisions of the Bill were a carbon copy of the 
United Kingdom Legitimacy Act, 1926* But the Sierra Leone Bill 
differed from the United Kingdom Act in three respects* Firstly, 
a child born out of wedlock after the commencement of the Sierra 
Leone Bill was to be legitimated* Secondly, a person could have 
been legitimated in Sierra Leone even if at the time of his birth
3
one of his parents was married to a third person* Thirdly, a 
legitimated person would seem to have had the same rights to suc­
ceed to real or personal property, dignity and title of honour 
as a person born legitimate*
It is unfortunate that the Bill did not become law* At 
least it would have resolved the complex problem of internal con­
flicts .of law, at any rate in deciding the legitimacy of children 
born after its commencement*
5
Who is legitimate or illegitimate under the general law?
Under the general law,6 a child is legitimate if he is
1* Art*9(l)•
2. Art.9(2)*
3* The Bill omitted s*l(2) of the United Kingdom Legitimacy Act, 
1926, which did not regard such child as legitimated*
4* The Bill also omitted ss*l(3) and 3(3) of the United Kingdom 
Legitimacy Act, 1926, which limited the rights of legitimated 
persons in respect of such matters.
5* There has been a great deal of change in the law of legitimacy 
in English law which, because.they fall outside the reception 
date of English law in Sierra Leone, i*e* 1 January, 1880, do 
not apply to Sierra Leone* It is therefore, inappropriate to 
discuss these changes at length in this work*
6* Which is the English common law as received inSierra Leone*
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conceived or born in lawful wedlock.1 In other words, he must 
be b om  during the valid marriage of his parents or within a 
reasonable period after the dissolution of the marriage by di­
vorce or death of the husband, but he must have been conceived
o
before such dissolution. The phrase "lawful wedlock'1 implies 
that a valid marriage must be in subsistence between the parents 
of the child at the time of his conception or birth. For this 
purpose, a valid marriage need not be confined to one contracted 
under the Christian or Civil Marriage Acts. A marriage that is 
valid at customary law and a valid Mohammedan marriage which are
3
not void under the general law should be regarded as valid mar­
riage for the purpose of determining the legitimacy of the child­
ren. Any child born out of lawful wedlock is illegitimate. 
Moreover, a child of a void marriage is illegitimate whether or 
not a decree of nullity has been pronounced.
Children of a voidable marriage were at common law legiti­
mate so long as the marriage remained inexistence. But if it 
was annulled, the children became bastardised from the moment a
4
decree was pronounced.
Statutory law has now mitigated the common law rule in 
respect of children of voidable marriages. At first, children 
of a marriage that was annulled on the ground of venereal disease
in a communicable form suffered by one spouse at the time of the
1. See Graveson; The Conf 1 ict of Laws, 6th ed., p.378.
2. Dicey: Conflict of Laws (8th ed., 1967) 418, note 18.
3. But not so if the marriage is regarded as void under the gener­
al law, e.g. where a marriage valid at customary law is con­
tracted with a third party during the subsistence of a valid
marriage under the Christian Marriage Act. Note that in
Islamic law, the child must be conceived in wedlock before he 
can be legitimate. The general law would, however, regard a 
child of an Islamic marriage born but not conceived during the 
marriage as legitimate.
4. Rayden on Divorce. 11th ed., p«364.
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marriage were deemed legitimate by s*3(2) of the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1 9 4 9 Now, according to s*2 of the Matrimonial
2
Causes (Amendment) Act, 1961:
"Where a decree of nullity is granted in re­
spect of a voidable marriage, any child who 
would have been the legitimate child of the 
parties to the marriage if it had been dis­
solved, instead of being annulled, on the 
date of the decree shall be deemed to be 
their legitimate child notwithstanding the 
annulment •"
No Sierra Leone Court has as yet ruled on the precise 
meaning of this provision* Nevertheless, in our submission, it 
puts a decree of nullity of a voidable marriage on the same basis 
as a decree of divorce insofar as the legitimacy of the children 
are concerned* As children of divorcees born or conceived be­
fore a decree of divorce remain legitimate, in spite of the disso­
lution of their parents' marriage, so would the children of a 
voidable marriage that has been annulled continue to be legitimate 
despite the annulment*
3
Commenting on a similar provision in Nigerian law, Obi
has e3q?ressed doubt* He rightly says that the phrase "at the
date of the decree" could refer to the phrase "the legitimate
child of the parties to the marriage" or to the phrase "if it had
been dissolved instead of being annulled*" Thus, he concedes,
the section could read "any child who would have been legitimate
at the'date of the decree"* Prom this, Obi concludes that
"only children already born before the date of the decree of
4nullity could be legitimate*" , but
1* Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
2. Act No.16 of 1961. It has not yet been ruled upon whether or 
not this Act is retrospective* Cos£are with s*4(l) of the 
United Kingdom Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, 
repealed and substantially re-enacted by s*ll of the Matrimon­
ial Causes Act, 1965*
3* Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria* London, 1966, p*289*
4. Ibid*
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"children conceived during the subsistence 
of the marriage but born subsequent to its 
annulment would not be legitimate even if 
they were the joint biological product of 
the parties to the said marriage*"1
In our submission, there is nothing in the section to justify 
differentiating between children "born" and children "conceived” 
at the date of the decree* The section speaks of "child” with­
out the adjectives which Obi has supplied in his interpretation* 
The word "child”, as used in the section, it is submitted, means 
a child born or conceived during the subsistence of the marriage 
up to the time of its annulment; for, without the annulment of 
the marriage, these are the children who would be normally re­
garded as legitimate if the marriage were valid for all purposes 
and not merely voidable* It is not, therefore, right to prefer 
one child to the other especially when the statute is silent on 
the matter* Our submission is fortified in that a child that is 
conceived during marriage is, nevertheless, legitimate if before 
his birth the marriage of his parents is dissolved; and the in­
stant statutory provision aims at treating such child in thesame 
manner as the child, the marriage of whose parents is annulled 
during his lifetime*
Presumption of Legitimacy
If a child is bom to a married woman, her husband ispre- 
sumed to be its father and thus the child is regarded as legiti- 
mate until the contrary is proved* This presumption of legiti­
macy is commonly expressed in Sierra Leone by the Creole proverb 
"married woman nor day born bastar pikin (translated into Bng^ish 
literally as "a married woman cannot give birth to an illegitimate
1* Ibid*
2* In re Clarke (an infant) 1964-66 ALR S.L* .270 at p*273 per 
Bankole Jones C*J*
child"). Where the legitimacy of the child of a married woman 
is in issue, the burden of rebutting the presumption of legitimacy 
is cast upon the party alleging the illegitimacy, and in order to 
discharge it, that party must prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the husband is not the father of the child, and the evidence to
disprove legitimacy must be strong, distinct, satisfactory and
1 2 conclusive* Thus in re Clarke (an infant), H (husband) and
W (wife) married in April, 1956, and separated permanently three 
months afterwards• Thereafter, H had no access to W. Later 
in the year, VI went to live with another man as man; and wife and 
continued to do so until November, 1957, when she gave birth to a 
baby girl* This man fulfilled the responsibility of registering 
and christening the child and took her as his daughter, even send­
ing her for some time to his mother in Ghana, during the lifetime 
of H* After the birth of the child W continued cohabitation with 
the man and had another child by him* The couple lived together 
until June, 1965, when W died* Meanwhile, H had died in 1960 
while the marriage between him and W was still subsisting* On 
the question whether child born to W in November, 1957, was the 
legitimate child of H, it was held that in the absence of evidence 
from H and w, who were dead at the date of the proceedings, and 
after considering the conduct of the parties concerned and the cir­
cumstances existing at the time of conception and birth of the 
child as well as relevant facts both preceding and following them, 
the presumption of the legitimacy of the child was rebutted and 
that she was illegitimate*
Whether husband and wife can themselves give evidence to
1* In re Clarke (an infant), 1964-66 ALR S.L* 270 at p.277 per 
Bankole Jones, C.J. adopting the English case of Morris v* 
Davies (1837) 5 Cl. & Fin*163, 215.
2. 1964-66, ALR S.L. 270.
prove or disprove the legitimacy of a child borne by the wife is
a question which for a long time called for a negative answer*
At common law, it was not open to the husband os wife to give
evidence of non-access to bastardise a child born in wedlock
even though there might be doubts as to the child's legitimacy.1
The rule was, in English common law, founded on decency, morality
and public policy affecting the children bom during the marriage
2as well as the parties.themselves* The only person, therefore, 
who was competent to rebut the presumption of legitimacy was a 
stranger to the marriage* In certain cases, however, the rule 
was relaxed. Thus, in one case in which the legitimacy of a 
child born within a period less than the normal period of gesta­
tion was in issue, evidence of the husband that he did not have
3
access to the wife before the marriage was held to be admissible* 
Moreover, since the rule is primarily meant to prevent the bast­
ardizing of a child, if there is no child to bastardize it will
not apply* Thus, it was held inapplicable in a case where a
4
child was still-born* It must also be borne in mind that the 
rule was relevant only to proceedings involving questions of 
paternity or of bastardizing an issue but had no place in nullity 
actions where it was intended to prove that no intercourse took 
place between husband and wife, and in a prosecution for incest 
where the accused sought to disprove guilty intention when he 
gave evidence that he did not know that the girl with whom he
1* See the English cases: Goodright v* Moss (1777) 2 Cowp* 591,
592, 593 per Lord Mansfield; R. v* Sourton (1836) 5 Ad* & E 
180, 188, 189 per Lord Denman C.J. and Litiledale, J.; R. v* 
Kea, (1809) 11 East, 132; and Russell v* Russell [l924] AC687*
2* See Goodright v* Moss (1777) 2 Cowp* 591, 592 , 593 and Rt _ v* 
Kea (1809) 11 East, 132.
3* The Poulett Peerage [1903] A.C. 395.
4. Holland v. Holland [i925] P.101.
5. Farnham v. Farnham [1937] P.49*
was alleged to have committed incest was his daughter.*
The present position in Sierra Leone is now that spouses
are free to give evidence of non-access in order to bastardize a
child born during their marriage* This, it is submitted, is the
2effect of the Bvidence (Marital Intercourse) Act, s*l of which 
states:
"Notwithstanding any rule of law, the evi­
dence of a husband or wife shall be admis­
sible in any proceedings to prove that mari­
tal intercourse did or did not take place 
between them during any period:
Provided that a husband or wife shall not 
be compellable in any proceedings to give 
evidence of the matters aforesaid*"
Declaration of Legitimacy
3
Bromley has rightly pointed out two very important situ­
ations in which the legitimacy of a person may be put in issue* 
One is when that person wishes to claim an interest in property* 
The other is where a husband in a matrimonial proceeding wishing 
to establish that the wife has committed adultery alleges that he 
is not the father of a child born by the wife* We may also add 
a third situation, that is, where a person wishes to succeed to 
a title of honour, say, a paramount chief ship or headship of a 
family*
In order to remove doubts about a person's legitimacy,
4
s*19(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act provides that:
" (1) Any person who is a natural-born sub- 
ject of Her Majesty, or whose right to be 
deemed a natural-born subject of Her Majesty 
depends wholly or in part on his legitimacy 
or on the validity of any marriage, may, if
1* R v* Carmichael [1940] K.B. 630*
2. Cap.103 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
3. Op.cit., p*244*
4* Cap.102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone^960*
he is domiciled in Sierra Leone or claims 
any real or personal estate situated in 
Sierra Leone, apply by petition to the 
court for a decree declaring that the 
petitioner is the legitimate child of his 
parents, and that the marriage of his 
father and mother or of his grandfather 
and grandmother was a valid marriage or 
that his own marriage was a valid marriage."
Who may apply for a declaration of legitimacy?
Firstly, the applicant must either be domiciled in Sierra 
Leone or claim real or personal estate situated in Sierra Leone.
Secondly, he must be a natural-born subject of Her Majesty 
or his right to be deemed a natural-born subject of Her Majesty 
must depend wholly, or in part, on his legitimacy or the validity 
of any marriage.
Because of the constitutional changes injbierra Leone since 
the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1949, it is necessary 
to clarify the term "natural-born subject of Her Majesty", and we 
must begin with the use of the term in Britain.
Before the British Nationality Act, 1948, came into force,* 
a natural-born subject of His Majesty was any person who acquired 
British nationality at birth. Such a person could be either one 
born in a territory which formed part of His Majesty's dominions 
at the time of that person's birth, or one born outside those
dominions but whose father was a British subject at the time of
the birth of that person. Outside the group of natural-born 
subjects of His Majesty were children of persons entitled to 
diplomatic immunity, children of members of a foreign invading
q
army, children of enemy aliens, of British-protected persons,
1. The Act came into force on 1 January, 1949.
2. For a fuller discussion of this point, see J. Mervyn Jones:
British Nationality Law. London, O.U.P., 1956, pp.200-208.
3. British Protected Persons were British nationals (but not 
British subjects) only for the purposes of international law 
and were regarded as aliens. See Mervyn Jones, op;cit.. 185,
and of aliens. After the Act, insofar as our present discussion 
is concerned, the class of natural-born subjects of His Majesty 
remained the same but British protected persons for the first 
time acquired a status intermediate betwen aliens and British 
subjects, sharing some of the disabilities attached to aliens and 
at the same time, enjoying certain privileges not enjoyed by 
aliens.* Nevertheless, they did not become British subjects.
At the same time when the Sierra Leone Matrimonial Causes 
Act came into force, that is, on 1 November, 1950, natural-born 
subjects of His Majesty were as indicated above. Therefore, the 
children of the peoples of the Protectorate of Sierra Leone could 
not have been competent to apply for a declaration of legitimacy 
because their parents were not natural-born subjects of Her 
Majesty, as they were British-protected persons.
Since Independence, on 27 April, 1961, the people of 
Sierra Leone, British subjects as well as British protected per­
sons, became citizens of Sierra Leone, and the former terms 
"British subject" or "British-protected person" are no longer 
applicable to the peoples of the former Colony and protectorate. 
In the light of the changed circumstances, therefore, it would be 
reasonable to assume that natives from the Provinces can apply 
under s«19(l) of the Matrimonial Causes Act. Adhering to the 
strict letter of the section, and according the privilege only to 
those citizens who but for independence would still have been re­
garded as British subjects, would be putting the clock back, and 
would be tantamount to a further step in perpetuating what we 
have already decried, that is, the treatment of the citizens of 
the same country as two different peoples. But this concession
1. Mervyn Jones, op.cit.. 186.
is Bade only for the citizens of Sierra Leone and for the citizens 
of those former British protectorates which have attained to inde­
pendence and whose citizens have become Commonwealth citizens. 
Persons outside Sierra Leone who are not natural-born British 
subjects would still not avail themselves of the provisions of 
s.19 of the Matrimonial Causes Act.
Now that we have examined the meaning of the term "natural- 
born subject of Her Majesty", another matter we need to investi­
gate is whether the children of persons married under customary 
law or in accordance with Muslim rites can apply under the sec­
tion which we are discussing. S.19(6) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act states that:
"The provisions of the Act relating to
matrimonial causes shall, so far as appli­
cable, extend to any proceedings under 
this section."!
It must be remembered that s.2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act in­
tended the provisions of the Act to apply to only monogamous mar­
riages; for that section defines marriage for the purposes of 
the Act as "the union of one man and one woman for life to the
exclusion of all others". It would, therefore, seem, at first
sight, that only persons relying on monogamous marriages for 
their legitimacy can apply under s.l9(l).
But from s*19(6) it is quite clear that neither a declara­
tion of legitimacy under s .19(1) nor a declaration that a person 
is "a natural-born subject of Her Majesty", which is provided for 
under s.l9(2) of thejAct, is a matrimonial cause; for if such 
matters were regarded as such, it would not have been necessary 
for s.19(6) to be enacted.
The rule formulated by Lord Penzance in the English
1. i.e. dealing with declaration of legitimacy.
case of Hyde v* Hyde,* which seems to have been the origin of s*2
of the Sierra Leone Matrimonial Causes Act and w&ich^on the face
of it, excludes jurisdiction in regard to polygamous marriages,
has been confined to matrimonial reliefs; and despite the rule
in Hyde v* Hyde, the English courts have shown themselves prepared
to consider and determine questions relating to the validity of a
2polygamous marriage and the legitimacy of the children of such
3 CLmarriages* One may, therefore,submit that a child of^custom-
4
ary or Mohammedan marriage who fulfils the other conditions im­
posed by s*19 can make an application under s*19(l)* The ex­
pression "the provisions of thejAct relating to matrimonial causes
*•* so far as applicable" used in s*19(6) would be interpreted to 
refer to the procedural aspects of the Act only and would not ex­
tend to the jurisdiction or lack of it of the High Court to hear 
petitions under s«19 where the marriage on which the petitioner 
relies for his legitimacy is a non-monogamous one*
B. NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP
After dealing with the nationality and citizenship of a
5
married woman, we can now treat the two concepts as one and con- 
sider them from that viewpoint in relation to children*
The acquisition of Sierra Leone citizenship by children is 
ohe which has evoked much interest in Sierra Leone since Independ­
ence, culminating in the classic case of Akar v* Attorney-General
1. (1866) L.R. I P & D 130.
2. Baindail v. Baindail [1946] P.122.
3. The Sinha Peerage Case [1946] 1 All E.R* 348 (H*L») per Lord 
Mangham* "
4* Note that under s*13(l) of the Local Courts, 1963, a Local 
Court has no jurisdiction over questions dealing with the 
status of an individual*
5. In Chapter 8.
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of Sierra Leone.*
o
At first, the Constitution of Sierra Leone, which came 
into effect on 27 April, 1961, provided by s.1(1) that:
"every person, who, having been born in 
... Sierra Leone, was on April 26th, 1961, 
a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colo- ^ 
nies or a British protected person shall 
become a citizen of Sierra Leone on 
April 27, 1961;
Provided that a person shall become a 
citizen of Sierra Leone by virtue of 
this subsection if neither of his par­
ents nor any of his grandparents was 
born in the former colony or protector­
ate of Sierra Leone .**
Similarly, s.l(2) conferred automatic citizenship on such
a person born outside Sierra Leone before independence and whose
father became or would, but for his death, have become a Sierra
Leone citizen in accordance withthe provisions of s.l(l).
According to ss.4 and 5, a child born in or outside Sierra
Leone, one of whose parents is a Sierra Leone citizen, becomes a
citizen of that country by birth.
To resolve the conflict of dual citizenship, s.6 provided
that an infant could have the citizenship of Sierra Leone and
that of another country until he reached his majority when he
would lose his Sierra Leone citizenship if he did not renounce
the other.
Next, on 17 March, 1962, s.l(l) of the Constitution was
3
amended by the Constitution (Amendment)(No.2) Act, 1962, which 
inserted in s.l(l) after the words "every person" the words "of 
negro African descent". S.1(3) defined the phrase "person of 
negro African descent" as meaning:
1. 1967-68 ALR S.L. 283 (S.C.), 381 (C.A.), [l970] AC.853 (P.C.).
2. P.N. 78 of 1961.
3. Act No.12 of 1962.
"a person whose father and his father»s 
father are or were negroes of African 
origin.”
S.l(4) provided further that:
"any person, either of whose parents is 
a negro of African descent and would, but 
for the provisions of subsection (3), have 
been a Sierra Leone citizen, may on making 
... be registered as a citizen of Sierra 
Leone, but such person shall not be quali­
fied to become a member of the House of 
Representatives or of any district council 
or other local authority unless he shall 
have resided continuously in Sierra Leone 
for twenty-five years after such registra­
tion or shall have served in the civil or 
regular armed services of Sierra Leone for 
a continuous period of twenty-five years."
The amendment was deemed to have come into operation on 
27 April, 1961.1
The cumulative effect of these provisions is that whereas 
under the Constitution, as it stood in 1961 without an amendment, 
a child could become a citizen of Sierra Leone by birth if one of 
his parents or grandparents was born in Sierra Leone; with the 
amendment in 1962, there was a further qualification, that is, 
that his father or father* s'father should be a negro of African
origin. As the amendment Act was retrospective, it reduced to 
"second-class” 2 citizens, falling within the provisions of s.l(3) 
of the 1962 Amendment Act, persons who were hitherto full and 
"first-class" citizens under the original provisions of the Con­
stitution. Consequently, a child born in or outside Sierra 
Leone, one of whose parents is a citizen of Sierra Leone but 
having a father or father* s father who is not a negro of African
1 * 9 ^  *1 *
2. The expressions "first-class" and "second-class" were used by 
Counsel for the jJaintiff in the Supreme Court to describe re­
spectively persons automatically entitled to citizenship by 
birth and those who became citizens only on registration. The 
Act itself did not use the term.
origin no longer became a Sierra Leone citizen by birth*
There are many such people in Sierra Leone, and John Akar, 
the plaintiff in the aforementioned case, was one of them* In 
that case,* the plaintiff sought a declaration from the Supreme 
Court of Sierra Leone that the 1962 Amendment to the Constitution 
was ultra vires on several grounds, one of which being that the 
inclusion of the words 11 negro of African descent" made the Amend­
ment a discriminatory piece of legislation on the basis of race* 
The Supreme Court granted the declaration sought, but the 
Sierra Leone Court of Appeal reversed that decision* On appeal 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it was held 
that the add$d qualification for citizenship was essentially a 
racial one and, therefore, it contravened the Constitution,and 
was invalid*
There is no doubt that the judgment was binding in Sierra 
Leone during the pre-Republican era* It is submitted that even 
though the country is now a Republic and a new Supreme Court with­
in the country has now replaced the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, the decision is still good law until it is rever­
sed*^
Quite apart from the situation already discussed, s*2(l) 
of the 1961 Constitution places another stumbling block in the
1. Akar v* Attorney-General_of Sierra Leone, 1967-68* ALR S.L. 
232P(S.C7J! 381 (C.A.) [l£7o] A.C. 8^3 (P.C.).
2* Lords Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Hodson, Wilber force and Sir 
Gordon Willmer (Lord Gest dissented) *
3. In a tribute made to a deceased member of the Sierra Leone
legal profession shortly after the country became a Republic,
Justice C.O.B. Cole, the Chief Justice, said that Sierra
Leone was no longer bound by decisions of the Privy Council*
This assertion has no legal binding force, as it was merely
an extra-judicial statement*
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way of a child whose father or father1s father is not a negro of 
African origin* In the case of a male child under 21 years of 
age, or a female under that age and unmarried, neither can dir­
ectly apply to be registered as a citizen; it is the parent or 
guardian that must do so on their behalf*
The citizenship provisions of the 1961 Constitution are 
still in force and the provisions relating to the citizenship of 
children may be summarised as follows :-
A child becomes a citizen of Sierra Leone if one of his 
parents is a citizen of that country or if dead would have become 
a citizen had he not died* In addition, the child's father or 
paternal grandfather must be a negro of African origin* Secondly, 
where the father or paternal grandfather is not a negro of African 
origin, but the mother is and one of the parents is a Sierra 
Leone citizen, a parent or guardian can apply on the child's be­
half to become a citizen of Sierra Leone* Thirdly, a child can 
during his minority possess dual citizenship, but unless he re­
nounces the other on his reaching majority, he will lose his Sierra 
Leone citizenship* Finally, a child born in Sierra Leone does 
not become a citizen of that country if at the time of his birth 
his father enjoyed diplomatic immunity or was an enemy alien and 
the child was born in a place then occupied by the enemy
C. MAINTENANCE
(i) Legitimate children
At common law, neither the father nor the mother of a
1* S.4(2)(a) and (b) of thel961-Constitution*
421 •
legitimate child has a legal duty to maintain that child*1 But
2
the father has a moral duty, and if the spouses are separated
3 4and the wife has custody of the child, she, but not the child,
can enforce that moral obligation by pledging her husband* s credit 
for necessaries supplied to her for the benefit of the child* 
Statutory law in Sierra Leone has, however, imposed' a 
legal duty on the parents to maintain their children in prescribed 
circumstances*
We shall fi?st consider the relevant provisions of the 
Children and Young Persons Act*5 Under s*23, where a child under 
the age of fourteen years resorts to crime as a result of neglect 
by the parents, if he is found guilty by a juvenile court of any 
offences punishable by a fine or compensation or costs are awarded 
against him at the trial, the court has power to order the parent 
of the child to meet the financial responsibility*^ If the 
parent fails to discharge it, distress will be levied against him 
or her at the instance of the complainant* Moreover, under 
s*30, if a child under the age of seventeen years is committed to 
the care of an institution, a fit person or an approved school, 
upon the application of the guardian, a court can make a contri­
butory order against the child's parent for the maintenance of the
o
child during the period that the child is in care* Any amount
1* Halsbury* s Laws of England* 3rd ed., Vol*21, para*419, p*189«
2* Halsbury's, op*cit* * para*420, p.189*
3* See the English case of Bazeley v* Forder (1868) fc.R. 3 Q.B* 555
4* See the English cases of Shelton v* Springett (1851) 11 C*B*
452; Mortimore v* Wright (1840 ) 6 M & W, 482*
5. Cap.44 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
6. S«23(l)*
7* S.23(3)*
8* See also ss*20 and 21 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
Act, cap«31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
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ordered by the court to be paid by the parent may be recovered by 
the person in whose favour it is made in the same manner as if it 
were a civil debt owing to him by the parent.*
It is not clear from s*23 and s*30 read together, which of 
the parents is liable for the maintenance of the child* In both 
sections, the word "parent" is used in the singular* Probably 
it is the parent who was liable to maintain the child at the time 
of the commission of the crime for which the child was found guilty 
or immediately prior to the giving of the child into the care of 
an institution, a fit person or an approved school* Thus, it is
submitted, where the father and mother axe cohabiting at the
material time, it is the father who is the parent liable, because
he has a duty to maintain the child at common law* In the event
of the separation of the spouses and the child is in the custody
of the mothex, if the father fails to make adequate provision for
the child*s maintenance, he is again liable* But if, it issxb-
mitted, the father has provided necessaries for the child while
in his mother* s custody or if the father is dead„ the mother
ought to bear the responsibility of the subsequent unbecoming
conduct of the child*
Secondly, under s*4 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Child*
2ren Act, if any person over the age of sixteen years, who has
3
the custody, charge, or care of any child neglects, abandons or 
causes the child to be neglected or &andoned in a manner likely to 
cause the child unnecessary suffering or injury to his health,
that person is guilty of an offence* The section simply speaks 
of the person having "the custody, charge or care of the child"*
1* S.30(3)*
2* Cap.31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
3. A "child" is defined by s*2 of tbeAct as a person under the 
age of sixteen years*
Therefore, while the child is living with his parents, since it 
is the father who has a common law moral duty to maintain the 
child, it is he who will be liable if the child is eaqposed to 
suffering or injury through neglect to provide maintenance for 
him* But as in the case of the Children and Young Persons Act, 
if the spouses are separated and the mother has the custody of 
the child, and the father has no obligation to maintain him, it is 
she who will be liable*
Thirdly, under the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act,* if 
a father wilfully neglects to provide reasonable maintenance for 
the infant children of the marriage, upon the application of the 
mother, the High Court can order the father to make periodic pay­
ments to the mother* A wife, however, cannot enforce the child's 
right to maintenance against his father under this provision un­
less she has a ground to be judicially separated from her husband* 
Once such a ground is established, it is submitted, the court may 
make the order whether or not the spouses are still living to­
gether* This is the only statutory provision in Sierra Leone 
law whereby a wife can, during cohabitation, compel her husband 
to maintain the children of the family* Otherwise, she must 
exercise her common law right cf. pledging his credit*
Finally, in a petition for divorce, nullity or for resti­
tution of conjugal rights, the High Court can order any of the
o
parents to maintain the children of the marriage, and may order
property belonging to any of the spouses to be settled for the
3benefit of such children* Under these provisions, in deserv­
ing cases, it is submitted, a maintenance order may be made again­
st the mother of the children. An order for secured provision
1. S,4 of Act No*16 of 1961*
2* Ss*22(2) and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, cap*102*
3* Ibid*. s*23.
for a child lasts only during the minority of that child,, that is, 
when he is under the age of 21 years,1
(ii) Illegitimate children
At common law, neither the father nor the mother of an
2
illegitimate child is liable to maintain him. It was the parish
in which the mother resided that was responsible for the child's 
3
maintenance. Thus, the weapon of pledging the husband's cre­
dit for necessaries for the benefit of the children of the spouses 
which is used by the mother of a legitimate child is not avail­
able to the mother of an illegitimate child against the putative 
father. Any improvement in the lot of the illegitimate child is* 
therefore, absolutely statutory,
4
We must begin with the Act for the Amendment and Better 
Administration of the Laws relating to the Poor in England and 
Wales, 1834, S,71 of this Act imposed upon the mother of an
illegitimate child the obligation to maintain him until the child 
reaches the age of sixteen years, so long as the mother is un­
married or a widow. The obligation, however, lasts for the 
period of her lifetime and does not affect her estate on her 
death,5 Furthermore, s. 57 makes it an obligation on a man who
marries a woman having a child at the time of the marriage to
1, Ibid,» s.24(3) proviso,
2, See dicta of Cockburn C.J. and Wightman and Blackburn J.J. in 
the English case of Ruttinger v. Temple (1863) 4 B & S 491,
495, 496,
3, See the case of R v, Hemlington in Note 2 to thejEnglish case 
of Simpson v, JoEnson (17^8) 1 Dougl, 9,
4, This Act Applies in Sierra Leone as a statute of general appli­
cation in force in England on 1 January, 1880, See s,74 of 
the Sierra Leone Courts Act, 1965, Act No,31 of 1965,
5, See Ruttinger v. Temple (1863) 4 B & S, 491,
maintain such child as part of his family, whether the child i£ 
legitimate or illegitimate, until the child is sixteen years of 
age, or until the death of its mother.
Next, it would seem that the provisions of the local 
Children and Young Persons Act apply to illegitimate children as 
much as they do to those that are legitimate, for s,2 defines a 
child simply as "a person under the age of fourteen years1' and a 
young person as "a person who is fourteen years of age or upwards 
and under the age of seventeen years". What is doubtful, how­
ever, is the meaning of the word "parent" when used in relation 
to an illegitimate child. Probably, in this context, it means 
the mother, because according to s,27(l)(d) of the Act, a child 
or young person that may be entrusted to the care of an approved 
school or a fit person is one
"found destitute, not being an orphan and 
having both parents or his surviving parent, 
or in the case of an illegitimate child or 
young person, his mother, undergoing im­
prisonment,"
This section, it is submitted, impliedly recognises the duty of 
the mother of an illegitimate child to take care of him and to 
provide him with the necessaries of life and if she cannot per­
form that duty because she is incarcerated and the child becomes 
destitute, then the child cam be sent to an approved school or 
given to a fit person. If a similar duty were imposed on the 
putative father the section would not have contained the word 
"mother" specifically and omitted the word "father",
Ttop Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1 is more defi­
nite on the point at issue. Among the persons against whom a 
contribution order for the maintenance of a child cam be made 
are a step-parent, a person cohabiting with the child's mother, 
and in the case of an illegitimate child, the child's putative
1, Cap,31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960,
father.1 Before such an order could be made, however, the per­
son against whom it is intended to be made must be liable to main­
tain the child.
As will be seen shortly, in the case of a putative father, 
the liability to maintain his illegitimate child arises when there 
is an affiliation order against him in respect of that child*
But the proviso to s*21 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
Act seems to regard liability arising from some other source be­
cause the section states that when an affiliation order against 
the putative father has previously been made, the court will not 
make a contribution order against him unless it thinks it desir­
able in view of the special circumstances* An affiliation order 
apart, therefore, a putative father's liability to maintain his 
illegitimate child would be inferred from the Prevention of Cru­
elty to Children Act if the child is in the custody, charge or
care of the putative father at that time when an offence under
2
the Act is committed against the child* This is the only 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the provisions of the
Act in the absence of an express statement stipulating when a
person is liable to maintain a child, since a putative father has
no common law duty to maintain his illegitimate child*
The clearest indication of the duty of a putative father to
3
maintain his illegitimate child is found in the Bastardy laws, 
but the initiative must be taken by the child's mother* Under
1* Ibid*, s.21*
2* The Act deals with offences committed against children under 
the age of 16 by persons under whose custody, charge or care 
the children are*
3* The Bnglish Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872, which applies 
in Sierra Leone as a statute of general application in force 
in England before the 1st day of January, 1880, and the local 
Act to Increase Payments for the Support of Illegitimate Child­
ren, Act No*12 of 1961*
the Bnglish Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872, the mother of an 
illegitimate child may apply to a Magistrate's Court for the 
father of the child to be adjudged the putative father and for an 
order that he should pay a weekly sum * for the maintenance, edu­
cation and expenses incidental to the birth of the child, and if
the child dies before the date of the order, for his funeral ex- 
2penses•
In order to succeed, the applicant must be a single woman*
This term is not confined to an unmarried woman, but it includes
a married woman who is reduced to the condition of a single woman
by widowhood or otherwise* Therefore, if the mother of the
child has married since the birth of the child, and is at the
time of the application living with her husband, she cannot apply
under the Act for an affiliation order against the child's puta- 
4tive father* The application must be made either before the 
birth of the child or within twelve months from his birth* But 
an application can be entertained outside this period if within 
twelve months after the birth of the child, the putative father
5
has paid money for the child's maintenance* Before the court 
can make an order, the applicant must give evidence which must be 
corroborated in some material particular by other evidence to the 
satisfaction of the court*6
Finally, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1* The weekly maximum sum provided for by the Act is five shilling 
This has now been increased to thirty shillings by the Act to 
Increase Paymentsfor the Support of Illegitimate Children Act, 
No.12 of 1961.
2* S.4 of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872*
3. See Roberts v. Leigh, 1964-66 ALR S.L. 80 at 83 per Cole J* 
adopting Lush J. m  the Bnglish case of Stacey v* Lintell 
(1878) 4 Q.B.D* 291 at 294*
4* Ibid*
5* S.3 of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872*
6* S*4, ibid*
7* Cap*19 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
creates another avenue through which an illegitimate child can be
hoi cui
maintained where any of his natural parent s^be^ki lied in^accident,
S«3 of the Act enacts that for the purposes of claims under the
Fatal Accidents Act, 1846-18&**,
"any illegitimate person shall be treated 
as being or as having been the legitimate 
offspring of his mother and reputed father•"
D, CUSTODY
(i) Definition
The word "custody” used in connection with a child is cap­
able of more than one meaning. Firstly, it may refer to the 
physical charge or control of a child and nothing more. For
example, while my wife and I have an evening out we may leave our
baby in the charge or control of a baby-sitter. All that the re­
lationship between the baby and the baby-sitter involves is that 
the latter takes care of the former and protects him from immed­
iate injury and harm. Secondly, custody may exceed physical 
control and include the power to administer reasonable chastise­
ment to the child, to control his religion and education, and to 
protect, either physically or through the process of law, the
child*s person and proprietary interests against strangers. It 
also gives the custodian the right to the services of the child 
which, if invaded by a third party, gives rise to a cause of ac­
tion at the instance of the custodian. Finally, it may entail 
the power to see the child temporarily and have the pleasure of 
his company. Thus, the father of a child may be empowered by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to visit or be visited by the 
child for, say, a day in a week, while the child is under the per­
manent care and control of the mother.
Our first example of "custody" amounts to a de facto con-
trol and it is more appropriate to call it "charge, care or con­
trol", The third may be correctly termed "access". It is the 
second that is equivalent to legal custody and it is in this con­
text that the term will be used in this sub-heading and wherever 
we refer to custody of a child in a parent-child relationship,
(ii) Legitimate Children
Questions regarding the children’s custody rarely, if ever, 
arise while the parents are cohabiting, and taking proper care of 
their children. As against strangers, both parents have the 
custody of their children. It is only when the spouses are sepa­
rated or divorced or when the children are neglected and there­
fore need the protection of the state, that the issue as to who 
is entitled to their custody becomes relevant. We are, therefore, 
discussing the topic in this light.
At common law, the father had the right, as against the
mother and other parties, to the custody of his legitimate child­
ren until they become of age,* except that in the case of a daugh-
ter, the right determined when she married under age. The father 
could, however, be deprived of the child’s custody, but not neces­
sarily in favour of the mother, if he was a person unfit to remain
in custody of the child or if his remaining so would be against
3the interest of the child,
1. i.e. 21 years,
2. See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol.21, para,425,p,192^
3. See the Bnglish case In re Taylor (an Infant) , (1876) 4 Ch,D,
157 at 159 per Jessel, M.R. See also two other English cases:
Ex parte Warner (1792) 4 Bro.C.C. 10 and De Manneville v. De
Mannevil'le (1804) 10 Ves.52. The father, in both cases, was 
deprived. of the custody of his children. In the first case, 
the father who had no fixed residence was unable to provide for 
the children but wanted to force them out of a good school 
which they were attending and to abscond with them. In the 
other case, the father, a foreigner, was a profligate with 
drunken habits and he wanted to take the children out of the
jurisdiction of the English courts. See also the headnote of 
the English case R. v. Grenhill (1836) 4 Ad & E 624.
As long as the father had custody, his right prevailed 
even after his death* Thus, he could by deed or will appoint a 
guardian of his legitimate children who were under age or unmar­
ried (in the case of daughters),* and the guardian could act 
jointly with the mother of the children, or solely*
The right of the father has now been whittled down by
statute law* There is no local enactment on the subject and so
2the relevant Bnglish statutes at the reception date apply*
Firstly, by the Custody of Infants Act, 1839, the mother
could be granted by the Court of Chancery the custody of the
children under the age of seven, and beyond that age, access, for
3
any period until the children reached their majority* Under 
this Act, however, if the mother was proved in an action for cri­
minal conversation to have committed adultery she would be en-
4
titled to neither custody nor access*
Secondly, the Custody of Infants Act, 1873, reserved the 
right of the mother to apply to the Court of Chancery for custody 
or access and altered the age of the child to 16 years up to 
which the mother could have the custody of the child*5 Whatever 
happens after that age and before 21 is a matter for ^ peculation* 
Probably, as the latter statutory developments in English law do 
not apply in Sierra Leone, the father again becomes entitled to
1* This right was conferred by the Tenures Abolition Act, 1 6 6 0jSfS 
2* i.e. 1 January, 1880*
3* S.l of the Custody of Infants Act, 1839*
4* Ibrd;, s*4*
5* The Custody of Infants Act, 1873, repealed the Custody of In­
fants Act, 1839* The latter Act did not, however, reserve
thejprovisions of the former relating to depriving the wife of 
custody or access if she was guilty of adultery* That the 
commission of adultery is no bar in Sierra Leone to a mother 
having custody, see Spaine v* Spaine* 1964-66, ALR S.L. 249, 
251-2 per Beoku-Betts J*
1
the same rights as under the common law*
Sierra Leone case law, however, has adopted the principle
that in deciding who is to have the custody of the infant child-
oren, regard must be had to the interests of the children* It 
is these interests that are paramount* In arriving at a deci­
sion as to who should have custody, the courts have taken into 
consideration all the surrounding circumstances of the case, in­
cluding the lives of the father and mother, both before and after 
the dissolution of the marriage, the age andssx of the child, its 
health and the effect on him on his being brought up in an environ*
ment separate from that which his brothers and sisters, if any,
3
are living* Where, after considering these interests, either 
parent is fit to have the custody, it is submitted, that the
4
common law right of the father should prevail*
Without resorting to court, the parents can agree as to 
who of the two should have a child* s custody* Under the common 
law, such an agreement was void on grounds of public policy, but 
now, by s*2 of the Custody of Infants Act, 1873, the agreement is 
valid, but not enforceable unless it is for the benefit of the
f * The United Kingdom Custody of Infants Act, 1886, extended the 
right of the mother to have the custody of her children until 
they reach 21 years of age* Also, the Guardianship of In­
fants Act, 1925, enacted that neither the father nor the mother 
has a superior claim to the other in regard to the custody of 
their children*
2* See In the Matter of Zenebah Mustapha & Ors - Infants (1936)
3 S.L* Law Recorder 19; see the complete records of this case 
in the Supreme Court Records (1936) Vol*2, p.100. In the 
above case, the English case of In re Taylor (an Infant)(18761
4 Ch*}>157 was considered and adopted. There is no local sta­
tutory law in Sierra Leone on the matter.
3* Spaine v* Spaine, 1964-66 ALR S.L. 249, 251-2 per Beoku-Betts 
J.
4* See Buck v* Buck, nnreported, decided by the Supreme Court at 
Freetown on 24 March, 1924*
5. See Halsbury* s Laws of England, 3rd ed*, Vo 1.21, par a. 43©, 
p.195.
infant child*
(iii) Illegitimate children
The reverse situation to that of a legitimate child existed 
at common law in regard to the custody of an illegitimate child*
It was the mother and not the natural father that was entitled to j
1 2 it* Note that Kasunmu and Salacuse state, without citing an
authority, that at common law neither the father nor the mother
had the right to the custody of an illegitimate child* Professor
James, too, seems to subscribe to this view, relying on dicta of
4 5Maule, J* in Re Lloyd, and of Ellenborough C.J. in R v* Hopkins * j
It is submitted that there is nothing in these cases in support '
of Professor James's statement* In Re Lloyd, Maule J* was con- 1
!
cerned with the interpretation of s*57 of the Poor Laws Act,1834, 
relating to the obligation of a man who married the mother of an 
illegitimate child to maintain that child as a member of his 
family* What Maule J. said was that according to this section, 
"the applicant's husband would appear to be the fit person" to 
have the child's custody* In the final analysis, however, 
neither contender had the custody because the child refused to go 
with either parent* In R v* Hopkins, it is conceded that Ellen­
borough C.J. expressed doubt whether the court could ihterfere on 
behalf of the mother of an illegitimate child whom the learned 
Chief Justice said "had no legal right to the person of the 
child*" He said that that was a question of guardianship which
1* See the English cases of R v* Hemlington reported in Note 2 of 
the case of Simpson v* JoHnson (177&) i Doug 1.7 i Ex parte 
Anne Knee (1&04) i Bos & Pul (N.R*) 148; R v* Nasb (1883) 10 
Q.B.b. 4^4.
2* Op*cit*, at p*256*
3* Child Law, London, 1962, at p.37*
4. (1841) 4 M & G 547.
5* (1806) 7 East 579.
he was not deciding as it "belongs to the Lord Chancellor repre­
senting the King in Chancery"* Surely, Professor James does not 
use "custody" as a synonym for "guardianship" which Ellenborough
C.J. had in mind, for the Professor rightly says earlier,* that
"custody" is narrower than "guardianship" and it is in the former
context that he uses the word in the statement we are discussing*
We concede that at common law a mother of an illegitimate child
had no legal right to the guardianship of the child, otherwise it
would not be possible for the court to deprive her of the child's
custody when the child needed the state's protection* But she
had right to the child's custody as against the putative father i
and strangers so long as the Chancery Court did not exercise its
right of guardianship when the child was exposed to danger on its
being left with her*
After this digression, we may now continue our main point
and say that against the father, the mother's right of custody
was absolute, even though from his circumstances, he might be
2better able to caxe for the child* The mother, however, could
be deprived of the child's custody only when there was apprehen­
sion that the child would be exposed to danger from being left 4 
with her*^
The modem trend of regarding the interests of the child 
as the paramount consideration when determining its custody ap­
pears to be the same for illegitimate as well as for legitimate
1. Op.cit., pp.1-2.
2. Ex parte Anne Knee (1804) 1 Bos & Pul (N.R.) 148, 149 per 
KfaSsfTeT3TT .------
3. Ibid.
t
children. But before an illegitimate child can be given into 
the custody of a complete stranger where neither parent is suit­
able, the blood-relations on the mother's side must first be con- 
2
sidered. Though this principle emanated from the Bnglish doc­
trines of equity, it represents one of the few instances in which 
the general law takes cognizance of the social background of the 
Sierra Leone people; for, among the various tribes in the country, 
as will be seen in Chapter 19, an illegitimate child belongs to 
the family of its mother or a member thereof.
E. OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN AND THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF 
PARENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THEIR CHILDREN
A parent, guardian or someone in lawful control of a child 
has the power to control the child, but such power must be exer­
cised cautiously and reasonably and must not be to the detriment
of, nor result in danger, mental or physical, to the child.
Sierra Leone law does not recognise a jus vitae necisque in deal­
ings with children.
Power to control, however, entails the right to administer 
reasonable chastisement and anyone in lawful control of a child
1. In re Clarke (an Infant) 1964-66 ALR S.L. 270 at 276. In this 
case, Bankole Jones, C.J. presiding over the Supreme Court of 
Sierra Leone, considered the child's interest as paramount and 
held that nobody has an absolute right to custody. In Anoff 
v. Fofanah 1967-68, ALR S.L. 357 at 359 where Dobbs J., also 
presiding over the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone, accepted the 
rule that the child's welfare is paramount, but said that it 
was not exclusive and that the wishes of the mother must pre­
vail against those of the father, if having regard to her wish­
es the child's welfare is not impaired. It is submitted that 
the opinion of Dobbs J. is to be preferred.
2. See In re Claurke (an Infant) (supra) at p.276 per Bankole Jones 
J. adopting Jessel, M.R. in the English case of R v. Nash 
(1883) 10 Q.B.D. 454.
may administer such correction with impunity*1 He is also 
duty-bound to look after the child properly and if he fails to 
discharge this duty and the child becomes destitute or falls into 
bad habits to the extent of contravening the law, the person 
under whose control the child is will bear the responsibility im­
posed by law*
In this sub-heading, therefore, we are concerned with the 
circumstances under which a parent, guardian or someone in lawful 
control of a child is criminally responsible for his dealings 
with the child, or is vicariously liable for the acts perpetrated 
by the child*
(i) Offences against children
The child is protected by the law even while it is in the
womb of its mother* Thus, abortion is a crime carrying a maxi-
2
mum penalty of two years1 imprisonment* Similarly, it is an
offence carrying the same penalty for anyone to conceal the dead
body of a child, whether the child died before, at, or after its 
3
birth* It is also the crime of infanticide punishable like 
manslaughter for a mother to cause the death of her child under 
the age of twelve months if, at the time cf the act or omission 
that causes the death, she suffers from mental disturbance be­
cause she has not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth 
or because of the effect of suckling the child*
Various other offences are created by the Prevention of
1* See s*3 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, cap*31 
of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
2* See ss*58 and 59 of the United Kingdom Offences against the 
Persons Act, 1861, which is in force in Sierra Leone as a 
statute of general application in Bngland on 1 January, 1880*
3. Ibid*
4* Cap*28 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
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Cruelty to Children Act 1 in respect of acts and omissions against
children under the age of sixteen years, and they may conveniently
be classified into two divisions*
Firstly, those dealing with the physical and mental welfare
of the child* It is an offence for any person over the age of
sixteen years, who has the custody, charge or care of any child,
wilfully to assault, illwtreat, neglect, abandon, or expose such
a child or cause of procure such child to be assaulted, ill-
treated, neglected, abandoned or exposed, so as to cause the child
2unnecessary suffering or injury to health, bodily or mental* 
Neglect of the child will be inferred when the person liable to 
maintain it fails to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid,
3
or lodging for the child* Moreover, if a child under the age
of three years is found in bed suffocated to death and there is
evidence that the child has been in bed with a person over the
age of sixteen years who was drunk at the time, that person is
4deemed to have neglected the child*
Secondly, there are offences dealing with the moral welfare 
of the child, and their gravity ranges in accordance with the age 
of the child* Thus, to have unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl 
under the age of thirteen years carries a maximum penalty of fif- 
teen years' imprisonment, while a similar offence against a girl 
between 13 and 14 years is punishable with imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding two years*^ Indecent assault or an attempt
1* Cap.31*
2. S*4(l)«
3. S*4(l)(b)*
4. S.5.
5. S.6.
6* S *7*
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to have carnal knowledge of a girl under 14 years of age is also
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding two years,* and so is
procuring or attempting to procure any child, not being a common
prostitute, or of known immoral character, to have unlawful sexual 
2intercourse•
A person in custody, charge or care of a child above the 
age of four years who allows the child to reside in or to frequent 
a brothel, commits an offence punishable by a fine and/or imprison-
3
ment for a period of not mob than six months. It is also an
offence carrying a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding two years 
for such person to cause of encourage the seduction or prostitu­
tion or unlawful carnal knowledge of a child under the age of 16
4
years. It is the duty of householders to prevent the presence 
of children in their premises for the purposes of unlawful sexual 
intercourse. If they fail in this duty, and it is proved that 
they induced or knew of the presence of the child for such im­
moral purpose, they are liable to the same penalty as a guardian 
who encourages the seduction of such children. Similarly, any
person who abducts an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen 
years from the possession and against the will of her father, 
mother or anyone under whose lawful control the girl is, is liable 
to the same punishment.^
Finally, a magistrates' court has power, on the complaint 
of any person that a girl under the age of sixteen years is, with
1. S.9.
2. S.10.
3. S.8.
4. S.13.
5. S.ll.
6. S.12.
the knowledge of her parents or guardian, exposed to the risk of 
seduction or prostitution, or of unlawful carnal knowledge or 
living a life of prostitution, to order her parent or guardian to 
enter into a recognisance to exercise due care and supervision in
•t
respect of the child*
The above offences are additional to the general criminal 
liability for wrongs committed by one member of the society 
against another*
(ii) Vicarious liability of parents and guardians for the con­
duct of children
(a) Liability for Torts
As a rule, a parent is not vicariously liable for the torts
2of his or her children* But where there is a relationship of
master and servant between the parent and child or where the
parent is negligent in the control of the child, he will be vicar-
3
iously liable for the torts committed by the child*
Vicarious liability arises in the case of master and ser­
vant relationship where the parent employs the child as his or her 
servant, and the child commits the tortious wrong in the course of
his employment* Thus, for example, if the parent is a shop owner 
and employs his 18 year old son to sell the wares on the premises, j 
if the son unlawfully assaults a customer while in the shop and 
during opening hours, the parent will be vicariously liable to 1 
the customer*
A parent is under a duty to control his child even when the 
child is not employed by him, a duty which he must carry out as a
1. S.16.
2. Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 13th ed*, 1969, para.161, pp*100-l.
3* Ibid*, para.161, p.lOt*
prudent parent* The discharge<f this duty and the degree of
care that is expected of the parent depend on the age of the
child, its tendency to be mischievous, and its propensity to
meddle with things that come its way.* Thus, if a parent is in
possession of a dangerous object which he alone is able to control,
he must not leave it lying about where the child can pick it up
2
and cause harm to other people with it* Similarly, he must not
provide for the use of his child, objects that are intrinsically
dangerous and likely to cause harm to other people without en-
3
suring that the child will put such objects into proper use*
The same principles apply in the case of a guardian and
ward*
(b) Liability for contract
A parent or guardian is not, as such, liable for contract-
4
ual obligations entered into by children under their care*
Where a parent or guardian, however, expressly or impliedly autho­
rises a child to contract on his behalf, the parent or guardian 
will be liable on the contract if the child acts within the scope
5
of his authority* The positioned the child in this respect is 
no different from that of an adult duly appointed as agent* In 
one respect, however, a father (but not a guardian) will be
1* See Lord Esher, M.R. in the English case of Williams v* Eady 
(1893) 10 T.L.R. 41, 42*
2* See the Irish case of Sullivan v* Creed £l904] 2 I *R.3/7 
where a father was held vicariously liable for injury caused 
by his 15 year old son who fired a gun which his father had 
carelessly left lying about loaded*
3* See the English case of Bebee v* Sales (1916) 32 T.L.R. 413 in 
which a father who had given his lS year old son a present of 
an airgun was held liable for the son shooting another child 
with it after the father had been warned*
4* See Chitty on Contracts, General Principles, 23rd ed*, 1968, 
para.437, p*206*
5* The child will be deemed to have acted as agent*
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legally responsible for necessaries supplied to the child's 
mother, that is, if the necessaries are for the benefit of the 
child.1 There is, strictly speaking, no vicarious liability 
for the contract if entered into by the child himself. The 
father's liability arises only when it is the mother that con­
tracts,and even so the marriage between the mother and father 
must be an existence and the parties must be cohabiting at the 
time that the mother pledges the credit of the child's father.
(c) Liability arising from crime
A parent or guardian in general has no liability for 
crimes committed by children under their care unless the crime 
is committed under circumstances whereby the child is deemed to 
have acted as an innocent agent of the parent or guardian.
Various liabilities are, however, imposed by the Preven-
3
tion of Cruelty to Children Act, and the Children and Young Per-
i
4sons Act. For example, where a child under the age of seven­
teen years is charged with any offence, the court trying him may |
e
order his parent or guardian to attend the trial. If the 
child is convicted and fined or ordered to pay compensation or 
costs, the court may, and if the child is under the age of four­
teen years, must, order the parent or guardian to meet the finan­
cial responsibility unless the court is satisfied that the parent 
or guardian cannot be found or that he has not conduced to the
1. See the English case of Bazeley v. Forder (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B, 
559.
2. See the English cases of Shelton v. Springett (1851) 11 C.B. 
452; Mortimer&v. Wright (1840) 6 M & W 482.
3. Cap 31.
4. Cap.44.
5. Ibid., s.17.
crime through his neglect of the child concerned.* Before such 
order can be made against a parent or guardian, he must be afford­
ed the opportunity of being heard, and where such opportunity has
been given him, but he failed to attend court, the order will,
2
nevertheless, be made in his absence.
Finally, a parent or guardian of a child under the age of 
seventeen who has been committed to the care of am institution,
fit person or approved school may be ordered by the court to con-
3
tribute to the child1s maintenance during the period of committal.
F LOSS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND AUTHORITY
As we have seen, a parent cannot abdicate the duties im­
posed upon him in relation to his child without incurring some 
liability. In some cases where the parent is in breach of his 
duties, for example, the duty to take proper care of the child, 
a magistrates court can take steps to prevent a repetition.
Thus, if it is proved before that court that a parent has allowed 
his child or young person to be exposed to immorality, neglect or
destitution, it can order the parent to enter into a recognisance
4
to exercise due care and supervision in respect of the child.
In other cases, a breach of duty may give rise to the loss of 
parental rights and authority. Quite apart from the conduct of 
his parents, that of the child himself may result in the parent 
having to be deprived of his rights and authority over the child.
1. S.23(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act, cap.44*
2. Ibid.. s.23(2).
3. S.20(2), 20(3), 20(5) and 21 of the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children Act, cap.31; and s.30 of the Children and Young 
Persons Act, cap.44. ^
4. S.16(1) of cap.31; s.27(iii) of cap.44.
Finally, the right may he lost by operation of law.
We shall now examine in detail the circumstances under 
which pecrental rights and authority are lost.
(a) Voluntary loss
A parent can voluntarily surrender his rights and autho­
rity over and thus his responsibility for his child, but in 
order to be effective he must do it through a juvenile court.*
It is quite inconceivable in Sierra Leone that a parent would 
want to lose legal custody of a child who is an asset to him and 
whom he is able to control. However destitute a Sierra Leone 
parent may be, so long as his child is properly behaved he would 
not like to part with him under circumstances which would deprive 
him of parental authority. Perhaps this is one reason for the 
absence of legal adoption in the country.
Nevertheless, where the parent is unable to control a 
child and has proved this before a.jivenile court, the court may, 
after being satisfied that it is expedient to deal with the 
child in such manner and aifter ensuring that the parent under­
stands its consequences, order that the child, if under the age 
of seventeen yeaxs, be sent to an approved school or be placed 
under the supervision of a probation officer, or a fit person,
whether a relative or not, for a period not exceeding three 
2years.
(b) Involuntary loss
A parent may, against his will, be deprived of his rights 
and authority over his child under the following circumstances:
Firstly, where the parent commits an offence involving the
1. See s.28 of cap.44.
2. ib;«f ■.
•f
child under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act* In this
case, the court trying the parent has power to order that the
child be taken out of the custody, charge and care of the paxent
and be given to the care of a relative of the child or some other
fit person for any period not exceeding the sixteenth birthday of 
2
the child* The court will make the order if the parent is com­
mitted for trial or convicted or bound over to keep the peace for 
3
the offence*
Secondly, where the character or situation of the child
warrants it* Ihis is regulated by the Children and Young Persons
4 5Act* Under this Act^  a child or young person that has been
found guilty of an offence other than homicide and is given a 
conditional discharge may be entrusted to the supervision of a 
probation officer whose duty is, subject to the control of the 
court, to visit or receive reports frcm the child, to see that 
the child observes the conditions of his recognizance, to report 
to the court on the child's behaviour and to advise, assist, and 
befriend the c h i l d D u r i n g  this period, although the child is 
under; the de facto control of his parent, it is the court that has 
his legal custody* If the cffence for which the child has been 
found guilty is not homicide or one punishable with imprisonment 
for more than seven years, the court may in addition or alterna­
tively to a sentence,.order the child to be given into the legal
1. S*19(l) of cap*31*
2* Ibid
3. S*19(l) of cap*31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
4* Cap.44 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
5. The word "child" used hereafter in this paragraph in relation 
to the Children and Young Persons Act, includes a "young per­
son" *
6* S.20 of cap*44 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
cuatody of a fit person or institution, as directed by the court 
Similarly, where the child is guilty of an offence which, if com­
mitted by an adult will be punishable with imprisonment, the
court may send the child to an approved school for any period not
2exceeding his eighteenth birthday.
Furthermore, an administrative officer, police officer 
above the rank of sub-inspector, or any other authorised person,
has power to bring a child before a juvenile court end the court 
can order the child to be sent 1d  an approved school or committed 
to the care of a fit person, whether a relative or not, or an in­
stitution, until he is eighteen years of age or for a shorter
3
period. The court will make the order only when satisfied that
4
one of the following facts has been established: (a) that the
child was found begging or receiving alms or in a place for that 
purpose; (b)that he was found wandering without a fixed resi­
dence and any visible means of subsistence or under no proper 
control of a parent or guardian; (c) that he is falling in bad 
associations, or exposed to moral danger,or beyond control;
(d) that he is found destitute and at least one of his parents 
is alive, or being an illegitimate child, that his mother is 
undergoing imprisonment; (e) that the parent under whose care
the child is, is of criminal and drunken habits; (f) that he is 
frequently in the company of a reputed thief, or a common or re­
puted prostitute; (g) that he is persistently ill-treated or
1. Ibid., s.25.
2. Ibid.t s.26.
3. But where the child is a female, the person into whose care 
she is committed cam, with her consent, request the court to 
extend the period until she attains the age of 21 years. 
S.2vjtii) and proviso of cap.44.
4. These conditions are enumerated in s.27(l) of cap.44.
neglected by his parent; (h) that his place of residence is used 
for the purposes of prostitution or is otherwise living in cir­
cumstances calculated to cause, encourage or favour the seduction 
or prostitution of the child*
The third circumstance under which a parent may involun­
tarily lose his rights and authority over his child is when in 
matrimonial proceedings, the High Court rules that, in the inter­
est of the child, smother person or one parent as against the 
other, should have the custody of the child**
Finally, a parent loses all rights and authority over a
child when that child reaches his majority or marries under that 
2age*
1* See s.24 of cap*102 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, I960*
2. In Sierra Leone, an infant is still a person under the age of 
21 and a person reaches his majority therefore at 21*
CHAPTER 13
Mw-
SUCCESSION UNDER ^CUSTOMARY LAW
A. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Quite apart from the usual external conflict of law pro­
blem which arises when a Sierra Leonean dies domiciled in another 
country leaving property in Sierra Leone, or dies in Sierra Leone 
leaving property abroad, if he dies in Sierra Leone and leaves 
property there, there is a further problem of internal conflict 
of law: with the country* s pluralistic legal system in the law of 
succession* Here we shall address ourselves to this internal 
conflict and not to external conflict, as it is the former that 
is of peculiar significance to Sierra Leone family law of suc­
cession*
0) Conflict in Testate Succession
The possible area of conflict is between customary law
SQ-Qa* "to
and the general law* Happily, Islamic law does not^come into 
the picture on this occasion because the Islamic law of testate
VOOufa '&)•&£, ^
succession/, of no application in Sierra Leone* A purported
n. haa&'tp
will under Islamic law therefore, comply with the provi-
sions of the general law in order to be valid*
Conflict between customary law and the general law re­
sults from the fact that the formal requirements for a valid will 
are different in the two systems* Under customary law, a will
1* In this Chapter, I have used much of the material in my article 
entitled ”Inheritance to property in Sierra Leone” S.L.S.(N.S.) 
No.24, Jan. 1969, pp*^ l-Z£* The Chapter is, however, not only 
an enlarged form of article, but also a revision of it
since as a result of further research, I have had cause to 
modify or change some of the views expressed therein*
Coco cn. _ TjiJtoio ✓
can be in any form, oral or written** The essential require­
ments of such a will are that it must dispose of movable property 
only and must be proved by two credible witnesses*
Except with regard to registration of wills and the formal 
requirements of the wills of soldiers, there is no local enact­
ment in Sierra Leone on testate succession* Therefore, the gen­
eral law on the matter is the received English law, which is the 
Wills Act, 1837, as amended in 1852 and 1861* As regards form, 
the 1837 Act requires that a will must be in writing*
Because of the differences of formal requirements between 
customary law and the general law, a pertinent question that we 
must ask ourselves is whether a valid will made under customary
law will be recognised as valid by the general law, despite the
fact that such will does not comply with the formal requirements
imposed by the general law? The immediate answer that will come
to mind is a negative one* But s*2 of the Wills Amendment Act,
1861, introduces some ground for debate and the likelihood of a
positive answer* That section provides that:
"Every will • • • made within the United King­
dom 2 by any British subject (whatever may 
be the domicile of such person at the time
of making the same or at the time of his or
her death) shall as regards personal 3 estate 
be held to be well executed, and shall be ad­
mitted in England *** to probate, and in Scot­
land to confirmation, if the same be executed
1. Written wills are of recent origin in customary law. On their 
validity, see Chapter 20*
2* The expressions "United Kingdom" and "British subject" must 
for the purposes of Sierra Leone law be understood to mean 
"Sierra Leone" and "Sierra Leone citizen" respectively as 
adopted law applies with local variations*
3* My emphasis* Note that in customary law, the disposition of 
movable property is valid* "Personal estate" as used in this 
section includes movables as well as chattels real* In our 
instant discussion, we are addressing ourselves to movable pro­
perty only, as it is in respect of it that there is a possible 
conflict of law problem*
according to the forms required by the laws 
for the time being in force in that part of 
the United Kingdom where the same is made*"
This section, it is submitted, permits a will executed in 
one part of the United Kingdom according to a form which may be 
different from that of English wills as provided for under the 
1837 Act to be admitted to probate in England. As received 
English law applies to Sierra Leone with verbal and local varia­
tion, in the interpretation of this section it is necessary to 
have in mind the dual legal system in Sierra Leone and the formal 
difference between them in regard to the execution of wills*
The section ought to be taken to mean that a will that is formally 
valid under one system of law in the country should be regarded as 
such under the other*
The effect of s*2 of the Wills Amendment Act, 1861, with 
particular reference to Sierra Leone which we have just examined, 
has, from the reported cases, not yet been argued before and ruled 
upon by the Sierra Leone courts* The practice so far, however, 
has been to regard all wills that do not comply with the require­
ments of s*9 of the Wills Act, 1837, as invalid under the general 
law*
In Nigeria, however, where the same statutory provision 
applies and which operates under a legal system similar to Sierra 
Leone's, the Federal Supreme Court has come very near to deciding 
the point at issue* In the case of Apatira & Ors v. Akanke &
Ors a Muslim made a written will which did not comply with the 
requirements of the Wills Act, 1837, and it was sought to admit 
this will to probate* The argument of Counsel for the plaintiffs 
was that the will was valid, since, under Islamic law according
1. (1944) 17 N.L.R. 149.
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to the Maliki School, writing was not essential in order to vali­
date a Muslim's will, much less the formalities of signing and 
witnessing* Ames J* accepted the argument of plaintiffs* counsel 
to the extent of the formal requirements of a valid will under 
Islamic law, but held that as the will was not intended by the
testator to be a will made in accordance with Islamic law, be­
cause the testator made dispositions which were invalid under that 
law, the general law would not regard the will as valid since it 
did not comply with the formal requirements of that law* The 
case revolved on the intention of the testator* It would, there­
fore, appear from this judgment that if the will had complied with 
Islamic law in regard to the quantum of property disposable by 
will, the court would have upheld it even though it did not accord 
with the provisions of the general law.*
It is submitted that, even though Ames J* did not consider 
s*2 of the Wills Amendment Act when reaching his decision, he 
took the correct view of the law with regard to the fate of valid 
customary law wills which do not comply with the formal require­
ments of wills under the general law* If the testator intends 
his disposition to be a will under customary law and the will is 
formally valid under that law, it ought to be admitted to probate 
under the general law even though it does not comply with the 
general law provisions as to formal requirement* Our submission 1 
should, nevertheless, not be misunderstood as a plea that all 
valid customary law wills should be regarded as such by the gener­
al law* What.is the important and deciding factor is the inten­
tion of the testator* If it was his intention, gathered from
1* Note: however, that in the re6ent case of Adesubokan v* Yunusa 
[1972] J,A*L. 82, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that a 
Nigerian Muslim can by his will made in accordance with the 
Wills Act, 1837, dispose of the whole of his property and that 
the Wills Act supersedes Islamic law on the matter. Note fur­
ther that in the instant case the testator purported to make a 
will in accordance with the Wills Act and not Islamic law*
evidence and the surrounding circumstances, to make a will under 
customary law, then our submission stands unshaken* But if 
there is any evidence that his intention was to make a will under 
the general law, non-compliance with the Wills Act ought to invali* 
date the will even though it conforms with the requirements of a 
valid customary law will* For example, reducing the will into 
writing will raise a presumption that the testator intended to 
make a will under the general law because, until recently, written 
wills were virtually unknown under customary law*
01) Conflict in Intestate Succession
One. area for conflict is the legal division of the citi­
zens of the country into native and non-native for the purposes
of specific areas of the law, one of which is intestate succession 
regarding customary law as the personal law of natives, while the 
general law is the personal law of the non-natives, and the appli­
cation of one's personal law to determine the descent of one's 
estate on intestacy* The problem is high-lighted when one 
marries under a system of law quite different from that of one's 
personal law and assumes a manner of life quite distinct from what 
is known by one's personal law; for example, an educated native 
contracting a marriage under the Christian or Civil Marriage Act 
and living a life in accordance with Western civilization*
Another area is the application of Islamic law to the
distribution of the property of a Muslim, single or married in
accordance with Muslim rites at the time of his death, without 
any further qualification as to whether the Muslim should be a 
native or non-native - to toe the line drawn by the general law.* 
Insofar as a native Muslim is concerned, there is a conflict
 ...... ... ■ ■ —    ... —
1. S*9(l) of the Mohammedan Marriage Act, cap.96.
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between this provision and the general law which provides that 
customary law should determine the distribution of the property 
of a native who dies intestate
We shall now discuss these problems in relation to marri­
age and we shall begin with statutory marriage contracted in 
accordance with the Christian and Civil Marriage Acts*
Under s*26 of the Christian Marriage Act, a marriage to 
which one of the parties ia a native does not have any effect on 
the property of that native; and if both parties are natives the 
property of each is Subject to the customary law of his or her own 
tribe. Thus, in either case the property of a native party to 
the marriage devolves on his intestacy in accordance with his 
customary law, and that of the non-native under the general law.
This conclusion is inherent in the Administration of Estates Acts
, 2also*
Thejcivil Marriage Act has no provision similar to s*26 of 
the Christian Marriage Act. Probably, as before the Civil Marri­
age (Amendment)(No*2) Act, 1965, it was impossible for non-natives 
to contract marriage under the Civil Marriage Act, it would have 
been superfluous or unnecessary to insert in the Act a section 
relating to property rights of natives* But the 1965 Amendment 
now enables a native to enter into marriage in accordance with 
the Civil Marriage Act* The amendment, nevertheless, does not 
also make any provision in respect of the properties of the par­
ties to the marriage. This may be an oversight. Presumably, 
the intention in the Civil Marriage Act (as amended) is the same
1. S.43(1) of the Administration of Estates Act, cap.45 and s* 
13(1) of the Local Courts Act, 1963, Act No*20 of 1963*
2* This Act provides for the Administration of Estates* S*43(l) 
specificaBy provides that the estates of a native shall .be 
distributed in accordance with customary law*
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as it is in s.26 of the Christian Marriage Act. It is a moot 
point whether, since the Christian Marriage Act and the Civil 
Marriage Act are to be read as one,* s.26 of the Christian Marri­
age Act should apply automatically to marriages contracted under 
the Civil Marriage Act as well, now that natives cam contract 
marriage under the Civil Marriage Act. To remove doubt, how­
ever, it is desirable to have in the Civil Marriage Act a section 
similar to s.26 of the Christian Marriage Act. In the absence of 
such provision, one must look for guidance to s.43(l) of the 
Administration of Estates Act and s*13(l) of the Local Courts 
Act insofar as succession is concerned. The overall effect of 
these sections is that a native*s property must on intestacy be 
distributed in accordance with customary law.
One may, therdbre, safely conclude that a marriage under 
the Christian or Civil Marriage Acts has no effect on the pro­
perty of a native and its distribution if that native dies intest­
ate. The applicable law is the customary law of the tribe to 
which he belongs. Thus, if such marriage is between a native 
and non-native, on their death intestate, the native*s property 
will devolve under customary law and that of the non-native in 
accordance with the general law. To put the whole process 
graphically, if X, a Mende man, marries Y, a Creole woman, under 
the Christian Marriage Act, on X*s death intestate his property 
is distributed in accordance with Mende customary law, and if Y 
dies intestate her property devolves and is distributed under the 
general law.
Simple and straightforward as this may appear, it is a 
source of serious problems and injustice of the highest magnitude.
1. See s.l of the CiviL Marriage Act:.
First, under Mende law, Y would not be able to claim an interest 
in the estate of her deceased husband because she lerself is 
under that law regarded as property and passes to a male relative 
of the deceased just like any other property. On the other hand, 
if it is Y who dies intestate, survived by X the whole of her pro­
perty goes to X under the g&xeral law. The same hardship faces 
the Creole man who marries a native woman under the Christian or 
Civil Marriage Acts without first going through the formalities 
imposed by the customary law of the tribe of the wife. If the 
wife dies intestate, the husband cannot legally claim her pro­
perty under customary law, as he is not regarded under that law
as the lawful husband. But if the husband dies intestate, his 
wife, being regarded by the man’s personal law - the general law - 
as a lawful wife, is entitled to at least one-third of the resi­
due of his estate.
Perhaps these hardships can be circumvented in one of two 
ways: (a) by the introduction of special rules of succession to 
meet the case of inter-marriage; (b) by making a will.
With the present state of the law, however, the only feas­
ible and practical solution is the making of a valid will by 
either party and the consequent prevention of intestacy. Pre­
sumably, this was anticipated by s.26 of the Christian Marriage 
Act which further provided that nothing in the section shall have 
the effect of preventing the parties to a marriage under the Act 
from disposing by legal procedure and means, of their respective 
properties after their respective deaths.
Next, we shall consider the effect of a Mohammedan marri­
age. Before we do so, however, we must investigate what the 
applicable law is when a native Muslim domiciled o± permamently 
resident in the Western Area, dies intestate, for there seems to
be a conflict between s.9(l) of the Mohammedan Marriage Act,*
2
and s.43(l) of the Administration of Bstates Act.
S.9(l) of the Mohammedan Marriage Act, on the one hand, 
makes Islamic law the applicable law for the distribution of the 
estate of a Muslim in the Western Area who dies intestate. The 
section does not specify whether the deceased should also be a 
native or non-native. As we have already pointed out, this 
section applies to natives as well as non-natives who have their 
permanent residence in the Western Area.
S.43(l) of the Administration of Estates Act, on the other
hand, enacts that,
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
^Ordinance] [Act], where any native dies in­
testate leaving assets in Sierra Leone which 
are not within the jurisdiction of any 
[Native][Local] Court 3 the distribution of 
such assets ... shall be according to native 
law and custom•”
It is submitted that s.9(l) prevails over s.43(l). because 
s.43(1) is to be read subject to any other law in force which, 
for our present purpose, is s.9(l). This construction is not 
expressly borne out by either section but from other provisions 
of the Administration of Estates Act. For example, when it was 
intended that s.41 of that Act should prevail over any other law, 
the opening part of it specifically has the words “notwithstand­
ing anything contained in this or any other [ordinance] [Act] •
The words “any other Ordinance*' axe absent in s.43(l).
Our submission is also justified by obiter dicta of
4Smith C.J. in Re Allie (dcd.) to the effect that Islamic law
1. Cap.96.
2. Cap.45.
3. Assets not within the jurisdiction of any local court axe 
those which a native dies leaving in the Western Area.
4. 1950-56 ALR S.L. 338, 341.
could apply to the distribution of the estate of a native Muslim*
Having concluded that Islamic law is the applicable law 
when a Muslim, native or non-native, permanently resident in the 
Western Area, dies intestate, we must now investigate the effect 
of marriage*
It frequently happens in Sierra Leone for a native Muslim 
already married to four women in accordance with Muslim rites 
to exceed that number and marry other women in a manner recog­
nised by customary law, or,conversely, for a native already mar­
ried to four women in accordance with customary law later to em­
brace Islam and enter into further Muslim marriages with other 
women *^
In such a case, a special problem arises as to the appli­
cable law on the death of the husband intestate* Is he to be
regarded as married under Islamic law or customary law or both? 
Does marriage under one law affect marriage under the other?
If we are correct in our submission that Islamic law super­
sedes customary law so long as the deceased was at his death a 
Muslim, then only the Muslim maxriages will be recognised for 
the purposes of intestate succession, in which case only the 
wives' thereof will be treated as such for the distribution of the 
estate* But the children of the customary marriages will suc­
ceed because, as we have argued earlier, the non-recognition of 
the marriage of its. parents by one law ought not to determine the 
legitimacy of the child for the purposes of succession*
In this connection, a wife customarily married to a native 
Muslim in the Western Area must beware* If she intends to suc­
ceed to the property of her late husband, she must also contract
1. The stricter Muslims, however, regard such conduct as Repre­
hensible and that the so-called Muslim who does this only 
pays lip-service to the religion*
a valid Mohammedan marriage with him in order to convert her 
prior customary marriage into a Muslim one*
From our instant discussion we may, therefore, conclude 
that unlike the other two forms of statutory marriage, the effect 
of a Mohammedan marriage contracted in the Western Area is that 
irrespective of the personal law of the parties they come under a 
new legal regime at least for the purposes of intestate success­
ion* In the light of this consideration for a Mohammedan marri­
age based on religion, perhaps one can advocate a similar treat­
ment for Christian and Civil marriages having regard to the man­
ner of life of the parties concerned*
When two persons marry in church or in a registry, be 
they native or non-native, during their lives their legal rela­
tionship, insofar as the.marital status is concerned, is governed 
by the general law* Thus, matrimonial reliefs such as mainten­
ance, divorce, judicial separation and settlement of property on 
the dissolution of the marriage all come within the purview of
the general law* In this regard, one must ask why should a dif­
ferent approach be taken to their marriage in respect of property 
rights on their death intestate?
The situation under review in which a person normally suh- 
j'ect to customary law contracts marriage under statute is not one 
that is peculiar to Sierra Leone alone* In Nigeria and Ghana, 
a similar situation had existed* Formerly, in Nigeria, j'udicial 
opinions supported the proposition that a Christian marriage re­
lieved the parties to it of the burdens and benefits, if any, of 
customary law.* Later, at least for intestate succession
1. See Cole v.Cde (1898) 1 N.L.R. 15 at 22, where Bxandford 
Griffith J. said "In fact a Christian marriage clothes the 
parties to such marriage and their offspring with a status 
unknown to native law1* • See also Adegbola v* Folaranmi & Ors, 
(1921) 3 N.L.R. 81 at 84 per Combe u.J. and Lokdl V* CukgL 
17 N.L.R. 55 at 57 , 58 per Brooke J*, both approving Cole v*
 Gole*_________________
purposes, statutory law followed this view, for s.36(1) of the
succession was inapplicable to the estate of a person who married 
under the Marriage Act. Ghana took what appears to be a more
s*48 of which stipulated that if a person subject to customary law 
contracted an Ordinance Marriage, on his death intestate, two- 
thirds of his residuary estate would descend and be distributed 
in accordance with English law, whilst the remaining one-third 
goes under customary law* This section, therefore, takes into 
consideration both the marital status and personal law of the 
individual concerned* By adopting such a line, the Ghana Mar­
riage Act subsumes that by contracting an Ordinance marriage one 
opts, though not wholly, for the application of the general law
As we have said repeatedly earlier, one1s mode of marriage 
is a very important, though not the only^factor in determing 
what law should govern his activities for the rest of his life* 
Apart from the usual legal incidents of the marriage which should 
be regulated by the law under which the marriage is contracted, 
the determination of proprietary rights, on his death just as in 
his lifetime, should pay regard to his manner of life* ; Thus, 
the self-acquired property of a native married in accordance with 
the Christian or Civil Marriage Act and who does not live a 
native form of life, should devolve under the general law* Pro­
perty to which he might be entitled as a member of a corporate 
family group, for example, family land held in common with his 
tribal folk, should devolve under customary law* Similarly, for 
a native married in accordance with the Act, but who leads a
Nigerian Marriage Act * provided that customary law of intestate
o
realistic view to intestate succession in its Marriage Act,
1* Cap.115 of the revised Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and 
Lagos, 1958.
2 * Cap*127 of the revised Laws of the Gold Coast, 1951.
458*
native form of life thereafter, part of his self-acquired pro­
perty should devolve under the general law and the other part 
under customary law* Such an arrangement would safeguard the 
interest of the wife in her husband* s property which is recog- 
nised by the general law, but non-exislent in^cdstomary laws. As 
the non-customary marriage, to some extent, changes the status 
of the wife, that change should reflect in her proprietary 
rights*
B* SUCCESSION UNDER THE GENERAL LAW 1
(1) Testate Succession
Who can make a Will?
S*3 of the Wills Act, 1837 reads:
"every person can dispose by will of any 
real estate or personal estate which he 
shall be entitled to either at law or in 
equity, at the time of his death and which 
if not so disposed of, would devolve upon 
the heir at law or the customary heir of 
him if he became entitled by descent, of 
his ancestor or upon his executor or ad­
ministrator*"
The preceding section speaks of "every person1* which 
means that anybody can make a will under the Act*
Marriage, however, has effect on wills. Firstly, by 
s.18 of the Wills Act, 1837^ every will made by a main 6r woman 
is revoked by his or her marriage* The only exception to this 
rule is a will made in exdrcise of a power of appointment when the 
property thereby appointed would not, in default of appointment,
1. It is not intended here to examine in detail the whole corpus 
of the law of succession* For this, reference should be made 
to the standard works* What we hope to do here is to give 
merely., an outline, confining our discussion to the law as it 
relate to the family*
pass to the testator's heir, executor or administrator, or the 
person entitled as his or her next-of-kin under the Statute of 
Distribution, 1670.
Secondly, married women have not always had full testa­
mentary capacity to dispose of their freehold estate by will, and 
the present law is not very clear about such dispositions made by 
women married before 1933. In order to understand the present 
law, we must begin with the pre-1933 law.
The English Statute of Wills, 1542,* invalidated any will 
disposing of land made by a married woman. In Sierra Leone,with 
the passing of the Intestates Estates Act, J%&7 * the strict rule 
imposed by the 1542 Act was relaxed and a married woman became 
capable of disposing by will of any property, real or personal, 
which became her "separate property" under the Married Women's 
Property Act, 1875, provided that such will was acknowledged by 
her before a Supreme Court judge. The proviso was removed by
4
the Intestates Estates (Amendment) Act, 1938, and after that 
date, a married woman had full testamentary capacity to dispose 
by will of any property belonging to her. But whether this rule 
is applicable to a woman married before the Imperial Statutes 
(Law of Property) Adoption Act, 1932, was a question which arrest­
ed the attention of the Supreme Court at Freetown in the case of 
In re Hamilton (deed).5 In that case, a testatrix married in 
1908, left her husband the following year and lived apart until 
she died in 1945, survived by her husband. In the same year,
1. S.14.
2. fict NO• 8 of 1887* ' '
3. S.50.
4. S.7 of Act No.23 of 1938.
5. 1950-56 ALR S.L.l.
she bought freehold land out of money to which she was entitled 
as her "separate property". She made a will in 1944 without 
the acknowledgment of a judge of the Supreme Court and by it dis­
posed of the said property. Beoku-Betts J. held that the woman 
was competent to dispose of the property as it was her "separate 
property" without requiring the acknowledgment of a Supreme Court 
judge. The learned trial judge rightly based his decision on 
grounds which maybe summarised an follows: Firstly, before 1933
a married woman could dispose of by will of her "separate pro­
perty"; secondly, the condition for acknowledgment before a 
judge in respect of such will was removed in 1938 after which she 
made her will; thirdly, though the Imperial Statutes (Law of 
Property) Adoption Act, 1932, was retrospective, its effect 
could only have been relevant if a woman married before that date 
had disposed of freehold property thereafter, such property not 
being her "separate property".
It would appear that if the property in question were not 
"separate property", Beoku-Betts J. would have been prepared to 
hold that the disposition by will made by a married woman of such 
property after 1933 would be subject to the pre-1933 property law.
But a later case, In re Bright (deed),* seems to blur the 
distinction between "separate estate" and non-separate estate.
The facts of this case have already been stated, but in the inter­
est of clairity, it is necessary to repeat them. Dr. and Mrs. 
Bright married in 1911 and lived together until 1932, when Mrs. 
Bright left him. At the time of separation, Mrs. Bright was 
seised of the freehold estate in two houses which she devised by 
will and died in 1956. The question for our present purpose 
was whether she could madce a valid testamentary disposition of
1. 1957-60, ALR S.L. 102.
the said property. In the Supreme Court, Bairamian C.J. held
that she could, on the ground that the Imperial Statutes (Law of
Property) Adoption Act, 1932
"did not distinguish between women who mar­
ried before 1933 and women who married after 
January 1st 1933 (or between property ac­
quired before and property acquired after 
that date)."
On appeal, the West African Court of Appeal,* without
addressing itself to the question whether or not the property
concerned was "separate property", held that a proper disposition
was made of the property because, in the words of Hearne, Ag.P.:
"In Sierra Leone, testamentary capacity has 
been conferred on a married woman by legis­
lation. By virtue of S.4 of the Imperial 
Statute (Law of Property) Adoption £ordi­
nance^ Act] the deceased could have made 
her will in 1956."2
By holding this view, the West African Court of Appeal has 
ruled that a woman married before 1932 cam make a proper disposi­
tion by will of her property, whether "separate" or not or whether 
acquired before 1933 or after, so long as the disposition takes 
effect after 1932 *
According to the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts, 
Bright* s case is of superior authority to Hamilton1s case, as the 
former was decided by a higher court than the latter. But we 
must repeat here a former submission which we made in connection 
wdth the retroactive nature of this Act ^ that a retroactive oper­
ation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing 
right.
1. Bright v. Bright Executors, 1959-60 ALR S.L.182.
2. Ibid.. pp.186-7.
3. Chapter 9,pp. 3o6 .
Requirements of a valid will
(a) Formal requirements
A will purported to take effect under the general law must
comply with the requirements of the Wills Act, 1837, as amended*
Under the Principal Act, the will must be in writing, signed at
the foot or end by the testator or someone on his behalf and by
/
his direction, and his signature must be attested by at least two 
witnesses * present at the same time, and the attestation must al­
so be made in the presence of the testator*
The Wills Amendment Act, 1852 did away with the condition 
that the will must be signed at the foot or end and provided that 
the will shall be deemed to be properly executed if the signature
"placed at or after, or following, or under, 
or beside, or opposite to the end of the will, 
that it shall be apparent on the face of the
will that the testator intended to give effect
by such his signature to the writing signed 
as his will."2
A further amendment in 1861 altered the common law rule 
that the law governing the formal validity of a will which dis­
poses of movable property is the lex domcilii of the testator at 
the time of his death* It enacted that a will made outside the 
United Kingdom by a British subject is, as regards personal
estate, properly executed whatever be the domicile of the testa­
tor at the time that the will is made or at the time of death, 
provided such will complies with the forms required either by the
1. A will of a soldier in the army irfeierra Leone disposing of 
personal property may be attested by only one witness if such 
witness is an army officer or a Government medical officer in 
theWestern Area. See s.99(1) of the Royal West African 
Frontier Force Act, cap.179, of the revised Laws of Sierra 
Leone, 1960.
2. S.l.
3. The expressions "United Kingdom" and "British subject" must 
for the purposes of Sierra Leone law be understood to mean 
"Sierra Leone" and "Sierra Leone citizen" respectively.
law of the place where it was executed, or by the law of the 
place where the testator was domiciled when the will was made or 
by the law in force in that part of Her Majesty1s dominions where 
the testator had his domicile of origin** Furthermore, s*2 of 
the Amendment Act, 1861, provided that a will disposing of person­
al property is deemed to be properly executed if it complies with 
the forms required by the laws in force in that part of the United 
Kingdom where it was made*
We have already investigated, when discussing conflict of 
law, the effect of s*2 of the 1861 Act on wills properly executed
in accordance with customary law* Here, we need, therefore, only 
to point out that under s*l of the Amendment Act, a will disposing 
of personal property which is made outside Sierra Leone and is 
properly executed under the law of the country where it is made 
will also be deemed to be properly executed under the general law 
of Sierra Leone*
(b) Requirement with respect to capacity
Capacity to make a will under the general law is governed
by both the common law and the Wills Act, 1837.
Under the common law, the testator must have a sound and
disposing mind and memory at the time that he makes the will*
The position was put quite vividly by Cockburn C.J. in the English
2case of Banks v* Goodfellow when he said:
M(The testator) ought to be capable of mak­
ing his will with an understanding of the 
nature of the business in which he is en­
gaged, a recollection of the property he 
means to dispose of, of the persons who
1* S*1 of the Wills Amendment Act, 1861*
2* (1870) b.R* 5 Q.B. 549, 567, quoting with approval the common 
law as stated by the United States Circuit Court for the dis­
trict of New Jersey, in the case of Harrison v* Rowan, 3 Wash­
ington, at p*585«
are the object of his bounty, and the 
manner in which it is to be distributed 
between them. It is not necessary that 
he should view his will with the eye of 
a lawyer, and comprehend its provisions 
in their legal form. It is sufficient
if he has such a mind and memory as will j
enable him to understand the elements of }
which it is composed, and the disposition -
of his property in its simple forms.”
The important element, therefore, is the mental state of j
the testator at the time of the making of the will. In this
j
connection, bodily health is irrelevant unless it also affects the 
testator*s ability to understand the nature of his act.*
2The Privy Council in the case of Christian v. Intsiful 
also decided that old age, blindness or illiteracy would not 
amount to incapacity if the testator understood the document that
3
is purported to be his will.
Infancy also renders a person incapable of making a will 
for s.7 of the Wills Act, 1837, provides that a valid will can be 
made only by a person of 21 years of age or more. S.11 of the 
Act, however, seems to exempt soldiers in actual military service j 
from the age requirement and they can make valid testamentary dis­
positions of monies which they earn in respect of services, even 
though they are under age.
■ j
The burden of proof of testamentary capacity is on the per-
4son propounding the will and once that burden has been discharged
1. Ibid.
2. (1953) 13 W.A.C.A. 347. See especially p.348 , 349 per Lord 
Poster.
3. Quaere, whether verification of a document written for an illi­
terate person as required by the Illiterate Protection Act, cap. 
104 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, is sufficient 
proof that the illiterate understood the nature of the document. 
It is submitted that in the absence of a vitiating element such 
as fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake or misrepresentation, 
it ought to be regarded as conclusive proof.
4. See Inniss and Stevens v. Wray»fl963_) 3 S.L.L.R. 44, 45 per 
Bonkole Jones Ag.C.J.. Beckley and Beckley v. Aubee and Faulkner 
1968-69 ALR S.L. 190, 198" peaTMAc&ulay Ag.J.
injthe absence of any vitiating element to avoid it, the High 
Court will give effect to the will and grant probate.
What property may be disposed by will?
We may yet again refer to the relevant provisions of s.3
of the Wills Act, 1837, which states that property which a person
can dispose of by will is "any real and personal estate which he 
shall be entitled to either at law or in equity”. This section 
must be read subject to the system of land tenure in Sierra Leone.
A non-native citizen can acquire property both real and 
personal in Sierra Leone except that in the case of land in the 
provinces, the maximum interest he can acquire in it is a lease­
hold estate not exceeding 50 years.* Whatever interest in pro- \ 
vincial land he acquires, a non-native cannot devise it by will
unless the disposition was specifically provided for in the docu-
2ment creating the interest.
A native, on the other hand, can acquire any property, J
real or personal, anywhere in the country. Thus, he can acquire
*
the freehold estate in land in the Western Area and can dispose 1 
of it by will. As he can also acquire "a bundle of rights” 
over land in the provinces more than that permitted to a non­
native, he cam also dispose of them by will. In this case, how­
ever, a distinction is made between "self-acquired” property and
4
"family" lamd. The former he can devise but the latter not
1. S.4 of the Protectorate Land Act, cap*122 of the revisedLaws 
of Sierra Leone, I960.
2. Ibid.. s.3(3)(e).
3. It is preferable to use JjJie ^term "bundle of rights” rather tham 
absolute interest because^or every purpose a native hais rights 
of an absolute owner over self-acquired lamd in the provinces, 
his rights of alienation are limited.
4. "Family” used in this context means a corporate and not a 
nuclear family.
because "family” property does not belong to him absolutely.*
(S) Intestate Succession
The general law of intestate succession has a remarkable 
variation depending on whether the deceased is a native or non- 
nat i ve .
The law in regard to non-natives
When a non-native dies intestate, a next-of-kin may apply
to the High Court for a grant of letters of administration. If
he is granted he can administer the estate within a month from
the grant. Alternatively, upon receiving notice that a person
has died intestate, the Administrator-General must serve on the
widow, widower or next-of-kin a written notice signed by him and
must, in three weekly publications in the Sierra Leone Gazette or
in any other public paper, invite such next-of-kin to show cause
within one month why he, the Administrator-General, should not
2
administer the estate.
At the expiry of a month without a satisfactory cause be­
ing shown to the High Court, the Administrator-General must apply
3to the court for a grant of letters of Administration. When 
these are granted, he must make an inventory of the estate, file
1. Compare the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the 
case of Adesubokan v. Yunusu [1972] J.A.L. 82 in which the 
Court held that a disposition of the whole of the testator1 s 
property under the Wills Act, 1837, took precedence over the 
Islamic law rule in accordance with the Maliki School that a 
testator cannot dispose of more than 1/3 of his property to 
non-heirs. In Nigeria, Islamic law applies as customary law. 
In the instant case, the property which the testator disposed 
of was his absolute property. Had the property been "family” 
property, such as the one with which we are concerned, he cou]d 
probably have not disposed of it under the rule nemo dat quod 
non habet. See s.36(l)(b) of the Nigerian Marriage Act, cap. 
115.
2. S.10(1) Administration of Estates Act, cap.45 of the revised 
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
3. Ibid.. s.10(2).
it in court and keep an account of all his receipts, payments and 
dealings with the estate* He must then sell the personal estate 
in order to meet the debts and funeral expenses of the deceased*
If the personal estate is insufficient to meet these demands, he 
must then, either with the consent of the persons beneficially 
interested in the estate or by order of the court, sell the real 
estate*
After reimbursing himself for all reasonable expenses in­
curred in the administration of the estate and paying its credi­
tors, he must pay the persons legally entitled on intestacy in 
accordance with the following table
(a) where the deceased left a widower he gets the residue of the 
estate;
(b) where the deceased left a widow and children, the widow re­
ceives one-third of the residue and the children or issue the 
remaining two-thirds which they share among them equally per 
stirpes;
(c) where there are'children or issue but no widow the children 
and issue take the whole between them per stirpes;
(d) where there is a widow, but no children or issue, one half of 
the estate goes to the widow, the other half to the deceased*s 
nearest relatives sharing equally between them whether they 
are of full or half-blood;
(e) Failing a widow or children or issue, the father gets the 
whole estate;
(f) failing a widow or children or issue, the mother, brothers 
and sisters are equally entitled to the residue, no distinct­
ion being made between them on the grounds of the extent of 
blood relationship. The child of a brother or sister who
1 * This table is a summary of the second schedule of the Admini­
stration of Estates Act, cap.45.
predeceases the intestate is entitled to his parents' share 
provided the intestate is survived by the mother or a brother 
or a sister;
(g) failing a brother, sister or child of a brother or sister, the 
mother is entitled to the whole residuary estate;
(h) if the deceased left no mother, the brothers and sisters take 
equally per stirpes;
(i) where there is no next-of-kin,* the : residue goes to the 
Crown as bona vacantia*
A.
With respect to personlty, the rules of distribution tabu­
lated above are essentially a carbon copy of the English Statute 
of Distribution, 1670, which regulated the mode of distribution 
of personal estate of an intestate dying in England before 1925* 
But the Sierra Leone Administration of Estates Act stretches the 
pre-1925 English rules further by dealing with real estate in the 
same manner as personal estate*
In addition to the provisions of the Second Schedule of 
the Administration of Estates Act, s*29(l) arranges for the dis­
position of an intestate's property where he leaves no widow or 
widower or next-of-kin* Under this section, the Administrator- 
General must put the residuary estate into an "Intestate Fund" 
and must call upon all persons claiming to be interested in such 
estate "on legal, equitable or moral grounds, to present their 
petitions to the Court*" Every such petition must state the 
place of residence of the claimant and the ground upon which,
1* The term "next-of-kin" is defined by s*2 of cap*45 as includ­
ing "any person other than a widow, or widower of a deceased 
person who by law would be entitled to letters of administra­
tion in peference to a creditor"* Presumably, the term in­
cludes those persons other than the ones excluded who would be 
entitled to distribution under the Second Schedule of cap*45* 
See the case of In the Estate of Mopeh Palmer (dcd*),£l96lj 
1 S.L.L.R. 71, where Benka-Coker C.J. held that a person^en- 
titled under (f) or (g) of the table above was next-of—kin*
and the description of the estate in respect of which the claim
is made,* and the petitioner must verify his claim by evidence to
the satisfaction of the court* The court will then make an
order allotting the residue to the petitioner in a proportion as
the court thinks fit*
The courts seem to have interpreted these provisions by
not making blood relationship a qualification for entitlement but
the degree of dependence the applicant had on the deceased. Thus,
3
in Re Thomas (dcd), out of six applicants who petitioned the 
court, to be allotted shares of the estate of the intestate under
s*29 of the Administration of Bstates Act on the ground that they 
were ”all petty traders and need the amount lying to the credit 
of the estate to enable them to carry on their trade and to main­
tain themselves”, Kingsley J* allowed the claims of only two, 
whom he found to be in sincere and dire need of the money because 
they had presumably been dependent on the deceased during her 
lifetime* The learned judge, however, dismissed the claim of one 
on the ground that though a blood relation of the deceased, she 
was not dependent upon her; the claims of two, because their evi­
dence was not believed; and the claim of a fourth because she
4
failed to comply with s*29(4) of the Act.
5
Similarly, in the Estate of Jacob Wyse, the High Court
1. S.29(4).
2. S.30(1) *
3. 1950-56 ALR S.L. 188.
4* Note that in the course of his judgment, Kingsley J* adopted 
with approval the case <f In Re Clarke {deed), Supreme Court, 
Civil Case No.35/40, unreported, in which Graham Paul C.J. dis­
missed the petitions of persons who merely averred that they 
were the lawful brothers of the deceased and nothing more, but 
upheld the claim in one case where there was no blood relation­
ship but ”special circumstances”.
5. Unreported, decided by the Supreme Court at Freetown on 12, 
February, 1957.
upheld the claims of a paramour of the deceased and his niece, 
both of whom had obtained financial assistance from him during 
his lifetime and who were left destitute on his death.
The law in regard to natives
Where a native dies leaving estate in the provinces, its 
administration and distribution are governed by customary law.*
But if he dies and leaves property in the Western Area, it is 
administered in the same manner as in the case of a non-native.
But the distribution of the property is again in accordance with 
customary law.
In a discussion on the general law of succession, we shall
limit ourselves only to the manner of ascertainment of customary
law in order to enable the administrator to administer the estate.
A person entitled to distribution according to customary
law who also wants to administer the estate has priority over the
2Administrator-General. If such a person is not forthcoming,
the Administrator-General administers the estate after which he
applies for and obtains from the District Officer of the area of
origin of the deceased a certificate showing the names of the
persons entitled to the residuary estate according to customary 
3law. If the deceased was born or had prior to his death been
permanently resident in Freetown, and had practically lost con­
nection with his native town or village, the Administrator-General 
on the basis of fairness, dispenses with the certificate of the 
District Officer, and ascertains the mode of distribution from
1. S.43(1) of theAdministration of Estates Act, cap.45 and s.13 
of the Local Courts Act; Act No.20 of 1963.
2. In re Soloku (dcd), 1950-56 ALR S . L . 8 .
3. S.43(3). The District Officer ascertains from the local 
courts who these persons are.
the headman in Freetown of the tribe to which the deceased belong-
If after weighing the circumstances of each individual
case, that headman is of opinion that some individual, for example,
the wife, who is not normally entitled to a share under customary 
law, should have something, the practice has been for the Admini­
strator-General to give that individual a share in the residue
and to distribute the balance in accordance with customary law
2
as ascertained from the local headman.
Where there is no known person entitled by customary law,
and there appears to be any person or persons who were dependent
on the deceased or who would have been entitled had the deceased
been a non-native, the President may direct the Administrator-
General to pay the balance of the estate to such person or per-
3
sons in such proportions as he may think equitable.
C. SUCCESSION UNDER ISLAMIC LAW ^
(1) Testate Succession
Islamic law recognises the making of wills but the essent­
ial characteristics of a valid will under that law differ in many 
respects from those under the general law. For example, accord­
ing to the Maliki School, writing, signature and attestation are
1. There is no legal justification for this procedure as it is not 
provided for by the Administration of Estates Act or any other 
law in Sierra Leone.
2. Such a practice is against the provisions of the Act.
3. S.43(3). As a matter of law, wives who are not entitled to
their husband’s estate on intestacy in some customary laws may 
claim under this section. But the Administrator-General fre­
quently gives them a share on equitable grounds, even when 
there are known persons entitled under customary law. He 
bases his authority for this on s.43(3). In our submission, 
this is wrong.
not necessary; moreover, a testator cannot by his will dispose 
of more than one-third of his property as bequest to persons who 
are not his heirs, nor can he by his will alter the prescribed 
shares of such heirs in the remaining two-thirds without their 
consent•
A good many Muslims in Sierra Leone mistakenly believe 
that they can make wills to take effect under Islamic law. This 
mistake perhaps originated from the conclusions reached at a meet­
ing which the Muslim leaders in Freetown had with the Attorney- 
General of the Colony of Sierra Leone at the Foulah Town Mosque 
in Freetown on the 10th March, 1904,* a meeting which heralded 
the passing of the Mohammedan Marriage Act. At that meeting, 
the Muslim leaders expressed their desire for Islamic law to 
govern their wills which the Attorney-General accepted in prin­
ciple. As can be seen, however, from the Mohammedan Marriage Act 
that ensued, the hopes of the Muslims did not materialise.
Neither the Mohammedan Marriage Act nor any other enact­
ment provides for the application of Islamic law to wills made 
2
by Muslims. Such wills must, therefore, comply with the general 
law .
(//) Intestate Succession
Authority for the application of Islamic law of succession 
to the distribution of the estatei, both real and personal, of a 
Muslim who dies intestate is s.9 of the Mohammedan Marriage
1. A typed copy of the minutes of this meeting and the conclusions 
arrived at was obtained from Dr. Barbara Harrell-Bond, to whom 
the writer is very grateful.
2. In re Allie (dcd) 1950-56 ALR S.L. 338, 341, Smith C.J. pre­
siding over the Sierra Leone Supreme Court left the issue open 
but applied English law to determine the validity of a will 
made by a Muslim because "he (the testator) made a will in 
the form recognised by English law."
1
Act. That section goes on further to hierarchically enumerate 
the persons on whom the property devolves for administration as 
being (a) the eldest son of the intestate, if of full age accord­
ing to Islamic law; (b) the eldest brother, also if of full age 
according to Islamic law, or (c) the Administrator-General.
It is not proposed here to probe into the intricate depths 
of distribution under Islamic law; this is appropriate in a 
treatise on Islamic law generally or succession specifically. 
Here, we must limit the scope of our analysis bearing our general 
subject-matter in mind.
What is intestacy?
When dealing with Islamic law of succession, it is neces­
sary to have a very clear understanding of the word "intestacy'*. 
The word is used in the general law to connote a scheme of suc­
cession which is invoked only when the deceased fails personally 
to arrange the devolution of his property.. Used in the Islamic 
law context, however, it carries the idea of a pre-arranged 
scheme under which the property of the deceased must descend, 
whether or not during his lifetime he has made provision for its 
devolution on his death. Thus, under the rules of Islamic suc­
cession at least two-thirds of the property of a Muslim must de­
volve under "intestacy" even if he had purported to devise the
whole property by will. In what sense, therefore, are we to use 
the word for the purposes of our present discussion?
Si9(1) of the Mohammedan Marriage Act uses the word
1. Note that Elias, op.cit., p.297, erroneously states that the 
Mohammedan Marriage Act provides that real estate shall be 
distributed in accordance with cusjtomary law. S.9(1) of the
Act which deals with succession provides clearly that both 
real and personal estate shall be distributed in accordance 
with Islamic law.
"intestate11 without any indication as to whether it should mean 
intestate according to the general law or Islamic law* As the 
section stands, it could mean either* Presumably, the general 
law concept was the one intended, but this is not borne out by the 
Act* We shall, therefore, use the general law concept only for 
the sake of convenience*
Who are entitled to thei Estate? *
In Islamic law, a man's legal heirs succeed to his property 
on intestacy. They belong to two main groups:-
(a) The Quranic heirs
Under Maliki law, the Qu~ranic heirs are twelve in number,
2
namely: Husband, wife, father, grandfather, mother, daughter,
agnatic granddaughter, grandmother, germane sister, consanguine 
sister, uterine brother, and uterine sister.
(b) The Residuary heirs
They consist of the male agnates, asaba, of the deceased 
and belong to five classes in order of priority: (i) the son and
his descendants (son's son how low soever); (ii) the father and 
his ascendants (father's father how high soever); (iii) the des­
cendants of the father (the deceased's brothers and nephews, how 
low soever); (iv) the descendants of the father's father (the 
deceased's uncles and cousins), and (v) the descendants of the 
higher grandfathers in ascending order.
1. Por a detailed and more comprehensive analysis of Islamic law 
of succession, see N.J. Coulson: Succession in the Muslim 
Family, O.U.P., 1971; J.N.D. Anderson: Islamic Law in the 
Modern World, London, 1959, pp.59-80; Anderson and Coulson: 
Islamic Law in Contemporary Cultural Change, London, pp.77-85.
2. A daughter takes as a QuCranic heir only when there is no son 
of the deceased. If there is a son, she succeeds as a resi­
duary heir to half of what the son takes.
There is no place in the Maliki Islamic law of succession 
for the non-agnatic relations to succeed however close to the de­
ceased they may be.* Thus, the mother's father, brother's 
daughter or daughter's child cannot succeed.
Mode of distribution
As a rule, the Quranic heirs must have their fixed shares 
before the Residuary heirs# However, as the estate may not be 
sufficient to satisfy the portions of all claimants, some of them 
may be excluded. But five of them are never excluded, namely, 
husband, wife, father, mother and daughter. Moreover, where the 
deceased is survived by a son, no other relative succeeds except 
these five named, who after receiving their shares, the son takes 
the residue with a daughter in the proportion of two to one.
Among the Residuary heirs, the nearest relative to the de­
ceased alone inherits and priority is determined by three prin­
ciples.
Firstly, a member of a higher class excludes a member of
a lower class. The only exception to this rule is that brothers
of the deceased in class (iii) are not excluded by the father's
2
father in class (ii)» Secondly, among relatives of the same 
class, the nearest relative to the deceased excludes the other. 
Thus, if there is a son, the son's son will not succeed*
Thirdly, among collaterals who are in the same class and within 
the same degree, a consanguine is inferior to a germane. For 
instance, a consanguine brother is excluded by a germane brother. 
Without going into the arithmetical distribution of the
1. In non-Maliki Sunni Law, the heirs belonging to the outer family
succeed in the absence of a Quranic heir other than the spouse
relict and any agnatic heir.
2. In Hanafi law, the father's father excludesall collateral.
estate, we shall draw attention to a point which is worthy of 
note.
The allocation of fixed shares results in the fragmenta­
tion or sale of real property. In order to satisfy the shares 
of the heirs, for instance, where a man dies survived by his wife, 
father, mother, a son and daughter, the first three receive one- 
eighth, one-sixth and one-sixth respectively, whilst the son and 
the daughter share the residue in the proportion of two to one, 
real property, if any, must either be partitioned or sold. A 
commendable practice has, however, existed among Sierra Leone 
Muslims in such a case to arrive at a family arrangement whereby 
the property is kept in the family and enjoyed by all those con­
cerned. In re Banufe (deed),* the validity of such arrangement 
was put to the test. In that case, one Ibrahim Banufe, a Mus­
lim, died intestate in Freetown, survived by three wives and nine 
children and left real property in Freetown. One of the houses 
which formed the estate was allocated to a son, Muctarr, who 
later died survived by his mother, maternal grandmother, maternal 
uncle and five consanguine sisters. On the son's death, a family 
meeting was held in which the elders of the tribe to which the 
deceased belonged decided that the mother should occupy the son's 
estate as a tenant at will until her death, and thereafter the 
property should go to the sisters absolutely, as the elders said 
it belonged to them. After the death of the mother, the sisters
of Muctarr sought to claim possession and absolute ownership of 
this property and the claim was resisted by the maternal grand­
mother and maternal uncle of Muctarr, who claimed as next-of-kin 
of Muctarr's mother. The learned trial acting Chief Justice 
held that though as a rule Islamic law of intestate succession
1. 1968-69 ALR S.L. 268.
should have applied in order to determine the rights of the 
claimants, he found>on the evidence> the existence of a valid 
family arrangement following the death of Muctarr which in equity 
displaced Islamic law. On the point of law, it is submitted 
that the decision is correct.
Equity favours family arrangements entered into fairly and 
reasonably for the benefit of all those who have any sort of
•i
claim to the property in question. But such an arrangement 
may be expunged by a party on the ground that at the purported 
settlement he did not acknowledge the title of others in property
in whicl^ he has a claim in exchange for their acknowledgment of his
\
title to property in respect of which the other members of the
2
family may have had a claim. Other grounds on which a party 
may expunge the arrangement are (a) if he was misled as to his 
legal rights in respect of the property; (b) mistake, misrepre­
sentation or undue influence which normally renders a contract 
3
voidable•
On the facts of the instant case, however, it is debatable 
whether the purported family arrangement is one which Equity would 
favour. Throughout the meeting which followed Muctarr1s death, 
the elders of his sect assumed that his sisters, but not the
4mother, had legal right to his property on his death intestate. 
This was erroneously believed to be the law*5 The meeting was
1. On family arrangements generally, see J.D.M. Derrett: "Family 
Arrangements in developing countries" in Family Law in Asia 
and-Africa (ed. J.N.D. Anderson), London, 1968, pp.156-181; 
Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol.17, pp.215-230.
2. Derrett, opscit.> p.164.
3. Halsbury* o p . c i t pp.226-228.
4. See p.271 of the report of the case for extracts of the evi­
dence of two of the witnesses of the plaintiffs.
5. Under Islamic law, the mot^her takes a Quranic share of one- 
sdfeth where the deceased is survived by two or more sisters/ 
brothers whether these last inherit themselves or not.
not intended to be a family gathering where the claims of all 
those having a legal right to the property were to be acknowledged 
after which a compromise was to be reached in order to retain the 
property in the family. Clearly, it was intended to distribute 
the property according to Islamic law but on moral grounds, the 
mother of the deceased was to be allowed to occupy the premises 
rent free for the rest of her life. No doubt, she agreed to this
i
but perhaps, were she not misled as to the law by the elders, she 
would have taken a different line of action. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that since her legal right was in only one- 
sixth of the property, despite the misrepresentation, the arrange­
ment that allowed her to occupy the premises rent free for the 
rest of her life was reasonable and fair in order to give legal 
effect to the arrangement.
The present writer, who was also counsel for* the defendants
in the instant case, subscribes to the view that the arrangement
l.
was unreasonable.
Whatever view is taken of the instant case, before a family 
arrangement can be arrived at which displaces the Islamic law of 
succession, it is necessary that the parties concerned must be
aware of their legal rights and there should be, as it were, a
give and take in respect of those rights. Arrangements concluded 1 
in mistaken application of Islamic law will only be valid, if 
taking the legal rights of all the parties concerned, the arrange­
ment is fair and reasonable.
1. An appeal was lodged against the decision, one of the grounds 
being that the learned trial acting Chief Justice mis-directed 
himself as to the facts on which he established that there was 
a family arrangement capable of displacing Islamic law. With­
out considering this ground, the Court of Appeal allowed the 
appeal and set the decision of the Supreme Court aside on the 
ground that when Ibrahim Banufe died, his property vested in 
the Administ rat or-General and that the purported family arrange­
ment was invalid on the ground that letters of administration 
had not been taken before the arrangement was made. The deci­
sion of the appoa.1 court is unreported.
Presumably, the elders in Banufe1s case intended to apply 
the Islamic law of intestate succession in accordance with their 
custom*1 It is submitted that this is wrong under the present
law, since the law does not admit custom but Islamic law simpli-
citer. But the application of Islamic law with tribal custom 
is a gloss on the law which is desirable and must be welcomed,
since it not only suits local conditions but is also a move to­
wards the unification of the pluralistic system of law in the 
country*
D. CONCLUSION
Our conclusions to this Chapter are by way of suggestions 
for reform in the existing law*
Social mobility is greatly on the increase in Sierra Leone, 
especially as regards children born to uneducated parents, who 
are now accepted as* part of the elite which formerly was synony­
mous with the non-nativef Creole population of Freetown* In 
many areas of opportunities,greater emphasis is being laid on ac­
quired rather than inborn rights* Sooner or later, the law of 
succession will follow in the trail, even only for a short dist­
ance*
The tripartite division of Sierra Leone citizens for the 
sake of intestate succession which, at the moment, is based on 
birth and, to some extent, religion, will have to give way either 
to a single division embracing all citizens alike or a quadruple 
division, the fourth class comprising persons who have undergone 
one form of marriage alien to that of their personal law and have
1* This is the way many people in Sierra Leone, Muslims and even 
lawyers, regard the intestate succession provision (personal 
communication)•
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assumed a manner of life different from that prescribed by their 
personal law.
Furthermore, unlike English law, Sierra Leone law makes no 
or inadequate provision for a member of a family or dependant of 
the deceased who is left unprovided for by the will or on the in­
testacy of the deceased to take a shore in the estate. The 
Islamic law of succession, which disregards non-agnatic relations 
for succession purposes, must be modified in order to include 
them. This will be in conformity with the customs of the people
of Sierra Leone. After all, the Islamic rules of succession 
were moulded after the customs of the people of Arabia. In re­
gard to wills, either because of natural love and affection for 
the children or because of the selfish notion entertained by a 
handful of persons that a surviving spouse can take care of him­
self or herself, there is the tendency for testators to leave the 
lion's share of their estates to their children or other rela­
tives bequeathing very little and in some cases, nothing at all 
to the surviving spouse. This practice is very common among 
testatrices. An Inheritance (Family Provision) law will rectify 
the foregoing inadequacies and practices.
Next, the Islamic rules of testate succession should be 
introduced to enable Muslims to make wills in accordance with 
Islamic law which should be regarded as properly executed and 
valid for the purposes of the general law. One hardly sees the 
efficacy, justice and logic in adopting the rules of intestate 
succession while leaving out those of testate succession.
Finally, the Mohammedan Marriage Act should extend to the 
provinces where there are a good many devoted and practising 
Muslims. That Islam has been fervently embraced by provincial
natives is evidenced by the popularity of the feast which marks 
the end of Ramadan in the provinces and the annual pilgrimages of 
provincial natives to Mecca.
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PART THREE
CUSTCMARY FAMILY LAW
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers do not always describe the methods they use in 
their research. The reason is that legal material is usually 
documentary and the task of the researcher is reduced to the 
discovery of the material and using it in the manner appropriate 
to the subject matter of his research. The references contain­
ed in the final text are sufficient to provide guidance to some­
one embarking on similar work. But where the research is into 
a field on which there is little or no recorded material, it is 
necessary for the benefit of both the reader, in order that he 
may have a clear understanding of what he reads, and the future 
researcher into the same field, that the pioneer should state 
the methods by which his data were collected. Sierra Leone 
Customary Family Law is virtually unwritten. This is the first 
attempt by a lawyer to make a comprehensive analysis of it.
In all, there are at least 12 tribes * in Sierra Leone, each 
having its own customary law. In theory, therefore, there 
is more than one customary law. In practice, however, there 
are resemblances as well as differences between the different 
customary laws. For these reasons, it is quite apposite to 
begin this restatement of Sierra Leone Customary Family Law 
with an outline of the sources of the law and a guide on the 
mode of presentation of that law.
1. A 13th tribe, the Gola, is regarded more as belonging to the 
neighbouring Liberian State. We have no information on this 
tribe.
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(1) Sources
(a) Previous writings
Hitherto, a few attempts have been made by anthropolo­
gists, scientists, ministers of religion and administrative offi­
cers to record the customs of some of the tribes of Sierra
1 2  3Leone. Little, Finnegan (both anthropologists), and Parsons
(a minister of religion) have written books on the Mende, Limba
4
and Kono respectively. Hall (an anthropologist) wrote on
r ^  p j
the Sherbro, whilst Alldridge, Migeod and Thomas (all scien­
tists) recorded their experiences with some of the tribes they 
came across in Sierra Leone. Each of these writings contains 
descriptions, some scanty, of the marriage customs of one or 
other of the tribes of Sierra Leone. In a publication by the 
Government Printer, Freetown, in 1917, Vergette (an administra­
tive officer) produced a handbook captioned Certain Marriage 
Customs of some of the Tribes in the Protectorate of Sierra Leone. 
Despite the general nature of its title, Vergette1s handbook was 
essentially a description of Mende marriage customs. Beside
1. The Mende of Sierra Leone. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 
(1st published 1951; revised ed. 1967).
2. Survey of the Limba People of Sierra Leone, H.M.S.O., London, 
1965.
3. Religion in an African Society, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1964.
4. The Sherbro of Sierra Leone, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1938. :
5. A Transformed Colony Sierra Leone, Selby & Co. Ltd., London, 
1910, reprinted by Megro Universities Press, Westport, Con­
necticut, U.S.A., 1970.
6. A View of Sierra Leone, Kegan Paul, London, 1926.
7. Anthropological Report on Sierra Leone, Part I, Harrison and 
Sons, London, 1916.
these books there axe a number of articles in the Sierra Leone 
Studies,* a journal published in Sierra Leone under the auspices
of the Sierra Leone Society, in the Sierra Leone Bulletin of
2 3
Religion and in other overseas journals, on some aspects of
tribal custom in Sierra Leone. Finally, the first attempt to
record Sierra Leone customary law was made in 1932 by Fenton,
then Secretary for Protectorate Affairs in Sierra Leone, in his
Outline of Sierra Leone Native Law. This is a general handbook
dealing with many areas of tribal law, including marriage and
divorce. Its source is derived from material published in the
Sierra Leone Studies, and from essays "buried in the archives of
4the Secretariat in Freetown."
Each of the published works on Sierra Leone which we 
have mentioned in this introduction, except Fenton*s, was pro­
bably never intended for lawyers despite the title of some of
1. Mende: N.C. Hollins, "Notes on Mende Marriage Law", S;L;S.,
No.13, 1928, p.29; "Notes on Mende Law", S.L.S., No.15, 1929, 
p.57; A. Bokhari, "Notes on the Mende People", S.L.S., Nos.l 
& 2, 1918, 1919.
Temne: E.R. Langley, "Marriage Customs among the Temne",S.L.S.
No.13, 1928, p.54; "The Temne, Their Life, Land and Ways",
S.L.S., No.22, 1939, p.68.
Susu: M. Aubert "Laws and Customs of the Susus", S.L.S. (O.S).
No720, 1939, p.67.
Kissi; M. Aubert, "Kissi Customs1*, S.L.S. , No.22, 1936, p.88. 
Koranko: K. Kamara, & D.S. Drummond, "Marriage Customs among 
the Korankos", S.L.S., No.16, 1930.
2. W.T. Harris, "Mende Marriage and the Law of Inheritance," 
Sierra Leone Bulletin of Religion, June 1959, p.10; Dec.1959, 
p.34.
3. K.M. Crosby, "Polygamy in Mende Country", Africa, Vol.10,
July 1937; E.R. Langley, "The Kono People oH: sTerra Leone", 
Africa, Vol.5, jran.1932, p.61; C.B. Wallis, "Tribal Laws of
* the Mende", Journal of Comparative Legislation, Vol.3, 1921.
4. See the preface to Fenton*s handbook written by C.E. Cookson, 
who was Governor of Sierra Leone in 1932, the year that the 
handbook was published, r . '.t.,
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them* The main concern of each writer seems to have been to 
record the life and customs o>f the people or of the experiences 
of the writer among the peoplie* Fenton, on the other hand, 
claimed that he was recording} matters bearing directly on law*
He produced quite a useful hamdbook for someone who wants to have 
a bird* s eye view of Sierra L>eone customary law but, being a mere 
outline,the hamdbook omits "miany qualifications and exceptions1* 
to the law which Fenton contended would obscure his work.
These qualifications amd exceptions, in our submission, are exact­
ly what would appeal to lawyers * Besides, perhaps because the 
handbook was intended to be only an outline as the title suggests, 
the space in it devoted to faimily law is reduced to no more than 
ten pages amd many important issues in family law that would 
interest a lawyer* for instamce, the legal requirements for a 
valid marriage and the incidlents of such marriage, are excluded* 
In his attempt to write on thie contemporary customaary family law 
of Sierra Leone, the present writer, therefore, proposes to fill 
in the gaps left by Fenton*
In undertaking this rresearch, I have tested prior written 
information in personal enquiries. I have found some of this 
information in the relevamt spheres of customaary family law to be 
still current amd others to hiave gone away with the passage of 
time*
(b) Personal enquiries
The only advantage I had in my personal enquiries which 
some researchers into the customary laws of many Africam tribal 
people may not have is that IC am a citizen by birth of the 
country of my reseau:ch. This distinctive quality made it easy
for me to meet people informaally, some of whom I have known
1. Qp;cit*» p*(vi).
A
personally from childhood, and discuss my interests with them*
The period of my field work in Sierra Leone lasted from 
November 1968 to February 1972, part of which I spent in teaching 
at Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone*
In Freetown, I was able to meet and discuss with the 
tribal headmen of the various ethnic groups resident in the West­
ern Area and distinguished educated natives* While in the Pro­
vinces, which I was able to visit regularly, I had interviews with 
a cross-section of the paramount chiefs, section chiefs, local 
court presidents, elders and ordinary people from the various 
tribes*
Apart from the oral enquiries, I prepared questionnaires
which I sent to all the district officers in the Provinces for 
distribution to persons chosen at random among the predominant 
ethnic group of each district* Though the questionnaires were 
in English- and the majority of the people who answered them were 
illiterate in that language, the respondents were assisted by 
young educated natives, mainly students from Fourah Bay College*
I received back most of these questionnaires fully answered* It 
was noticeable that the answers were,in many respects, identical 
to those received in reply to the same questions posed at the 
oral interviews.
In March 1972, I was taken ill and had to spend a couple 
of months hospitalized in England* This would have heavily im­
paired my field-work as I had started panel discussions which had 
not been completed* I was, however, fortunate to benefit from 
the oral enquiries conducted by a research team from the Africa - 
Studiecentrum, Leiden, Holland, which was engaged in anthropolo­
gical research in Sierra Leone under the leadership of Dr*
Barbara Harrell-Bond. This group had needed the services of a
British-trained lawyer and Dr* Harrell-Bond had requested me to 
join them. During the period I was indisposed, the group con­
tinued the panel discussions using questions and topics which 
I had supplied to it. The discussions took place in the main 
provincial towns of Sierra Leone and were tape-recorded. There 
was one panel for each district, and it consisted of a cross- 
section of the members of the ethnic group predominant in that 
district and the discussants were chosen at random, but included 
the elders and ordinary people, men as well as women* The rele­
vant information gleaned from these discussions was also similar 
to that obtained in my individual oral interviews and the 
questionnaires *
(c) Court records
(i) Superior Courts
All the superior court records are kept in the Law Courts 
Buildings in Freetown* The courts for which there are records 
are the former Circuit Court sitting in the Protectorate, the 
former Supreme Court, the present High Court 2nd the Court of 
Appeal. These records contain practically nothing on dustomary 
family law. The archives at the Law Courts in Freetown and at 
Fourah Bay College Library were also searched in vain*
(ii) Native and local courts records
In Sierra Leone, the native and local court records are 
less complete and of less guidance than in other countries such 
as Ghana and Nigeria. In many parts of the provinces proper 
records have not been kept. The reason probably is that only 
recently has it become obligatory for local court presidents to 
be literate in the English language* Added to this, perhaps 
because the majority of the native and local court officials 
could speak but not write their local dialects, there have been
no records written in the native dialect. Formerly, the "judges’* 
of the native courts were illiterate and their judgments, if re­
corded at all, were recorded by the court clerk and it was only 
the verdict rather than the reasons for the judgment that would 
be so recorded. Legible records were found in the Bo, Mayamba, 
Pujehun and Bombali districts dating back about ten years. Un­
fortunately, however, even these contain very little law and the
majority„ if not all, of the cases on family law are concerned
1 2 with either "woman damage" or "detention of a wife". There­
fore, my task is more difficult than it should have been if I 
were writing on some other African country.
(2) Mode of presentation
It is, indeed, a laborious task to restate separately 
the unwritten customary family law of each and every tribe in 
Sierra Leone in a work of this nature. Nevertheless, I would 
have ventured to do so were these laws very different from one 
another that a general treatment cannot suffice* However, in 
practbe, the resemblances between the different customary laws 
have proved to be so many and so fundamental as to justify a 
general treatment of the various customary laws topic by topic,
drawing attention to local and tribal variations where they occur
1. "Woman damage" is the term commonly used in Sierra Leone for 
an action in customary law for compensation against a man who 
had attempted or is suspected of having had sexual intercourse 
with a woman to whom he is not married. The origin of the 
term is doubtful. The translation of most of the vernacular 
expressions is "woman-palaver" • If the woman is married, the 
action for "woman-damage" is at the instance of her husband; 
but if she is unmarried, her parent will bring it.
2. The expression "detention of a wife" is found in the local 
court records . but the action is actually for harbouring a 
wife.
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under each topic.
In such an exercise, one has to be careful about general­
izations which may related to somie but not to all the tribes 
and thus result in the misstatemeint of the law. In order to 
avoid this, I shall adopt the following scheme:- (i) A general 
statement of the law without qualification is to be taken as a 
description applicable to all the tribes. If no information has 
been obtained by the present writer on a particular tribe, that 
fact will be specifically mentiomed. (ii) Where there is a 
tribal variation, the difference in respect of that tribe will be 
dealt with immediately after the general statement has been made 
and discussed. (iii) The discusision will be on an ethnic rather 
than territorial basis generally,, though attention will be drawn 
to local variations in the laws of an ethnic group between sec­
tions of that group residing in different areas of Sierra Leone.
/
CHAPTER 1 4 :
THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF CUSTOMARY-LAW MARRIAGE
A. THE FEATURES OF CUSTQMAR?Y-LAW MARRIAGE
The expression "customary-law marriage11 is not used in 
this thesis as a term of art* Generically rather than specifi­
cally , it refers to all marriages celebrated and recognised as 
valid under any system of customary law in force in Sierra Leone* 
It must be understood that in aruy one customary law, there may
l
be several different types of vailid customary law marriages.
In other words, "customary-law marriage11 is not a single institu­
tion with uniform procedures and! effects. It is not proposed to 
essay any definition beyond this;, for to do so will be to invite 
pitfalls because it is impossible to arrive at a unitary defini­
tion that is capable of embracing the nature and character of 
all types of customary marriage* Instead, the egression "cus- 
tomary-law marriage11 can be understood in terms of the features
that are distinctive of it*
Cotran, following Allot;t, has rightly pointed out seven 
such features, namely:- polygamy; that a marriage constitutes 
an alliance of the families of t;he spouses; the formalities 
attached to the marriage; the Institution of the marriage con­
sideration; the procreation of children as one of the principal 
purposes of the marriage; the inferior status of the female 
spouse; and the peculiar nature of divorce which may be extra-
1. "The Changing Nature of African MarriagS,"in Family Law^in- 
Asia and Africa (ed* J.N.D. Anderson), London, 196q , pp*15-33• 
See Allott1 s lecture notes to> the Council of Legal Education*— 
For recent developments in Af rican customary maxriage law gen­
erally, see H*F. Morris, "Review of Developments in African 
Marriage Law" in Phillips and! Morris, Marriage Laws in Africa,
O.U.P., 1971, pp.37-59*
judicial and which may be easy to obtain without any reason 
whatsoever*
The idea that marriage is an alliance of the families of 
the spouses needs qualification ewen without talcing recent devel­
opments into consideration* In Sierra Leone, the statement that 
marriage is an alliance between tvwo families was true even in the 
olden days either for the purpose of the re-marriage of a widow 
when among tribes like the Mende, Koranko and Yalunka, the widow 
was expected to re-marry into the family of the deceased husband, 
or in respect of a man* s fist marrriage when both his family and 
he were expected to contract the marriage with the woman* s family* 
But the statement is not completeUy accurate if applied in respect 
of a man* s second or subsequent maarriages, because in tribal law,
he could validly enter into such maarriages without the consent or 
<
assistance of his own family*
There is no doubt that thea features of customary maxriage 
mentioned by Cotran and Allott were all characteristic of Sierra 
Leone customary laws in the tradittional (i.e. pre-colonial, and
early colonial) period* However,, many of these features have
changed, some of them radically, sin more recent times*
Firstly, the consent of thie woman* s family is still an 
ingredient without which no valid marriage takes place, but a man 
can now contract even his first msarriage without parental consent* 
Moreover, particularly among the educated class of tribal people, 
the "alliance** aspect of the marrilage is now whittled down to the 
obtaining of the consent of the woman’s family to the maxriage.
Secondly, most of the elafoorate formalities are now aban­
doned where the spouses to the marrriage neither live in a tribal
milieu nor lead a tribal life, butt who, because of family affili-
ations>are expected to comply withi the demands of their parents 
by contracting a customary marriage. This is usually the case
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with first-generation educated nat:ives for whom aI,marriage11 
under customary law usually precedles a marriage under the Civil 
or Christian Marriage Acts*
Thirdly, while it is true that all the tribes of Sierra 
Leone still adhere to the customary token or gift by the husband- 
to-be or his family when initiatimg proceedings for marriage, 
payment in cash has frequently takien the place of the traditional 
transfers of property* Moreover:, the quantum of the amount re­
fundable as marriage consideration! when the marriage breaks up is 
now far less than what it used to be*
Fourthly, there is now a slight improvement in the status 
of the married woman in three spheires:- (a) in property; some
■t
tribes now regard a woman’s self:-acquired property, that is,
property she acquires without any financial help from her husband,
as her own; (b) in divorces: whereas among the Mende, formerly
a woman could not easily get a divorce except at great financial 
2
expense, now she can go to a locaxl court, pay the prescribed fee
and obtain a divorce certificate wihich puts an end to the marriage
even without the prior knowledge o>f her husband or her family;
(c) in more chiefdoms than before,, on the death of the husband,
3
the widow is now free to re-marry whomever she pleases* Apart
1* The Temne and the Susu are fair ahead of the other tribes in 
this regard* The Mende in the urbanized areas like Bo,
Moyamba and Kenema also hold thiis view*
2. Up to 1961, for a Mende woman 1to obtain divorce against her - 
husband she must deposit £10 or: more to the Native Administra­
tion before the latter could compel the husband to institute 
legal proceedings in the native court for refund of his dowry 
which alone brought the marriage to an end: see Memorandum
NO.P/60 of the Southern Province, dated November 8, 1961*
3* This is the result of a directive by the Sierra Leone Govern­
ment. For details, see Chapter 18, pp*fc37-63P.
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from these areas mentioned, the wife of a customary-law marriage 
hats, nevertheless, not yet reached the position 6f her counter­
part in a statutory marriage. The inequality of a wife in such 
marriage partnership is still maintained. It is in respect of 
this that most educated young tribal people in Sierra Leone, men 
as well as women, disdain customary marriage and wish that it
•t
were abolished. Such a step, of course, would not be a
rational one to take, as the vast majority of thepeople of the
o
country are still illiterate, and customary-law marriage is the 
accepted marriage for them.
The changes that have occurred in customary marriage have 
been due to religious and economic influences, opportunities of 
employment outside the tribe, urbanization, educational and social 
advancement, and cultural contact generally. As these influences 
increase, in due course the objectionable aspects of the institu­
tion will be whittled away and it will ’’move with the times11 and 
become acceptable to the social and educational elite of the 
country. In this respect, customary law will converge with the 
general law.
B* TYPES OF CUSTOMARY-LAW MARRIAGE
There are at least eight types of customary-law marriage 
in Sierra Leone. Of these types, marriage with marriage con­
sideration and marriage by service are universally found.
The commonest of all is marriage with thepayment of a
1. In a recent survey conducted among some 200 students belonging 
to all the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, this was the view of 
all of them: See B. Harrell-Bond, Marriage among thejprofes-
sional group in Sierra Leone, an unpublished D.jPhil. Thesis, 
Oxford University, i9Vl, pp.169-189.
2. The 1963 Population Census of Sierra Leone.
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marriage consideration.* Such a marriage is formed when the 
husband-to-be and/or his family make a formal payment of the con­
sideration either in cash or in kind or both to the prospective 
wife and to her family. This type of marriage is usually viri- 
local*
2
Next comes marriage by service. In this kind of marri­
age an indigent potential husband, whose family cannot afford to 
pay a marriage consideration, renders services of a manual nature 
to the family or parents of the intended wife. In the olden 
days, with a cutlass in hand, he was formally introduced by his 
parents to the woman’s family as a potential son-in-law. A 
cutlass was symbolic of manual labour and the man was obliged to 
work on the farm of the family of the woman, to collect firewood 
for them when needed^and render other services for them like 
fishing and hunting. If the man’s request was granted, he became 
a member of the intended wife’s family and lived with and worked 
for them before and even after the marriage had been entered into. 
It was usually a man's first marriage that was concluded in this 
way and,though the marriage was potentially polygamous, the hus­
band, perhaps because of his poverty., did not marry a second wife. 
This type of marriage was also universally found among the tribes 
and it was uxorilocal. Today, with the improved economic
1. We prefer the term ’’marriage consideration" to the words’’bride- 
price" or "dowrcy", all of which refer to the maxriage payment 
that is made in customary law by the mein and his family to
the family of the intended wife for the hand of the wife. In 
Sierra Leone, the word "dowry" is the one in common use to 
describe this payment. This is a misnomer. For the reasons, 
see Chapter 16, pp.56/-X43.
2. W.T. Harris calls this type of marriage, "marriage by cutlass". 
See his"Mende Marriage and the Law Inheritance", Sierra Leone 
Bulletin of Religion, Vol.I, June 1959, pp.11. Writing on - 
the Kono, Parsons calls this marriage, "marriage by common con­
sent" : See his Religion in an African Society. London, 1964,
p.12.
position of many natives, this typ«e of marriage seems to be on 
the decline*
Another type of marriage iis marriage by gift* It usu­
ally took place as an expression ofr gratitude by the family of the 
bride to the bridegroom for past o>r future services rendered or 
favours shown by him to the bride1 :s family, or in recognition of 
their high esteem for the bridegro#om* Formerly, such a marriage 
was common where the intended husbaand was a chief or a man of 
standing in the local community. The family which sought to be­
stow the honour on the intended huisband offered their young 
daughter to him as wife. This wais also the mode adopted where 
a daughter of a chief was to becomae the wife of another chief or
a nbig man” * In either case, thomgh there was no formal present­
ation of a marriage consideration,, the intended husband recipro­
cated the gift of the bride with ai lavish series of presents to 
the bride’s family which in the evrent might far exceed in amount 
what might have been paid by the hiusband if an ordinary marriage 
with marriage consideration had be*en entered into. This type of 
marriage too. was common among alll the tribes. Nowadays, how­
ever, with the increase of "big mem" in the local, community and 
the dwindling of the autocratic powers of chiefs in relation to 
their subjects, traces of the marrriage can be found only among 
ruling houses. The idea is that royal blood will be stronger if 
a daughter of a chief marries anot;her chief.
■i
There is on record, a peouliar type of marriage by gift 
among the Koranko called almadi. In the olden days, a Muslim
father, desirous of the blessing of a Mulsim priest whom he 
esteemed, reserved his young daughiter of whom he was particularly
1, See K. Kamara and D. Drummond: "Marriage Customs amongst the
Kurankos", S;L.S.(0.S .), No.l6„ 1930, p*66.
fond for the priest as a future vwife without notifying the 
priest of it. When the girl reached a marriageable age and 
had undergone the usual initiation ceremony, the father equipped 
her with personal goods and domestic paraphernalia and took her 
without a marriage ceremony or notice to the priest and presented 
her to him as his wife. The priiest received the girl with 
solemnity and in return gave his blessings to the girl’s father. 
Informants from the Koinadugu district say that this practice is 
still in vogue among the Koranko and Limba Muslims in that dis­
trict.
Next, among the Mende, there is a type of marriage known 
as goat’s head marriage (njewui) a, which is a form of ’’cross- 
cousin” marriage. It is marriage within the same family between 
a mam dnd the daughter of his motther* s consanguine * brother.
Such marriage is regarded as highly commendable. A man* s mothefs 
brother (kenya) is thought^ in Memde law, to have certain obliga­
tions to his nephew, and presumably some of the parental respon­
sibility of a man’s mother is shiifted on to his kenya. Thus, a 
kenya is expected to maintain hiis nephew, and the traditional 
way of fulfilling this obligatiom is to give the nephew the head 
of any animal that he kills. I if the man marries the daughter of 
his kenya, this responsibility to supply animals’ heads to the 
nephew is regarded as being discharged by the marriage. Volun­
tary dissolutions of such marriagces are veyy rare.
Another type of customarjy marriage is widow inheritance. 
When a man dies and is survived tby his wife or wives, they are 
expected to re-marry into the latte husband’s family. The new 
husband is not expected to go thorough the usual formalities that
1. Marriage between a man and thee daughter of his mother* s brother 
germane or uterine is, howevexr, not allowed.
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would be necessary on a first marriage, but merely presents him-
1
self with a kola to the parents of the woman as her new husband* 
TIis type of marriage was formerly common among all the tribes, 
but is not of frequent occurrence nowadays. Sometimes, where 
the widow does not want to marry any male members of the deceaseds 
family but, nevertheless, wishes to remain with her deceased*s
husband1 s family, she can "marry" a female member of the family, 
usually a sister of the deceased, and stay within it. This 
latter course, ofcourse, is not marriage in the true sense as the 
parties cannot cohabit as man and wife. In practice, they live 
together only an close friends. A widow who takes this step has 
no obligation to refund the marriage consideration to the family 
of the deceased husband. It is worthy of note that the levirate 
end ghost-marriage are unknown in Sierra Leone customary laws.
Somewhat akin to widow inheritance is a type of trans­
action which has been described as marriage by "showing oneself 
to a new father-in-law". This type of transaction is common 
among the Mende living in households in villages and homesteads. 
When a man’s father-in-law dies, the deceased is for the purposes 
of guardianship succeeded by a male head of family (ndaimowai).
By a legal fiction, every marriage of his daughters consented to 
by the deceased father is deemed to be suspended upon his death, 
and any husband who wants his marital relationship with such 
daughter to continue must "show herself" (ngi ge) to the ndaimowai 
The showing of oneself is done by a token gift of money to the
1. The word "kola" will appear many times in our discussion of 
customary family law. It means the real kola fruit or a 
token sun of money representing it. In customary law, giving 
kola to a person is a sign of good will, and it signifies the 
intiation or termination of a transaction intended to have a 
happy ending•
2. N.C. Hollins, "Notes on Mende Marriage Law", S;L;S;(0;S;).
No.13, 1928, p.31; W.T. Harris, op.cit., p.19.
head of the family after the funer;al ceremonies of the deceased
have been concluded. Failure by ;a husband to show himself to 
the new father-in-law, of course, cdoes not legally invalidate his 
"prior11 marriage to his wife. It is, however, desirable to do 
so because, should the husband lat<er divorce his wife, his chance 
of recovering the mariiage consideration may be jeopardised, as 
the head of the woman1 s family can successfully plead before the 
local court that he does not know “that the husband and the wife 
were ever married as he never consented to it and the woman1 s 
natural father is dead. Such trainsaction, as we have described, 
has not been found among the other tribes of Sierra Leone.
However, there is evidence * that some ICrim and Gallina in the 
Pujehun district and some Sherbro in the Bonthe and Moyamba 
districts practise it. Presumably, this is the result of Mende 
cultural influence on these tribes rather than their own custom­
ary laws.
Next, there is a form of c<ohabitation between a man and 
a woman which may be termed "frienidship arrangement". A man 
and woman fall in love with each otther and live together as hus­
band and wife without the prior comsent of the woman1 s family. 
Such a union has a hybrid character. Vis-a-vis the family of 
the woman, there is no valid marriiage between theparties and the 
"husband" cannot make claims on thie woman1 s family which are in­
cidental to marriage. But in resjpect of the children of the 
union, the Mende consider them as Tbeing entitled to succeed to 
their father provided he dies witlhout leaving children who are 
the issue of a proper* customary miarriage. Among all the tribes, 
however, a "friendship arrangement!" can be converted into a
1. From the local court records of? these areas
legally constituted marriage for all purposes by the husband's 
obtaining the consent of the family of the wife. A marriage con­
tracted in the olden days between a woman and a soldier or court 
messenger, in which the consent of the woman's brother who lived 
in the same barracks as the intended husband was obtained but 
not that of the woman's parents since almost invariably they 
might be far away, has also been described as "friendship marri­
age" and irregular.* While it is conceded that such a "marriage" 
contracted without the consent of the woman’s parents will be 
irregular if the parents are alive and can easily be got in touch 
with, in our submission, if the only surviving member of the 
woman's family is a brother or sister or uncle as the case may be, 
the consent of that member is quite sufficient to render the 
marriage proper and valid.
o
Finally, there was in the olden days marriage by capture. 
The Protectorate of Sierra Leone was,up to the turn of this cen­
tury, the battle ground for tribal wars. Men saw in these wars 
an opportunity of winning wives for themselves. An attack upon 
a town or village resulted in the extermination of the male in­
habitants and the capture of the women folk, who subsequently be­
came the wives of their conquerors. No requirement was essen­
tial for the validity of such marriage other than a public de­
claration by the captor of his intention to cohabit with his cap­
tive followed by actual cohabitation* Such a wife was, however, 
regarded as a slave and her children could not inherit from their 
father. Nowadays, there are no longer inter-tribal wars in the
1. N.C. Hollins, op.cit., p.31.
2* See T.J. Alldridge: A Transformed Colony: Sierra Leone, Negro
University Press, Westport, Connecticut, reprinted 1976, p.3125 
W.T. Harris, op.cit., p.10. Note that these writers wrote on 
the Mende but, from our investigation, marriage by capture was 
also common among the Temne and Susu. There is no informa­
tion on the other tribes.
country and^with the abolition of slavery in 1933, this kind of 
marriage no longer exists.
To sum up, the legally constituted marriages which give 
rise to legal incidents at customarry law are marriages by the 
payment of a consideration, service or gift; goat’s head marri­
age, and widow inheritance. These legal incidents are the same 
for each and every type of marriage* For example, the spouses 
of a marriage after the payment of a marriage consideration have 
•fiie same rights and obligations as ithe spouses of a marriage by 
gift. The difference in terminology between these kinds of 
marriage arises from social practice and procedures, but the 
legal consequences are substantially the same. One marked legal 
difference, however, between marri«age with the payment of a marri­
age consideration, on the one hand, and the other types of marri­
age, on the other, is that as ther<e is no formal payment of a 
marriage consideration in the latt«er, none is refundable on 
divorce. Looking at it from the point of view of English law, 
there is consideration moving from the husband in these other 
types of marriage, since the quid pro quo for the marriage is,
as the case may be, his service, hiis presents or the token that 
heaves.* The difference perhaps is that there is no tangible 
quantifiable thing which has passed at least in marriage by ser­
vice. Nevertheless, in our submission, if it is considered 
proper that "dowry" should be refuindable when the marriage is 
dissolved, then the husband who substitutes services for the 
usual customary marriage payment should be compensated for his 
services because his consideration is as good and, in many cases, 
even better than a formal payment of a marriage consideration.
As for marriage by gift, goat’s head marriage and widow
1. Even in the case of the goat’s head marriage, the man must 
make a token gift to his uncle..
inheritance, the present position in customary law should remain 
intact since any gift given by the husband is in exchange for 
the hand of the wife in marriage* Perhaps, a more rational 
solution in all cases is to abolish the refund of the "dowry" 
since the wife, reduced as she is, in some respects, to the posi­
tion of a servant in customary law, would have rendered suffic­
ient services to the husband in order to compensate him fully for 
the marriage consideration*
Finally, in our discussion of customary family law, we 
shall deal with all the legally constituted marriages as one 
form of marriage, i.e. customary-law marriage. However, where 
there are differences in procedures and effect, we shall point 
them out in their relevant places.
CHAPTER -15
THE FORMATION OF A CUSTOMARY LAW MARRIAGE
A. INTRODUCTION
Commenting on the establishment of marriage in customary
law generally, Phillips has remarked that
"In African native law there is not usually 
any prescribed formality or set of formali­
ties which can be readily identified as 
corresponding to the * solemnization* or 
* celebration* of a marriage under European 
law* - The marriage transaction is normally 
a long-drawn-out process, and there is often 
doubt, both as to the exact point in that 
process at which the parties become husband 
and wife, and also as to which (if any) of 
the accompanying ceremonies and observances 
are strictly essential to the conclusion of 
a valid marriage*"1
This statement is true for customary law marriages in 
Sierra Leone as for such marriages in other African countries.
A customary law marriage in Sierra Leone does not require an 
officiating priest or official who, at a prescribed moment, ties 
the bonds of marriage and declares the spouses husband and wife 
in order to bring the marriage into existence in law. True, 
among some tribes, like the Temne and Susu, the service of an 
official may be enlisted to perform certain ceremonies which are 
regarded as concluding the marriage transaction, but the employ­
ment of such official and his ensuing duty are modern develop­
ments to customary law brought about admittedly by religious in-
2
fluence, for example^ Islam. Although the strict Muslims
1. Marriage Laws in Africa, OrU.P., 1971, 107* For similar 
views, see: A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, op^cit. 9 p.49; A.N.Allot'fr, 
A.L. Epstein and M. Gluckman, "Introduction", Ideas and -Pro­
cedures in -African Customary ’-Law, O.U.P., 1969, p.63.
2. An officiating priest is not essential in Islamic law. This 
is, therefore, a local modification of that law.
among the tribes regard the intervention of an official as de­
sirable, the validity of customary marriages contracted without 
such intervention has never been doubted.
Similarly, though a customary-law marriage is attended 
with a series of formalities, the non-observance of many of them
does not invalidate the marriage;; they are complied with merely 
because tradition demands it. OThere are no prescribed set rules 
in regard to preliminaries and solemnization, as in the general 
law, non-compliance with which is fatal to the validity of the 
marriage. Nevertheless, as all the formalities contribute to 
the formation of the marriage, it: is, in our view, inappropriate 
to speak in terms of thepreliminairies of a customary law marriage 
and then the marriage itself. Rather, it is apposite to regard 
marriage as a transaction beginning with betrothal or a friendship 
arrangement, culminating in the obtaining of the consent of the 
family of the wife to the marriagje, the latter being, as we shall 
see in due course, the most inporrtant essential without which a 
customary-law marriage is non-esiistent, and finally ending with 
the wife taking her place in the husband* s household. Since 
every stage of this transaction iLs accompanied by one or more 
formalities, for a better understanding of the law and with a 
view to laying on the table materrial relevant for future codifi­
cation, it is necessary, at this juncture, to describe the most 
important stages through which a marriage passes with their con­
comittant formalities. These stages are, in particular, betro­
thal, initiation, friendship and the concluding formalities and 
ceremonies.
B. BETROTHAL
A woman1 s first marriage is usually preceded by betro- 
thal. Betrothal takes place when a man* and/or his family 
communicates to the family of the woman the man* s intention to 
marry her and that request is granted* In customary law, it 
is attended by certain formalities*
Traditionally, marriage was regarded as a link binding 
the immediate parties to it as well as their ante-nuptial fami­
lies* Because of the consequences, both legal and social, that 
flowed from the relationship, it was considered expedient that 
before the marriage was concluded a trial period should elapse 
during which an opportunity could be afforded to all the parties 
concerned for a careful appraisal of the responsibility upon 
which they proposed to embark* Similarly, a combination of cir­
cumstances might prevent a man from immediate cohabitation with 
a girl whom he loved; he might not be in a position to assume 
immediate marital responsibility or the girl might still be 
young and of un-marriageable age, but without communicating* his 
wish to the girl’s parents another suitor might come forward 
and displace him* Moreover, the man, his family and the 
woman’s family, although they might have no immediate objection 
the union, would need some time during which to study one an­
other’s background and way of life* Nowadays, even though mar­
riage is to a great extent , these considerations
may still be present.
A man and his family normally expect certain qualities
1. This is the case for marriage by the payment of a marriage 
consideration and for marriage by service* It is seldom the 
case with goat’s head marriages. Marriage by gift is never 
preceded by betrothal.
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in the woman whom he proposes to marry. A respectful and in­
dustrious girl and one with a good character would be very much 
to their liking. Likewise, the woman’s family would prefer an 
industrious, generous and respectable man. Only time will re­
veal these qualities. Finally, mutual trust and understanding 
are nurtured between the two families* The period of betrothal 
is, therefore, the time for assessment and the cultivation of 
cordial relationship between the families which go to strengthen 
the marriage bonds once they are finally tied.
Time of Betrothal
Betrothal can take place at any time. Formerly, it
i
could be either before the girl was born or after. Nowadays, 
it is frequently post-natal. Where the betrothal is ante-natal, 
however, it must be confirmed by the man and/or his family with 
the donation of a token gift after the girl is born. Infant 
betrothal was common amongst all the tribes in Sierra Leone in 
the olden days. A man and woman of the same age seldom married*
A man was expected to work and acquit himself as being capable 
of assuming both family and marital responsibilities before he 
could embark upon marriage* Therefore, if he approached a woman 
of his age who had never been married, he would be told to wait 
for the daughter of that woman. Almost invariably, the intended 
wife became the man’s mother-in-law at a later date.
Among the strict tribal Muslims in the North, like the 
Susu and the Temne, betrothal is never ante-natal and it takes 
place when the girl has reached the age of puberty. The reason
1* M. McCulloch states that Koranko girls are betrothed by the - 
age of 10 years: Peoples^of Sierra beone, International Afri­
can Institute, London, 19^0 (revised 1964), p*91* My re­
searches reveal that, in fact, by the age of 10 many Koranko 
girls are betrothed.
is that it is believed that a giirl cannot give a valid consent 
until she has reached the age of puberty, and her consent is 
essential for a betrothal. Maririage with its relevant incidents 
to them, should follow close to *tthe heels of betrothal. Conse­
quently, only girls who have reached a marriageable age may be 
betrothed. Presumably, one reason for the shortness of the 
period between betrothal and the actual marriage is that as mar­
riage usually takes place between members of the same Muslim 
community (jamaat), the families of the man and woman would have 
been sufficiently known to, or acquainted with^each other even 
before the question of the marriage arises. Consequently, a 
period of friendship between the intended spouses known tc or 
even nurtured by their parents would have lasted for a long time 
before the betrothal, thus giving all the parties concerned the 
opportunity of assessing one anotther.
Who Initiates ^ Betrothal?
Betrothal is never initiated by the woman or her family. 
It must always begin from the man and/or his family.
It is as a rule effected through an intermediary or a 
"go-between"• In the case of amte-natal betrothals, however, 
the man himself approaches the woman’s mother* Where the be­
trothal is post-natal, the ”go-beetween" for a man’s first marri­
age is a close relative, usually female, of the man. Where no 
such relative is available, it iss the father. If the man has no 
relative at hand, then he can semd a close friend of his to the 
woman’s family. For subsequent marriages, the "go-between" is 
normally the head wife of the mam. It is desirable that she 
should play a part in the finding of a second or subsequent wife 
for herhusband, because she is tlhe second in command in the com­
pound polygamous family, and thee other wives come directly under 
her supervision. If the head wrife is relilctant to play the
role of a "go-between11, the man employs the services of a member 
of his family*
Procedure
Generally, the man or his "go-between” takes a gift each 
for the girl and her family and informs the girl and her family 
of the man1 s intention to have her ais wife* Acceptance of the 
gifts is conclusive of the betrothal* We shall now consider the 
tribal differences*
Mende: If the intended wife is not yet born but is being
expected, the man gives her mother about 20 cents with an expres­
sion of the desire that if the baby happens to be a girl, she 
should become his wife* This is known as koi raaho * When the 
child is born, the main confirms his intention with the giving of 
presents, like fish and oil, to the mother and clothes for the 
child* This is known as "tying a rope on the hand of the child”
(ngeya gula tokola)* After this, the man continues to render
services to the girlfs family and to give them presents until the 
girl $rows up and is initiated into the Sande society at his ex­
pense. This type of wife is called fale ~ gbua nyaha (mushroom 
1
wife)*
In the case of a grown-up girl who has already beei initi­
ated into the Sande society, the "go-between” takes a gift of 
cash of about Le*l for the girl, Le*2 for the mother, and Le.2
1. The mushroom plant is used here in a figurative sense. Harris, 
op.cit*, p.13, suggests that the wife is called a "mushroom
wife" because the husband has to be quick in picking her as a 
wife, otherwise someone else will take her* Harris1 second 
suggestion that the word "mushroom” is used because the wife 
is chosen as soon as she is born or "sprouts" as a mushroom- 
seems to be the generally accepted view. Thus, a woman be­
trothed when grown-up is called koli nyaha (woman found) be­
cause of her grown-up state when betrothed.
for the father, or goods such as tobacco or wearing apparel*
The gift is called mboya  ^and it is intended to induce the con­
sent of the intended wife and her parents* A wife obtained by 
such procedure is called koli nyaha (woman found).
Sherbro, Krim and Gallina; The betrothal procedure among 
these tribes is similar to that of the Mende.
Kissi: These, too, adopt a procedure similar to that of
the Mende, except that a present of four Kola nuts and a native 
mat from the man and his family is expected. in urban areas, 
however, the presentation of these items may be lawfully and 
factually dispensed with and a cash present of about 20 cents
suffices.
2Temne: In the olden days, the girl must be given by the
man or his family a present of a string of waist beads which she 
tied around her waist* The mother was also given either tobacco 
or a mat* Nowadays, it is customary to give eight kola nuts 
(red or white) together with a sum of 40 cents to the parents.
In addition, the girl is given at least one of the following 
items:- a head tie, necklace, gold or trinket. All these pre­
sents are referred to by the generic name Ta ° wonukum.
Susu: The "go-between” approaches the family of the wo­
man with about 40 cents (kolananl) and asks whether the girl has 
not been betrothed to anybody. If the reply is in the negative, 
the 11 go-between” pays a second visit to the woman* s family and
1. McCulloch, op;clt.,p»2a and Little: The Mende of Sierra Leone, 
(revised ed*), London, 1967, p.154, use the word mboya as mean- 
ing the marriage consideration. This is inaccurate, Mboya
is the gift payable in order to induce consent. This gUt is 
also called by some Mende tolei, (a kola). The marriage con­
sideration itself is generally known sis tolei.
2. See E.R. Langley:"Marriage Customs Amongst the Tem^es’,* S;L;S. 
(Q;S.)t No.13, 1923, pp.54, 55.
carries presents for them consisting of a calabash containing a 
piece of white cloth, four kola nuts, seven needles, a head of 
tobacco and rice. The calabash is usually covered with a woven 
fabric called leffa. It is also usual for the marriage con­
sideration (guinefensay) to be paid at this time, but there is no 
hard and fast rule about this, and it may be deferred to another 
date.
Koranko: Before initiating proceedings for betrothal, it
is customary for the Koranko to consult a reputed medicine-man *
(beresigile) to foretell whether the marriage, if contracted,
will last* If the augury is favourable, the man or the "go-
2between'1 gives a "shake-hand" to the chief of the village after 
which a new mat or four kola nuts wrapped in leaves and. tied up 
with a piece of thread are given to the woman's family as the 
betrothal presents (woronani). Acceptance of the presents con­
cludes the transaction.
Kono: On the birth of the intended wife, the man pre­
sents a red-agate bead to the future mother-in-law. This gift
signifies the man's intention to have the woman as wife. When 
the girl reaches the age of puberty and is about to be initiated
into the bondo society, the man makes another approach to the 
girl's family. The girl makes the final choice and if it is 
favourable, the man exchanges the red agate bead with a mat, fowl 
and native spun cloth. This exchange of gift is known as
1. Kamara & Drummond, opicit., p.57.
2. This is a term used in customary law to describe a gift given
to a chief either by a stranger who wishes to reside or settle
in his village, or by any member of the community who requires 
the blessing of the chief for any enterprise which he (the 
member) wishes to embark upon.
fandafene and the gift itself is called wona o sapua,
Limba; The transaction is usually between the man and 
the girl's mother if the girl is too young to understand it.
He gives the girl's mother a head tie or a small sum of money sis 
"kola". If the girl is capable of understanding the transaction 
and she is supposed to be a virgin, it is not customary for the 
man to present himself to the girl's parents* He must first of 
all approach the girl to ensure that she is willing andUien he 
must conduct the negotiation with the girl's family through a 
"go-between". If the "go-between" is the man's head wife, she 
must be accompanied by a relation of the man. The "go-between"
I
takes kola nuts to the woman's family which are first distributee 
among the household of the woman's father. Finally, a sum of 
money, about 20 cents, is given to the mother and father as "kola" 
acceptance of which signifies that they have agreed to the pro­
posal.
Loko: A special ceremony marks betrothal among the Loko.
Through a "go-between", the intended husband notifies the parents 
of his intended wife of his intention to pay them a visit. The 
parents^ who would have known the purpose of the man's visit, 
assemble members of their family to await his arrival. When he 
arrives at the appointed place for the meeting, usually the resi­
dence of his future parents-in-law, he opens all the doors in 
the house after which he closes all of them. Such opening or 
closing of a door is accompanied with the payment of a kola 
(about 1 cent). The ceremony is an acknowledgement that the 
man has gained access to the home of his intended wife's parents 
and that thereafter, no other suitor should be permitted to ask 
for the hand of the girl in marriage.
Religious Influence: Islam has to a igreat extent in­
fluenced the customary laws in respect of betrothal. It is
common for all the strict tribal Muslims to adopt the same pro­
cedure, although differences in the customary items of gift, as j 
we have already pointed out, could be found here and there. The 
common element in the procedure is this. A go-between, who must 
be a respectable member of the local jamaat, but not related to 
either family, visits the family of the woman and discloses the 
man1s intention of marriage. The head of the woman’s family in-, 
forms the girl, her parents and other available relatives. If 
the girl agrees and her family approves, the head of the woman1s 
family tells the 11 go-between” to pay another visit for a reply.
On the second visit, the 11 go-between11 brings with him a calabash 
containing at least 100 kola nuts and a sum of money of any 1
amount in order to "put the kola". After some time, usually a 
week, the empty calabash is returned through the same "go-between*1 
accompanied by some member of the man’s family with words of 
thanks. The return of the calabash without its contents signifies 
acceptance of the proposal and marks the completion of the betro­
thal.
Legal Consequences of betrothal
Betrothal brings the intended spousCes and their families
close together but no legal consequences generally flow from it.^
No rights of consortium exist in favour of the intended spouses.
If the man has sexual intercourse with his betrothed being a vir-
2gin and unitiated into the women’s secret society, he commits a
3
wrong against her parents. In this respect,**virgin-money", usuallj
1. Except as regards the rights of action for seduction of a be­
trothed woman brought up in the household of the betrothed man*, 
see p.514.
2. As a social custom, every native woman must be initiated into 
a secret society on reaching puberty before she can enter into 
a customary law marriage. For more information about this 
society, see later.
3. This is the money a man pays for deflowering a girl. ,
Le.2.10, must be paid by the man to the parents of the woman, 
after which he must ensure that the girl is initiated into the 
women1 s society, the expenses of which he must pay, and marry her. 
Among the Mende and the Temne, the family of a woman who is se­
duced by her betrothed prior to her initiation in the sande or 
bondo society  ^can refuse to permit the main to marry the woman, 
and the man would have no right to the refund of any expenses he 
has incurred hitherto. In order to pacify the girl’s parents, 
among the Temne, the man may, in addition to the virgin-money, 
be fined an amount from Le.2.10 upwards, depending on his economic 
and social status, and the man may then be permitted to marry the 
girl. The Kissi, on the other hand, require the man either to 
marry the woman after she is initiated into the bondo society at 
his expense, or to pay the marriage consideration a3 demanded by 
the woman’s parents.
As between the man and the woman’s family, although no 
legal rights are acquired by being betrothed, social and moral 
obligations result from it. In rural societies, the man is ex­
pected to assist the woman’s family on their farm during culti­
vation and harvest either by talcing part in the manual labour
2
himself or by employing adjutants. During the rainy season,
he is also expected to supply the woman’s family with occasional 
bundles of fire-wood, a scarce commodity during this period.
His duty also includes the rendering of financial help to the 
woman’s family whenever they are bereaved and to make occasional 
presents to the girl and her parents, particularly the mother.
1. This is the same society called by different names by the 
tribes.
2. This is one of the two seasons in Sierra Leone and it lasts 
approximately from May to October.
In the towns and cities, where internal migration makes it diffi­
cult for the man and the woman* s family to live in the same vici­
nity, and where employment facilities make it impossible for the 
man to be engaged on some agricultural occupation, and he is em­
ployed as, say, a clerk, a professional, a labourer or a domestic 
servant, monetary gifts to the woman and her family replace the 
man*s personal service.
As between the betrothed couple, there is no legal obli­
gation to carry out the contract -of marriage' and consequently 
there is no right of action for bsreach of promise. But social 
consequences follow. Visits are; exchanged between the couple 
and each is a welcome visitor to “the home of the other* s parents, 
VThere the man is not already married to some other wife, the 
betrothed woman or, if she is too> young, her mother, prepares 
the occasional meal for him. Sometimes, where the girl is too 
young when betrothed, it is customary for her to be reared in the
house and under the care of the Intended husband. In this 
case, the intended husband virtually assumes parental rights over 
her vis-a-vis third parties, Ome important legal consequence is 
that if the woman is seduced by another man, the intended husband 
and the woman1 s parents both have a legal right of action for 
damages against the seducer, Buit the husband* s right is retro­
active and takes effect only aft ex he has finally married the 
woman,^
1, Some Krim and Mende informants from the Pujehun, Bonthe and 
Bo districts resident at Moiba Town, Freetown, say that a man 
has an immediate right of action even without concluding the 
marriage with the woman. This information, however, is not 
supported by other members of 1the same ethnic groups from the 
same areas. The difference o:f opinion probably arose from the 
first informants* repeated reference to the betrothed couple 
as ’’husband** and ’’wife’*. The opinion that the man acquires a~ 
retrospective right after the conclusion of the marriage trans­
action, therefore, ought to prevail.
Termination of betrothal
(i) By act of the parties
It is rare for the parents expressly to bring a betrothal 
to an end, but either betrothed party can do so expressly by tell 
ing the other or, if by the woman, impliedly by marrying some 
other man. If it is the man who terminates the relationship, 
his reason usually is that he has found the woman to be of a 
questionable character or that she has been seduced by another 
man. Whenever the woman takes the initiative, there is fre­
quently another suitor behind the scene or her family may have 
advised ho: against the natch after discovering certain character­
istics of the man or his family with which they do not want to 
be associated. For example, the man may be found disrespectful
or unhelpful or a quarrel may have arisen between the two fami­
lies which has fallen them^art,
( )  By death
The death of either the man or the woman automatically 
terminates the betrothal. But if it is the woman who dies and 
the two families have been favourably disposed to each other, 
should there be other unmarried female members of the deceased 
woman’s family, the man is encouraged by the woman’s family to 
choose another wife from among them; but he has no legal right 
to claim a substitute if they are unwilling to accord him this 
privilege,
(iii) By marriage
As soon as the marriage is finally concluded, betrothal 
merges with it and the parties attain to the status of husband 
and wife. Prior to that, however, but after betrothal, they 
may be referred to as "husband" and "wife"• This is of common 
occurrence when the woman ia brought up in the household of the
man. Such expression, nevertheless, used before the actual 
marriage ceremonies is only of sotcial but of no legal significsmcj
Effect of termination of betrothall on property
Where termination takes pdace as a result of the death 
of either of the betrothed partieis, no expenses incurred by the 
man at the time of betrothal or a^ fter is refunded. Similarly, 
if it is the man who brings the relationship to an end, the law 
of almost all  ^the tribes is tha~t he forfeits anything he gave 
the woman and her parents. The IKono, however, are rather flex­
ible in this respect. According to them, the man forfeits
everything only if he does not gi^ ve a good reason for the termi­
nation, In addition to the forfeiture, among the Mende, in 
the olden days, the man was fined, by the parents or the chief for 
wasting the woman’s time in looking up to him as a prospective 
husband. Nowadays, the Limba injsist on a fine which, they say, 
is used in order to buy soap to ”rcvash” the man* s bad luck off 
the woman.
If it is the woman and/or her family who put an end to 
the betrothal, all the gifts made: to her and expenses incurred 
in respect of the woman and her fiamily must be refunded to the 
man, failing which he can recover them in an action for civil 
debt incurred by the woman and he:r family or he can swear them. 
Among the Kono, however, if the woman’s parents do not approve 
of or consent to her breaking up <of the betrothal she, but not 
the family, is liable to the man.
1. Except the Kono.
Effect of termination on children
A child born during the period of betrothal belongs to 
the mother and her family if the marriage does not take place.
The natural father has no right to it. Besides, he is liable to
the woman1 s family and can be mulcted in damages. Such a child 
is prima facie illegitimate but the natural father can later 
legitimize him by paying a fee « regarded as marriage considera- 
tion - to the woman1 s family, followed by his assumption of 
full parental responsibility for the child.
C. INITIATION
Initiation into one of the tribal secret societies in 
Sierra Leone is regarded by the appropriate tribe as part of the 
preparation for marriage. These societies are(a) for males:- 
poro (Mende, Temne, Sherbro, Gallina and Kono ); biri gbangbani 
or andoma (Koranko); beri (Gallina); and gbangbani (Limba);
(b) for the f e m a l e s sande (Mende); bondo (Temne, Sherbro, 
Loko, Limba, Kono, Susu, Kissi, Krim and Gallina); and biri 
kambam or segere (Koranko).
Initiation into the male society is usually at puberty 
but younger boys or adults may be accepted. For those who have
1. There is a legal fiction that on payment of the fee and ob­
taining the consent of the woman1s family, a "marriage” be­
tween the natural father and the child1 s mother is in exist­
ence, which makes the child legitimate. This is, however, 
one method of legitimation under customary law. For more 
information on this, see Chapter 19.
2. J.F. Luke: "Some impressions of the Korankos and their 
Country", S;L;S;~(Q;S;)j No.22, 1939, pp#90, 92 mentions this 
society for the male and kambam for the female. Though both 
appear to be still in existence, the society commonly used by 
the Moranko for the purposes of preparation for marriage seems 
to be the biri.
reached puberty, initiation marks the passage into full adulthood 
while for the younger boys, initiation is commonly the stage for
their circumcision. Theprimary purpose of initiation is to
/ _
teach the candidates their tribal lass and customs, self-disci­
pline, co-operation, obedience to one’s elders and family respon­
sibility.
In the woman’s society, initiation into which usually 
takes place at puberty, girls are taught, inter alia, the arts of 
housekeeping and motherhood. The most important aspect of the 
initiation is the operation of clitoridectomy. It is a common 
belief among the tribes that a woman on whom this operation has 
been performed will remain faithful to her husband during their 
marriage because it curbs her appetite for sex which, in a poly­
gamous family, is considered virtuous for the woman since she 
may go for months or even years without having sexual intercourse
with her husband,"^ as the husband may have several wives each
2
taking her turn to sleep with him.
Though initiation is desirable for both men and women in 
preparation for a full marital life, it is regarded as a neces­
sity for the females. A girl who has not been initiated should^ 
strictly speaking, not have sexual intercourse, and any man who 
violates this rule by having an affair with her must compensate 
her parents and the head of the women’s society whenever she is 
initiated into it.
The traditional rule was that a person was socially in­
competent to enter into marriage if he or she was not previously
1. The multiplicity of cases for woman damage which appears be­
fore the local courts does not, however, lend credence to this 
belief.
2. For fuller discussion on this point, see Chapter 17, pp^S'S^.
initiated. Nowadays, insofar as men are concerned, the rule 
appears to be in theory only even among the most conservative 
tribal people. But native women, in strict tribal society may 
not marry unless they have undergtone the initiation ceremony.
This rule is relaxed in the case <of young educated women who 
have been brought up outside thei:r tribal community by the Cre­
oles, more particularly in the WeiSternArea.’1’ It is relaxed 
only when it is impossible for thcem to take time off to return to
their villages for three or four tweeks in order to undergo the 
2
initiation. With the spread o2f education and social admixture, 
initiation will die out among theise educated tribal people.
To sum up, although initication has been and is still re­
garded as an essential forerunner of marriage, its absence is
3attended only by a social stigma, but is not a legal bar to mar­
riage. Our conclusion is based con the fact that many non-natives 
as well as educated natives have contracted customary-law marri­
ages in the Provinces without undcergoing the appropriate initia­
tion ceremony and the validity of these marriages have never been 
disputed either extra-gudicially cor before the local courts.
1. For a long time ever since the beginning of this century, it — 
was usual for children of the people of the tribes of the pro­
tectorate of Sierra Leone to bee given as wards to the Creoles 
in the colony.
2. The parents of such women require, whenever possible, that 
these women return home and be initiated into society before 
they enter into even statutory marriage.
3. A married woman who has never Tbeen initiated into society is 
held in very low estimation by the women graduates of such 
society in any matter concerning womanhood.
D. FRIENDSHIP ARRANGEMENT
Generally speaking, the marriage of women who are already 
married or divorced, widows, and adult women leading an independ­
ent life of their own, usually in towns and cities where they are 
engaged in some petty trade, begins with a friendship arrangement* 
No "go-between” is required to initiate the transaction* Ihe 
man speaks privately to the woman, lavishes presents on her, and 
they begin to see each other frequently.
If the woman is already married to another man, it is 
also necessary for the intended husband to approach the section 
chief of the village or the headman of his tribe in the town or 
city where he is resident with a fee indicating his intention to 
cohabit with the woman* The chief or headman calls the woman 
and asks her about her present husband* After being satisfied 
that the marriage has gone on the rocks, the chief or headman 
gives his consent to the cohabitation* A good ground on which 
his consent is usually given is that the woman has been deserted 
by her husband and she has no visible means of subsistence* The 
result of obtaining the consent of the chief or headman is that 
should the womans husband turn up afterwards, the man with whom 
she has been cohabiting is not liable to him for "woman damage"*'*’ 
But the husband can take his wife away, or alternatively, can 
demand the refund of the marriage consideration which he gave for 
the woman from such a man, the payment of which by the man con­
verts the cohabitation into a lawful marriage* The word "lawful" 
in this respect is used in a relative sense* As regards the
1. Relatively, customary law, in this respect, is moving towards 
polyandry. For another instance, see Chapter 16, pp.svs'-5^ 7
parties, inter se, and third parties, except the.woman’s parents, 
the spouses are now regarded as husband and wife. But insofar 
as the woman’s parents are concerned, there is no marriage until 
the new husband has "shown himself" to them with the payment of 
a nominal fee. The marriage consideration which he refunded to 
the first husband takes the place <£ what he would have given to 
his parents-in-law, but in the event of a divorce he cannot re­
cover it from them though he can from a subsequent suitor who, 
again, may want to marry the woman.
In the case of a friendship arrangement, the man does 
not initially approach any person with the subject of negotiat­
ing the relationship other than the woman herself. Once they 
have met, cohabitation can take place at any time. The matter 
need not be mentioned to the woman*s parents at this stage but 
where the man and her parents live together in the same communitys 
although no formal request is made for the hand of the woman in 
marriage, the man is expected to be generous to them and assist 
them on their farm. Nevertheless, receipt of this generosity 
and assistance is not an acknowledgement by the woman’s family 
that the parties are husband and wife. Should the husband in­
tend to regularise the union, he must "show life" with a small 
present, even a kola nut, to the woman’s parents. In return 
for this present, the consent of the woman’s family is given 
which is the most important element for the validity of a custom­
ary marriage*
Although a friendship arrangement does not amount to a 
Jiill and proper marriage unless and until it is converted into a 
regular marriage,*“ certain legal consequences flow from it.
1, By the man’s obtaining of the consent of the woman’s family.
Subject to the rights of an existing husband where the woman is 
already married, or of the woman’s faunily, the parties to a 
friendship arrangement are regarded by the community in which 
they live as husband and wife, if they cohabit continuously for 
a reasonable length of time, usually one year and more. Conse­
quently, the "husband" has some, though not exclusive, rights 
to her consortium. Thus, he can sue third parties, other than 
the woman’s family or her real husband, for harbouring her and 
he cannot be sued by the woman’s family for his having sexual 
intercourse with her. But he cannot succeed in an action for 
"woman damage" against any man who has intercourse with her be­
cause^ in this respect, he and the woman are regarded as mere 
lovers. Because of this quasi-marriage relationship which re­
sults from a friendship arrangement, a male involved in such re­
lationship is in a better legal position than one to whom a 
woman is merely betrothed.
E. CONCLUDING MARRIAGE FORMALITIES AND CEREMONIES
The formalities and ceremonies attending the conclusion 
of a customary law marriage vary depending on whether the marri­
age begins with betrothal or is one by gift, or is preceded by 
friendship arrangement* We shall consider each in turn.
£0 Marriage beginning with betrothal
Generally speaking, the marriage is concluded with the 
payment of the marriage consideration by the man and his family 
and its acceptance by the woman and her family,followed by the 
handing over of the woman to the man. In the case of marriage 
by service and goat’s head marriage, where no formal marriage 
consideration is paid, the consent of the woman and her parents
together with the giving away of the woman to the man seals the 
marriage bond. But, there are some tribal differences in pro­
cedure and we shall deal with them presently.
1
Mende: If the intended husband lives in the village
where the girl is initiated into the sande society, a few days 
before she emerges, she is taken either to the entrance of the 
sande bush to meet him or to the house of the intended husband 
who then presents her with a gift (mboya-hani)♦ If she accepts 
it, it is an indication of her readiness to marry the man. The 
importance of the ceremony is to ensure that her consent will be 
forthcoming at the final stage of the marriage, because she might 
have been betrothed whilst a baby or an adolescent, and now that 
she is on the threshold of adulthood, she may not want to con­
tinue the transaction either because she had not previously con­
sented to the match or because she has changed her mind.
When the girl has finally emerged from the sande society, 
a meeting is held between the man, usually supported by his 
family, and the woman’s family. If the girl’s maternal uncle 
(kenya) is within easy reach, he should attend. An important 
member of the town or village must also be present as witness.
The object of this meeting is three-fold: firstly, to agree on
the final amount of marriage consideration, where payable; 
secondly, to obtain the consent of the woman and her family; and 
finally, to seal the marriage contract. VJhere the marriage con­
sideration (tolei) is payable, it must include a lump sum in 
money - the amount depending on the economic and social position 
of the husband. When it is presented, the woman and her family
1. The Krim and the Gallina appear to follow the same custom as 
the Mende.
withdraw for a short while in order to consult with one another 
privately; the money is handed over to the woman and asked 
whether she consents to having the man as husband* If she gives 
a positive reply, the general meeting is resumed and the man and 
his family are informed that the woman is ready to marry* Form­
erly, the tolei used to be one or several country cloths fgbali(s) 
gbalisia (pljijin many chiefdoms and in addition, the maternal 
uncle, father and mother of the woman and the head of the sande 
society (sowoi) were given presentst the maternal uncle received 
a capx the father a gown (mbla lomei) a the mother a lappa (dagba 
gulei) in gratitude for having nursed the woman, and the sowoi 
a lappa***- Nowadays, money takes the place of these items in 
several chiefdoms. The whole transaction connected with the
payment of the marriage consideration and obtaining the consent 
of the woman and her family is known as nyahargoi (literally, 
"finding the woman").
A couple of days after the conclusion of this transac­
tion, if the man is not already married, a female relative should 
accompany him to receive the wife; but if he is married, his head 
wife makes the errand. The man or "go-between" is accompanied 
by other friends and well-wishers to the woman’s family. On 
their arrival, they are met by dancers. Before the woman is 
handed over, the man or the "go-between" must "show life"
(ndevu ge) with a sum of money of about 50 cents. The payment 
of this money is an acknowledgment by the man that he has assumed 
full responsibility for the.wife and from that moment, the rights
1. Harris, op;cit., p.11.
525.
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of the family over her are extinguished. Should he fail to
pay it before taking the wife to his home, and she is subsequently 
stricken by a serious illness or she dies, the husband is liable 
to the parents for compensation. After the husband has"shown 
life”, the marriage is completed and the wife’s mother gives her 
blessing to the wife, followed by a prayer that the marriage 
yields several children.
Sherbro: The Southern Shefbro adopt a procedure similar
to that of the Mende. But the negotiation for the payment of 
the marriage consideration is^as a rule, not conducted in the pre­
sence of the intended husband. The "go-between" (kea) takes 
the marriage consideration to the woman’s family, and gives it to 
the brother of the woman’s mother (kenya) who shares it with other 
members of the family. So far as the marriage is concerned, the 
kenya plays the leading role in the settlement of disputes between 
the spouses and in decisions affecting the welfare of the children 
The importance of the kenya, in this respect, is as a manifesta­
tion of matrilinity in the early Sherbro kinship system. The 
Northern Sherbro (Bullom) who are to a great extent influenced by 
Temne culture, adopt a procedure very much akin to that of the 
Temne•
2Temne: Traditionally, when the woman’s initiation cere­
mony was completed, the man sent a "go-between11 to the woman’s 
parents with the marriage consideration (ankala ananta) and with 
about twelve canes of salt (kasankra), some country cloths, and 
tobacco, all warapped in a bundle with a small sum of money,
1. This "life kola" (ndevu tolei) as it is called, must be given 
even by the husband of a goat’s head marriage or marriage by 
serwce.
2. Langley: "Marriage Customs amongst the Temne", S.L.S. (O.S.), 
No.13, 1928, 54, 57.
about 2 shillings, placed on top of it. On arrival at the 
woman’s house, the bundie was placed on the floor and the parents 
of the woman would invite her to indicate her consent by taking 
the 2 shillings. When she had done this, the family took the
bundle and sent back the ’’go-between” to the man with the message
that, the wife was preparing herself for the marital life. A few 
days later, representatives of the woman* s family, usually female, 
were sent to the man with a reciprocal gift of two chickens and 
rice. The man made a return gift with another chicken and the 
marriage was completed. Two nights afterwards, the wife was 
conducted to the husband’s house by female members of her family, 
accompanied by dancers.
Nowadays, the same formalities as described are followed 
by the Temne in villages and homesteads. But the ones in the 
towns and cities follow a procedure which is different in many 
respects. Presumably, it is the result of association with 
other cultures. A date is fixed for a gathering of representa­
tives of both the man’s and woman* s families at the home of the 
woman. The man and his family collect about 100 kola nuts, 100
bitter-kolas, niddles, thread, a writing pad called kaidi stari,
1a winnower, a piece of white cloth, and a sum of money - the 
marriage consideration: the money is wrapped in the white cloth
and is placed with the other articles in a calabash. On arrival
1. The significance of the white cloth is that it is used as - 
linen on the bed of the spouses on the night of the consumma­
tion of marriage. If the wife is proved to be a virgin, it 
is returned to her parents with a sum of Le.2.10 as virgin- 
money (nbola). Formerly, instead of money, a large iron pot 
and country cloths were sent to the wife’s mother in appreci­
ation of her careful upbringing of her daughter. This custom 
of paying Le.2.10 cents as virgin money is nowadays prevalent 
among all the tribes in Sierra Leone.
at the woman1s house, the representatives of the man, among whom
is usually his head wife, if he is already married, give about 
Le.l or Le.2 each to the maternal and paternal relatives of the 
intended wife, and 40 cents each to the women and men in the 
wife1s household for their safe guidance and protection of the 
wife. The occasion is one of jubilation and is also attended by 
jpcular remarks by the two families aimed at each other. Even­
tually, the mat is spread, the calabash is placed on it and the 
relatives of the intended wife are invited to examine its con­
tents. In strict Muslim families,’1' the calabash is placed at 
the centre of the gathering, and the intended wife is called upon 
to take it and hand it over to a respectable person who is ap­
pointed for that purpose. He is called ansaba akananta and is 
regarded as the "father” of the marriage to whom the intended 
wife should make a first approach with her marital problems 
during the marriage. He will ask the bride why she has given 
him the calabash, and she is expected to reply that it contains 
her marriage consideration (ankala aranta) and that she wants 
him to take everything for himself and to become the father of 
the marriage. He will ask her repeatedly whether she consents 
to the marriage and, if she replies in the positive, the contents 
of the calabash are examined by a selected group. At this 
stage, the leader of the main’s representatives will greet the 
bride (bot o rim) with a sum of money of any amount eind will give 
her household token amounts of money as ’’bribe” so that they 
will not permit any other suitor to come and ask for the hand of 
the bride in maxriage. The ceremony is concluded with a feast
1. The procedure herein mentioned is not a requirement of Islamic 
law. It is a custom which must have evolved aimong the people 
themselves•
after which a relative of the husband must make another token 
present of about 40 cents with a request that the bride should 
go with them. If the bride is a virgin, she is not allowed to 
go to the husband until a couple of days have elapsed.
Among the Temne in the Kambia and Port Loko districts, no 
marriage is valid even though the foregoing formalities have been 
compled with, until a specific sum of money, Le.1.70 cents is 
paid by the man and his family to the woman’s family.**- The pay­
ment of this amount is known as ’’tying the marriage contract’* 
(ankala kananta). Even where no marriage consideration is given,
this amount must be paid. It is the Temne equivalent of the 
Mende ndevu ge (’’show life”), and it is a custom found among the 
Susu as well.
Susu; There is some similarity between the Susu and
Temne customs. As with the Temne, a piece of white cloth, kola
nuts, needles, tobacco and rice must accompany the other articles
in the calabash. But the Susu formerly demanded that the bride
be conducted to her husband* s house on the evening of the marri- 
2age. The present practice is that a few days must first 
elapse and then on the appointed date the futiwalieu call at 
the bride’s home and conduct her to the husband. This giving 
away of the bride is done quietly for fear that she might not be 
a virgin. After the consummation of the marriage, comes the
1. Personal communication from P.C. Bai Sherbro Yumkella II.
2. Aubert: ’’Laws and Customs of the Susus”, S.L.S. (O.S.), No.20, 
1939, pp.67, 69.
3. i.e. Guardians of the marriage. These are witnesses to the 
marriage, to whom the spouses must first resort during the 
life of the marriage^ whenever there is a dispute between them 
before deciding upon a divorce.
time for celebration provided the bride is a virgin.1
Kissi: The only formality worthy of mention is that at
the gathering of both families on the day of the conclusion of 
the marriage, a proper inventory must be taken of the marriage 
consideration which may include presents given to the wife and 
any member of her family since the date of betrothal. The ob­
ject is to minimize a dispute about its quantum should the neces­
sity ever arise for its being refunded. As with a Mende marri­
age, "life kola” must be given to the parents of the wife in 
order to conclude the transaction.
Koranko; A Koranko marriage ceremony usually takes place 
in stages. The first stage is when the future wife reaches 
puberty and is about to be initiated into the biri society. A 
few weeks before the initiation, she goes as a guest to the pro­
spective husband’s home for a couple of days. The reason is to 
ensure whether she will find it a comfortable place to live after 
her marriage. During this period, no sexual intercourse takes 
place between them. The second stage is the day of the woman’s
2
initiation. Formerly, the man prepared a "meal” of pounded 
kola nut and ginger and sent it to the woman in the biri bush 
to eat. It was believed that if she was not a virgin, she 
would suffer severe pain after eating the ’’meal”. It was then 
left to theprospective husband either to abandon the marriage
1. If she is nmt a virgin, she is taken back to her family and 
given a severe beating. Some husbands will return such a 
wife to her family and ask for the refund of the marriage 
consideration. Formerly, the left ear of the wife was cut 
off, her head shaven, and she was put in chains. (Personal 
communication from P.C. Bai Sherbro Yumkella II).
2. Kamara and Drummond, op;cit., p.59.
transaction or to proceed with it. Almost invariably, this 
process was merely perfunctory since whatever was the condition 
of the woman he would always receive a favourable message from 
the head of the society. It is not, therefore, surprising that 
nowadays this ceremony is dispensed with even among the most con­
servative Koranko. The third stage occurs a few weeks before 
the end of the woman’s initiation. It is important that the 
bride’s consent to the marriage must be known before she emerges 
from the society because every Koranko girl is expected to marry 
immediately after her initiation* The man prepares food and 
articles which are to be used for the woman’s decoration and 
sends them to her. Her acceptance of the presents indicates 
that she is still prepared to marry the man. Finally, a day or 
two after the initiation ceremonies are over, the families of the 
main and woman meet to agree provisionally on the marriage con­
sideration (furufa). Some of it may be given at this meeting
and3 the remainder at a later date. In the evening, the bride is 
escorted to the husband by her mother and other members of her 
mother’s household. They wait at the matrimonial home until 
the marriage is consummated which must take place on the same 
evening. If the wife is a virgin, the husband must give the 
mother-in-law a cow or its value in addition to the sum of Le. 
2.10 cents • Conversely, if she is not a virgin, either her 
parents or her seducer, if known, must give a cow or its value. 
Sometimes, there may be a difference of opinion between the hus­
band and the wife about her virginity. In such a case, the 
husband must give the customary presents to the wife’s parents 
and content himself by swearing the wife on a medicine provided
by him. Among the Koranko, it is consummation that completes a
marriage. For this reason, before a wife is allowed to go to 
her husband finally, she must be neither pregnant nor on her 
menstrual course.
Kono: As the Koranko, the Kono too conclude their marri­
age transaction by stages. On the eve of the woman’s initiation 
the ceremony of ’’knocking at the door” takes place (kangatu).
It commences with the man and his entourage consisting of fmends 
and relatives going to the woman’s house where they knock at the 
door and request that the woman should spend the night at the 
man’s house. Singing, dancing and merrymaking follow, after 
which the woman is delivered to them. She sleeps with the man 
but no sexual intercourse should take place. Early in the morn­
ing, the girl is escorted by women to the bondo bush where she is
initiated. On the same day, the man sends her presents of a 
mat and rice flour. If the woman or her family want to break 
off the marriage, the gift is returned to him; but if they are 
willing to continue, a message is sent to the man to get himself 
ready. In the evening, a meeting is held at the home of the 
woman’s parents at which the man or his representatives, the 
woman’s family - usually her parents and brothers, and an import­
ant member of the community, usually a chief, are present. The 
marriage consideration (foo) together with a large iron pot for 
the mother, a gown for the father and a piece of white cloth 
(wose lcoa) for the woman, are presented to the gathering. The 
wose koa is sent to the woman in the initiation bush and her 
acceptance of it is greeted with jubilation both in the bush 
and at the meeting. When the woman comes out of the bondo, the 
man himself, or through his ’’go-between”, pays a life kola - 
about 20 cents - to her family. The marriage is not consumma'feed 
on the first night of her arrival at the husband’s house as it
is regarded immodest on her part to have sexual intercourse on 
the first night that she enters the husband's household. On 
two or three successive nights she "runs” back home to her family 
and^each time^the husband must give her some present in order to 
persuade her to return to him. If the woman was betrothed after 
having been initiated into the bondo society, a meeting similar 
to what has been described is held at which she must be present. 
In this latter case, the ceremonies of betrothal and the actual 
marriage take place at the same time, and the man is expectedjto 
add kola nuts to the foo and to give presents of clothes to the 
woman's mother and money to her father, brothers and sisters and 
grandparents•
Limba: After the girl has been betrothed, the man is ex­
pected to play an active part in her material upbringing. Thus, 
he must provide maintenance for her irrespective of the respon­
sibility of her parents. When she is initiated into the bondo 
society, he should incur the expenses. If betrothal is preceded 
by initiation, he should refund all the initiation expenses in­
curred by the woman1 s parents. When the woman has left the 
bondo society, she spends some time with her parents during which 
she should cook occasionally and send meals to the husband. In 
an agricultural community, she is also expected to take part in 
the farm work of her family* All this process is to prepare her 
for life with her husband as she is ejected to be a good cook 
and industrious. On an appointed date, the husband pays the 
marriage consideration (nahulu) to the father of the wife or, if 
he is not available, to his representative. The Limba are very 
strict in this respect, since it is their custom that a father 
alone has the right to give away a daughter in marriage. The 
person to whom the nahulu is paid is just symbolic of authority 
as the mother also must have a share of it. After the
presentation of the nahulu, a white kola is split into two; one 
half is given to the wife and the other to the man or his "go- 
between”. In the evening, the wife is escorted to her husband 
by a male and female member of her family.
Loko: Northcote Thomas  ^reported that formerly the in­
tended husband gave a ring to the prospective wife1 s mother,, 
a head of tobacco to her father, and went in person alone to the 
woman1s family. The giving of a ring has not been substantiated 
by the present elders of the tribe. Probably, Thomas's informa­
tion concerned a Loko man purporting to enter into a Muslim marri­
age, because Muslims in general now, as in 1916, require a man to
2wed a woman with a ring. If the assumption is correct, then 
the information is inaccurate because the ring is not given to 
the prospective wife's mother but to the woman herself. It is 
unlikely that Thomas was reporting on a Loko customary law pre­
ceding a Christian marriage, which is now a common practice among 
many Christian natives, because at the time he wrote hardly any 
Loko man was a Christian. Even now that there are many Christ­
ians as well as Muslims among the Loko, there is no giving of a
ring at the customary law marriage; this is reserved for the 
religious ceremony which follows afterwards. A Loko customary- 
law marriage today is, in many respect, similar to that of the 
other tribes. Thus, there are the usual "putting of the kola", 
thepayment of the marriage consideration and the festivities. 
Particularly, however, a Loko man is expected to be present at
1. Anthropological Report on Sierra Leone, Part I, Harrison and 
Sons, London, 19l6, p.9l and p.I6l.
2. This is not an Islamic law requirement. Probably, it is a 
practice borrowed from Christians.
every transaction connected with the marriage of the woman.
In conclusion of the marriage transaction, the wife's parents 
give a kola, usually about 10 cents to the man and his family, 
which signifies that they approve of the wedding. If the woman 
is betrothed after initiation into the bondo society, the intended 
husband must refund part of the expenses to the woman's family. 
Such a husband is held in very high esteem. Moreover, the marri­
age payments are deemed never to be made in full and the husband 
is expected throughout the marriage to make frequent presents to 
the wife's parents, especially the mother.
(ii) Marriage by gift
The formalities and ceremonies attending a marriage by 
gift are very much the same as those following betrothal. The 
only marked difference is that there is no formal payment of a 
marriage consideration. It is, however, important to note that 
though the wife's parents do not demand a formal marriage con­
sideration, the non-payment cf which, as we shall see, does not 
affect the validity of the marriage, very frequently and as a 
matter of custom, the husband is expected to shower presents on 
the wife and her immediate relatives such as the parents and
t
younger brothers and sisters. This^always the case, particu­
larly when a chief gives his daughter in marriage or is given a 
wife without the legal liability of paying a marriage considera­
tion. Custom prescribes that the husband must show himself as 
one worthy of the "gift" and in addition to what he spends on 
the wife's family, he is expected to celebrate the occasion with 
a sumptuous feast sometimes lasting for days to which the import­
ant members of the community should be invited. Contrary to
what one writer  ^has said, wives obtained by these means occupy 
a position of prestige usually second only to the head wife, in 
the husband1s household,
(iii) Marriage beginning with a friendship arrangement
Marriage that begins with friendship, other than the
marriage of a widow, is generally completed by a very simple
ceremony. The majority of the tribes, except the Susu, Temne,
2and Northern Sherbro (Builorn) do not demand the same formalities 
as in the case of the marriage of a betrothed woman, ^The marri­
age comes into existence upon the man showing himself to the 
womans family with a "life kola**, A marriage consideration 
may or may not be paid and it is usually demanded only when the 
woman has never been married before. If she is a divorced woman, 
her family do not in practice accept a marriage consideration 
and if they do, only to a limited extent, for fear of its having 
to be refunded inthe event of another divorce*
The marriage of a widow, on the other hand, is somewhat 
preceded by a formality strictly peculiar to it alone* After 
the funeral ceremonies of the deceased husband, which take place 
for a period lasting from seven to forty days, the widows are 
ceremonially "washed11. The object of the washing is to purify 
them as it is believed that without it the spirit of the deceas­
ed husband will haunt any further marriage into which they may 
enter and thus jeopardise its chances of success. It is
1, K.H. Crosby: "Polygamy in Mende Country", Africa, Vol*10,
3, July 1937, 249 at 262, Crosby says that the position of 
such women was very low indeed. He was writing on the 
Mende•
2, These tribes require such women to be married in the same 
manner as those who have previously been betrothed.
regarded as an offence actionably by the head of the family of 
the deceased for any man to have sexual intercourse with a widow 
before her purification. After the washing ceremony, the widows 
are expected to name their future husband. Among the Temne, 
Susu, Limba, Loko, Kissi and Kono, a widow can elect to marry a 
member of the deceased1 s family, usually a brother, or a stranger 
without her family having to refund the marriage consideration. 
But the Mende, Krim, Sherbro, Gallina, Koranko and Yalunka re­
quire the widow to marry into the late husband* s family, and if
she refuses and fails to do so, her family should refund the mar­
riage consideration given for her by the deceased* It is inter­
esting to note that among some tribes like the Mende, the widow 
can marry even a son of the late husband other than her own son* 
Recently, the question of whom a widow should marry has 
seized the attention of the Sierra Leone government* Three 
Customary Law Advisory Panels were set up in 1959 in the three 
provinces of the then Protectorate, having as their terms of 
reference to "advise on such questions of Native Law and Customs 
as may be referred to by Government". One such question was 
whether it would be permissible for a widow to marry whomever she 
pleased without obligation to refund the marriage consideration. 
All the Panels observed that:
"There is growing reluctance, as indicated 
by the number of cases which come before 
the (native) Courts, on the part of widows 
to re-marry into their deceased husband*s 
family. With the spread of education, 
it seems desirable to re-assess the intrin­
sic value of this aspect of customary law.
In the days when the consent of a girl was 
immaterial for her betrothal, the practice 
of requiring widows to re-marry into their 
deceased husband*s family was justified.
Now that the tendency is to get the consent
of the bride-to-be, such a system seems 
untenable.”^
Following the recommendation of the Panels, the Sierra 
Leone government issued a directive to all the districts of the 
provinces effective as from April 27, 1963 that a widow should 
be free to marry whomever she pleases and that no marriage con­
sideration is refundable should she choose a spouse outside the
2family of her late husband*
When a widow has selected her future husband, the custom 
of many of the tribes is merely for him to present himself to the 
woman’s family with a kola and a small sum of money and ask for 
the hand of the woman \ The woman’s family may further ask for 
a marriage consideration in addition depending on whether the 
prospective husband is a member of the deceased husband’s family 
or not.
Among the Temne, Susu and the Northern Sherbro (Bullom), 
soon after the burial ceremonies are complete, if a member of 
the deceased’s family is interested in his widow, representatives
of the family formally take her accompanied by a sum of money to 
her family and report the death of her husband as if the family 
does not know about it. Another amount of money is given as 
kola for the woman just as if she were a betrothed woman who has 
not been married before. The consent, of both the woman and 
her family is essential and it is easily given if the woman 
had not got children by the first marriage.
Among the Mende, a widow normally remains with the late
1. See Cabinet File P/43/3 and Minutes of a Meeting of the Cabi­
net Committee on Customary Law Advisory Panels, held at 
Freetown on March 26, 1963.
2. For more information on this directive, and its effect on
existing customary lav*/, see Chapter 10, pp.637-63S.
husband1s family for a year during which she is maintained and
looked after by a guardian who is either the head of the family 
or a prospective suitor within the family. After this period, 
she is expected to marry within the family and if she is willing, 
the prospective husband will show himself to her family with a 
life kola.
^ CONCLUSION
Many varying points of detail in a marriage transaction 
have been shown as existing among the tribes of Sierra Leonej 
but it was noticeable that without exception, all the tribes 
require a kola to be put for an intended bride at the beginning 
of the marriage, the consent of the bride and her parents to be 
obtained and finally, a life kola to be given by the husband to
the family of the wife in order to conclude the transaction. 
Before a marriage can be said to come into existence, it would 
appear that these conditions must be complied with.
At this juncture, therefore, we will try to suggest a 
way of solving the complex problem of determining the exact 
point at which a customary-law marriage, at any rate in Sierra 
Leone, comes into existence.
Three learned jurists  ^have expressed the view that a 
possible exact time of the birth of a customary marriage is when 
the power to sue the woman1s lover for damages passes to the 
alleged husband and does not remain vested in her kin or a former 
husband. To this we may add that such a power is exercisable 
by a man only when there is a marriage between him and the woman
1, Profs. A.N. Allott, A.L. Epstein, and M. Gluckman, op.cit.» 
pp .63-64..
concerned, but the date of its commencement must be marked by 
an overt act. It is the act which creates the power that 
determines the time at which the marriage comes into existence.
The same jurists have also argued that registration of
the marriage is a possible solution since it will simplify a
situation where varieties in customs of the intermarrying peoples
are numerous.*1' Registration, in our submission, is an answer
provided before it is accomplished, the registering officer satis«
2fies himself, as was the law in the former French West Africa, 
that the necessary conditions imposed by customary law for the 
validity of the marriage are complied with. Otherwise, a 
friendship arrangement may be registered as a marriage thus 
giving a semblance of recognition to a union which is not recog­
nised by customary law as conferring, for all purposes, complete 
marital status on the parties concerned.
At present in Sierra Leone, a number of chiefdoms have 
enacted bye-laws for the non-compulsory registration of custom­
ary law marriages. But as we shall argue in due course, such 
registration does not create the marriage but is only evidence 
of its existence and is intended to minimise disputes relating 
to the quantum of marriage consideration refundable on divorce. 
Since we have discovered at least three elements common to all 
Sierra Leone customary law marriages, compulsory registration 
of a marriage which complies with these elements in addition to 
other essential requirements of a valid customary-law marriage, 
ouglt to be the final act which determines the existence of the
1. Ibid., at p.64.
2. See Arrete No.972 of December 13, 1940, cited by Phillips, 
op.cit., p.107.
marriage. In chiefdoms where there is provision for the 
registration of customary marriages, very little or no atten­
tion is paid to it by many married couples. Compulsory regi­
stration with the sanction that no legal incident will follow 
from a marriage which is not registered will induce spouses to 
a customary-law marriage to register it, and thus, it will not 
only provide evidence of the union but will also become a 
stepping-stone towards the harmonization of the customary laws 
of Sierra Leone.
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CHAPTER 16
T
THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID CUSpiARY-LAW MARRIAGE
The essential requirements for a valid customary law 
marriage in.Sierra Leone may be classified as follows:- First, 
the immediate parties to the marriage, i.e. the man and the woman, 
as distinct from their respective families, must have the capa­
city to marry* Secondly, the consents of the man, the woman 
and her family should be obtained. Thirdly, the man or his 
family must give a marriage consideration to the woman’s family, 
unless its payment is waived by that family. Fourthly, the mar­
riage formalities should be complied with, and in some chiefdoms, 
the marriage should be registered. Finally, there is evidence 
that at least one tribe, the Koranko, requires consummation for 
the completion of the marriage contract. We shall now critically 
examine these requirements.
A. CAPACITY
Legal capacity to contract a customary law marriage in 
Sierra Leone, like in many African societies, depends on three 
factors: (i) the marital status of the woman; (ii) the physi­
cal development and the mental state of the intended spouses;
(iii) whether the intended spouses are not prohibited from inter­
marrying on the grounds of consanguinity, affinity, fosterage, 
or clanship.
Before we undertake a discussion of these factors, there 
is a preliminary point to make. Certain disabilities, which 
adversely affect the social acceptability of a person or poten­
tial spouse, rendering it difficult or impossible for him or her 
to get married^ do not as such constitute grounds for the invali- 
dation of a marriage if it takes place despite the disability.
.^ n example of such disabilities is a physical or mental 
handicap of one party at the time of the marriage# Subject to 
what we shall say in due course in regard to the physical develop­
ment and mental state of the intended spouses as an essential ele­
ment for the validity of their marriage, physical conditions such 
as deformity, deafness, dumbness and blindness, and a mental con­
dition such as the insanity of the prospective bride, are not 
legal bars to a customary law marriage in Sierra Leone#^ It may 
be hard to accept that under customary law an insane woman cam 
contract a valid marriage even outside any lucid interval; but 
this is legally possible, the reason being that, even though in 
current practice the consent of the prospective bride is import­
ant, in traditional laws^the validity of a marriage has depended 
mainly on the consent of the bride’s family and not that of the 
bride# While the modern tendency is to insist^as a legal re­
quirement, on the girl*s consent, instances still occur when 
young girls are given in marriage by their paxents against the
girls’ will or consent, and the marriage is regarded as legal 
2
and valid#
A second disability, which constitutes a social but not a
legal bar, in non-initiation# A woman who has not been initi-
3
ated into the appropriate female seociety may not be allowed
by her family to marry. So far as men are concerned, they must
at least be circumcised before they are regarded as mature enough
to marry (under the influence of Islam, initiation is discouraged
4among the orthodox male Muslims)#
1, Compare with consent in non-customary law marriage# See 
Chapter 6#
2# For more discussion, on this, see later in this Chapter#
3# For these societies, see ante, Chapter 15#
4# See J. Spencer Trimingham, op.cit#, p.los.
Next, we must consider ethnic differences, the existence 
of which may make an inter-marriage between a woman of one tribe 
and a man foreign to her tribe objectionable# Formerly, marri­
age between two natives belonging to different tribes was dis­
couraged# The reason, perhaps, was that as the man usually came 
from another place and his background was unknown, the woman’s 
family was suspicious of his intentions#’1' Once any grain of
suspicion was removed, the woman* s parents would readily give
2
their consent to the marriage# Migeod states that among the 
Koranko, if a man belonging to another tribe proved that he had 
a house either at his own home or in Koranko territory, he could 
be given a Koranko woman to marry# Nowadays, with internal 
tribal migration, inter-marriage between the members of different
tribes is welcomed#
So far as a marriage between native and non-native is con­
cerned, while all the tribes welcome a marriage between a native 
and a non-African, there has always been a social bar against a 
tribal person marrying a "non-native" Sierra Leonean - a Creole# 
The reason for the disapproval has been that th^Creole might not 
be respectful to his or her parents-in-law. Since the Creoles 
were the first among Sierra Leone citizens to come into contact 
with Western civilization, they have assumed an air of superior­
ity over the tribal people of Sierra Leone. Despite this, the 
more progressive and well-educated "natives1’ (i.e. people of the 
Provinces) continue^to permit their children to marry Creole 
mates# The more conservative Creoles reciprocate this suspicion
1# The purposes commonly suspected were slavery and cannibalism#
2. Qp.cit#, p.65.
3# Note that we argued in Chapter 4 that a non-native can enter 
into a valid customary law marriage#
of inter-ethnic marriage, thinking it beneath their dignity for 
their children to marry natives even in a Christian form, let 
alone to contract customary-law marriages with them*
Having disposed of these preliminary issues, we may now 
turn to the factors that determine legal capacity to marry*
(i) Marital status
It is a clear rule of all the customary laws that a roan;
may contract as many customary law marriages as he can afford
without a legal or social sanction*'1' Similarly, he may contract
as many customary law marriages as he wishes with more women
2during the subsistence of a non-customary law marriage with a
wife and the subsequent marriages are valid under customary law, 
although they will be regarded as invalid and adulterous under 
the general law. In this respect, Sierra Leone family law is
unique, because in many other African countries, for example,
3 4 ~Ghana and Nigeria, once a man has contracted a non-customary
law marriage, he is incapable, during the subsistence of it, of
entering into a subsequent customary law marriage with another
woman* What a Sierra Leone main is prevented by law from doing
is that if he is already married under customary law, he cannot
contract a further marriage in accordance with the Christian or
Civil Maorriage Acts with another woman during the subsistence of
5
the customary law maorriage. Why the main is clothed with
1* A maun may, however, marry only one wife or the number of wives 
as permitted him by his religious belief. But many native 
Muslims are not inhibited in marrying mpre than four wives.
2* i.e. even marriage under the Christian and Civil Marriaige Acts, 
see ante» P*55.
3. See s.44 of the Ghana Marriage Act.
4. See s.35 of the Nigerian Marriage Act.
5. S.l of the Christian Marriage (Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1965;
On the-general effect of this section, see ante, Chapter 6, 
pp*195-201.
incapacity in one case but not in the other in the two sets of 
circumstances is difficult to comprehend.
Since polyandry is not practised in Sierra Leone, as a 
general rule, a woman cannot enter into a marriage^even at custom­
ary law, with one man during the subsistence of a marriage be­
tween her and another. The purported second marriage is utterly 
void.
This rule, however, seems to be ignored from time to time 
in diamond-mining areas.**- The situation occasionally arises in 
these areas when a woman forms an association with a rich diamond 
miner who is prepared to marry her irrespective of the fact that 
she is still married to another man. Very much impressed by the 
wealth of her suitor, the woman usually tells her parents that 
she no longer wants her marriage with her real husband to continue 
and she presents her suitor to them as her new husband. The 
man then offers the parents sufficient money in order to indemnify 
them against any action for a refund of marriage consideration, 
reclaim of the wife, or for damages for their giving their 
daughter away in marriage to another man, which the first husband 
may bring against them when he becomes aware of that fact.
Where a wife obtains a judicial divorce from a local 
court by merely indicating her intention to divorce her husband 
and refunding the requisite marriage consideration without any 
further formality, the woman1s first marriage can be legally 
brought to an abrupt end upon the receipt of a divorce certifi­
cate, which automatically madces her a single woman for the pur-
2
pose of validly contracting another marriage.
1. In some chiefdoms of the Kono and Kenema districts.
2. On customary law divorces generally, see Chapter 18.
But in extra-judicial divorce, it is wrong to assume that 
the woman can divorce her husband so that the divorce takes effect 
automatically, by merely telling her parents that she does not 
want him any longer* The reason is that, as we shall see laterJ 
in extra-judicial divorce by a wife, the exact moment of the 
divorce is when the marriage consideration has been refunded to, 
or its refund is waived by the husband* In such a situation, 
divorce by a wife is ineffective without the knowledge and ac­
quiescence of the husband* Therefore, unless these conditions 
are fulfilled, the wife is still legally married to the first 
husband, and her second marriage would be, strictly speaking, 
void or at best, a "friendship arrangement"«
In the areas where this sequence of events occurs, it is 
not certain from the information available whether or not the 
second marriage will be treated as valid under customary law*
The better opinion would appear to be that the marriage should 
be void*
But in these areas, once it is proved before the local 
courts that both the first and second husbands obtained the con­
sent of the woman* s family to the marriages of their daughter, 
the dissatsfied first husband cannot succeed in "woman damage" 
against the other, although he can successfully sue his parents- 
in-law not only for the refund of the marriage consideration, but 
also for damages giving his wife away in marriage to another main* 
The local courts in these areas resent such conduct by parents 
and they are prone to award high damages against them*
It is suggested that a second marriage under these cir­
cumstances should be held to be utterly void, because to allow
1* In Chapter 18*
it will be tantamount to permitting polyandry since the first mar­
riage was still in existence when the second marriage was con­
tracted* The best means of^romoting certainty in the law is by
/
the making of a bye-law.
In conclusion, we should emphasise that in the customary 
laws of the rest of Sierra Leone, a man who marries another man* s 
wife is liable to the first husband for "woman damage", despite 
any consent of the woman1s family to the purported second marri­
age* The second husband is also liable in damages to the first
husband. The only defence available to the second husband is 
lack of knowledge that the woman was already married; but this 
defence only mitigates the damages and does not save him from 
the liability.
(ii) Physical and mental development
We shall begin with mental development. As we have al­
ready stated, an insane woman may be given in marriage with the 
consent of her family. If she enjoys a lucid interval, how­
ever, she can ask for divorce on the ground of her lack of con­
sent. Unless she does this, whatever transaction takes place 
based on an existing marriage between the spouses remains valid.
On the other hand, an insane man cannot contract a valid marriage 
The reason is that in traditional, as well as in modern socie­
ties, the consent of the man to his marriage, even if it is his 
first maxriage which is usually arranged by his family, is essen­
tial for its validity. The rule that in traditional society
children could be given in marriage without their consent ap­
plied to females but not to males.
Next, we must examine physical development. Some 
writers state a specific age at which a man or a woman can
contract a customary law marriage in Sierra Leone. Aubert ^
gives 21 years and 16 years as the normal ages for a Susu man and
2woman respectively. He also states that formerly a Kissi main 
married at the minimum age of 18 years, while a Kissi woman wed­
ded only if she was at least 15 years of age. Writing on the 
3Mende, Crosby mentions that m  1937 many women married before 
they were 15 years of age, and that the sons of chiefs aind big 
men married at 18 or 19, whilst the children of ordinary people
4
did not marry until they axe about 25 years. The 1931 Census
of Sierra Leone gave the usual age of marriage for women as being 
from 14 to 16 years, but the Census rightly conceded that marri­
age depended on the girl* s general development and fitness for 
intercourse.5 Both the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) 
Act, 1965, and the Civil Marriage (Amendment)(No.2) Act, 1965, 
lay down that 18 years is the age at which **a person whose per­
sonal law is customary law1* can contract marriage under the re­
spective Acts without parental consent. This provision subsumes, 
it is submitted, that a native whose personal law is customary 
law is regarded under that law as mature and capable of marrying 
long before he reaches the age of 18 years.
Though attempts have been made by writers to state speci­
fic ages at which persons could be regarded as capable of marry­
ing under customary law, there is no fixed age limit specified by
1. Op.cit., 68.
2. Op.cit.. 89•_
3. Op;cit.. 259-260.
4. The disparity in the age of marriage between sons of chiefs 
and big men,on the one hand, and the sons of ordinary people, 
on the other hand, is attributed to poverty on the part of the 
latter. See Crosby, op;pit.,.260.
5. Cited by Crosby, op.cit.. 259.
6. Note that 21 years is stated by the Acts as being the age at 
which other persons, non-natives, can marry without parental 
consent.
any of the respective customary laws. Instead, marriageable 
age is determined generally by the individual* s physical develop­
ment, and his or her capability to consummate the marriage. In 
addition, for a man, he must have the ability to assume parental 
responsibilities. For a woman, as a general rule, she must have 
reached the age of puberty which is determined by the development 
of her breasts, the first appearance of menstruation and initia­
tion.
However, instances occur where very young girls who have 
not fulfilled these conditions are given in marriage. This is 
frequently the case when the man wants to bring up the wife in the 
manner in which he desires her to be reared. Nowadays, the prac­
tice is of common occurrence among chiefs and big men, but 
scarcely prevails among ordinary people. For example, one in­
formant revealed that a Paramount Chief called Meama Kajue in the 
Moyamba district married a girl when, she was three years of age 
and that everybody regarded her as the Chief* s wife. This type 
of relationship, it is submitted, is equivalent to betrothal 
which is a stage in the marriage transaction, because the marri­
age cannot be consummated with impunity until the girl has reach­
ed puberty and is physically capable of having sexual intercourse.
(iii) Prohibited degrees
Generally speaking, among all the tribes of Sierra Leone, 
there are certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity within 
which persons may not inter-marry. Thus, a man 1 may not marry 
his mother, his sister (germane, consanguine or uterine), his 
aunt or niece, his daughter, and the ascendant or descendant of 
his wife. Moreover, a man may not marry his foster-mother, i.e.
1. A woman too may not marry the corresponding male persons.
a woman that suckled him during his infancy, or the ascendant or 
descendant of his foster-mother* A foster-mother is deemed to 
be in the same blood relationship as the natural mother* Be­
yond these principles stated above, it is not possible to formu­
late general statements which are equally applicable to all the 
tribes, as there are tribal variations in regard to prohibited 
degrees with which we can accurately deal by taking each respect­
ive tribe in turn*
Mende, Krim and Gallina; A man may not marry any member 
of his father*s family,^ his wife’s sister during the lifetime of 
his wife, and the daughter of his mother’s germane or uterine 
brother* But he can marry the daughter of his mother’s consan­
guine brother, the widow of his father except his own mother or 
a foster-mother, and the widow of his kenya, unless he has already 
married his kenya* s daughter. Goat’s head marriage (njewui) 
apart, cross-cousin marriage is not permitted.
Kissi; The prohibited degrees of consanguinity and Af­
finity among the Kissi seem to be narrower than those for many
2of the other tribes. Among the Kissi, Aubert says, ’’cousins 
are permitted to marry as well as brothers-in-law and sisters-in- 
law”. As with the Kono, a man may concurrently marry two 
sisters.
Kono: The Kono are one of the tribes that apply the
rule of exogamy. An early statement on this was made in 1932 
by Langley, who asserted that ’’members of the same sect (dambi) 
are not allowed to intermarry”. But he concluded that ’’this 
rule is gradually being broken in the case of the larger sects,
1. i.e. lineage.
2. Op;cit.. p.89.
3. ’’The Kono People of Sierra Leone”, Africa, 5, Jan. 2* 1932,
61, 62.
but then only when relationship is not too closd*. As recently 
as 1964, Parsons  ^wrote that ”a man may not marry any one who is 
of the same clan. Marriage with anyone who has the same totem 
as the father is prohibited1*. **It is also incestuous**, he con­
tinued, **to marry a member of the mother’s clan because of the
2 ~ ~  kindred relationship’*. A.A. Koroma, however, says that nowa-
3days, members of the same clan except the kawr clan may inter­
marry, provided there is no blood relationship between them. 
Marriage is not forbidden between a man and the younger sister 
of his wife if the wife is the eldest sister. Koroma also 
says that there is no legal but social probition for a man to 
marry the elder sister of his wife. The reason for the social 
prohibition is that as she is older in age, the second wife will 
not respect her younger sister who is regarded els senior in the 
husband’s polygamous fsunily. A man may marry the widow of his 
father, except his own mother or foster-mother. Cross-cousin,
4
marriage is also permitted.
Koranko: The general rule is that a man may not marry
a blood relation, nor may he marry the widow of his father or
father’s brother unless the marriage between the deceased and
5
such widow was never consummated. But a man may mEirry the 
widow or divorced wife of a brother. Marriage between a man 
and the daughter of his paternal or maternal aunt or between a
1. j p. 13.
2. Personal-communication. A.A. Koroma is a Kono and was 
Attorney-General of Sierra Leone during the Militaxy regime 
from March 1967 to April 1968.
3. The kawi is the clan whose totem is the dog.
4. See MoCulloch, op^cit., p.89. The present writer has not-
been able to substantiate McCulloch’s claim that the exist­
ence of cross-cousin marriage among the Mende is a result of 
Kono influence.
5. Kamara and Drummond, op;cit., p.64.
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man and the daughter of his paternal uncle is forbidden. A man 
may, however, marry the daughter of his mother1s consanguine 
brother. There is divided opinion as to whether marriage be­
tween a main and the daughter of his mother* s uterine brother is 
permissible. It is, however, clearly settled that marriage with
the daughter of a man*s mother*s germane brother is disallowed.
On marriage within the same clan, Migeod says that the
only clan restriction which he could find wais that the clams of
Karaara, Mensereng amd Kagbo could not intermarry.** The fullest
statement of the rule which subsists even in modern times, was
made four years later, in 1930, by Kamara and Drummond as follows
**There is much division of opinion on the ques­
tion of exogamy amongst the sienu (clams) ...
Some say that inter-marriage in a sie is not 
allowed amd it would appear that in the old 
days this was a fixed rule. In certain of 
the more remote parts it seems to be true to 
this day w that, for instance, a Konde cannot 
marry a Konde, but the rule is relaxing amongst 
many in the parts that have come in contact 
with civilization amd especially in the larger2 
sienu. such as the Maras, Koromas and Kagbos.**
Limba: The Limba rules on the subject are clearly laid
3down.by Finnegan. On prohibited degrees on the ground of con­
sanguinity and affinity, she says that a man **may not marry his 
full sister’s daughter, his wife’s full sister in his wife’s 
lifetime at least”. She continues that cross-cousins, that is, 
if descended from the same grandmother as well as grandfather may 
not marry; but that if the grandmother is different, they may 
marry. ”A man may also marry the daughter of his father’s half- 
brother (of a different mother)”, she says. On prohibition on 
the ground of clanship, Finnegan concludes that a man ’’cannot 
marry a woman of the same clan as himself even if she is of no
1. Op;cit., p.65.
Op.cit., p.65.
3. Op;cit., p.62.
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known kinship”. But she correctly qualifies this statement by 
asserting that 11 in the larger clans this rule is no longer always 
observed, specially if the couple have travelled down country”
Sherbro: Writing in 1938 on the Sherbro tribe of Sierra
2 3Leone, , Hall made the point that sexual relations between pente
and wante were considered to be incestuous. If such a relation 
is incestuous, then marriage could not take place between the per­
sons concerned. The Sherbro are not divided into clans but 
there are among them kinship groupings - ramde.4 Concerning 
them, Hall wrote that marriage between members of the same group­
ing was forbidden. ”It is believed”, he said, ”that actual 
blood relationship is traceable among all members of a given ram.
5
The remotest degree of such relationship is a bar to marriage”.
We may observe that these rules axe less strictly kept in modern 
times where the blood relationship is remote, send the present 
position is very much similar to that of the Mende, Krim and 
Gallina.
Susu; The only specific prohibition, apart from the 
general one in regard to close blood relations, is that a man 
may not marry the widow of his father or his father*s brother. 
Widows are inherited by the brothers of the deceased. Among this 
tribe, the son of the wife of a polygamist is deemed to be at the 
same time the son of the co-wives of his mother and on this 
account, a son and the widow of his father cannot intermarry.
1. Ibid.
2. Op;cit., p.3.
3. Pente and wante are Sherbro terms describing brother-sister 
and cousin-cousin relationships. In these relationships, 
the males axe pente and the females wante.
4. Hall called the grouping a ram. The actual Sherbro word is 
ramde.
5.  ^ p . 2.
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Cross-cousins may, however, intermarry.* Therefore, marriage
between a man and the daughter of his mother* s full or half
brother is not forbidden* The reason is that it is believed
that the blood relationship is distinct, since a man1s mother is
married in a family which is regarded as different from that set
up by a man*s uncle on his marriage.
Temne: Formerly, marriage was prohibited between members
2of the same clan (abuna). Today, unless a close blood relation­
ship is discovered, persons within the same clan may intermarry,
although some families require a propitiatory sacrifice to be
3
performed before the marriage is contracted. Thomas and 
4Langley, writing in 1916 and 1928 respectively, maintained that 
cross-cousins marriage was not permissible among the Temne. In 
present-day Sierra Leone, however, cross-cousins are not prohi­
bited from intermarrying.
Legal effect of lack of capacity
In our discussion of capacity, we stated that an insane 
man cannot contract a valid customary-law marriage, and that a 
married woman cannot generally enter a marriage with another man 
during the subsistence of her first marriage. We also observed 
that marriage contracted between persons within certain degress 
of consanguinity, affinity and clanship is prohibited. The 
effect of the absence of capacity based on these grounds is that 
the marriage is void ab initio;’ Other incapacities which we 
have mentioned do not invalidate the marriage. But we must 
repeat that in regard to non-age, a mam cauinot with impunity at 
customary law have sexual intercourse with a young girl who is
1. Thomas..op;cit..,p.!01.
2. Langley, op;cit.. p.54; MoCulloch, op.cit.. p.55.
3. Op;cit.« p.91.
4. Op;cit*. p.54.
uninitiated, and marriage with such a girl is no defence to an 
action for damages brought by her parents against the alleged 
husband* In this respect, marriage with a girl that has not 
reached puberty is legally inchoate. The marriage, however, be­
comes complete upon either the initiation or its waiver by the 
girl»s parents#’*'
One last word on prohibited degrees of relationship.
Among all the tribes without exception, though the marriage is 
void ab initio, the position can be rectified retroactively, but 
not prospectively, if the spouses are in the relationship of
brother and sister or cousin, by the performance of rites and
oceremonies by which the offending parties are cleansed. It is 
believed that if the propitiatory rite or ceremony is not perform­
ed, the spouses will not have issue and if they do, such issue 
will die. But where the relationship is that of father- 
daughter, mother-son, nephew-aunt or niece-uncle, the general 
consensus of opinion is that the marriage should be dissolved 
forthwith and an expiatory sacrifice offered to the ancestors of 
the offending spouses#
B. CONSENT
The parties whose consents sire legally essential for a 
customary-law marriage are the spouses (subject to some except­
ions) and their families; if the man is already married, the
1. In practice, waiver of initiation never occurs in the case of 
a young girl brought up in a native milieu in a village or 
homestead.
2. Some tribes have special societies through which the * cleansing 
ceremonies are carried out. For example, the Mende, Krim sind 
Gallina have the humoi; the Kono, the sumoia and the Sherbro 
the yassjft. The Temne do it through the ragbenle society.
For details about these societies, see Chapter 17, pp.&i1-45&.
consent of his head wife is socially, though not legally, essen­
tial.
Consent of the spouses
In traditional, as well as in modern societies, the male 
spouse must consent to the marriage even if it is his first mar­
riage which is usually negotiated by or with the help of his 
family. But for the female spouse, it was in the olden days the 
absolute right of the father to give her in marriage to whomever 
he pleased, whether or not she liked the partner or consented to 
marry him. Thus, the consent of the female spouse to her marri­
age was, as a rule, subordinate to that of her fatherland if 
there was conflict between her*s and her father’s, that of the 
latter prevailed. This rule was relaxed only in the case of an 
elderly woman, or one who was divorced or widowed, in which case
she could marry a man of her own choice. In modern times, how­
ever, there is a degree of uniformity in all the customary laws 
to the effect that a girl’s consent should be bbtained even for 
her first marriage. The change of outlook is due to the fre­
quency of divorces which follow forced marriages and a recog­
nition of the fact that with increased opportunities outside the 
home cicle,'1' modern girls mingle freely with boys of their age 
group and form liaisons with them even without the knowledge of 
their parents. Therefore, if the marriage is to last, which is
the wish of all those concerned, regard must be paid to the con-
2 ~
sent or lack of it of both spouses. One elder has attri­
buted the un-filial nature of modern girls as the cause for the
1. For the ways in which modern opportunities have influenced the 
choice of partners in customary law marriages in Sierra Leone, 
see Barbara Harrell-Bond, opwcit., pp. /73- H I  See also D. 
Gamble^ "The Temne Family xn a Modern Town (Lunsar) in Sierra 
Leone*1, Africa. 33, 1963, p.209.
2. Pa. Fofana of Port Loko.
change. In a Port Loko Panel discussion on the point held in
1972, he commented:
"Formerly, a father giving his daughter away 
in marriage without her consent was a common 
thing. But nowadays, it is very rare because 
our daughters are not so filial as our mothers 
used to be."
Although the present trend is for the female spouse to 
give her prior consent, marriage can still be negotiated for a 
daughter by her father without her consent. This is common when 
a father wishes to have a chief as a son-in-law.
Consent of the families
It is not necessary that all members of a manf s or a 
woman* s family should consent in order that there should be a 
regular marriage between the spouses. For the purpose of con­
sent, a family is represented by a parent or a person standing 
in loco parentis. like a guardian or family head.
Though, in practice, the consent of the man’s family is 
sought, a man can contract even his first marriage without family 
consent and the marriage may, nevertheless, be valid.
In the case of a woman, however, the absence of the pre­
requisite family consent is fatal to the marriage. If the 
father and mother of the woman are alive, both should give their 
consent, but if there is conflict between them, the wishes of the 
father prevail. For the stability of the marriage, however, it 
is necessary to obtain the mother’s consent because it is be­
lieved that a mother whose daughter marries against her (the 
mother’s) will, may in future, induce her daughter to break up 
the marriage when she (the mother) sees a suitor whom she likes 
for her daughter. Where the father is dead, or unavailable,
1. Extra-marital relationships with other men by a married woman 
are in many tribal societies attributed to the encouragement 
of the wife’s mother. Mothers continue to have influence on 
their daughters even when they are married and are blamed for 
their daughters’ sexual lapses during marriage.
the mother steps into his shoes and she must give her consent to
the marriage of her daughters.1 But if there are surviving
members of the deceased husband1s ante-nuptial family, the con-
o
sent of the head of that family supersedes that of the mother.
If the child is born illegitimate but has been taken care of by 
the natural father, his consent to her marriage supersedes that 
of the mother*s family; but if the child has been brought up by 
the mother and/or her family, the head of the mother*s family is 
the person regarded by the customary laws as capable of giving a 
valid consent to her marriage. Though in practice, the views of 
a guardian of the child or the head of her family other than a 
parent are highly respected, the consent of a guardian or a 
family head alone renders validity to the marriage only in the 
absence of a living parent# We must add that among some tribes 
like the Mende, Krim and Sherbro, a woman*s mother*s brother 
plays a very important role in her life. Some informants say 
that among these tribes a woman cannot be given in marriage with­
out the consent of his mother*s brother, and that it is he who 
is actually entitled to the marriage payment given for his nieces, 
In order to maintain peace and harmony within the family, it is 
submitted, the uncle is consulted when important questions like 
the marriage of his nieces axise, but our informants are agreed, 
and rightly so, that a marriage consented to by the parents but 
not by an uncle is, nevertheless, valid.
Finally, in the absence of a surviving parent or family 
head, a guardian or any other member of the woman* s family, like
1. Among the Susu and Temne, if the father is alive but unavail­
able, he is represented by his eonsanguine or germane brothers,
- The consent of the eldest of them suffices.
2. On the death of the husband, the wife and their children go 
under the guardianship of the head of the husband* s family.
a brother or cousin, can consent to her marriage in order to 
render validity to it.
Consent of the head-wife
So long as a man is already married, all his subsequent 
marriages are usually the result of agreement between him and his 
head wife. In order to maintain peace and stability in the 
man* s polygamous family, it is necessary that the head wife should 
consent to any further marriage into which her husband wishes to 
enter. Besides, most parents in Sierra Leone are reluctant to 
give their daughters in marriage to a man whose head wife is 
opposed to such marriage.
Bearing these in mind, a husband who intends to take an­
other wife induces the consent of his head wife by giving her a 
"begging kola" - usually money. If aLfter this display of 
courtesy, she refuses to allow him to marry the woman concerned, 
the husband has the right not only to divorce her but also to 
marry the other woman. It is settled in all the customary laws 
of Sierra Leone that a wife has no right to prevent her husband 
from marrying another woman. One reason for this rule has been 
given as being that the husband needs as many wives around him 
as he can afford in order that they may assist him on his farm
and entertain visitors who, in a tribal society, are welcomed
\
guests at every hour of the day and night. This may be a good 
excuse for the practice of polygamy by the husband, but it can 
hardly be supported as a ground for not making the lack of con­
sent of a wife, withvhom he has a subsisting marriage, fatal to 
the validity by his subsequent marriages. A head wife, for 
some reason, may refuse her husband’s marriage with one woman 
but agree to his marrying another woman. The real reason, as 
stated by one elder, seems to be that in customary law it is the 
husband who controls the wife and not the reverse.
Legal effect of lack of consent
As we have seen, the consents of the spouses, their fami­
lies and the main’s head wife are, for a number of reasons, desir­
able for the marriage. There is unanimity that the absence of 
the consent of only three in this group, namely: the man, the
womain, if she is elderly, divorced or widowed, and the woman’s 
family, renders the marriage void. Without their consents, a 
proper marriage cannot take place because there will be no agree­
ment, express or implied, for the payment or waiver of the marri­
age consideration, nor can there be any giving away of the bride 
to, and her acceptance by the husband.
Though it has been stressed that nowadays, as a rule, a 
young bride’s views on the choice of her prospective husband are 
more respected than before in that she may not now be given in 
marriage without her consent, there is divided opinion on the 
legality of a marriage into which she is forced. There is no 
tribal difference in this regard. While the vast majority of 
peoples of all the tribes maintain that the marriage is void, 
there is a minority opinion to the effect that the marriage is, 
nevertheless, regular. But among this minority the legal posi­
tion of such a wife is, in many chiefdoms, particularly the 
Temne and Susu chief doms, in one respect different from that of 
a wife who married with her consent. In the event of a divorce 
initiated by a wife who was married without her consent, the law 
in some chiefdoms is that gifts, presents and payments refundable 
as marriage payments, excluding gifts to the girl, must be paid 
in full by the member or members of her family who acquiesced in 
the marriage. Other chiefdoms hold that the woman’s family 
should refund only half of the amount as the husband too is 
deemed blameworthy for marrying the woman.
Since there is now a degree of acceptance by all the 
tribes that a woman1 s consent is necessary for her marriage, legi­
slation on the matter would afford an adequate safeguard in order 
to ensure that the acceptance is not just in theory but also in 
practice/
C. THE MARRIAGE CONSIDERATION
Definition
There is no appropriate equivalent in English for the
vernacular terms used in the customary laws of Sierra Leone to 
describe the marriage payments which a prospective husband makes 
to his intended wife and her family. The word "dowry** is of 
common usage in Sierra Leone as a generic term to mean not only 
the lump sum of money or money* s worth paid to the wife* s family 
in consideration of the marriage and which gives validity to the 
marriage, but also all gifts and presents given to the wife and 
her family since the inception of the marriage transaction and 
throughout the marriage, except gifts and presents the man gives 
to his wife during the period of cohabitation.
In the absence of a legal definition in Sierra Leone for 
these payments, the word "dowry: ** is, strictly speaking, a mis­
nomer. In Roman law, from which the concept is probably borrow­
ed, a dowry (dos) was property brought in by a wife or given by
1, As under the general law, in the customary laws consent in­
duced by duress, undue influence and mistake is no consent at 
all. But under the customary laws, in order to establish that 
a woman did not consent to her marriage, it must ben shown 
that before it was concluded she repeatedly protested, that 
there was a disagreement between her and her family on the 
issue in which the will of her family prevailed and that she 
exhibited an overt act or ommission, such as not accepting — 
any gift or present from the intended husband, refusal to con­
summate the marriage, or persistent running away from the 
husband*s household.
her pater familias or another on her marriage and it became the
property of the husband.^ The practice was the same in early
2 ~Jewish marriages. "Marriage-price" has been used by some
3
writers to describe these payments. We hesitate to use the
word because it carries the idea that a customary law marriage
transaction is a sale. Another term which is in common usage is 
4"bride-price". This, too, is objectionable because the trans­
action does not involve the sale of the wife which the term im­
plies. The term "marriage payment", which we prefer, is the 
expression which some writers on African law have used to des­
cribe similar payments in the customary laws of other African 
countries. The term was first used by Radcl iff e-Brown who de­
fined it as "a kind of * consideration1 by means of which the
transfer (of the wife to the husband) is formally and legally
5 ~~made". As can be seen, Radcliffe-Brown*s definition is not
wide enough to include gifts and presents given by the husband 
to the wife and her family in order to induce their consents to 
the marriage, and gifts and presents to the wife* s family during 
the marriage for these do not affect the validity of the marri­
age. The definition seems to cover only the payment made by the 
husband to the wife* s family in contemplation of the marriage and
1. W.W. Buckland, The main institutions of Roman Private Law, 
Cambridge University Press, 1931^ p.6l* The word "dowry" 
seems to be derived from the Ancient French translation of 
the Roman dos (Norman French: doweyre or dowarrie; Ancient 
French: douaire).
2. See L.M. Epstein, The Jewish Marriage 'Contract:# a study in ~
- the status of the Woman in Jewish Law. New York, 1927T P«89.
3. Fenton, 'opicit., p.23; Kamara and Drummond, op;cit.5 p*57;
. Langley, "Marriage Customs amongst the TemneS", p.38•
4. See Finnegan, og^cit.,'p.63; Harrisa op;cit., p.18; Hollins, 
opicit., p.29; Crosby, op;cit., p .250; Thomas. op;cit;, 
p.96; Hall. op.cit., p.3.
5. Op;cit., p.50.
which renders validity to the marriage. We may call this payment 
the "marriage consideration"and the rest "customary marriage dues" 
The sum total of both is simply "marriage payments".
We may, therefore, essay the following definitions: A
customary marriage due is a payment' by gift or present by an in­
tended husband to a prospective bride or her family in contempla­
tion of marriage and in order to induce their consents, or a pay­
ment by gift or present to the wife* s family during the marriage 
in recognition of the marriage. A marriage consideration is the 
lump sum in money or kind paid by a prospective husband, or ser­
vices rendered to the bride* s family, which gives legal effect to 
the marriage.
Sometimes, this subtle distinction between a marriage due 
and the marriage consideration, which we are attempting to make, 
is difficult to draw in practice, since in many of the customary 
laws, particularly Mende customary law, almost every marriage 
payment is counted as part of the "dowry1* refundable when the 
marriage is terminated either by the death of the husband or di-
i
vofce. The distinction is, however, justified on the ground 
that in all the customary laws, without exception, it is the pay­
ment of the marriage consideration that validates the marriage.
The customary marriage dues, on the other hand, are payable only 
as a matter of social practice and their payment or non-payment 
has no effect on the legal status of the marriage.
1. This appears still to be the common practice in many Mende 
chiefdoms despite the Cabinet directive dated April 27, 1963, 
to the effect that the amount of "dowry** refundable on divorce 
is the lump sum paid by the man at the time of the marriage - 
what we are describing as marriage consideration; The case * 
concerning Madam Hawa Margao of Selenga Chiefdom, Bo district, 
is a typical example this practice. A discussion of this 
directive and this case follows later in Chapter 18*
Character of the marriage considerat ion
The amount of the marriage consideration is not fixed by 
customary law but sometimes by agreement between theprospective 
husband and his family and the family of the intended bride. 
Frequently, however, it is at the discretion of the prospective 
husband to pay whatever he can afford. The social and economic 
position of the man, nevertheless, in many cases, determines the
amount that will be acceptable to the man1s family, and> generally 
speaking, the higher the amount the greater is the man1 s esteem 
among the family circle of the woman. The obligation to refund 
the marriage payments on death or divorce, however, discourages 
many families from accepting exorbitant sums of money as marriage 
consideration.
It is impossible to give an exhaustive list of items of 
property traditionally given as marriage consideration • We 
can merely mention the commonest, which are^native cloths, 
clothes and ornaments, cattle, sheep, goats, fowls, leopard's 
teeth, elephant tusks, iron pots, rice, fish, oil, salt, wine 
and kola nuts. Of them all, the most important were cattle and 
country cloths which were for many purposes regarded as currency
by the tribes in the North and South of Sierra Leone respective. 
Thus, a wealthy Koranko man could marry a woman with as many as 
fifty cows, whilst a corresponding Mende man would pay to his 
wife's family the same number of country cloths or more.
Nowadays, many of the traditional goods axe still given 
as part of the marriage consideration. But the main portion is 
now paid in money. In the diamond mining areas, large sums of 
money are paid and one informant alleged that he knew of a dia­
mond min£r who paid Le.2,000 to his wife's family. Among the
Koranko, Susu, Sanda Temne and Yalunka, there is a custom whereby 
in addition to money or any other goods, a cow is given by the 
man. The cow is, nevertheless, intended not for the woman's 
family but for the woman herself. The cow accompanies the wife 
to the husband's household where it is reared and produces calves 
The proceeds of sale of these calves are the property of the wife 
but they are given to the husband, and he is expected to maintain 
the wife from this source. The importance of this custom is 
that the cow and its proceeds are not refundable as part of the 
marriage consideration should the occasion arise for such con­
sideration to be refunded. This payment is, in our submission, 
a customary marriage due only and even if it is not paid, the 
marriage may nevertheless, be valid.
Time for the payment of the Marriage Consideration
There is a division of opinion not on tribal but on ter­
ritorial basis as to the exact time for the payment of the Marri­
age Consideration. In some chiefdoms, such as Tonko Limba Chief 
dom, Kambia district, Sulima Chiefdom, Koinaduga district, Samu 
Chiefdom, Kambia district, Lubu Chiefdom, Bo district and Timdel 
Chiefdom, Moyamba district, the* marriage consideration, where 
payable, must be given before the conclusion of the marriage, 
though it may be given by instalments up to that date.
But in other chiefdoms, such as Kamara Chiefdom, Kono 
district, Diang Chiefdom, Koinadugu district, Nimi Koro Chiefdom, 
Kono district, Jong Chiefdom, Bonthe district, Maforki Chiefom, 
Port Loko district, and Kakua Chiefdom, Bo disttict, it is 
alleged that the marriage consideration may be paid by instal­
ments, some of it after the marriage itself has been concluded.
The conflict of opinion appears to have arisen from lack 
of appreciation by the chiefdoms which hold that marriage con­
sideration can be paid by instalments, some of it falling due 
after the marriage, of the difference between a marriage due amd 
the marriage consideration. For example, one of the informants, 
while admitting that a lump aum must be paid at the time of the 
marriage, maintained that the husband should continue to give 
money to the wife* s family, even after the marriage has been con­
tracted.
Since we are concerned with the marriage consideration as 
an essential for the validity of the marriage, it is submitted 
that such consideration is payable only before or at the time of 
the marriage. Whatever payment that falls due after the marri­
age is a marriage due. Our submission is fortified by the 
answer to a question which was put to those who contended that 
the marriage consideration could be paid by instalments after the 
conclusion of the marriage. The question was: "Can a father-
in-law recall his daughter and refuse her to return to the hus­
band for an unpaid balance of 'bride-price' or 'dowry'?" The 
answer was unanimously No.'*' When further questioned on the 
basis of their negative answer, they replied that any amount paid 
at the marriage as part of the "dowry11 is sufficient to render 
validity to the marriage. The idea that the marriage considera­
tion can be paid after the date of the marriage has also been
1. Compare M. Aubert, "Kissi Customs", op;cit., p.90, who says 
of the Kissi that "non-payment of dowry or of the portion“re­
maining due can be made a reason for dissolving marriage"#
This statement does not represent modern'law and practice.
Only the spouses, but not their families, are capable of tak­
ing steps to dissolve their marriage, and the present writer 
was not able to find any‘evidence that marriage has ever been 
dissolved on this ground. Anderson has made the“same state­
ment as Aubert: See Islamic Law in Africa, p*291.
impliedly dismissed by the Cabinet directive of the 27th April, 
1963, which decreed, inter alia, that "the amount of a * dowry1 
that may be refundable in case of a divorce should be limited to 
the lump sum paid for the wife at the time of the marriage".'*'
Distribution of the Marriage Consideration
The marriage consideration is formally handed over to the 
bride’s father or the person standing in loco parentis to her.
If the mother is unmarried, then it goes to her (the mouther’s)
father or the head of her family. Among the Sherbro, the 
mother* s brother receives the amount on behalf of the family. 
Nowadays, it is customary to pass the consideration through the 
bride, her receipt of it being an indication that she consents to 
the marriage.
The amount is divided into two portions, with the fami-
2
lies of the father and mother of the bride getting one portion 
each. The portion is distributed among the different members 
of each family, with the parents and heads of the family receiv­
ing the lion* s share. The bride herself is as a rule not en­
titled to a share, but the husband is expected to give her money 
and presents of clothing and other wearing apparel. These pre­
sents to the bride are not part of the marriage consideration 
but are customary marriage dues which are, nevertheless, reclaim-
able on divorce.
Though in practice, the consideration is distributed 
among the members of the wife* s family, the person legally en­
titled to it is the wife’s father, or if he is dead, the head of
1. A further discussion of this directive is to be found in 
. Chapter 18,
2. i.e. the lineages.
his family who invariably acts as guardian for the woman’s mother. 
This seems to be the rule even though the mother might have re­
married since the death of the wife’s father. If the wife is 
illegitimate or an orphan who has been brought up by a guardian, 
the consideration goes to the head of the wife* s mother’s family,
although the wife’s natural father, if he had cared for her, and 
her guardian, as the case may be, are consulted and given shares 
thereof.
Waiver of the Marriage Consideration
The marriage consideration, we may emphasise, is essential 
to the validity of the marriage but its payment can be waived by 
the wife’s family. In this respect, the waiver substitutes the 
consideration and the marriage is valid.
There is doubt about the extent to which the wife’s family 
can, in practice, waive the marriage consideration. For marriages 
other than marriage by gift, some consideration is always paid 
despite its insufficiency. For example, in goat’s head marriage, 
although there is no formal agreement on what amount should be 
paid, the man must always give something to his uncle for his 
uncle’s daughter. Likewise, in marriage by service, it is the 
services which the prospective husband renders to the family of 
the wife that constitutes the consideration, though such services 
are not commuted in money and refunded when the marriage breaks up«
4 J
Even in marriage by gift, as we have seen, although there is no 
prior agreement with respect to the payment of consideration, the 
husband is expected to give presents to his wife’s family at least 
after the marriage. We have conceded that payments made by a man 
after the marriage transactions are concluded are customary marri­
age dues and not the consideration itself. Therefore, one may
say that in the case of marriage by gift, the marriage considera­
tion, but not the marriage dues, is waived* Apart from this, the 
only other instance when the marriage consideration is waived in 
practice is in the case of a divorced woman.'*' Since in the 
customary laws a main must be capable of looking after his own 
affairs and of maintaining a family before he can venture on mar­
riage, no man is deemed to be so poor as not to be able to afford 
even 5 cents, a fowl, a bundle of fire-wood or a gourde of wine, 
with which to pay the consideration for his marriage. It is not, 
therefore, surprising that if one poses to any member of the 
tribes of Sierra Leone the question whether there can be a valid 
customary marriage without the payment of a marriage consideration 
one is bound to meet with a universal negative answer.
Effect of payment of Marriage Consideration
Unless waived, the actual payment and not the acknowledg­
ment of the liability to pay the marriage consideration is essen­
tial to the validity of a marriage. A marriage consideration 
is not regarded under the customary laws as' a civil debt for which
the woman1 s family cam sue the man and/or his faniily. Therefore, 
in the nature of things, if it is not paid the relationship be­
tween the spouses remains irregular. It is, however, submitted 
that if the wife* s family regards the relationship as a proper 
union despite the husbands failure to pay the consideration, 
this constitutes waiver and the marriage becomes valid.
1. The Marriage consideration is commonly waived in the case of 
a divorced woman for whom the intended husband has'refunded 
the marriage consideration to the divorced husband.
2x THE MARRIAGE FORMALITIES AND REGISTRATION
0) The Marriage Formalities
We have already discussed in detail in Chapter 15 the 
various formalities which attend a customary law marriage. It 
will be recalled that it is doubtful which of these formalities 
is essential for the validity of the marriages. Despite certain 
unfavourable social results which may follow from non-compliance 
with them, it is submitted that so long as the partids to the marri­
age have the capacity, the prerequisite consents have been ob­
tained, and the marriage consideration has been paid or waived, 
the non-observance of one or other of the marriage formalities 
would not invalidate the marriage.
For example, it is desirable to celebrate the marriage by 
feasting and dancing in order to give publicity to it and to make ' 
it an occasion for entertaining friends and well-wishers, but a 
proper marriage can be contracted in secret with only the neces­
sary parties present and without any ceremony whatsoever; though 
in such a case the respective families might be regarded by the 
community as mean. Similarly a Mende woman who marries without
being initiated into the sande society, is referred to as kpowei1
- a derogatory term denoting that she cannot keep secrets - but 
the elders do not, nevertheless, question the validity of her 
marriage on that ground.
At this juncture, we must examine the effect of registra­
tion of a marriage as a formality essential to its validity.
1. When taking oaths in everyday life, tribal women usually swear' 
upon their membership of their secret society. A non-initiate, 
however, who cannot do so is hardly trusted, quite apart from 
other social stigma which attaches to her.
571.
Registration of marriage
Pursuant to s.16 of the Tribal Authorities Act  ^as amendec
2 ~~ 
in 1964, which provides for the making of bye-laws by Chiefdom
Councils "for promoting the peace, good order and welfare of the
people within such towns as may be within its (Chiefdom Council1 s)
area’*, 32 out of 147 chiefdoms in the country have made bye-laws
for the registration of customary-law marriages and divorces. In
the Bonthe district, the relevant Chiefdoms are Bendu-Cha, Bum,
Jong, Kpanda-Kemo, Kwamebai-Krim, Nongoba Bulloia, Sitia and
Yawbeko. The Kailahun district has the Dia, Kissi Kama, Kissi
Tungi, Luawa, Malema, Mandu, Pejewa, Penguia and Upper Bambara
Chiefdoms. In the Kono district the following Chiefdoms have
made: Gbane, Gbane-Kandoh, Gorama Kono, Kamara, Mafindo, Nimi
Koro, Nimi Yema, Soa and Tonkora. The Port Loko district has
5 Chiefdoms which have made, namely: Kaffu Bullom, Loko Masama,
Marampa Masimera, Sanda Magbolonto and Tinkatupa-Makama-Sofroko-
Dibia. In the Kenema district, the only Chiefdom which has fol«*
lowed the steps of the other named Chiefdoms is the Malegohun
Chiefdom.
The provisions of all these bye-laws are uniform, except 
as regards the amount payable on registration and they have been 
published as Public Notices commencing from Public Notice No.161 
of 1960 to Public Notice No.139 of 1963. The present writer 
could not find any cogent reason why the system started in 1960 
and came to an abrupt halt in 1963, leaving the remaining 115
1. Cap.61-of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
2. Act No.13 of 1964. Note that s.2 of this Amendment Act re- 
. designates "Tribal Authorities" as "Chiefdom Councils". .,
3. The 32 relevant Public Notices are to be'found in the 1960, 
1961, 1962 ahd 1963 Laws of Sierra Leone. For their detail 
in this work, see the Table of Statutes,
chiefdoms in the country uninterested in it. It must be pointed 
out, however, that the provision for the making of the requisite 
bye-law is enabling but not mandatory, and even when the bye-law 
is made, the registration of a marriage or divorce is not compul­
sory. Perhaps, because of the very little use that has been made 
of its provisions by even chiefdoms that have made them, and its 
non-compulsory nature, it has been thought not worth the while by 
other chiefdoms to adopt it.
For our present purpose, we shall confine ourselves to a 
discussion of the bye-laws as they related to the registration of 
marriage and we shall postpone a discussion with regard to divorce 
to its relevant place.'*’
Let us take the Tribal Authorities (Nongoba Bullom Chief-
o
dom Native Marriage and Divorce) Bye-Laws, 1961, which are typi­
cal examples of the bye-laws on the point at issue. The relevant 
provisions are regulations 2 and 3. Regulation 2 enacts that:
"The Tribal Authority shall appoint a suitable 
person to be a Registrar of Native 3 Marriage 
and Divorce who shall register any native' 
marriage .. which he is asked to register."
Regulation 3 goes on to say that:
"The Registrar of Native Marriage and Divorce 
shall keep a Native Marriage Register with 
pages as in Form A of the Schedule. Each 
page shall be in triplicate and shall be 
numbered serially. The Registrar shall 
register in such book the prescribed parti­
culars relating to each marriage reported 
with particulars of marriage payments or 
any other’important details if the parties 
so desire. The register shall then be 
signed by the Registrar, the two parties 
to the marriage and their family heads
1. See Chapter 18.
2. P.N. No.211 of 1961.
3. "Native" as used here must now be substituted by "customary". 
See s.2 of the Tribal Authorities (Amendment) Act, 1964, Act 
No.13 of 1964.
recognised as such by native law and: 
custom for the purpose of the marri­
age. The original certificate and 
one copy shall then be detached and~ 
handed one to each party as a marri­
age certificate which shall be re­
cognised as proof of the marriage 
in any Native^ Court."
Looking at the above and considering the other pro­
visions of the bye-laws, there is nothing to indicate that non­
registration would invalidate a customary-law marriage. The 
Registrar does not seem to be given a discretion to question 
whether the marriage he is asked to register is a proper one. 
Regulation 3, however, appears to provide certain safeguards 
that the marriage is a valid one since the parties to the 
marriage and their respective family heads must append their 
signatures to the certificate and the amount of the marriage 
payments should be stated therein. Form A, to which refer­
ence is made in regulation 3, has particulars relating to 
the spouses, their family heads * the date and place of the 
marriage, the amount of "dowry" paid, other particulars, 
the fee paid for registration^and the receipt number of the 
marriage certificate. Significantly, Form A omits the fact 
whether or not the spouses are already married or the name 
of any person whose consent is required for the marriage. 
Presumably, the requirement of consent is taken care of by 
the fact that the family heads and the spouses must sigh 
the certificate, which is an indication that they consented 
to the marriage.
Quite apart from affording evidence of the existence
1. "Native" in this context must be replaced by "Local": see
The Local Courts Act, 1963, Act No.20 of 1963.
of the marriage, the importance of registration is the 
certainty ivhich it gives to the quantum of the marriage 
payments. Registration minimises disputes as to the 
quantum of these payments which frequently follow should 
the need arise for their refund. The tribe whose members 
are the meanest in demanding the refund of every act of 
generosity is the Mende who, upon divorce, count every 
expense incurred on behalf of the wife from a gift of an
orange given to the wife before betrothal to a kola nut
casually given to her relative, all as part of refundable 
marriage payments. The present system of registration 
at least Vmlfe a claim which a husband may make in respect 
of such payments to expenses incurred up to the time of 
the registration and which is stated in the marriage 
certificate. Perhaps this is one reason why registra­
tion of customary marriages has not been popular in many 
Chiefdoms, particularly the Mende Chiefdoms,
To sum up, though registration is not essential 
for the validity of a customary-law marriage, it has cer­
tain advantaged, as we have indicated, for which it should 
be encouraged. It is our contention that it should be
made compulsory in all chiefdoms and that there should
c 1
be a criminal sanction for failure to register.
1, At present, the only criminal sanction is for the making 
of a false statement to the Registrar which is material 
to the marriage. See Regulation 7 of P,N. No,211 of 
1961.
E. CONSUMMATION
In our discussion in Chapter 15 of the concluding 
marriage formalities and ceremonies among the Koranko, we 
observed that among this tribe, marriage is regarded as in­
complete unless it has been consummated. How far can non­
consummation affect the validity of a customary-law marriage 
is, therefore, the subject matter of our instant discussion*
Throughout present-day Sierra Leone, because of 
internal migration and the quest for better opportunities 
away from one* s home town, it is usual for many young men 
to seek jobs and employment in places other than their 
hometowns where they can both earn their living and save 
up for their subsequent marriage. Many of these young 
men, however, continue links with their places of origin 
and prefer to secure wives there instead of at their pre­
sent place of residence. It is a common belief among 
them that a woman who is born in the same locality as a 
aan would be more understanding as a wife and would behave
to her husband just like a sister, thus reducing the pres­
sures and tensions of married life. Thus, while far away 
from home, it is usual for the young man, at least for his 
first marriage, to request his family to look for a wife 
for him at home. This, of course, is not an arranged 
marriage in the true sense of the term since the young 
man and the intended wife would have been known to each 
other since their childhood and their final choice of 
each other as spouses would rest solely on them. The
young man* s family then goes through the formalities of 
marriage on his behalf during his absence after which 
the wife spends some time with the husband's parents 
until he is ready to send for her. This practice is 
common among all the tribes, including the Koranko,
If, during the period that the wife is waiting 
to be invited to the husband*s place of residence, she 
forms an association with another man and commits adultery 
with him, is the husband not entitled to sue the adulterer 
for "woman damage"? There is uniformity among all the 
tribes, including the Koranko, that the husband can suc­
ceed in such an action - the reason being that the woman 
is his wife even though they had not commenced cohabi-
f
tation nor consummated the marriage when the offence was 
committed, A husband, it is submitted, can exercise
such a right only when there is a proper and valid marri­
age between him and the wife concerned. It is, there­
fore, our contention that consummation is not essential 
for the validity of a customary-law marriage in Sierra 
Leone, though a wilful refusal to consummate the 
marriage when the spouses are living together or the 
husband's persistent and unreasonable failure to bring
the wife to his household and consummate the marriage will 
be a good reason for a divorce.
CHAPTER 17 
THE MATRIMONIAL RELATIONSHIP
Unlike non-customary-law marriage, the matrimonial rela­
tionship arising from a customary-law marriage cam conveniently be 
discussed in a single chapter. In this chapter, we shall deal 
with the rights and duties of the spouses to a customary-law mar­
riage, We shall also consider matrimonial offences committed by
third parties against the husband and matrimonial offences commit­
ted by the spouses themselves, or by third parties against the 
community in which they live. Every such offence is accompanied 
by its appropriate remedy, remedies or sanction. These, too, 
will be examined in this chapter. In sum, therefore, our instant 
discussion will fall under the following headings:-
A. Choice of the matrimonial residence,
B. Ranking of Wives,
C. Guardianship of a Wife,
D. Sexual rights of the Spouses,
E. Duties of a Wife.
F. Wife's right to Maintenance.
G. Husband's right of Chastisement of Wife.
H. Matrimonial Property.
I. Matrimonial Offences.
A. THE CHOICE OF THE MATRIMONIAL RESIDENCE
All customary-law marriages in Sierra Leone, except mar­
riage by service and goat's head marriage, are virilocal. In 
these two exceptional cases, the location of the matrimonial resi­
dence is the household of the wife's family, or any other place se­
lected by that family. For want of a better expression, we shall
use the term uxorilocal  ^to describe such marriages. In marriage 
by service, the spouses take up residence in the household of the 
wife's family because the husband is too poor to pay the marriage 
consideration, and his residence there is a guarantee that he will 
be available at all times to render services to the family. In 
goat's head marriage, although a marriage consideration is paid, 
the payment is usually very small, and the nephew is expected to 
remain in his uncled family to work on his wife's mother's farm.
The uxorilocal nature of these two types of marriage lasts as long 
as there is no change in the economic or social position of the 
husband concerned. In the case of marriage by service, for in­
stance, if there is an improvement in the economic position of the 
husband which makes it possible to substitute money or presents for 
his future services to his wife's family, he can, with the consent 
of his parents-in-law, leave their household and control and the 
marriage becomes virilocal. There have been many such situations 
since the beginning of this century when, with the construction of 
the railway and motor roads, migration from the village to the 
towns where there were employment prospects became easy. Nowadays, 
also, the diamond industry in many areas in the Eastern and Southern 
Provinces, and the increase in employment facilities in commercial 
firms, industries and the civil service have created opportunities 
outside the farm which are regarded in tribal society as more 
honourable than tilling the soil. The result is that parents-in- 
law of a marriage by service would not only mind their sons-in-law 
pursuing those occupations, but even encourage them to do so.
1. The term "uxorilocal” carries the impression that the choice of 
the residence is made by the wife. As a matter of law, it is 
the wife's father who makes the decision. The term "patri- 
local" would, therefore, have been an appropriate one, but its 
use will create confusion since this term is commonly used as a 
synonym for "virilocal". "Uxorilocal" is, therefore, though 
not quite appropriate, preferable.
Political, but not merely social or economic change may also 
convert a virilocal marriage to one that is of a quasi-uxorilocal 
character,but such change seems to be possible only where a wife 
is a paramount chief. Paramount chieftaincy tenable by females 
is virtually unknown among the tribes in the North, who regard 
such an institution as excluding women. But among the Southern 
tribes, particularly the Mende, women have as much right to become 
paramount chiefs as men, and in some instances are even more highly 
respected than their male counterparts. For example, at the begin­
ning of this century, a female Paramount Chief, Madam Yoko, wielded 
so much power, influence and prestige among a vast area of Kpaa 
Mende land, and over the colonial administration, that on the re- 
comenndation of the Governor of the Colony of Sierra Leone the 
British sovereign bestowed an honour on her.’1'
If a woman becomes a paramount chief, whether married or
2not, she is expected to live in her compound in her chiefdom.
There is no reported instance of a female paramount chief marrying 
a man who is not himself a paramount chief. If such a situation 
should occur, opinion is divided as to the effect of the marriage 
on the location of the matrimonial residence. Some informants say 
that the husband should go and live with the wife in her compound. 
Others say that he should live in the same town or village as the 
wife, but not in the Chief's compound and that he should have a 
house there of his own, where his wife meets him. Those who hold 
the latter view maintain that it is not etiquette for the husband
1. Madam Yoko wore a crown which was a gift from the British 
sovereign.
2. The residence of aiiparamount chief in Sierra Leone is his or her 
compound. The compound consists of a main house where the 
chief sleeps, and other houses in which the chief's relations 
and some of the principal advisers live. The compound is 
walled round.
to live with his wife in her compound, but concede that if the 
wife desires it the husband should go and live with her there*
The one instance in which there is a general consensus of opinion 
is when a male paramount chief is married to a female paramount 
chief. The rule is that each remains in his or her respective 
chiefdom, exchanging visits when convenient for them.
Shere the marriage is virilocal, the matrimonial residence 
is where the husband chooses to live.^ It may be in the same 
village as the wife's, if both come from the same place, or in the
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husband's village. Alternatively, where circumstances such as ( I ( 
employment possibilities compel the husband to reside in some pro­
vincial. town or in Freetown, the wife should accompany him. In 
other words, he has an absolute right to choose the matrimonial 
residence even without consulting the wife or wives. It may be 
observed, therefore, that the position with regard to the choice 
of matrimonial residence under the customary laws of Sierra Leone 
is in complete contrast to that which exists under the general law, 
where the choice is by agreement between both spouses.
The collolary of the husband's absolute right of choice of 
the matrimonial residence in virilocal marriages is that should 
the wife refuse to follow him wherever he chooses to live, she is 
deemed to have deserted him. To this rule there are a few except­
ions •
Firstly, if the wife is over 5 of 6 months pregnant,she is 
expected to go and live with her mother until the baby is born 
and is due for weaning. When it is time to wean the child, the
1. His choice is, however, limited to any place other than the
house of his wife's family. He can live with his wife's family 
only with their permission. If he lives with them, the marri­
age becomes uxorilocal de facto, but remains virilocal de jure 
since the husband can legally change his residence at any time 
on his own deliberate judgment.
husband goes to the wife1s parents with a shake-hand for the 
mother-in-law in gratitude for having cared for his wife and child, 
and must take leave of the parents-in-law for him to take home his 
wife and child. Failure by him to go for them when the time is 
reached is evidence of desertion by him, and the wife can look for 
a lover to take care of her until the husband turns up. Such 
lover is not liable to the husband for "woman damage".
Secondly, if the wife is affected by some serious disease 
such as leprosy, epilepsy, or insanity, the cause is usually attri­
buted to witchcraft py pne pf the co-wives - the mates’1" resulting 
from jealousy because she, the stricken wife, is blessed with child­
ren or because undue favours are being shown to her by the husband. 
Such a wife is also expected to go to her parents and stay with 
them until she is cured.
Thirdly, where there is a bereavement in the wife's family, 
she is expected to stay with her family until the funeral cere­
monies, lasting sometimes for up to forty days, are over. The 
husband is expected to equip her and make his own contribution to 
the funeral expenses before she departs. Usually, it is the hus­
band. who sends her but in case he is reluctant to do so, she can go 
on her own. In either case, when the ceremonies are over, the hus­
band must go for her and pay a shake-hand to her family.
Fourthly, if the wife has children and they die in infancy, 
the cause of death is usually attributed to witchcraft by some one 
within the household or in the locality. The wife has a right to 
ask the husband to change his residence, and if he fails to do so, 
the wife can leave him and she will not be deemed to be in desertion
1. The word "mate" has a special meaning in Sierra Leone. It is a 
Creole classificatory term by which a wife of a polygamous family 
refers to another wife of the same family. The head-wife, how­
ever, if older in age than the junior wives, is called "mother" 
by the latter.
In the exceptions cited, the wife is not under a legal obli­
gation to continue living with her husband at his residence, and 
the husband cannot compel her to do so. Apart from these except­
ions, the wife may leave the matrimonial residence only with the 
permission of the husband. Permission is more readily given if 
she wants to visit her parents, relatives and friends or for some 
other reasonable purposes, unless the husband suspects that the pro 
posed visit is an excuse for meeting some lover at a pre-arranged 
venue.
In a, virilocal marriage, when it is the man’s first marriage 
and the marriage consideration is provided by his father, his wife 
usually goes with him to live in his father* s household if they are 
resident in a rural community. She is regarded as a member of her 
father-in-law* s household, and is under the direct supervision of 
the head-wife of her father-in-law. If the husband does not have 
a room of his own, she sleeps with the other women in a house pro­
vided mainly for the women of the household. The couple sleep to­
gether occasionally by arrangement with the head of the household, 
when they are enabled to have access to a room. Alternatively, 
the husband hires a room in the neighbourhood which is used only 
for sleeping purposes, while all domestic and social activities 
take place in the main household.
When the husband takes an additional wife or wives, or if 
he is resident in an urban community, he usually forms his own 
household. He is head of that household and his head-wife is 
second in command.
B. RANKING OF WIVES
The wife whom a man marries first is his head-wife. As a
general rule, the other wives rank in seniority by the date of 
their marriage. Thus, a wife married second is senior to one
married third, and so on* To this rule, however, there are a num­
ber of exceptions. An inherited widow, if advanced in age, or if 
she is the widow of a person senior in rank or age to the present 
husband;^ a wife of a marriage by gift; a wife to whom the hus­
band is more favourably disposed and for whom he shows more affect-
2ion; and an educated wife; all occupy positions of privilege 
not commensurate with the date of their marriage*
In the case of an inherited widow of the kind described, she 
ranks pari passu with the head-wife, and if she is elderly and the 
head-wife is younger, she, the head-wife, surrenders her position to 
the inherited widow. As a matter of courtesy, but not of law, the 
inherited widow is consulted on every important matter affecting the 
household; she is highly respected by all, and at times she has the 
final say. She is treated not so much as a mate by the other 
wives, but as the "mother11 of the family. She plays a leading 
role on ceremonial occasions, such as birth and bereavement,in the 
polygamous family.
A young and attractive wife, or one being the daughter of a 
chief or an important parent, who is given in marriage as a gift, 
easily wins the favour and affection of a husband. Paramount 
chiefs and big men who can afford to marry a large number of wives 
are prone to fall victims to these qualities in a woman. They pay 
more attention to such wives, lavish gifts and presents on them, 
and sometimes hold them in higher esteem than women who are senior 
to them in marriage. Such conduct, of course, arouses much
1. For instance, among the Mende a son may marry the widow of his 
father. Among the Temne also, a younger brother may marry the 
widow of his elder brother. The widow in either case falls 
in the category to which we are referring.
2. The privileges include excuse from certain types of work such as 
planting, weeding and harvest in the husband^ farm; presents 
of dresses; and the allocation of separate sleeping quarters.
jealousy on the part of the less favoured wives, and it is believed 
that the more favoured wives are always the objects of witchcraft 
and calamities which in the normal course of events arise from 
natural causes* For instance, if the child of such a wife falls 
sick or dies, a mate is always suspected of being responsible for 
it*
An enlightened  ^husband with many wives usually ensures
<
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that at least one of them is educated* The reason is that guests 
enlightened like himself may visit him and there should be a "civi­
lised” woman in the household who does the housekeeping during the 
period of their stay and acts as maid to them* The status of such 
a wife is different from the rest of the wives, except the head- 
wife, irrespective of the date of her marriage to the husband*
Apart from the foregoing exceptions, a wife takes her posi­
tion in her husband*s household strictly in accordance with her 
seniority* Every wife is subject to the direct supervision of 
the head-wife, and in the absence of the head-wife the next in 
seniority takes her place* Seniority would appear to be relevant 
only for this reason, and for the rule that a junior wife must be 
respectful to her senior* In other respects, all the wives except 
the head-wife, are regarded as equals and are expected to discharge 
their responsibilities to the household and their husband in that 
wise. Each wife takes commands from the husband or the head-wife, 
but not from the mate who is her immediate senior.
Though, as we have pointed out earlier, there is a degree of
1. Enlightenment does not necessarily mean that the husband has 
been to school* He is regarded as enlightened if he has formed 
social contacts with educatedjpeople such as high-ranking civil 
servants and professionals. ' Paramount Chiefs, even if illiter­
ate, are regarded as enlightened.
2 . An educated woman in this respect is one who is capable of 
speaking at least the Creole language, probably brought up by 
a Creole family. She need not have had a formal education.
jealousy among the co-wives where the husband is accused of favour­
itism for one wife or the other, or where some of the wives are not 
fortunate to have children of their own, in the absence of these 
factors, the co-wives treat one another as the best of friends and 
where there is harmony among them, they may even combine against 
their husband, force him to meet their demands, and conceal from 
him their attachments to lovers.
To what extent, if at all, a wife may lose her seniority is 
a matter on which there is no certainty in any of the customary laws
of Sierra Leone. There are three schools of thought in each system 
of law. One school holds the view that once a senior always a 
senior, and that despite the fact that the rights and privileges of 
a wife may be curtailed by her husband for acts of misconduct com­
mitted by her, her seniority can never be taken away as long as she 
remains married to her husband. The other school maintains that 
if a wife is in persistent dereliction of duty, or is guilty of 
some gross misconduct, such as witchcraft or promiscuity, she loses 
her seniority to a junior wife who is hardworking, humane and faith­
ful. Another school is of the opinion that a wife*s seniority 
may be suspended at the instance of the husband, but not taken away 
finally, if she fails to perform her duties as a wife. This 
school concedes that if the wife repents - repentance is usually 
signified by her begging the . husband which she does by prostrat­
ing on the ground before him in the presence of at least a member 
of her family who intercedes on her behalf - and she leads a new 
life without repeating the misconduct, she can be restored to her 
former position by her husband.
The first view is the generally-accepted one and, in our 
submission, it ought to prevail. A husband in customary law has 
at his disposal a number of methods of punishing a wayward wife, ;
he can chastise her, deny her of certain privileges such as refus­
ing to give her presents or to have sexual intercourse with her 
when it is her turn to sleep with him; and in extreme cases, he 
can divorce her. But depriving her of her position even temporar­
ily affects the household structurally, and results in instability 
within its general framework. A junior wife who takes the place 
of her senior in marriage will not command the respect of the lat­
ter, even if the erstwhile junior wife becomes the head-wife or 
acts in that capacity; the domestic functions of the household 
will come to a standstill, as it is the head-wife who gives the 
directions and distributes the work. If there is anything that 
brings jealousy among co-wives, it is the husband*s showing favours 
to one wife in preference to another. Such jealousy, however, 
does not affect the general running of the household. But if the 
husband goes to the extent of superimposing a wife junior in marri­
age on one that is her senior, there will result a complete break 
in communication among the co-wives, and the polygamous family 
will be in a chaotic state.
Seniority among the children of the co-wives in the compound 
polygamous family is not determined by the date of the marriage of 
their mothers to their father. It is the date of birth of each 
child that decides his rank within the family. Thus, the eldest 
son in the whole compound polygamous family is the one who was 
first to be born in the family; his mother may even be the most 
junior wife.
So long as the father is alive, the ranks of the children 
do not affect the positions of their respective mothers.^ But
1. It should be noted, however, that the social and economic posi­
tions of a wife who has children are stronger than childless 
wives. A wife who has children is more respected by the family
of the husband than the one who has none. Children also assist 
their mothers on the little farms allocated to them for their 
personal cultivation and benefit.
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when the husband dies, the status of the wife whose son is the 
eldest son within the whole family may be elevated within the 
family circle. As we shall see later, the modern tendency in 
some customary laws is for the eldest son when he reaches maturity 
to succeed to the property of his father. If, for instance, the 
eldest son is the child of the most junior wife, the position of 
that wife is more secured and she enjoys more prestige than before, 
since her son becomes the caretaker of the family property,
C* GUARDIANSHIP
In the customary laws of Sierra Leone, a woman’s position
resembles, in many respects, that of a minor. While she is single,
she is under the guardianship of her father or, in his absence, his
2father’s brother who is senior in line to the remaining brothers 
or, if the father himself is living in his own father’s household, 
the head of her family.
Formerly, the legal consequences of guardianship were that 
the husband had the rights to maintain and defend actions on behalf 
of the wife, to obtain her full services without outside interfer­
ence, and to be consulted prior: to, or be informed immediately after 
a transaction had taken place between the wife and a third party.
In the last mentioned case, it was a wrong by a third party action­
able at the instance of the husband for the former even to do an 
act of kindness to a man’s wife without the husband’s permission
1. Even if the woman is fully grown-up, she is under guardianship. 
Perhaps, this explains why the marriage of a woman is never 
valid unless with the consent of her family.
2. For the Temne, Susu and Limba tribes.
3. The reason is that the father is not regarded as fully emanci­
pated if he continues to live in his own father’s household.
or a p p r o v a l T o  these fights, the husband had the correlative 
duty to pay his wifefs debts and he was liable to third parties 
for his wifefs torts and contracts*
Nowadays, while the husband's rights consequent upon guard­
ianship are still preserved, there is a change of attitude in each 
customary law in respect of the husband's vicarious liability for 
the torts and contracts of his wife* So fat as torts committed 
against third parties are concerned, the rule of the majority in 
each tribe is that the husband is liable if either he authorises 
the wife to do the wrong or, with knowledge that the wife intends 
to commit the wrong, he fails to stop her. The only wrong for 
which the husband still has strict liability is the one which the 
wife commits against the community* Thus, if the wife fights in 
public, the elders may levy a fine (kassi) on her, and if she is 
unable to pay, the husband is liable to pay it on her behalf. As 
for a wife's contract, the majority view is that a husband is li­
able only if he authorised the transaction, he adopts it, or his 
prior permission has been obtained before the wife contracts with 
the third party* But this majority also maintains that if the 
wife is deserted or is living with her family with the consent of 
her husband, the husband is vicariously liable for any contract into
which she enters in respect of maintenance for her and her child- 
2ren. There is, however^ a vocal minority in each tribe which
1. There is, however, a tribal variation on the kind of third party 
who can be sued. Among the Northern tribes like the Temne,
Susu and Limba, the wife's parents are exempted unless the act 
of kindness amounts to an encouragement of the wife to disobey 
or desert the husband. These tribes maintain that even in 
this case, the wife's father cannot be sued. The Southern 
tribes, particularly the Mende and Kono, do not exempt anybody 
at all. It is common for a Mende main to sue his father-in-law.
2. On the husband's duty to maintain, see pp 5<1S-6of.
insists on the husband's vicarious liability for the torts and 
contracts of his wife whether or not he knows of, or authorises 
them.
The change in the customary laws may be due to one main 
reason. Formerly, women were barred under customary law from in­
stituting or defending court actions; they must always resort to 
their appropriate guardians to act on their behalf. In modern 
times, however, women have as much right of access to the courts as 
men. This change of attitude is due to events which have occurred 
in this century and which have had repercussions on the status of 
women in tribal society in Sierra Leone. These occurrences have 
either made women economically less dependent on their husbands or 
created in some of them an awareness of self-sufficiency which has 
made them less controllable by their husbands. This semi-independ­
ence, if one may use the expression, and awareness are reflected in 
the frequency with which women resort to courts nowadays against 
their husbands as well as third parties. Despite this newly-ac­
quired status of a married wife, because of the husband's guardian­
ship over her, he can intervene in an action instituted by her and 
either continue or discontinue it unless it is one against himself.
The husband's guardianship of his wife does not automatically 
cease on his death to the extent of its averting to the wife's 
family. It vests in the head of the husband's family until the 
widow remarries or is temporarily assigneito a caretaker. Some 
widows for one reason or another, may not want to marry immediately 
after the completion of the funeral ceremonies of their deceased 
husband. A widow may want a trial period to judge whether a pro­
spective husband will be kind to her, her children and her family
1. See Little, "The changing position of women in Sierra Leone 
Protectorate", Africa, Vol.18, 1948, p.l. For details of the 
events, see further in this chapter, p. &0 if..
without immediately committing herself to a further marriage*
In this case, if a suitor from within the deceased*s husband*s 
family seeks her hand in marriage, she can opt for ’’friendship’* 
with him before marriage. During this period of ’’friendship”, her 
lover is her guardian. It must be emphasized, however, that this 
rule applies only if the lover is a member of the deceased husband’s 
family. Where the suitor is outside that family, guardianship 
over her reverts to her maiden family until she remarries, on which 
occasion her family is divested of her guardianship in favour of 
her new husband.
D. SEXUAL RIGHTS
A husband has exclusive sexual rights over his wife or 
wives. A wife must never refuse her husband sexual intercourse 
unless she has a reasonable cause. The categories of reasonable 
cause are, however, closed. The only recognised causes for refusal 
are: serious illness which renders the wife physically incapable
of having sexual intercourse; menstruation;*1’ suckling a very young 
child before the prescribed period for weaning; intercourse during 
the daytime or in the bush and, among the tribal Muslims, the feast 
of Ramadan. Any man who invades a husband’s sexual rights over
o
his wife is liable to compensate the husband for ’’woman damage”.
A wife, too, has sexual rights over her husband but they are 
not exclusive. Nevertheless, a man is expected to have sexual 
intercourse with his wives only. However, he may with the appro­
val of his head-wife, associate with another woman to whom he is
1. Intercourse during menstruation, at daytime or in the bush are 
regarded as sexual taboos in Sierra Leone. For details, see 
pp. 625-£?>%.
2. For more discussion on this point, see pp
593.
not legally married. This usually happens where a man married to 
only one wife - a young girl - falls in love with a woman very much 
senior in age to his wife. In order to preserve the smooth run­
ning of his household which, should he marry the other woman, might
be endangered through the ranking of wives in accordance with the 
date of their marriage and because of the disparity in age between 
his wife and the other woman, all the parties concerned sometimes 
agree on a friendship arrangement between the man and the other 
woman. This other woman does not join the man’s household, but 
stays away in an accommodation provided by the man. If a man 
goes after women other than his wives, the wives are not entitled 
to be compensated for the adultery with the other woman. But 
should a quarrel break out between a wife and her husband’s mistress 
and the cause of it is the husband’s extra-marital relationship 
with that mistress, in some chiefdoms kassi is levied on the mist­
ress but not on the wife; in others, both women are fined by the 
elders but the husband is compelled to pay his wife’s, and in addi­
tion to compensate her. It is immaterial which of the women 
started the quarrel. For this reason, a mistress who is not recog­
nised by a husband* s wife is expected to stay clear out of the way 
of the wife.
A man who is married to more than one wife sleeps with each 
wife for three consecutive nights. He is expected to have sexual 
intercourse with the wife who sleeps with him at least once during 
that period.'*' It is important that he must do so, not so much be­
cause of the desire for sex by the wife but because of the emphasis
1. For this reason, if the woman is not in a position to have 
sexual intercourse, for instance, if she is menstruating or 
ill, her turn may be deferred at her request.
on child-bearing in Sierra Leone tribal society in which women 
depend on their children for support and care in their old age. 
Moreover, the status of a woman within the polygamous household 
and in the tribal community at large increases with the number of 
children which dhe bears. Small wonder, therefore, that children 
are the main source of rivalry among co-wives. No greater tragedy 
can befall a woman than being childless. Women, therefore, take 
it seriously if their husbands, without reasonable cause, deprive 
them of sexual intercourse which to* a wife is an indication that 
the husband does not wantvher to have children. There are numerous 
instances when wives have complained to the elders of their villages 
and have even gone to the extent of suing their husbands before 
local courts for the husbands* refusal to have sexual intercourse 
with them. Both the elders and the local courts too have not 
taken such cases lightly. They would require the husband either 
to beg the complaining wife and desist from the misconduct or to 
declare that he no longer wants the woman as wife. If he takes 
the latter course and the wife is unblameworthy, he may even for­
feit any claim for the refund of the marriage consideration. On 
the other hand, if he still loves the woman and wishes her to con­
tinue to be his wife, but he is incapable of having sexual inter­
course because of sickness or impotence, the wife can divorce him.
B. DUTIES OF A WIFE
The duties of a wife depend on a number of factors. These 
are: whether she is the only wife; whether she is the head-wife;
and whether the matrimonial residence is located in a village, in 
a town in Provinces or in the city of Freetown. We shall deal
with a wife’s duties bearing these factors in mind.
Where the wife is the only wife of her husband, she is ex­
pected to do all the domestic work in her husband’s household, in­
cluding the cooking and tidying up, and looking after the children* 
It is not regarded as etiquette for a husband in Sierra Leone tri­
bal society to do any domestic work* If there is another wife, 
the domestic work is shared between the two with the junior wife 
doing the lion’s share. If there are many wives, the head-wife 
acts as general supervisor and she herself is exempted from the 
usual domestic chores, except cooking for her husband during the 
period she takes her turn to sleep with him* Cooking for the 
husband during that period is a correlative duty imposed on every 
wife who enjoys the right of sleeping with him*
For economic reasons, it is not usual in practice for men 
living in Freetown to have more than one wife. Accommodation in 
the city is scarce and expensive, and almost invariably the husband 
will be engaged in some paid job which yields him a monthly income 
which is barely sufficient to maintain a wife together with younger 
brothers, sisters or cousins who might have been sent to him by 
relatives in the Provinces in order that they may attend school in 
Freetown. In such a situation, a wife is regarded as more dutiful, 
if she engages in petty trading in order to supplement the monthly 
allowance given to her by the husband* Her main task, however, is 
1:o cook, wash her husband’s clothes, tidy up the home, and look 
after the children* But she is not deemed in customary law to be 
in dereliction of duty if she does not pursue the additional task 
«of trading, and some tribes, like the Susu, do not encourage their 
twives to trade.
In provincial towns, however, a little more is expected of 
a wife. Here too, the ability of a man to have msuiy wives is
limited, but as there are facilities in such towns which do not 
exist in Freetown, a man usually has an additional wife* Many 
residences in the Provinces have gardens (backyards). A wife is 
expected to make very good use of the garden, not for planting 
flowers as one would expect in a westernised household,but for 
growing vegetables and crops for human consumption. If there is 
a nearby stream, she is also expected to fish in it and with the 
catch, lighten the burden of the husband in maintaining the house­
hold. Alternatively, she can engage in some petty trading.
Where the location Of the matrimonial residence is a village,
a man usually has a plurality of wives. His main occupation is 
normally farming,^ although occasional hunting, weaving, and some 
specialised trade like smithery and carpentry may break the mono­
tony of his daily routine. While men do the heavy work of felling 
the trees in preparation for farm work, a man1s wives must assist 
on his farm with the sowing, planting vegetable crops, weeding, 
helping with the harvest and preparing food for the male workers 
on the farm at every stage of the farm work. Wives may be allo­
cated individual small farms by their husbands, and each wife is 
expected with the proceeds to provide the food for her husband 
when it is her turn to cook for him and for the daily maintenance 
of herself and her children. A wife is not obliged to cook for 
the whole household. The result is that every wife usually cooks 
her own individual food. A head-wife, however, always has some 
junior wife to do her cooking and only cooks herself when it is 
her turn to sleep with her husband.
Customary-law marriage in Sierra Leone is not a partnership
1. The economy of villages in Sierra Leone is based primarily on 
subsistence agriculture. The staple foods are rice, cassava, 
yam and millet. Palm kernels, coffee, cocoa and beniseed are 
cultivated mainly for export.
597.
between husband and wife, as is the case with marriage under the 
Christian or Civil Marriage Acts. A customary-law husband is to 
a certain degree in a position of a lord over his wife, and she 
must always pay obeisance to him. In law, she need not be con­
sulted if the husband wants to take any important decision affect­
ing the welfare of the family.'1' She must always stay in the back­
ground and must make her presence felt only when required by the 
husband. If, for instance, the husband is entertaining guests, 
it is the role of the wife to act as a servant and attend upon him 
and his guests. When summoned by him to his presence, she must 
enter quietly, stopping down in front of him, and must retire as 
soon as her services are no longer required. A wife who does not
i
show this deference to her husband is regarded as disrespectful and, 
if she persists in that misconduct, she can be divorced with the 
obligation of the refund of the marriage payments made for her. 
Education of women and contact with Western culture seem to have 
had no effect on Sierra Leone customary laws in this regard. In 
practice, however, some customary-law husbands who have had foreign 
contacts tend to ignore such an omission on the part of their 
wives, at any rate in the presence of Westernised guests. These 
husbands ape the customs and manners of their guests, and even 
feel embarrassed if their wives behave to them in the presence of 
their "foreign guests" in the manner expected of them in customary 
law. Thus it is not uncommon in provincial towns and in Freetown 
for customary-law wives to share the company of their husbands and 
their guests in the same manner as wives married under the other 
systems of law in Sierra Leone do.
To summarise, the duties of a customary-law wife are: to
1. In practice, however, the head-wife or an elderly wife is con­
sulted, but the husband has the final say.
take care of the matrimonial residence, do the domestic work, care 
for her children, and work for her husband as directed by him.
She must do all that lies in her power to please him and must be 
respectful to him.
WIFE'S RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE
The same factors which, as we have already mentioned, ought 
to be considered in dealing with the duties of a wife of a custom­
ary-law marriage are also relevant to a discussion of her right to 
maintenance. In return for a wife's industry in the matrimonial 
home, the husband is expected to protect her in the community, to 
provide her with accommodation, and to maintain her. But the ex- 
tent to which he is liable to maintain her is debatable.
If the location of the matrimonial residence is in a big 
provincial town or in Freetown, there are some among the tribes who 
maintain that the husband is responsible for the complete mainten­
ance of the wife and her children. The reason is that there may 
not be land available to the wife to cultivate vegetables and to 
assist the husband with the upkeep of the home. Others hold that 
the wife should engage: in some petty trading with funds provided 
by the husband, and that she should use the profit to buy food for 
the home and clothing for herself.^ These concede that the hus­
band's liability is limited to providing rice, which is the main 
dish in Sierra Leone, for the feeding of the household, and buying 
clothing for her only once in a while.
Where the matrimonial residence is in a rural society,there
1. The only tribal exception to this rule is the Susu, who do not 
require their wives to trade for their subsistence. The divi­
sion of opinion is based on sex. The men say that the women 
should contribute; the women, on the other hand, take the 
opposite view.
is a general consensus of opinion that the husband should provide 
only clothing for his wife or wives in addition to accommodation.
The day-to-day upkeep of the wife and her children is the primary 
responsibility of the wife herself. She is expected to make full 
use of the land provided by the husband for her cultivation. To 
this rule, however, there are exceptions. Firstly, during the 
rainy season when very little, if any, farming is done, it is the 
duty of the husband to provide rice for the whole household. The 
rice is kept under the strict supervision of the head-wife, who 
every morning dishes out thechily ration to each wife. Other items
like fish and oil are provided by the wife herself. Secondly, if 
the wife is unfit to work,for instance, she is ill or is nursing a 
baby, the husband is responsible for her full maintenance. Thirdly, 
if the wife is temporarily living with her family either on a visit 
- a common occurrence recognised by tribal society - or on a speci­
fic mission like giving birth, or attending a relative's funeral 
ceremonies, or has sought shelter with them after escaping from 
the husband's ill-treatment, the husband is liable for her complete 
maintenance. While she remains with her family, any expenses in­
curred by them on her account must be fully reimbursed by. the hus­
band before she is allowed to return to, or with him.’1’ Many fami­
lies do not, however, in practice adhere to this rule if the hus­
band has been kind and respectful to them, and the wife's staying 
with them is not the result of his ill-treatment of her.
1. When a wife is temporarily living with her family, it is not 
customary for her to return to her husband by herself. The hus­
band must either go for her himself or send a messenger. Which­
ever method is employed and for whatever reason that the wife 
went to her family, the husband must give, or send a "kola" for 
her family before she is released. In Mende customary law, the 
"kola" given by the husband is deemed to be sufficient compensa­
tion to the wife's parents for looking after her.
From the preceding analysis, it would appear that a custom­
ary-law husband is in an enviable position in regard to his respon­
sibility for the maintenance of his wife, a position which a hus­
band of a non-customary-law marriage does not find himself. But 
this is only vis-a-vis the wife. In the customary laws of Sierra 
Leone, a man's main obligation is to his and his wife's families.
He is expected to make a contribution to the funeral expenses of 
some relative whenever there is bereavement in either family. If 
he is living in the same village with them, he must join in the 
labour On their farms or hire labourers for them. When there is a 
harvest on his own farm, he must give them a share of the proceeds. 
If he is resident in a village far away from the two families, he 
must invest the surplus crops and money with which to make occa­
sional presents or gifts to the families, and assist them in times 
of need. A husband living in a provincial town or Freetown is 
expected to send at irregular intervals to his or his wife's fami­
lies such commodities as clothing, tobacco, and Western-type victu­
als like sugar, tea, coffee, corned beef and sardines, which are 
not to be found in the village. A husband who fails in his duty 
to his wife's family is not likely to continue his enjoyment of 
his wife's consortium. Though, as a rule, the wife's family can­
not take her away from him on this ground, that family can exercise 
a strong influence over the wife, and may even induce her to desert 
him. A generous lover may be sought by the wife on the instiga­
tion of her mother, or encouraged by the latter when the wife pays 
her usual visits to her family. Such a lover is a prospective 
husband for the wife concerned, and no sooner has he acquired a 
sum equivalent to the marriage payments which the husband paid for 
the wife than the wife deserts her husband and the marriage breaks
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up. Whatever be the attitude of a husband to a wife, in Sierra 
Leone tribal societies a marriage is destined to last only if the 
husband displays continuing generosity to his wifefs family. The 
economic burden on the husband of a customary-law marriage is not 
therefore 1ight•
G. CHASTISEMENT
In contrast to non-customary law, a husband under the custom­
ary laws of Sierra Leone has the right to administer reasonable 
chastisement to his wife for her misconduct towards him. But he 
is not permittedjto punish her for her misbehaviour towards a co­
wife, their children and third parties. For misconduct towards 
the children, the husband must complain to her family. If it is a 
co-wife or a third party that is offended, the husband must ask her 
to beg the aggrieved person and, if she refuses, he can also report 
her to her faunily. In some Mende, Sherbro and Krim chiefdoms in 
the South the husband can sue the wife in a local court for her be­
haviour. Though in reality no offence is committed by the wife 
against the husband himself, the courts in these areas entertain 
such an action because, as guardian of the wife, the husband may 
become vicariously liable to the aggrieved party if that party were 
to seek redress against him. The wife is often asked to pay mone­
tary compensation to the husband with which he settles the grievance 
with the party concerned.
The types of misconduct for rdiich a husband is allowed to 
punish a wife are: dereliction of her domestic duty, flirting with
other men, and adultery. It is not clear what amounts to reason­
able chastisement. However, there is a general consensus of opi­
nion that he can either send her to "Coventry" until she begs him, 
or beat her, but not to the extent of wounding her. The place
where he can lawfully administer the latter type of punishment is, 
however, a matter on which there is a difference of opinion. In 
some chiefdoms, if a husband beats his wife in a public place, he 
is liable to pay kassi to the efders. The fine is levied on him 
for being in breach of the peace of the village. While he can, 
with impunity, administer reasonable corporal punishment to his 
wife in his house, he should not do so behind closed doors, other­
wise it will be inferred by the elders that he intends to kill his 
wife, for which he is also liable to pay a fine. The rule in 
other chiefdoms is that nobody should fight either in a public or 
in a private place.*1. Though these chief doms recognise the right 
of a husband to beat his wife, if done reasonably, the exercise of 
the right by the husband is regarded as a fight between the 
spouses. Thus kassi is levied by the elders on both of them. If 
the marriage is to continue, the husband pays both fines, but if 
the parties are to separate, the guilty spouse pays hers and the 
other*s fines.
It is difficult to understand why a man should be liable to 
pay kassi for beating his wife at home, when his right to do so is 
recognised by the customary laws of the chiefdoms concerned. The 
kassi is in practice inflicted even where the wife does not com­
plain to the elders. Kassis are normally inflicted in tribal 
societies throughout Sierra Leone if fights take place in public 
which disturb the peace of the elders. It is, therefore, sub­
mitted that a fight at home between a husband and wife that does 
not lead to a breach of the peace in the village ought to be re­
garded purely as a domestic problem, and should not be an offence 
against the elders. The elders cannot have it both ways: if they
1. Bye-laws to this effect operate in the chiefdoms of the Bo 
district.
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recognise a husband*s "right" to beat his wife in private, then 
the levy of a kassi on him when he exercises that right is a recog­
nition by them of a "no-right11 on the same point. This is a legal 
situation which hardly exists under any system of law.**"
H. MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
Ihere is a great deal of uncertainty about the law of matri­
monial property in the customary laws of Sierra Leone. The reason 
is that the status of women in tribal society in Sierra Leone today
is a little better than that of women in early-tribal society.
While there are some people in each tribe who are prepared to give 
practical expression to such improvement by allowing a married woman 
some degree of economic independence, there are some who still ad­
here to the traditional view that she is her husband1s chattel and 
that whatever property she purports to own, belongs to her husband 
absolutely.
A short exposition of the historical background to the eco­
nomic position of women in traditional society in Sierra Leone will 
help one to appreciate the present confused state of the laws in 
regard to matrimonial property.
In traditional society, before the colonial era, a man1s 
personal effects - his house, farm and implements of trade and 
husbandry - were his main items of property. As the economy of 
the society was wholly agricultural, so were items of property 
limited. A woman could not acquire any property of her own. In 
fulfilment of her role as housewife, all her efforts were channel­
led towards strengthening the economic position of her husband.
I. W.N. Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions" (1913), 23
Yale L.J. 16-59, and "Fundamental Legal Conceptionsas Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning", (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710-770.
In addition to her domestic duties, she was employed on her hus­
band* s farm and in the farm allotted to her by her husband. The 
proceeds of her husband*s farm belonged to him absolutely, and 
those from her own faun were for the subsistence of herself, her 
husband and their children.
Then came the colonial era. A railway was built which 
linked Freetown with towns in the Provinces, motor roads were con­
structed and commercial centres were opened in the Provinces. The 
colonial administration levied a hut-tax on every building erected 
in the Provinces.^ In order to enable them to pay the tax, hus­
bands encouraged their wives to hawk some of the proceeds of their 
farms in the neighbouring towns. Women in traditional society, 
therefore, began to earn money. Next came the Second World War
and the payment by the colonial government of monthly allowances to
2
the wives of men engaged on military service overseas. Added to
these, the discovery of diamonds in Sierra Leone in the 1930s, and
3
the diamond boom which followed in the 1950s not only made many 
men less dependent on agricultural economy, but also provided 
avenues for women to earn money of their own. By this time, the 
economy of tribal society has begun tp undergo a remarkable change. 
Items of property which belong to industrialised societies like 
modern household furniture, radios, and cars were gradually intro­
duced into tribal society. At present,married women in large
1. This tax resulted in a civil war in Sierra Leone in 1898, the 
last in the country*s history.
2. During the Second World War, Sierra Leone men - the majority of 
whom were tribal natives - served in Asia with the Allied Forces. 
It is noteworthy that the majority of these Sierra Leoneans were 
natives and uneducated. In Sierra Leone, until recently, mili­
tary service was not regarded as an honourable profession for 
educated people.
3. Licences to mine were not initially granted to Sierra Leoneans, 
but many of them engaged in illicit diamong mining from which 
they gained large fortunes.
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provincial towns are now able to acquire properties of substantial 
value such as these. Some of these properties are acquired 
through the women1 s individual effort and others, with the joint 
effort of their husbands.
We shall now examine the extent to which, if at all, the 
events of the past years have affected the holding and disposition, 
in other words, the ownership of property by a married woman under 
the customary laws of Sierra Leone. We shall begin with a dis­
cussion of her position in early traditional society.
(a) Early traditional society
In the olden days the concept of matrimonial property was 
unknown to the customary laws of Sierra Leone. Every property in 
the household was owned by the husband. Even the wife was regard­
ed as his property.1 Therefore, property brought into the house­
hold by the wife at the time of her marriage, property purported to 
be acquired by her individual effort during the marriage, and any 
acquisition by the husband with her joint effort, all belonged to 
the husband. Ihere was only one instance when a husband did not 
have absolute right over property derived from the wife. This was 
the case where the husband choosing to locate the matrimonial resi­
dence in the village of his wife to which he himself did not belong, 
was given land by the wife's family on which he farmed or built a 
dwelling house. If the marriage broke up through the death of the 
husband, the house and land reverted to the wifefs family, and the 
wife's guardian became caretaker of the house until the children 
were grown up, when they took over from him. This rule applied 
only where the marriage was de facto monogamous. Where the
1. Among some tribes like the Kono and Mende, even a wife's dead 
body was regarded as her husband* s property and she could not 
be buried without his consent and direction.
husband married more than one wife, in the event of his divorcing 
the wife whose family gave him the land, he must either surrender 
the house with the land to that wife's family, or continue to live 
in the house and cultivate the land after paying a considerable com­
pensation to the wife's family.
Though as a general rule, the wife did not own property in 
early traditional society, in practice she was allowed full bene­
ficial rights over certain types of property. These were: (i) Her 
personal effects brought into the household by her on her marriage 
or given to her by her husband or acquired by her during the marri­
age. These included her clothing and articles of ornaments.
(ii) Her domestic utensils such as pots, knives and earthenware.
(iii) Crops and vegetables grown by her on her small farm allocated 
to her by her husband and livestock reared by her. . (iv) Imple­
ments used by her for fishing and cultivation such as fishing nets 
and hoes. Her right to these properties was, however, limited to 
her personal use and enjoyment of them. She could not alienate 
them by way of gift or pledge without the consent of her husband.
If she sold any of them, she must hand over the proceeds to her 
husband, who became both a trustee and beneficiary of it. The 
husband was, however, not accountable to her if he appropriated the 
whole or any part of the proceed. In the event of divorce she was 
not entitled to any of the properties which she had personally en­
joyed during the marriage. Even her personal clothing could be 
taken away by her only with the husband's permission, which was 
rarely given if she divorced the husband, or if he divorced her 
because of her misconduct. The present writer was informed of 
cases where wives leaving their husbands had to go to their fami­
lies either naked or in clothes borrowed from friends. If the 
husband died, his inerhitable property included his wife together 
with all her personal belongings.
(b) Modern Traditional Society
As we noted earlier in this discussion, the improvement in 
the economic position of women in tribal society has resulted in a 
change of attitude by some people towards the ability of married 
women to own property, while conservative traditionalists are still 
adamant. For a better understanding of modern developments, it is 
necessary to classify property in which a wife would appear to have 
an interest into (i) property she brought with her into the matri­
monial home; (iij_ gifts to the husband and wife at and during 
marriage; (iii) property acquired with the assistance, or joint 
effort of husband and wife; (iv) the wife's self-acquired pro­
perty; and (v) the matrimonial home.
(i) Property brought in by wife at marriage
It is now settled in each customary law that property 
brought into the matrimonial home by the wife on her marriage, 
which constitutes her personal effects such as clothing and jewel­
lery or which is of a domestic nature, such as pots, pans, buckets 
and spoons, belong to her and in the event of divorce, whether ini­
tiated by her or her husband, she can take them away with her.
There is, however, a difference of opinion with regard to properties 
which do not fall within the above categories. These include 
money and articles foreign to tribal society, such as a radio, a 
spring bed and a car. The majority view in each tribe, except the 
Kono, Kissi and Limba, is that such property belongs to the wife, 
but that the husband must know about them and the source from which 
the wife acquired them. But this majority also concede that so 
long as the parties.are married, the husband should be allowed 
access to any property she holds, and that he can use it even with­
out the wife's permission. The minority among these tribes and 
a vast majority of the Kono, Kissi and Limba, on the other hand,
maintain that such property belongs to the husband absolutely.
They contend that friends and relatives who give such property to 
a wife encourage her to be disobedient to her husband; for this 
reason, the property should be forfeited to him. But even among 
these dissenting groups, while the husband's right to the property
is recognised, in practice, if the property is given to the wife 
with the knowledge of her husband, her beneficial use of it is 
assured. In this respect, the husband acts as trustee of the said 
property and with his permission, the wife can dispose of it. In 
the event of divorce, if the property is still in specie, the wife 
takes it away with her. A house, however, seems to be treated 
differently. It is rare, but not impossible, for women in tribal 
society to possess a house at the time of their marriage. Children 
from wealthy families, and elderly women who have spent many years 
trading before their marriage, however, sometimes do, but such 
cases occur in the large provincial towns rather than in the vil­
lages. There is uniformity among each tribe that the wife is en­
titled to it absolutely, but may again dispose of it only with the 
husband's permission.
(ii) Gifts to the spouses at or during marriage
In contrast with non-customary-law marriage, it is not usual 
for gifts to be given to spouses of customary-lav; marriages in 
their joint names. Any donor who intends to make a gift to the 
wife must hand it over to the husband and not directly to the wife. 
This is in recognition of the husband's position as leader of the 
family and guardian of the wife. The husband has a right to keep 
the gift for himself and is not accountable to the wife for it, but 
if the donor is a member of the wife's family, the value of such 
gift is deducted from the husband's marriage payments refundable
on divorce. Moreover, if the husband dies and the gift is iden­
tifiable, it belongs to the wife. Where the gift is an item of 
property used by females only, for example, a dress or a piece of 
jewellery, in practice the hudband allows the wife complete use of 
it and it becomes her property. It is generally agreed that gifts 
given by the husband to the wife belong to her. But there are some 
among each tribe who hold that if the gift is expensive and the 
wife is not dutiful, the husband has a right to divest her of it 
during the marriage, but not sifter, and that he normally exercises 
that right if the wife deserts the husband,
(iii) Property acquired through the joint effort of husband 
and wife
Such property falls under three main heads, namely: the
farm, market and non-traditional type of property.
Farm: We have pointed out earlier that a nan's main occu­
pation in a village is farming and to do this he is assisted by his 
wife or wives. There is agreement in each customary law of Sierra 
Leone that the produce of the husband1s farm belongs to him abso­
lutely, despite the fact that a good deal of the work on it is done
by his wives. The husband's right is recogrised even in contempo­
rary customary law because of the obligation he owes to his wife's 
family to assist them in times of need, and to show them generosity 
at irregular intervals. Moreover, a wife is expected to assist 
her husband in order to enhhnce his economic and social positions 
in the community,
1
Market: It is common among many tribal people living in
towns nowadays that husbands provide their wives with a small
capital with which to buy articles and hawk them. Such trading
1, This custom does not persist among the Susu, though the wife 
can trade on her own if she wants to do so.
is not done on an elaborate basis. Sometimes the wife carries the 
whole <f her wares on her head and shows them to customers she meets 
on the streets. Alternatively, the wares are displayed at the 
verandah of the matrimonial residence. Frequently, too, a husband 
living in a village sends his wife to the town to reside with a 
relative in order that she may do some trading. These small trad­
ings carried on by women in Sierra Leone are commonly referred to 
as ,lmarkets,,. The wares include foodstuffs, wearing apparel, 
trinkets, provisions and even sometimes intoxicating liquor. There 
is no parallel between such "markets" in Sierra Leone and any trade 
carried out in Western industrialised countries, but a similar 
occupation is engaged in by women in many African countries.
There is some degree of uniformity amonig all the tribes in 
Sierra Leone as to the ownership of the capital and profit from
such enterprises. The husband is entitled to everything.
In carrying out such an enterprise, a wife is expected to 
be diligent and industrious. If the venture fails, the wife must 
return her husband's capital. It is only upon strict proof that 
the failure is due to the viccissitudes of fortune that she is 
exempted from liability.
Non-traditional type of property: By non-traditional type
of property is to be understood any species of property which was 
not originally found in traditional tribal society. These include 
all items of property of a foreign nature, such as modern household 
furniture, radiograms, and motor cars. These properties are not 
many in tribal society, but they can be found here and there among 
tribal people living in towns and in the city of Freetown. As 
news is broadcast in Sierra Leone in the tribal vernaculars in 
addition to English and Creole, radios are now found even in the 
remotest villages.
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There is a great divergence of opinion as to the ownership 
of property falling in this class. Some in each tribe adhere to 
the early traditional rule that the product of a common venture be­
tween husband and wife belongs to the husband. Others say that 
the property belongs to both of them, but that the husband has a 
greater share in it irrespective of their individual contributions 
to its acquisition. This group maintains that should the marriage 
be dissolved, the wife has a right to recover her share from her 
husband.^ The opinion of this group is, however, divided on the 
issue as to what happens to the property if the husband dies. Some 
say that if she stays with or remarries into the husband's family, 
she is entitled to the property as a whole. Others hold that even 
if she remarries into her late husband's family, where she has 
children the children are entitled to the said property. Where 
the wife chooses not to remarry into her deceased husband's family, 
some concede that she is entitled to monetary compensation only, 
whilst others maintain that she gets nothing.
(iv) Wife's self-acquired property
Some tribes are more broad-minded than others in their atti­
tude towards a wife's self-acquired property. The Temne and Susu 
give a right to the wife over such property.- The only condition 
they impose is that the wife must inform her husband of the source 
from which she acquired the property. If she is engaged in some 
"market", she would have loaned the capital with her husband's per­
mission, or the money would have been given to her by a relative. 
Both the market and its proceeds belong to her. In rural society, 
the wife usually receives income from the crops and vegetables
1. The opiniors herein do not seem to be based on law recognised by 
the^jnembers of the tribes concerned, but on value judgment. It 
was^ cfiff icult for the present writer to ascertain what the laws 
were.
which she plants at the backyard or in her small farm. The Mende, 
Sherbro and Krim in large provincial towns also allow their wives 
to hold their self-acquired property; but not so with members of 
the same tribes who are resident in villages. The latter contend 
that a wife cannot acquire property if her husband does not give 
her the opportunity; therefore, whatever property she obtains be­
longs to the husband. This rule, however, does not seem to work 
in practice nowadays, and any amount of interference by the husband 
w'#his wife's self-acquired property results in complaint by the 
wife to the elders, and if the husband cannot be persuaded to re­
frain from the property, divorce may result with loss to him of 
the refund of his marriage payments for the wife in question.
Many of the Kissi, Kono and Limba also contend that a wife cannot 
hold property independently of her husband, but it is doubtful to 
what extent this rule is of practical application by these tribes. 
On the whole, wives in tribal society are nowadays very jealous of 
their self-acquired property, and there is no doubt that in the 
near future there will be a complete revolution in this area of 
customary family law even among the most conservative of the tribal 
people.
(v) The matrimonial home
We stated earlier in this chapter that in marriage by ser­
vice the husband resides! in a residence provided by the family of 
his wife and that he continues to do so until he takes a second 
wife or, by a fortuitous combination of circumstances, he becomes 
economically capable of having his own. residence. We also stated 
that in the other types of marriage the husband may, if he chooses, 
live with the family of his wife - an event which is rare in custom* 
ary tribal society in Sierra Leone. In either case, the husband 
has no title to the matrimonial home since it belongs to his wife's
relatives. It is a privilege accorded him by his wife's family 
to reside with them, and his position is at best that of a tenant 
at will, if one may borrow the general-law expression.
But where the marriage is virilocal, there is a general con­
sensus of opinion among the tribes that the husband owns the matri­
monial home absolutely if he acquired it without the "contribution" 
of the wife, but that the wife has an interest in it inferior to 
that of the husband even if both contributed in equal shares to its 
acquisition. Whether or not she contributes to it, a customary- 
law wife resides at the matrimonial home at the pleasure of her 
husband. If she is driven away by the husband or the marriage 
comes to an end and she cannot stay in the house, she can claim 
compensation for any financial "contribution" which she made towards 
it acquisition. But she cannot insist on the house being sold and 
the proceeds divided, as would a wife married under the general law. 
Even the compensation granted her is not equivalent to her contri­
bution. If she contributed to the acquisition of the house through 
her personal services and not financially, she is entitled to 
nothing. Two reasons are advanced for this inegalitarian attitude 
taken by the customary laws of Sierra Leone. The first is that it 
is the duty of a wife to assist her husband by her personal ser­
vices, even in the provision of a shelter for her. Therefore, what
ever service she renders - personal as well as financial - towards 
the achievement of that goal is regarded more as a "help" to the 
husband than a "contribution" by her towards a common enterprise. 
This seems to be the same argument underlying 'the reluctance of 
some tribal people to allow a wife a share in any property ac­
quired by the husband with the joint effort of his wife. The 
practice of polygamy is the second reasonibr the inequality in the 
proprietary rights of the spouses in the matrimonial home. The 
tribes argue that the customary-law marriage is potentially
polygamous and that since more than one wife would be living in 
the matrimonial home, the whole structure of the polygamous family 
would be upset, if a wife were to be given equal rights in the home 
as the husband* Ihe argument may be illusttated as follows:- H 
is married to W^, and W^. H builds a house  ^with the 
assistance of the wives* bears half of the finaneial expenses
incurred by H from the profits of her separate "market". works
with the labourers throughout the construction of the house* W3 
provides the food for the maintenance of the workmen from the pro­
duct of her small farm* W4 performs all the domestic work in the 
household, while the other wives are busy with their respective 
assignments* The house is complete and H is living in it with 
his wives and their children. Hfs mother pays a visit to the 
house and suffers great disrespect from the hands of W^. H di­
vorces on that ground.
The house, the argument continues, cannot be sold in order 
to meet the contribution of without grave hardship to the rest 
of the’family; nor would it be just to refund fully her financial 
contribution to its construction, because the husband was deprived 
of her domestic services at the time she was carrying on "market" 
from which she was able to make the contribution.
Inherent in these reasons is the old concept that a wife is 
a form of a chattel of her husband which still persists in the 
customary laws. If equality were to be advocated in determining
1. A house in a typical tribal society in the Provinces of Sierra 
Leone is built by communal labour in which all the wives play 
an active role. Even the building materials are provided by 
communal labour. A typical ttibal house is built with mud and 
wattle and not with concrete. The roof is usually thatched. 
Financial expenditure in the building of a house in a village 
is normally very small, and is limited to paying the labourers 
and artisans. In towns, however, the expenditure is greater 
as it is now common for houses to be built with roofs of zinc 
or corrugated iron sheets•
the ownership of the matrimonial home, the leadership of the husband 
in the family would be destroyed and his ability to marry more than 
one wife would be impaired* As long as a customary-law marriage 
remains polygamous, the wife of such union is bound to suffer cer­
tain hardships, one of which is her unequal right to the matri­
monial home* In large provincial towns, the position of a custom­
ary-law wife who makes a financial contribution towards the build­
ing of the matrimonial home appears to be better than that of her 
counterpart in the village. If the husband lets out rooms in the 
house, there are some who maintain that the husband should give her 
a share of the rent.'1’ They concede, however, that the wife has no 
right of action to recover her share of the rent from the husband,
but that the husband can be compelled to allocate one or two rooms
2in the house for her personal use. This modern customary law
persists among the Mende, Temne and Susu.
Conclusion
Matrimonial property law under the modern customary laws of 
Sierra Leone is indeed in a muddle. In many cases, the opinion 
expressed by the informants in each tribe seems to be based on 
their individual value judgment, and on personal idiosyncracies 
rather than on any accepted customary law of their ethnic group 
or of the area of their residences. For instance, in an inter­
view with a section chief in the Kholifa Chiefdom in the Tonkolili 
District on the question of married women owning property, after
1. The proportion is, however, undecided. Presumably, the husband 
gets the lion’s share.
2. See the case, Yatta v. Musa, No.224/68, in which the Kakua local 
court, Bo, asked a husband to give his wife exclusive possession 
of two rooms in a house which was built in Bo town with the 
joint financial contributions of both.
giving his opinion he added: "this is my law, other people in this
village may have theirs, but that is their business". We may, 
therefore, suggest that it is inevitable for an accurate ascertain­
ment of the customary laws of matrimonial property that local bye- 
laws on the matter are enacted in each chiefdom. At present, no 
such law exists*
I MATRIMONIAL OFFENCES
Our discussion of matrimonial offences under this heading 
is limited to offences which when committed by a spouse or a third 
party result in remedies - expiatory, ritual or compensatory - or 
sanctions without bringing the marital relationship to an end. 
Offences by one spouse against the other which are "grounds" or
reasons for the dissolution of the marriage are excluded from our 
present discussion. These offences will be dealt with in Chapter 
18.
(1) Matrimonial Offences
These offences may be sub-divided into two main categories: 
(i) Offences against the husband; (ii) Sexual taboos.
(i) Offences against the husband
(a) Seduction of wife *
The word seduction is used in this context in its widest 
sense to include any act calculated to lead the wife astray. In 
the customary laws of Sierra Leone any act by a third party which
is likely to encourage a wife to be disobedient to her husband or
m
to be.dereliction of her duties as a housewife is an actionable
1. Note that under s.13(1) of the Local Courts Act, 1963, the
local courts have no jurisdiction in seduction actions,and,yet 
these courts in practice erroneously assume jurisdiction in 
such actions. See Chapter 3, pp.118-12©.
wrong. Thus, it is an offence for a third party to enter into 
any contractual relation with a married woman without the prior 
knowledge and approval of her husband. A wife may also not be
the donor or recipient of a present to or from a third party other 
than a relative. If the third party is a male, there is a presump­
tion that he is at the least a potential lover. Though the husband 
may not succeed in an action for adultery against the third party 
on this ground alone, he can, nevertheless, recover compensation 
from him for seduction. Thus, in one case, Kart eh v. Tailor,'*' 
decided by the Koribondo local court, Jaiama/Bongor Chiefdom, Bo 
District, a husband recovered Le4 compensation from a man to whom 
his wife gave cooked rice to eat without the husband1s permission.
Enticement of a wife by a lover to divorce her husband is 
clearly established if, with knowledge that the woman is married, 
the lover presents himself to the woman1s family as a suitor. An 
action for compensation against the suitor lies at the instance of
the husband in addition to any action he may bring for adultery.
2Thus, in the case of Fofana v. Amara, the Taiama local court, Kori 
Chiefdom, Mayamba District, awarded Lel5 compensation against a 
lover in favour of a husband when the lover offered Lel6 to the 
family of the man's wife in order to enable them to refund the 
husband's marriage payments in order that he (the lover) might be 
able to marry the woman.
1. Unreported, not numbered and undated.
2. Case No.283/68; unreported.
(b) Harbouring of Wife ^
In Sierra Leone tribal society, any person other than a 
relative who harbours a run-away wife is guilty of an offence 
against the husband. It is immaterial whether that person accom­
modates the wife for reasons of humanity or that the wife needs
protection from physical or mental danger at the hands of her hus-
2
band. Ihus, in Koroma v. Johnny, decided by the Kakua local 
court, at Bo town in the Bo District, a husband was awarded compen­
sation from a town chief to whom a man's wife was delivered by her 
parents for protection against the husband1s will until a dispute 
between the husband and wife which resulted in a fight, was to be 
settled. The only persons exempted from liability when they 
harbour a man's wife are the relatives of the wife, but they must 
not keep the wife after a reasonable demand for her has been made 
by the husband. The law has always been that the husband should 
go to his wife's parents and ask for his wife to return to him.
If he does not do so after a length of time, say three months or 
at most, one year, the parents will as a matter <£ principle send 
a message to him to go and take his wife. If he ignores the re­
quest, he will not succeed in any case against his parents-in-law 
for harbouring his wife, nor will he recover the marriage payments 
should he decide to divorce the wife for desertion.
Where a wife goes to her parents with her husband's per­
mission for a specific purpose, the same procedure as when she
1. In all the local court records written in English Which were 
examined by the present writer, the word "detention" is used 
instead of "harbouring". "Detention" probably springs from 
the literal translation of the Mende cgbaa mahun (refuse to let 
something go). It is a fictional notion that if a person har­
bours a run-away wife, he or she has refused to let her go to 
her husband even though no request is made for her by the hus­
band. As there is no element of detention, in the ordinary 
English sense, it is preferable to use the word "harbouring".
2> case No. 195/68; unreported.
runs away is adopted and the same legal consequences follow. In 
either case, however, if a husband goes for his wife and the parents 
refuse to let her go, among the Southern tribes like the Mende, 
Sherbro, Krim and Gallina, the husband can maintain an action 
against them for their harbouring his wife. Two cases will serve 
as illustrations. In Swaray v. Ghujahun,^  decided by the Kakua 
local court at Bo, a wife had gone to her parents on an errand but 
she did not return. The husband sent his brother for her, but her 
father refused to release her unless the husband went himself.
The husband went and gave his father-in-law 40 cents as shake-hand. 
The husband returned without the wife as her father promised to 
send her to him (the husband) after the feast of Ramadaro had been 
celebrated. Thereupon the husband sued his father-in-law and re­
covered from him Le40 as compensation. In the other case, Lewis 
2
v. YarfAlimamy, the defendant was the wife's mother. After a
domestic dispute between the husband and wife, the wife went to
her mother. The husband went to his mother-in-law four times,
each time paying the customary courtesy and asking for his wife
without success. Eventually, he sued the mother-in-law. His
right to do so was recognised by the Kakua local court provided
3
there was proof that he was the rightful husband.
Among the Northern tribes like the Temne, Susu, Limba, Loko, 
Koranko and Yalunba, it is not customary for sons-in-law to sue 
their parents-in-law for harbouring their wives for whatever 
reasons; but this is a "ground" for the husband to divorce the
1. Case No.60/68; unreported.
2. Case No.23/68; unreported.
3. The mother-in-law denied knowledge of the marriage in the in­
stant case. As the husband was not able to prove its exist­
ence, the case was di&missed.
wife and demand the return of his marriage payments.
It is interesting to note that in Mende, Sherbro and Gallina
customary laws, a wife may be sued by her husband for harbouring
herself.'1' A wife is deemed to harbour herself if she stays away
from the matrimonial home without the permission of her husband, or
if while temporarily living with her parents with her husband*s
permission, the husband asks her to return home and she refuses
after being persuaded by her parents to comply with her husband’s
wish. It is of more interest to observe that some of the cases
decided by the local courts reveal that the actions brought against
the wives for self-harbouring are captioned ’’Breach of domestic
work”. Thus, in a case before the Taiama local court, Kori Chief-
2dom, Moyamba District, Bindi v. Janet Luseni, a husband was grant­
ed Le8 as compensation because his wife, the defendant, left the 
matrimonial home without his permission and spent 8 months away.
She was held to be in breach of domestic work. In another case,
3
Mbayo v. Iye Ernest, decided by the same court, the wife went to 
her parents and refused to return to her husband when requested to 
do so by both the husband and her parents. The husband was award­
ed Le9 as compensation against her for her breach of domestic work 
during the period she was away without her husband’s permission.
An example from the Gallina tribe is afforded by the case of Kpaka
4
v. Massa Sama, a decision of the Blama Massaquoi local court,
Perri Chiefdom, Pujehun District. In that case, the wife’s mother 
was sick and she went home to her parents to look after her. 
Eventually, the mother died and after the funeral ceremonies the
1. The majority of the cases decided by the local courts on this 
point are captioned ”self-detention”.
2. Unreported, decided in July 1967.
3. Case No.24/67; unreported.
4. Case No.62/69; unreported.
wife refused to return home despite several requests by her husband 
and her father. The husband was awarded Lel4 as compensation.
Actions are maintainable for breach of domestic work only 
where the wife has stayed away from the matrimonial home without 
the husband1s permission. While she is living with the husband 
no such action lies even if she fails to do her domestic work.
The husband has other remedies for this.'*’
2(c) Adultery
Any man other than the husband who invades the sexual pri­
vacy of a man*s wife is, as a rule, liable to the husband for 
3
adultery. What constitutes adultery, thus giving rise to a 
cause of action in the customary laws of Sierra Leone, is wider 
than under the general law. In the customary laws any immoral 
gesture by a man to another man’s wife is regarded as adulterous. 
This includes the touching of the woman’s breast or any part of her 
body below the waist-line except her legs and feet, whether or not 
she is naked at the time of the act. Formerly, in some more re­
mote Mende chiefdoms, even the act of pounding rice in a mortar 
with another man’s wife, if done by a man, constituted adultery.
1. The husband’s remedy is chastisement, and if the wife persists 
in her misconduct, divorce.
2. For adultery in this context, the word used in the local court 
records is ’’woman-damage”. The origin of the word ’’woman- 
damage’’ is doubtful. Probably, it is regarded as a more refined 
way of expressing ’’woman-palaver”, which is the literal English 
equivalent of the vernacular term for the action; for example, 
Mende: nyaha yia.
3. One informant, Mr. Borbor Taylor, Acting Kissi tribal headman, 
Bo, said that there is no action for adultery (woman-damage) in 
Kissi customary law. The accuracy of this statement is doubt­
ful since other Kissi people interviewed held the contrary.
There can be no mistake that Mr. Taylor was not thinking in 
terms of the customary law of the area where he was resident 
since the prevailing customary law of Bo is Mende and under 
that law actions for adultery are taken more seriously than 
under many other customary laws. These actions are known 
throughout the other customary laws of Sierra Leone.
Although all these acts are in traditional society theoretically 
regarded as adulterous, in practice the present trend is to main­
tain an action for adultery only if there is actual slexual inter­
course, or where the main makes an unsuccessful attempt after the 
woman has been stripped naked.
In some chiefdoms, particularly in the Mende area, quite 
apart from the husband1s action for adultery, it is criminal for 
a man to have sexual intercourse with another man* s wife while she 
is pregnant or a suckling-mother, or if the intercourse is in vio­
lation of a sexual taboo, or if the intercourse results in the
i
woman’s pregnancy. Either the husband or the chief of the vil­
lage or town can levy kassi on the man and if he fails to pay it
2
he may be prosecuted in court. In the case of intercourse with
a pregnant woman or suckling-mother, even the female offender may 
be prosecuted. Thus, in Jabbie v. Katta, the section chief of 
Koribondo in the Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District, prosecuted 
one Madam Satta Katta for allowing one Sulaiman William to have 
sexual intercourse with her, another man's wife, which resulted in 
her pregnancy. She was fined LelO or 6 months imprisonment.
By way of conclusion, it should be noted that in the custom­
ary laws of Sierra Leone, just as in the general law, actions for
1. In'one case, Tambawa of Pelewahun v. Koroma of Mano, decided by 
the Koribondo local court, Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District, 
a husband prosecuted a man for pregnating his wife. This act­
ion was held to be different from that for "woman-damage” for 
which thfe accused had already been sued by the husband.
2. Where intercourse is with a pregnant woman or a suckling-mother 
lack of knowledge on the man* s part of the condition of the 
woman is irrelevant. See the cases of Abu v. Bundoh, Case No. 
209/68, and Bindi v. Carpenter, Case No. 131/68, both decided by 
the Kakua local court, Bo. Among the Temne, if a man has an 
affair with a married woman who does not reveal to him that she 
is married, any fine or damages for adultery against the man 
may be ordered to be paid by the woman.
3. Decided in November, 1967; unreported.
adultery are maintainable at the instance of the husband only; 
the wife has no similar action against another woman for adultery 
with her husband.
(d) Miscellaneous offences
Because of the husband1s right of guardianship over his 
wife, every wrong to a wife by a third party which is actionable 
by her is also actionable by her husband independent of any action 
the wife may bring. For instance, a husband can sue any person 
who assaults his wife. Thus, in Hallowell v. Magnust^  the Mongeri 
local court in the Bo District awarded compensation against a man 
in favour:: of a husband whose wife had been beaten up by the man 
in a fight. This case is an example of Mende customary law, but 
the principle is the same in the other customary laws of Sierra 
Leone.
(ii) Sexual taboos
There are in every customary law in Sierra Leone a number 
of restrictions on sexual intercourse between a man and his wife. 
Some of these restrictions are imposed in order to maintain sexual 
purity; others are designed to protect the well-being of the 
family. We shall now examine each of them.
(i) Intercourse is forbidden during the period of menstru­
ation. While in this state, the woman is said to be "seeing the 
moon" - a sort of supernatural condition that puts her beyond the
bounds of the husband. It is believedthat an infraction of this
I
rule will result in serious illness to the couple concerned. But 
the main reason seems to be that the woman cannot conceive during 
her menses, procreation being regarded in customary law as the 
principal essence of intercourse.
1. Case No.177/61, decided in 7/12/61; unreported
(ii) Intercourse may not take place during the daytime,'1'
The reason for this prohibition is probably that sexual intercourse 
induces tiredness and both spouses need sufficient energy in order 
to carry out their daily work*
(iii) It is forbidden to engage in sexual intercourse on 
the night before a fishing or hunting expedition, as this will re­
sult in ill-luck to the expedition*
(iv) A man may not have sexual intercourse with his wife 
2
in a bush. The reason is that such act defiles all the farms 
in the area, thus resulting in poor harvest* It is alsobelieved 
that if the wife becomes pregnant from the intercourse, the child 
will be a "devil’1. Deformity in children born is, in Sierra 
Leone tribal society, inter alia attributed to a violation of this 
rule.
(v) Intercourse with a wife who has recently given birth 
to a baby is prohibited. The custom in general is that when a 
wife is expecting her first baby, she goes to live with her parents 
when she is about 5 to 6 months pregnant and remains with them un­
til the baby is born and is ready for weaning. Formerly, the 
period extended to three years after the birth of the baby. Nowa­
days, probably as a result of Westernized influence, the time is
3
reduced among many "literate" tribal people. For a wife’s sub­
sequent babies, or where the marriage is de facto monogamous, the
1. For this purpose, daytime is the period which lapses from the 
time that the cock crows in the early hours of the morning to 
dusk.
2. It is interesting to note that among the Fula, a migrant tribe 
from Guinea, many of whom are in Sierra Leone, the bush is re­
garded as a proper place for intercourse because of its secrecy.
3* "Literate" in this context is the ability to read and write 
English*
wife usually remains in the matrimonial home to have her baby*
8ut during the suckling period, she does not share the same bed
her husband. Violation of this prohibition is believed to cause
illness to the child. Many cases of quashiorkor  ^are regarded 
by illiterate Sierra Leoneans as resulting from a violation of 
this rule.
(vi) A widow may not have sexual intercourse until the 
funeral obsequies of her late husband are over and she has been 
purified. Purification takes the form of a ceremonial washing.
The belief is that until purification, the widow still spiritually 
belongs to the deceased and that intercourse within the prohibited 
period will cause the deceased1s spirit to continue visiting her 
and bringing her ill-luck.
(vii) A girl who is uninitiated or whose initiation is not
complete, may not engage in sexual intercourse.
(viii) Finally, and the most heinous of all the sexual 
taboos, intercourse may not take place between persons within the 
prohibited degrees of consanguinity, affinity, fosterage, or clan­
ship. Such intercourse is regarded as incestuous and the conse­
quences are grave. It is popularly known among the Mende, Sherbroa 
Krim and Gallina as simongama. The Temne call it pinthkane.
We have so fax examined the matrimonial offences without 
paying special attention to the remedies and sanctions which follow 
them. Let us now discuss them.
(2) Remedies and Sanctions
(i) Compensation or fine
For a matrimonial breach against the husband by a third 
party, the remedy is monetary compensation awardedty the local
1. This is a disease very common in children not only in Sierra 
Leone but in many developing countries whereby the victim^ 
develops a large distended belly cause by acute avitaminosis.
court of the chiefdom where the offence occurs or where the hus­
band is resident at the commencement of the proceedings for compen­
sation, For offences other than adultery, the amount is not fixed 
by law. The result is that the compensation awarded is sometimes 
far less, and at other times exceeds the loss sustained by the hus­
band, In the case of adultery, the present trend is for each 
local court in the Provinces of Sierra Leone to fix its own amount. 
Some have awarded as little as Le3, and others have allowed as much 
as Le20.^ This is a recent innovation. Formerly, when there 
were no local courts but courts of the native chiefs, the amount 
was never fixed. The husband would demand from the adulterer 
whatever sum the husband deemed fit, and on the man* s :1kilure to 
meet it, would become liable to work as labourer on the husband*s 
farm. In those days, husbands who needed labourers to work for 
them used their wives as decoys to attract them. It was usual 
for such husbands to marry many wives, most of whom they could not 
satisfy sexually, and seemingly to ignore them. A wife would then 
associate with a young man in the village. When the husband knew 
about it he would make no fuss until he needed labourers. At the 
opportune time, he would call his wives to ’'confess1* their lovers. 
Aware that the lovers could not afford money, the husband would ask 
for exorbitant sums of money as compensation. Consequently, he 
got free labour on his farm. It is probably to check this prac­
tice that each local court now has a fixed amount as compensation 
for adultery.
2In addition to compensation, some local courts award a
1. The compensation awarded by the local courts in the North is
heavier than in the South.
3. The local courts in the Kakua and Jaiama Borgor Chiefdoms, Bo
District, are notorious for this. In one case, however, Mason v, 
Boamei (No.144/63) the President of a local court in the Bumpe. 
Chiefdom deprecated this practice as unjust. He said that it is 
no justice to punish a person twice or more for the same crime.
fine to a prosecutor for aggravated adultery, i.e. adultery with 
a pregnant or suckling-wife, and adultery with a woman which results 
in her pregnancy. Thus, if the husband prosecutes he gets the 
fine, and if the prosecutor is the village or town chief, the fine 
goes to him. In this manner, it is possible for the adulterer to 
be punished more than once for the same offence because a prosecu­
tion by the husband does not discharge the accused from further 
liability if he is again prosecuted by the chief, as the crime is 
regarded as one against the husband and the community. Therefore, 
that principle of natural justice which is widely acclaimed under 
the general law - that a man may not be punished twice for the 
same offence - seems to have no place in the customary family laws 
of Sierra Leone insofar as aggravated adultery is concerned. Does 
this offend against the "repugnancy provision11 for the application 
of customary law? This question has not as yet been answered by 
the general-law courts. Probably, it does.
A fine is imposed by the local court or the elders on the 
guilty parties for a breach of sexual taboos relating to inter­
course in a bush, intercourse with an uninitiated girl or one whose 
initiation has not been completed^ and for incest. For inter­
course in a bush, the fine is used by the elders to "wash" the bush 
ceremonially. In the case of an offence against initiation, the 
fine is given to the head of the sande/bondo society in order to 
appease her since the offence is regarded as one against the 
society. The fine for incest is used partly for the purification 
and ritual cleansing of the offenders and partly as compensation 
to the village, and it goes to the local treasury.
(ii) Swear
The "swear" is the appropriate remedy for adultery which 
is not admitted by the adulterer. Where a wife confesses adultery
and her lover denies it, if there is no corroborative evidence 
linking the lover with the offence, an aggrieved husband goes 
without the usual remedy of compensation# Instead, he swears the 
adulterer. The procedure in many chiefdoms is that the husband 
pays a fee to the Chiefdom Committee or to the chief of the town 
or village and "begs for a ground" on which to swear. When per­
mission is granted, the husband administers the swear on a "medi­
cine” 1 provided by him. Sometimes, the alleged adulterer himself
2
is made to swear on the medicine. The swear is believed to
3
cause serious sickness and death, not only to the adulterer, if 
he is guilty, but also to members of his family. Therefore, in 
many cases where a "medicine" is regarded as deadly, the alleged 
adulterer makes a clean breast of his misconduct and the usual fine 
is substituted for the swear.
(iii) Curse
There is no appropriate remedy for breach of such sexual 
taboos as intercourse with a woman on her monthly cycle, inter­
course with a suckling wife and intercourse with an unpurified 
widow. The guilty spouses are deemed to be under a curse. They
1.These "medicines" are a concoction of many objects such as 
stones, sea-shells and herbs, and are believed to have super­
natural powers which can make a person sick or kill him. The 
commonest are the thunder-bolt (ngele gbai: Mende), tomie,
(Sherbro), sasa (universal) and gbom (Temne and Susu). These 
medicines Helong to certain families and are hired through the 
paramount chiefs of the respective chiefdoms. The choice of 
the medicine to be used for a swear is governed by the bye-law 
of each chiefdom. In some chiefdoms, it is forbidden to use 
the deadliest medicines such as the thunder-bolt.
2. The adulteress may also be made to swear on a medicine provided 
by the alleged adulterer if he insists on his innocence in which 
case he pays the compensation just as if he had committed the 
adultery.
3. Sicknesses like paralysis, elephantiasis and dysentry are be­
lieved to be caused by a swear on these medicines.
must pay the penalty by being victims of misfortunes• As it is 
believed that the spirits of their ancestors have a hand in such 
misfortunes, the parties may, however, appease the ghosts of their 
deceased kin by making occasional sacrifices to them with a prayer 
for forgiveness.
(^v) Expiatory or ritual sacrifices
The offences of intercourse in the bush and incest are 
remedied by expiatory and ritual sacrifices. For the former of­
fence, the procedure is usually a simple one. When the harvests 
in a given season becojne poorer and poorer, it is generally assumed 
that some persons within the village had had intercourse in the 
bush where the farm is located. A "medicine" man (ine Mende: 
woman, manee-humoi) is invited to exorcise all evil influences 
from the farm. He "washes" the bush with a medicine prepared 
from a solution of compounded herbs which he sprinkles over the 
farm.
The expiatory and ritual sacrifice for incest is more ela­
borate. There are tribal variations in the procedure. Let us 
deal with three of the distinctive ones.
MENDE:  ^ Among the Mende, the humoi society is responsible 
for the purification of the violators of incest prohibitions 
(simongana). The culprits provide a fowl, rice, palm oil, salt, 
dried mud-fish and a mat or the cash equivalent of these articles. 
The ceremony is open to the public and it takes place at a shrine 
by the roadside leading to the village (pelewunga-humoi). The
offenders and all members of their families within easy reach are 
taken to the shrine. Each offender sits on a mat which is spread
1. The Sherbo, Gallina and Krim adopt a procedure similar to the 
Mende. Among the Sherbro, the purification takes place in the 
yassi society and a dog is "washed" together with the offenders.
over the humoi stone. The priestess (raee-nde) webs the thread 
round the offender from toe to ear and places grains of uncooked 
rice on their hands and tongues. The hands of the offenders 
are stretched out, the palms remain open and the tongues are 
protruded. While they are in that position, the fowl is made 
to peck all the rice from both the hands and tongues* If it 
succeeds in this with one offender, he or she is regarded to 
have made a full confession and contrition. The ceremony of 
"pecking the rice" which we have Just described is usually per­
formed if the offenders have not previously made a confession, 
or where there is a suspicion that their confession is only
partial. It is dispensed with where a complete confession 
has already been made. Thenceforth, a "medicine" - solution of 
compounded herbs - is prepared. The fowl is decapitated and 
while there is still life in it, it is quickly dipped in the medi­
cine and held over the offenders. As it struggles to die, it 
sprinkles the "medicine" over them.
Sometimes a bath is taken at the site with water mixed 
with the medicine. The rice is cooked and then the fowl. The 
gizzard of the fowl and some of the cooked rice mixed with the 
palm oil are placed on the humoi stone as a sacrifice to the an­
cestors of the society who are begged to forgive the contemnors 
for their sins.
In some chiefdoms, the offenders are taken to a nearby 
stream for a bath, after which they are flogged by the villagers 
all the way from the stream to the village.
Often, where the incest is regarded as too serious, for 
instance, intercourse between a parent and child, or between a 
brother and sister of the same mother, the tongues of the offenders 
are scratched with niddles, a razor blade, or a sharp knife 
fkpekelii)•
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Temne:  ^ Incest (pinthkane) is regarded by the Temne as 
a transgression of a taboo (mesem) imposed by the ragbenle society 
and also as a form of adultery and a crime against the ancestors 
of the families of both offenders.
The offenders are taken to the ragbenle society bush 
(turuma) for purification. Each provides the items demanded by 
the o£ gbenle which are to be offered as a sacrifice to the ancest­
ors. In return, the or gbenle prepares a liquid "medicine” (mafoi) 
for them. The hands and feet of the violators are tied with 
ropes. The same ropes are also tied on to the legs of a dog.
The dog is flogged until it dies. The dog meat is cooked and 
the offenders eat it. They are then led to a stream in order to 
be "washed" and the villagers flog them as they go. At the 
waterside, while they are talcing the bath, the or gbenle sprinkles 
into the water some of the medicine which he has prepared. After 
the "washing", the pair are made to run home naked, the villagers
again flogging them as they go.
2 1 Kono: The ceremony begins fromthe sumoi bush and ends at
a public waterside. The culprits are taken to the bush and there
they are stripped naked. In the Kamara chiefdom, a dog is tied
on to the back of the male offender. The road leading from the
bush to the waterside is lined up by the villagers, the women on 
one side and the men on the other. The violators are made to run 
>through the two lines and as they do so, the women abuse them for
1. The Limba follow the same procedure as the Temne. The society 
which is responsible for the cleansing among the Limba is the 
gbangbani society. In some Limba chiefdoms, the head of the 
female offender is shaven.
2. Among the Koranko and Susu the punishment was formerly banish­
ment from the chiefdom. Nowadays, the parties are either 
flogged or fined heavily by the elders of their families.
bringing shame and disgrace on the village and on their respective 
families, and the men flog the dog. The dog is eventually re­
moved from the man's back and the offenders are themselves flogged 
until they run and fall into the stream. In the other Kono chief- 
doms, a fowl is usually substituted for the dog.
MODERN DEVELOPMENT: The ceremonies which we have described
are the traditional modes of expiation. Today, they still take 
place in the more remote villages but they are seldom followed in 
the towns. The reason probably is partly that the societies 
which are responsible for the cleansing are now established only 
in the villages, and partly that the rituals are regarded as offen­
sive to the "civilized" ideas prevailing in the towns, as the 
wrongs which they seek to remedy. Consequently, the expiatory 
ceremony in the towns is reduced to the "washing" in private of 
the violators by a herbalist hired for that purpose from a village. 
Furthermore, the less conservative tribal people in the large pro­
vincial towns and in Freetown abandon even the ordinary "washing" 
ceremony, and many families are content with fines in cash or in 
kind, levied on the culprits with which to offer sacrifices to the 
ancestors.
CHAPTER 18 
TERMINATION OF A CUSTCMARY-LAW MARRIAGE
Under the customary laws of Sierra Leone, as in the general 
law, a marriage may be terminated by the death of one of the 
spouses or by divorce* In this chapter it is proposed to examine 
these modes of dissolution of marriage. The effect of termina­
tion of maniage, on the custody and maintenance of the children 
of the marriage, on the marriage payments, and on the right of a 
spouse to re-marry, will also be considered* The effect of 
divorce on property has already been dealt with in Chapter 17*
In Chapter 20 we shall address ourselves to the effect of death 
on the property rights of the spouses*
A. TERMINATION BY DEATH
(i) Death of the Wife
When a wife dies, her marriage is automatically terminated* 
The exact moment of the complete severance of the marital union is 
when the wife is buried and the funeral ceremonies are completed* 
Until such a time, the hufeband has certain rights and is subject 
to some obligations to her* For instance, among such tribes as 
the Mende and Kono, the corpse may not be buried without the hus­
bands consent and direction. Where he is not present but is with­
in easy reach af the death of his wife, the burial is normally post- 
poned until he is present or has given directions* If his 
whereabouts are known and he can easily be got at but his wife is
1. Where a husband is away from the place where his wife dies, the- 
custom is for the wife* s parents to send a message to him to re­
port the death and request him to be present and bury his wife.
nevertheless buried without his consent, the person who under­
takes the burial is liable to the husband* In practice, however, 
the husband does not pursue a remedy for the invasion of this 
right where the relationship between the husband and the "good
Samaritan" is cordial or if the wife is buried by or at the direct-
1
ion of the town chief. As a corrolary to his right to direct the 
burial of his wife, the husband has the duty to bury his wife and 
bear the funeral expenses. If such expenses are incurred on his 
behalf either at his request, or because he is not easily available 
at the time of the wife’s death, a claim for reimbursement may be 
made against him. In practice, parents or relatives of the de­
ceased wife who incur the wife1s funeral expenses on behalf of her 
husband do not demand reimbursement, but the husband is expected 
to compensate them nevertheless* If he fails to do so and he has 
apparent means, the deceased’s wife’s parents will claim every pro­
perty left by her which is in the husband’s possession or control*
(ii) Death of the Husband
The death of the husband also terminates the marriage. 
Termination, however, is incomplete until the widow has been cere­
monially washed or, if she is pregnant at the time of her husband’s 
death, until she has delivered provided she has not remarried 
after her ceremonial washing and before the birth of the child.
The reason for the latter condition is to determine the legitimacy
of a child conceived but not born at the time of the death of its 
2
natural father.
1* For hygienic reasons, a town chief has the right to bury or 
order the burial of a corpse in his village if there are indi­
cations that it is beginning to decompose.
2. For more discussion on this point, see Chapter 19, pp.CTo-^g.
Unlike a husband, a wife has no right to direct the burial 
of the corpse of her husband nor any obligations to bury it*
These responsibilities fall on the family of the husband* Never­
theless, a widow is expected to undergo a period of mourning for 
her husband* The minimum is seven days and the maximum forty 
days. Aubert mentions that among the Susu, the period of
mourning lasted for four months* This is probably an inaccurate
2
reference to the Islamic 1idda of death, since the Susu are pre­
dominantly Muslim. As we observed in Chapter 6, the 1 idda of 
death even among the strict Muslims in Sierra Leone does not ex­
ceed forty days.
The period of mourning by a widow begins as soon as the 
death of the husband is formally announced* The announcement is 
made usually by the next-of-kin of the man at a meeting of the 
widows and relatives of the deceased which takes place on the day 
of the man’s funeral. After the announcement, the heads of the
widows are shaven or, in some chiefdoms, dishevelled. Some of
the water which has been used to wash the corpse in preparation 
for burial is mixed with white clay or, if the latter is not avail­
able, mud, and the widows are smeared with the mixture all over 
the body. This indicates that they are in mourning. On the 
fourth day of the burial a sacrifice of a fowl or sheep and rice 
is offered at the graveside of the deceased, three days after 
which the widows go to a nearby stream and are ceremonially washed* 
In strict Muslims families, the ceremonial washing does not take 
place until after forty days from the death of the husband* While
1. Op.cit*. p*70.
2. The Islamic ’ idda of death is 4 months and 10 days.
3. Nowadays, the act of smearing the body with white clay or mud
is abandoned in many chiefdoms, particularly in the towns. The 
symbolic washing must, however, always take place.
performing the ablution, the widows bid farewell to the deceased 
and beseech his spirit to depart from them but to remember to 
render assistance to them whenever they are in need. After the 
washing ceremony, the widows are regarded as purified andfthey may 
then re-marry.
Widow inheritance
Widow inheritance has been a common institution in the 
customary laws.of Sierra Leone since the beginning of traditional 
society. When a man dies, his widows are expected to choose their 
new husbands from within the family of the deceased. Ghost and 
levirate marriages are not practised under any customary law of 
Sierra Leone. Consequently9 when a widow re-marries, the marri­
age is not regarded as one newly.contracted to the name of the 
dead husband as in ghost-marriage nor is the subsequent marriage 
considered to be a continuation of an existing marriage with the 
deceased as in the case of a levirate marriage.’1. Upon the death 
of her husband and after the ceremonial washing of his widow, in 
Sierra Leonce customary laws, she may continue links with the 
family of her deceased husband, but all connections with the dead 
man himself are severed. To this rule, there is one exception.
A posthumous child born to a widow within the period of mourning 
or before the widow re-marries belongs to the deceased husband, 
or to be more exact, to his family.
To what extent, if at all, a widow may in present-day 
Sierra Leone choose whether to re-marry within the family of her
1. See, by way of comparison, Howell, A Manual of Nuer Law, Inter­
national African Institute, 1954, pp.74-^9, for the legal dif­
ference between a ghost marriage and a levirate as practised by 
the Nuer of the Southern Sudan. It should be pointed out here, 
however, that in both marriages, the living husband is merely 
genitor of the children while the deceased man is the legal 
lathery pater.
deceased husband or to marry outside or to remain unmarried is a 
question to which we must now address ourselves. In Chapter 15 
it was noted that present-day widows in traditional society demon­
strate a reluctance to re-marry within their deceased husbands* 
families and that some tribes are more tolerant than others to­
wards a widow’s choice of a new husband. While the Temne, Susu, 
Limba, Loko, Kissi and Kono allow her carte blanche to select a 
husband and do not consider it a cause for the refund of the mar­
riage payments made by the deceased husband if she decides to 
marry someone outside the family of the deceased^ the Mende, Krim, 
Sherbro, Gallina, Koranko and Yalunka demand that she should re­
marry a member of he* deceased husband’s family, if she re-marries 
at all, otherwise the marriage payments are refundable. We have 
already observed that the Sierra Leone government in a directive, 
which purported to be effective as from 27 April, 1963, ordered 
that a widow should be free to re-marry any man of her choice 
without an obligation to refund the marriage payments made by her 
deceased husband, should she marry outside his family. There is 
ample evidence from informants that this directive is followed in 
practice in some parts of the country, but is frequently ignored 
in other parts. At this juncture, therefore, it is necessary 
to examine whether the directive has any force of law which is 
being violated by those who do not comply with it.
Clearly, the directive is not an ’’Act” within the meaning 
of s.3(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1971.  ^ That section provides 
that,
1. Act No.8 of 1971.
11’Act1 or ’Act of Parliament’ includes 
any Act, and any order, proclamation, 
order in council, rule, regulation or 
bye-law duly made under the authority 
of an Act, order of Her Majesty in 
Council or any other legislative enact­
ment, applicable to and in force in 
Sierra Leone#11
The directive was at best a government policy statement 
which never matured into an Act of Parliament, nor was it an 
order, inter alia, made under the authority of an Act of Parlia­
ment# At present, the only legislative machinery for the modifi­
cation or alteration of applicable customary law that does not
offend against the repugnancy provisions 1 is provided by s.40 of
2the District Council Act, which stipulates that,
"It shall be lawful for a District Council, 
with the approval of the Governor in Coun­
cil, [President] to make rules altering 
or modifying native [local] customary law 
in the district, and'all native [local] 
courts in the said district shall take 
cognisance of all the rules as made#1’
Prom the above provision it can be concluded that, in the 
absence of an Act of Parliament, only District Councils have power 
to change or modify customary law by legislative process # The, 
directive now under discussion, therefore, had no force of law 
since it was not adopted by any District Council in the prescribed 
manner# At present, there is no evidence that any District 
Council has as yet taken the necessary step to implement it# The 
current legal position, therefore, is the same as before the 
directive#
1# S.2 of the Local Courts Act, 1963; Act# No#20 of 1963 and s#76 
of the Courts Act, 1965; Act No#31 of 1965#
2# Cap#79 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960#
Effect of death on the custody of the children
Under the customary laws of Sierra Leone, on the death of 
the wife the children of the marriage remain with the husband and 
he is entitled to their custody just as he was entitled during the 
wife’s lifetime. If it is the husband who dies, on the other 
hand, all his children belong to his family head, who automati­
cally becomes their guardian. The widow1 s family has no claim 
to the children and if she re-marries outside the family of her 
deceased husband, the custody of the children remains vested in 
the head of the dead husband1 s family, but she has access to the 
children* If, bn the other hand, she marries within thefciead 
man’s family, it is her new husband who is entitled to the custody 
of the children
Effect of death on the marriage payments
So far as the marriage payments are concerned, the death of 
the husband does not result in an obligation on the family of the 
wife to refund such payments provided that the widow re-marries 
into the dead man*s family or she is too old to re-marry* But if 
she is young and a member of the deceased husband1 s family wants 
to marry her and she refuses or if she decides to re-marry outside 
that family some tribes like the Mende, Krim, Koranko and Yalunka, 
as we have seen, demand the: refund of the marriage payments. In 
such a situation an action against the woman’s family for the re­
covery of the marriage payments is maintainable at the instance 
\
oof the administrator of the estate of the deceased husband. In
1. For more on this point, see Chapter 19*
2. If the widow does not re-marry, the persons liable to refund 
the marriage payments are members of her family. But if she 
re-marries, it is her new husband who pays the money in prac­
tice although in theory it is her family who is liable*
some Chiefdoms the quantum of the amountrecoverable depends on 
whether or not there are children* If there are no children, 
the full amount is paid to the deceased* s estate* But if there 
are children, a proportion of it, decided upon by the Local Court, 
is allocated for their maintenance and is given to the person 
under whose care and control the children are*
Effect of death on the right to re-marry
A customary-law husband is free during the lifetime of his 
wife to contract as many customary-law marriages as he wishes*
The death of his wife does not, therefore, affect his status-quo 
ante* The wife’s death is, however, relevant if the widower 
wishes to contract a marriage under the Christian or Civil Marri­
age Acts. As we have already mentioned in Chapter 6, under s.l 
of the Christian Marriage (Amendment)(No*2) Act, 1965, one spouse 
is incapable during the subsistence of a customary-law marriage 
with another spouse to enter into a statutory marriage under any 
of the two Acts with a third party* On the other hand, the death 
of a husband is an important factor in determining the capacity of 
his widow to marry another man under customary law or the general 
law* Under both systems of law a woman cannot contract a valid 
marriage with one man during the subsistence of a valid marriage 
with smother. For the sake of this rule, each system of law 
recognises a valid marriage contracted under the other* As death 
terminates a marriage, the death of the husband, therefore, leaves 
his widow free to re-marry.
B. TERMINATION BY DIVORCE
Persons who may institute proceedings for divorce and how
Under each tribal system in Sierra Leone, proceedings for
a customary-law divorce may be initiated extra-judicially or 
judicially through a Local Court by either spouse of a customary
i
marriage. Apart from the spouses themselves, no other person 
is entitled to institute such proceedings# Formerly, a father 
could take his daughter from her husband and refund the marriage
payments and the process amounted to divorce# ,Nowadays, however, 
divorce is not effected in this way. The proceedings can be ini­
tiated at any time during the marriage and before the death of one 
spouse, but where the wife is visibly pregnant arbitration tribu­
nals and Local Courts do not as a rule grant a decree until she 
has given birth to the child. Though a wife may in all the 
tribal systems divorce her husband, in some chiefdoms she is not, 
on grounds of public policy, as free to do so as is the husband
when he wants to divorce his wife. In these chiefdoms, the suc­
cess of marriage is believed largely to depend on the conduct of
the wife, who is expected to be more tolerant than her husband#
To ensure the stability of wives, therefore, some chiefdoms have 
rules governing divorce by wives# For instance, in the town of 
Koribondo in the Bo district there is a law that any woman who 
divorces her husband must pay Le3 to the town chief# No similar
1. Informants from some areas, for instance parts of the Kambia and 
Port Loko districts, say that divorce under the Temne customary 
law prevailing in their areas may be obtained only judicially# 
This view, however, does not seem to accord with the law and 
practice in these areas, since the chiefs and elders still grant 
ext±a-judicial divorces which are recognised by all parties con­
cerned. The Samu Chiefdom of the Kambia district, which was 
cited as one such place where only judicial divorce is legal, 
had no record of judicial divorces for 1971, while some inform­
ants allege that extra-judicial divorces were many. It must be 
borne in mind that no chiefdom operates a bye-law making divorce 
obtainable by judicial process only# The bye-laws on the regi­
stration of marriages and divorces are often erroneously thought 
to provide for judicial divorces as the only legal divorces. 
Extra-judicial divorce has been a feature of the customary laws 
since early times and tS still legal in modern times#
obligation rests on the husband. Another rule that operates in 
certain chiefdoms is that if a husband and wife separate as a re­
sult of a quarrel and a wife goes to her parents, a period vary­
ing from six months to two years should elapse before she can in­
stitute proceedings for divorce. Before the expiry of this 
period, however, the husband, on the other hand, may divorce her.
Extra-judicial divorce
There are two methods of extra-judicial divorce in the 
customary laws of Sierra Leone:- (a) divorce by a decree of an 
arbitration tribunal, and (b) divorce by unilateral repudiation.
(a) Arbitration Tribunal
This is the commonest method of divorce and the vast major­
ity of customary-law divorces are effected by it, even in chief­
doms where there are bye-laws for a decree of judicial divorce to 
be granted. The arbitration tribunal begins deliberation as a 
reconciliatory organ and dissolves the marriage only when the 
parties or one of them is adamant that he or she no longer wants 
to continue the marriage with the other spouse. The composition 
of the tribunal changes at different stages of the proceedings.
If the divorce is sought by the husband, he complains to the 
wife*s parents; if the wife seeks divorce, she retires to her 
parents. At first, the tribunal consists of representatives of 
the families of both spouses, usually the parents who, following 
the complaint of one spouse, summon the other to a meeting of both 
families with a view to settling the differences between the 
spouses, each being given the opportunity to air his or her views. 
If the complainant insists on divorce even after this intervention, 
then the matter is put before the town chief and/or the elders,
who themselves endeavour to salvage the marriage by hearing the 
parties and encouraging them to live together amicably. Upon
its failure to effect a reconciliation, the tribunal pronounces 
a decree in favour of the complainant.
(b) Unilateral repudiation
The husband may unilaterally repudiate the wife and thus 
divorce her, but the wife may not. Repudiation by the husband 
may take one of two forms. He may drive the wife away and inform 
her parents that he no longer intends to cohabit with her and that 
he has terminated the marriage, or he may formally present the 
wife to her parents and declare before them his intention to bring 
the marriage to an end. The former method is, however, very rare 
indeed and is prohibited in certain parts of the country. Where 
this method is adopted, the wifefs parents would require from the 
husband his reasons for sending their child away, and would try to 
persuade him to take her back where the repudiation results from 
the conduct of the wife. If the husband ignores theif effort, he
forfeits any claim for a refund of the marriage payments whether or 
not it is the wife*s conduct that induces him to repudiate her*
A husband who behaves in this manner is in tribal society regarded 
as disrespectful to his parents-in-law and unworthy of marrying any 
other woman from the ex-wife1s family circle or village. Divorce 
effected by repudiation of this kind is operative from the time of 
the final communication to the wife*s family of the husband*s in­
tention to end the marriage.
If the husband employs the second method of repudiation 
he, together with a representative of his family, takes the wife 
to her family and,tin the presence of an impartial witness, usually 
the town chief or an elder of the community, he formally hands the 
wife over to her family, often with a kola (about 20c or 30c), and 
declares that he no longer wants the woman as his wife. If no
excuse is profferlfed for the repudiation which is a recognised
reason for divorce, he should give "soap"  ^in order to "wash*1 
bad luck from the woman, so that she may be attracted to some 
other man. Divorce effected by this method does not prejudice 
the husband*s claim for a refund of the marriage payments, but 
where no good reason is advanced for the divorce, the husband sel­
dom succeeds in an action for the refund of the marriage payments 
since he will be met with the argument by the woman*s parents that 
they had given him a wife and had not taken her away from him, and 
that he is free to take his wife. There.is a proverb among the 
Loko that one cannot recover compensation from another for a thing 
which one dislikes and has deliberately thrown away and which has
been found by another. Divorce effected by this method is opera­
tive when the woman is formally handed over to her parents.
-clE
Divorce by unilater^repudiation by the wife was not a 
common feature in early traditional society and is not permitted 
even today. A wife may leave the matrimonial home and either 
go to her parents or set up a household independent of her husband 
with the intention never to return to her husband. But if she 
wants Co divorce her husband without her going to a local court 
and without publicity, she must at least communicate her intention 
to the chief of the village in which she seeks the divorce. The 
chief will then contact the husband, if possible, and inform him 
of his wife*s intention to divorce him and that he should sue in 
the local court for the refund of his marriage payments. If the 
husband fails to take this course of action within the prescribed 
period allowed him by the chief, the latter pronounces the woman 
divorced and the husband cannot succeed in an action for woman- 
damage brought against any man with whom she subsequently has
1. This is a sum of money demanded by the family of the wife from 
the husband.
sexual intercourse. The divorce is operative when the marriage 
payments have been refunded to the husband or their refund has 
been expressly waived by him.
Judicial divorce
Jurisdiction to terminate judicially a customary-law marri­
age by divorce is vested in the local courts. In the bye-laws of 
32 chiefdoms relating to the registration of marriage and divorce 
to which we referred in Chapter 16, there is express mention of 
the assumption by a local court of the chiefdom concerned of juris­
diction in divorce suits. For example, regulation 4 of the Tribal
Authorities (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom Native Marriage and Divorce)
1
Bye-Laws, 1961, provides that:
"Any person married according to native 
[customary] law and custom may apply to 
the Native [Local] Court for divorce.
The Court may allow such divorce on such 
condition as it may decide."
It is noticeable that the word may is used twice in the pre­
ceding regulation. Should this word be interpreted as being dis­
cretionary or imperative? Should it have the same meaning when 
used in connection with the application for divorce as it is used 
in regard to the court’s granting of divorce? The determination
of the issue whether or not only judicial divorce of a customary- 
law marriage is recognised in Sierra Leone law will depend on the 
answers to these questions. No Sierra Leone Court has as yet 
ruled on the effect of this regulation.
On the face of it, the regulation enables a person to apply 
for a judicial divorce and a local court to grant the divorce.
The expression "may" when used in enabling enactments such as this 
confers a discretionary power but when it creates a power
1. Public Notice No.211 of 1961.
exercisable by a court that power may be imperativeAfter re-
2
viewing the English authorities on the interpretation of the 
term, Odgers has succinctly summarised the basis of the distinction
between a discretionary and imperative effect of the term as 
follows:-
”If the donee [of the power] has nobody’s 
interest to consult but his own, the power 
is permissive merely, but if a duty to 
others is at the same time created, the 
exercise of power will be imperative.” 3
Clearly, a person applying for divorce has nobody’s interest 
to consult but his o*** whereas the court adjudicating the issue 
owes a duty to both the parties and to society. Using the posi­
tion in English law as a guide line, we submit that the first ’’may” 
in regulation 4 ought to be interpreted as being discretionary, 
but the second ’’may” imperative. If our submission is correct, 
then a person is not bound to apply for a judicial divorce in order 
to terminate his or her marriage; he may terminate it extra-judi­
cially in accordance with customary law, but if he applies for 
judicial divorce, then the court ought to grant it.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that regulation 4 in no way
suggests that only judicial divorce is recognised in the appropri­
ate chiefdoms where the bye-laws operate.
So far as the remaining 115 chiefdoms are concerned, the 
jurisdiction of their local courts in divorce is derived from the 
Local Courts Act, 1963, There is no express provision in this 
Act pertaining to jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, but accord­
ing to s,13(l) of the Act a local court has jurisdiction in ’’all
1. Odger’s Construction of Deeds and Statutes, 5th ed, by Dworkiri, 
London, 1967, p.370.
2. The present writer does not think it worth while to go through
these authorities here, as they are exhaustively dealt with by
Odger’s op.cit., at pp.371-376.
3. Op.cit., p.375.
civil cases governed by customary law”, except those excluded by
the section. The local courts have jurisdiction when (a) custom­
ary law recognises a cause and form of action, and (b) statute 
gives them jurisdiction. A customary-law divorce is a civil 
matter recognised by customary law and it is not excluded by s. 
13(1J[. It is submitted, therefore, that even without express 
mention of divorce as such, every local court in Sierra Leone has 
jurisdiction to pronounce a decree of divorce of a customary mar­
riage. The provision in the bye-laws for jurisdiction over di­
vorce proceedings is, therefore, superfluous and may lead one to 
the erroneous conclusion that local courts in chiefdoms which do 
not have bye-laws such as the ones in our instant discussion, have 
no jurisdiction to pronounce a decree of divorce of a customary 
marriage.
Judicial divorces in Sierra Leone customary laws are not as 
frequent as those obtained extra-judicially, probably because the 
latter are relatively cheaper.'*’ In a sample collected by the 
present writer from 60 local courts for the year 1971, there were 
on the average 5 judicial divorces per court. No statistics were 
available for extra-judicial divorces as no records of such di­
vorces were found but it is believed that in the area of each 
local court, there is,at least, one extra-judicial divorce per 
month. In the diamond mining areas the minimum is about two a 
week.
A judicial divorce may be preceded by reconciliatory moves 
by the families of the spouses in the same manner as with an extra­
judicial divorce. This, however, is not a legal condition, and
1. Local courts charge fees varying from Le4 to Le25. With 
extra-judicial divorce all that is needed to be paid to the 
tribunal is the customary kola, usually 50c.
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in practice a spouse who wants to avoid any move at reconciliation 
resorts straight to court. The procedure which, in our submission 
ought to be followed for obtaining a judicial divorce is that laid 
down by the Local Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1964,^ for the conduct
of civil actions. In brief, the complainant should take out a
2 3summons, effect service of it on the other party, and the case
should be heard in the presence of both parties. The complainant 
may, however, present his or her case in the absence of the defend­
ant provided there is proof of service of the summons on the defend
4
-ant and he or she has failed to attend. In practice, neverthe­
less, this procedure is seldom followed. The procedure that is
commonly adopted slightly varies depending on whether it is the 
husband or the wife who is seeking the divorce. If it is the hus- i
band, he goes to the local court together with a member of his 
family or someone who was present when the marriage took place.
The husband pays the prescribed fee for the divorce certificate 
to the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk issues the certificate to
i
him. On the other hand, a wife seeking a divorce attends at the i 
local court registry with a member of her family, usually the 
father, a brother or an uncle. If none of these persons is avail­
able, she would be asked to inform the town chief who then in­
structs the section chief to provide an elder to accompany her to 
the court. In some chiefdoms, if a relative is not present, the 
wife is not granted a judicial divorce unless her marriage was 
registered at the local court where she is seeking the divorce
and she deposits the marriage payments stated on the marriage
1. Public Notice No.8 of 1964.
2. Ibid., r.3(l).
3. Ibid., r.7.
4. Ibid., r.ll and 20* I
certificate. In other chiefdoms, if a lover of the wife is 
available and is ready and prepared to refund the marriage pay­
ments, he may present himself to the chief and offee to refund 
the amount. He is then asked to make a signed statement that he 
undertakes responsibility for the woman ard to compensate the hus­
band for any action the latter may bring for the refund of the 
marriage payments.*^ When the necessary persons mentioned above
are present or the attendance of any of them is dispensed with, 
without a hearing, the divorce certificate is issued upon the pay­
ment of the prescribed fee. Seldomly, when a spouse indicates 
that he or she wants a divorce, the other is sent for and a court 
official tries to salvage the marriage, and may even hear both 
sides with a view to effecting a reconciliation. Where reconci­
liation is impossible, the divorce certificate is issued. The
divorce becomes effective from the date of the issue of the certi-
o
ficate. A judicial divorce is registered.
It is quite clear from the above that in practice, the pro­
cedure laid down by law for obtaining a judicial divroce is fre­
quently ignored by the local courts. The party against whom the 
divorce is sought is often deprived of the opportunity to present 
his or her case by not being notified of the proceedings. Though 
proof of the allegation is not essential for determining whether 
or not divorce should be granted since under each customary law 
no court can insist on the continuance of a marriage where such a 
marriage has broken down irretrievably without proof of facts in
1. Among some Terane, such a lover is not permitted to marry the 
woman after she is divorced. The woman and the lover can 
enter into only a "friendship arrangements.
2. See for instance, regulations 2 and 5 of the Tribal Authorities 
(Nongoba Bullora Chiefdom Native Marriage and Divorce) Bye-Laws, 
1961.
support, if the parties are allowed the opportunity to be heard, 
it may assist the court in deciding whether or not all or part of 
the marriage payments should be refunded. While it is true that 
the husband can at any time after the divorce, institute proceed­
ings for the recovery of the marriage payments, the need to bring 
a separate action would be avoided and thus, time and expenses 
would be saved if both parties were given the opportunity to appear 
in court and the issue of marriage payments is raised as an ancil­
lary relief, as with divorce under the general law.
In conclusion, it is submitted that any practice whereby 
judicial divorce is obtained by one spouse without the other being 
afforded the opportunity of being heard, offends against statute 
law and the principles of natural justice and ought, therefore, to 
be deprecated.
Reasons for divorce
The expression "grounds for divorce" is, in our submission,
V
stricto sensu not an appropriate term to use when dealing with the 
dissolution of a customary marriage in Sierra Leone. Under the 
general law, the use of this term.would be quite justifiable, be­
cause under that law a clearly defined ground must be advanced 
which is acceptable to the court of enquiry and the proof of which 
enables the court with or without discretion to pronounce a decree 
of divorce. Not so in the customary laws of Sierra Leone, sis in 
the customary laws of many other African tribal societies. In 
Sierra Leone customary laws, a person seeking a divorce merely 
gives a reason why he or she should be released from the bonds of 
marriage. The adjudicating tribunal need not enquire into the 
genuineness or truth of his or her allegation, and the allegation 
is not one formally recognised b^ law or which must be proved be- ( 
fore the complainant is entitled to a decree, although a strict
proof of the allegation may be relevant for other purposes, for 
instance, when considering the question of the refund of the mar­
riage payments. When all else has failed, in order to effect a 
reconciliation after the complainant has put the question of di­
vorce before the adjudicating tribunal, the marriage must be dis­
solved. On this account, one could say with certainty that there 
are no recognised grounds but only reasons for divorce in Sierra 
Leone customary laws.
The reasons usually given by the spouses may be classified 
under three headings: (a) Those advanced by either husband or wife
(b) Those which only the husband gives; (c) Reasons which only 
the wife profers. Let us now look at them in detail.
(a) Reasons by husband or wife
(i) Persistent disrespect of the other's parents
The definition of the kind of conduct that will constitute 
disrespect towards one*s parents-in-law in customary laws is 
broadly drawn. While abusing them and not showing reverence for 
them are typical examples (amongst the more serious), any conduct 
which meets with social disapproval may be regarded as disrespect­
ful even though it is not aimed at the parents-in-law, so long as 
it occurs in their presence. Thus, according to some informants, 
the flippant use of obscene language or undue and amorous familiar­
ity with a member of the opposite sex in the presence of one1s
parents-in-law are each examples of disrespect for them. When 
the parents-in-law are displeased, they first comment on the con­
duct to the spouse who is their child. If the other persists in 
his or her conduct, the parents-in-law cannot themselves initiate 
proceedings for divorce, but they can influence their child into 
leaving the other with the sanction of their disowning their child 
if he or she fails to do so. Children, who in general are very
attached to their parents, would rather give up a disrespectful 
spouse than break off connections with their parents on account of 
the spouse1s behaviour. Divorce, therefore, often results.
(ii) Incurable insanity
The general consensus of opinion in each tribal system is 
that insanity per se is not a good reason for divorce, unless it
is incurable. Insanity ds regarded as a sickness which must meet 
with the compassion of society in general, and of the other spouse 
in particular. For this reason, each tribe allows a healing 
period during which the other spouse is expected to care for the 
insane spouse. Immediate separation is, however, permitted where 
the insane sppuse is the first to offer an act of violence.
Where the most reputed herbalist or "moriman" * has failed to 
effect a cure and the insane spouse is prone to violence, in 
order to secure the safety of the other spouse, a proceeding for 
divorce is regarded as a proper course of conduct upon which to 
embark. The insane spouse need not be medically certified as 
insane. Under the customary laws, it is his or her behaviour 
that is the deciding factor.
(iii) Barrenness or sterility
The barrenness of a wife or the sterility of a husband is 
a reason for divorce because of the emphasis in tribal societies 
on the procreation of children. Inability to procreate within a 
period, varying from two up to five years from the date of the 
marriage, a period during which sexual intercourse has taken 
place normally and regularly, is evidence of barrenness or
1. A "moriraan" is a professed Muslim who claims to have super­
natural powers to prepare charms to bring luck to people, cure 
them of illness or injure others.
sterility. Although these are recognised reasons for divorce, 
instances when a spouse divorces the other for any of these 
reasons are, however, raTe in Sierra Leone tribal society. In 
particular, a barren wife who is otherwise a good wife will con­
tinue to enjoy the consortium of her husband. To ensure that 
they are cared for in their old age, such wives usually train yourg 
girls and encourage their husbands to marry them. These young 
wives and their children look upon the barren wife as theirt,raotherTJ 
Although in each customary law it is agreed that a husband can be 
divorced if he is proved to be sterile, such proof is, however, 
very difficult to obtain in the absence of medical evidence, which 
is not commonly available in tribal society. The only manner in 
which a man may be proved to be sterile is where he is married to 
more than one wife who are faithful to him, and he cannot have 
children by them. If he is married to only one wife, she is al­
ways the culpable party.
(iv) Persistent and unreasonable refusal of sexual 
intercourse
If one spouse unjustifiably denies sexual intercourse to 
the other, the aggrieved spouse is entitled to a divorce. A 
spouse may, however, have a reasonable excuse or excuses for re­
fusing to have sexual intercourse. These include sickness, the 
demand for intercourse at a period, time and place which offends 
against the sexual taboos, and excessive demand. If one spouse 
refuses to have sexual intercourse with the other when both appear 
to be in good health and in circumstances when it is not inbontra- 
vention of the sexual taboos to do so, and the demand is not ex­
cessive, the spouse who is refused should find out from the other 
his or her reason, because the refusal may be a retaliation for 
the behaviour of the spouse. If this is the reason, the differ­
ence is resolved and the dexual rights are restored. One act of
refusal is not enough; the refusal must be over a period of time. 
The offended spouse is not expected to resort to divorce until 
after he or she has complained to the family of the offending 
spouse or to the elders and, after warning, the offender persists 
in his or her refusal.
(v) Sexual intercourse with a person within the prohibited 
degree of affinity
Even one act of sexual intercourse between a spouse and a 
prohibited member of the family of the other is a reason for di­
vorce. This rule applies equally to the husband and the wife. 
Sexual intercourse with one1s affine is regarded as an act calcu­
lated to break up the family of the innocent spouse and is, there­
fore, deemed serious. Instances of such intercourse occur be­
tween byothers-in-law and sisters-in-law but are very rare between 
parents-in-law and sons-in-law and daughters-in-law.
(vi) Persistent cruelty
Although cruelty is a reason for divorce for both husband 
and wife, it is usually the wife who seeks divorce on this "ground” 
"Cruelty" in this context should be distinguished from reasonable 
chastisement which a husband is entitled to administer to his wife 
at customary law. It should also be distinguished from cruelty 
as is known under the general law. In customary law, a husband
is deemed to be cruel if he repeatedly and frequently beats up 
his wife with or without just cause to the point of wounding her 
or causing her great pain and discomfort. An act which is short 
of physical and brutal force is not sufficient to establish cru­
elty at the customary laws. Nor is a single act adequate, how­
ever serious it may be. As with refusal of sexual intercourse, 
a wife who accuses her husband of cruelty should always complain 
to her parents, who will summon the husband and warn him to desist
from his conduct. Divorce usually follows if he persists in his 
conduct despite these warnings.
(vii) Desertion
Just as under the general law, desertion at customary law 
is the unjustifiable withdrawal by one spouse from cohabiting 
with the other with an intention to remain permanently separated. 
But unlike the general law, there is no desertion under the same 
roof in customary law; there must be actual physical separation 
and the setting up of different households. Moreover, under the 
customary laws there is no fixed period of sepration; the short­
ness of the period of separation is immaterial.'1' If there is no 
prospect of the parties coming together after efforts have been 
made to reconcile them, divorce may be obtained. If a wife is in 
desertion, the husband must always make an effort to get her back 
before he embarks on divorce.
(viii) Witchcraft 2
There are certain unfortunate incidents which occur during 
marriage that are attributed to witchcraft. They include the 
death of young children, impotence of the husband, his poverty 
and ill-health. In the case of the death of the children, if 
either spouse is proved to be practising the art of witchcraft 
resulting in the death of the children, the other can divorce
him or her. Similarly, a wife who is responsible for her hus­
band’s impotence, poverty or ill-health through witchcraft may be 
divorced. Witchcraft in this respect may be proved in dreams,,
1. Except in the case of some chiefdoms where a wife is not per­
mitted to divorce her husband unless a prescribed period has 
elapsed since separation. See ante, p.64-<2.
2. This is not a reason for divorce among the Kono.
by confession of guilt, or by detection through "medicine11 men 
commonly called ariogbo.
(ix) Chronic and infectious disease
Chronic and infectious disease such as leprosy, epilepsy
and venereal disease are in general not recognised reasons for
cl
divorce, but they are just causes for separation and withdrawal 
from sexual intercourse for as long a period as the disease re­
mains uncured. It is regarded in Sierra Leone tribal society as 
uncompassionate for one spouse to divorce the other merely because 
the latter is a victim of serious illnesses. The victim is ex­
pected to be nursed and tended by the other spouse until the sick 
spouse is cured <r dies• In the case of venereal disease con­
tracted by a wife, however, where it is clear that she must have 
contracted it from some other man, she receives very little or no 
sympathy at all from her husband and she may be divorced whether 
or not the disease is incurable.
(b) Reasons by husband only
(i) Persistent adultery
One act of adultery by a wife is regarded as serious, and 
for it she may be divorced. But in practice, she is not usually 
divorced on that "ground", particularly when the husband has other 
wives, unless she persists in her adultery either with the same 
man or with other men and her conduct borders on promiscuity.
The elements required to establish adultery as a reason for 
divorce are much more precise than those for adultery as a 
"ground" for founding an action for "woman damage". Adultery 
as a reason for divorce in the customary laws is the same act of 
sexual intercourse as is required under the general law.; whereas 
adultery as a ground for an action for woman damage may be an act
657.
short of sexual intercourse.’*' But unlike the general law,
adultery connived at or conduced to by the husband may be a 
reason for divorce at customary law.
(ii) Repeated disobedience and laziness
A customary-law wife may be divorced for repeated disobed­
ience to her husband or laziness in the performance of her domestic 
duties. In the customary laws, a wife is expected to obey and 
serve her husband and if she fails in any of these duties, she is 
not regarded as a good wife. But the husband is not expected to 
divorce her outright without first sending her to her parents. 
During the period she is with them, if the parehts are interested 
in salvaging the marriage, they will talk to her to mend her ways. 
If after two or three sojourns with them her behaviour still re­
mains unchanged, she can be divorced.
(iii) Slander of husband
If the wife spreads malicious gossip about her husband 
which exposes him to ridicule and contempt in the community in 
which he lives, whether or not the allegation is true, she can be 
divorced on that account. For instance, it is slanderous of a 
wife to tell other women in the neighbourhood that her husband is 
impotent or a thief.
(iv) Non-co-operation with co-wives
If a wife is unco-operative aith her mates and is always 
at loggerheads with them, she may be divorced. Thus, a wife who 
is always quarrelling with one or other of the co-wives and is 
proved to be the cause of the quarrel is regarded as unco-opera- 
t ive.
1. See p.4a/
(v) Refusal to allow husband to marry another wife
As we noted in Chapter 17, the consent of the head-wife is 
sought when a husband intends to take another wife, but the hus­
band seeks this consent only as a matter of courtesy and in order 
to preserve peace and order in the compound polygamous family.
A wife who refuses to allow her husband to marry another wife may 
be divorced on that "ground11.
(vi) Subjecting the husband to the payment of frequent 
fines for the wife*s conduct
Where the wife is always in trouble with the law, and the 
husband pays fines which are levied on her, he can divorce her. 
Sending her away to her parents is not sufficient, because among 
some tribes, the husband still remains responsible for her conduct 
even though she is living with her parents so long as she remains 
married to him.
(vii) Non-virgin
In traditional society, much emphasis is put on a wife*s 
virginity at marriage. Therefore, where a young girl has been 
held out to her fiance as a virgin, if on the night that the 
marriage is consummated she is found out otherwise, the husband 
has a right to divorce her immediately but not during cohabita­
tion following the first night of intercourse.
(viii) Refusal to convert to Islam
On marriage, most tribal Muslim husbands expect their
1*1wives to convert to Islam if the wives are not already uslims. 
Conversion to Islam in this respect is not a formal process but 
is exhibited by the practice of the religion. .Thus, if the wife 
attends the Friday prayer meeting which is held at th*e local 
mosque and fasts during the feast of Ramadan, she is deemed to 
have embraced Islam.
(c) Reasons by wife only
(i) Non-maintenance
As we mentioned in Chapter 17, most wives in tribal society 
are expected to assist their husbands with the general economic 
running of the home including the wives1 and childrens1 mainten­
ance. Nevertheless, where the wife is unable to make any contri­
bution it is the sole responsibility of the husband to maintain 
her and her children and^ in theory, it is a reason for divorce 
by the wife if he fails to fulfil this obligation. In practice, 
however, customary law wives seldom seek divorce on this "ground". 
Instead, they would use judicial and extra-judicial methods 
through the Magistrates1 Courts and the Social Welfare Department 
respectively in order to obtain maintenance from their husbands. 
Alternatively, they desert the husbands and usually enter into 
"friendship arrangements" with other men by whom they expect to 
be maintained. Invariably, it is the husband who, in the final 
analysis, seeks divorce.
(ii) Unhelpfulness to wife’s parents
We also noted in Chapter 17, that one of a husband*s main 
obligations is to be of economic assistance to the family of his 
wife. Here we need only emphasise that a husband who is unhelp­
ful to his wife’s parents is unlikely to continue his enjoyment of 
his wife’s consortium and may be divorced by the wife at the insti­
gation of her parents.
(iii) Impotence
A wife may divorce her husband because of his impotence.
The impotence may have occurred either before the marriage or 
during its subsistence. In dome chiefdoms, where the wife seeks 
an extra-judicial divorce before an arbitration tribunal on the 
"ground" of impotence, the impotence must be proved as a fact if
the husband denies it* To say that a man is impotent is the 
most serious allegation which, in customary law, a wife can make 
against her husband. Under most customary laws, if the allega­
tion is proved, the wife can obtain a divorce without the obliga­
tion of the refund of any part of the marriage payments. If, on 
the other hand, the allegation is not true, divorce may, neverthe­
less, be granted but the wife’s family may refund the whole of the 
marriage payments. Formerly, whenever a wife alleged that her 
husband was impotent and that she wanted 1d divorce him for that 
reason, the tribunal before which the allegation was made, would 
ask her to make a deposit of a sum of money in order to indemnify 
the town chief against the payment of compensation for "woman
damage". The chief then provided the wife’s husband with an un­
married girl and both the husband ahd the girl were asked to sleep 
together. On the following day, the tribunal would request the 
girl to declare on oath taken on a "medicine" whether or not she
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had had sexual intercourse with the man. If intercourse took
place between them, the allegation of the man’s impotence was re-)
garded as false and the town chief would then pay the "woman 
damage" for the girl to her parents with the money which was de­
posited by the wife. Nowadays, this test of virility still takes 
place in some chiefdoms but is dispensed with in others.
Effect of divorce on the custody and maintenance of the children
Whoever obtains a divorce and for whatever reason, 
under the customary laws of Sierra Leone, it is the husband who 
is entitled to the custody of the children and liable to maintain 
them. But this principle only applies to children who have actu­
al lyjbeen born by the time when the divorce becomes effective. If 
a child is merely conceived at that time, the husband is not
entitled to its custody nor responsible for its maintenance when 
it is born because the child does not belong to him under* the 
customary laws. A mother may, however, take away with her a 
suckling child and she is entitled to its care and control until 
it is old enough, usually about 5 to 6 years of age, when upon 
request by the child’s father, the child is handed over to him. 
During the period such a child lives with its mother, the father 
is responsible for its maintenance and to facilitate his claim 
over the child the father pays money and gives articles for the
maintenance of the child to the ex-wife’s father. If the ex-wife 
has since re-married, the ex-husband can demand his young child 
and give it to a female relative, usually his mother or an un­
married sister in order that she may nurse it. These rules of 
customary law are subject to statute law under the general law in 
regard to the custody of children.'*'
Effect of divorce on the marriage payments
The opinion of the strict tribal Muslims is that the 
marriage payments are not refundable on divorce. But each tribe 
recognises the refund of such payments. While the general con­
sensus of opinion is that if a husband divorces a wife without 
reason he forfeits his marriage payments and that if it is the 
wife who divorces the husband without reason, the payments are 
refundable, the circumstances under which and the extent to which 
the payments are refundable when there is reason for divorce by 
either spouse vary from tribe to tribe. We shall examine these 
variations presently.
1. See Chapter 12
Mende, Krim, Sherbro, Gallina: Among these tribes,
where a husband has a reason for divorce other than the barrenness 
of the wife, the marriage payments are refundable. Formerly, in 
all Mende, Krim, Sherbro and Gallina chiefdoms, and now in the 
majority but not all of them, every payment made for the wife to 
a relative from the first kola at betrothal to the last act of 
kindness before the divorce is operative, is recoverable. But in
some chiefdoms, the whole of the marriage payment is not refunded 
if there are children of the marriage. This is an innovation by 
the local courts in large provincial towns whenever such claims 
are made before these courts. The only recognised reasonSfor 
which a wife may divorce her husband without an obligation to re­
fund the marriage payments are:- intercourse with an affine, 
impotence, and, in some chiefdoms, persistent cruelty.
Kono, Koranko and Yalunka: Among these tribes the mar­
riage payments are refundable if it is the wife who divorces the 
husband. In the Kamara, Nimi Koro and Sao chiefdoms of the Kono 
district and in the Saradugu, VJuli and Yeraia chiefdoms of the 
Koinadugu district, a wife may divorce her husband for his impot­
ence and persistent cruelty without refund of the marriage pay­
ments. If a husband divorces his wife for a reason the marriage 
payments are always refundable.
Limba; There is no refund of the marriage payments if 
the husband divorces the wife for disobedience or non-co-operation 
with co-wives or if the wife divorces the husband on the "ground" 
of insanity, non-maintenance or abuse of wife’s parents. In all 
other cases, the payments are refundable. Among the Wara Wara 
Limba the marriage payments are refundable for whatever reason a 
wife divorces her husband.’*'
X9 Personal communication from Chief Kandeh Bombolai of Wara Wara 
chiefdom, Koinadugu District.
Susu: While among this tribe no husband is entitled to
the refund of the marriage payments if he divorces his wife, the 
payments are recoverable in the case of divorce by the wife un­
less the reason is impotence, sexual intercourse with an affine 
or persistent cruelty. If there are children of the marriage, 
the recoverable marriage payments are divided into three parts. 
One-third goes to the wife’s family because of the husband’s 
right to the children; one-third is allocated to the elders and 
the husband receives the remainder.
Kissi and Loko: Among these tribes if a wife divorces
her husband, the marriage payments are refundable. It is not re­
garded as etiquette for the wife to state any reason for requiring 
a divorce, as she may disclose bad qualities in her husband, a 
thing which a wife is not supposed to do. She can simply say 
that she does not want her husband any longer. If, on the other 
hand, it is the husband who wants a divorce, he must state his 
reason and if it is through the bad conduct of his wife, the pay­
ments axe refundable in full. If she is not blameworthy, only 
part is refundable.
Temne: If a wife divorces her husband on the "ground”
of insanity, impotence, intercourse with an affine, non-mainten­
ance, cruelty or witchcraft, the marriage payments are not re­
funded. Similarly, a husband who asks for divorce by reason of 
his wife’s disobedience, laziness, slander of husband, subjecting 
the husband to the payment of frequent fines on her behalf or 
witchcraft is not entitled to the refund of the marriage payments. 
In all other cases, the payments are refundable, but the quantum 
may be considerably reduced where there are children.
Modern development in respect of the quantum of refundable 
marriage payments on divorce
In some of the customary laws as they operated before 
1963, any amount expended on the wife’s behalf and given to her 
relative at and during the marriage was refundable on divorce 
where appropriate, except where there were extenuating circum­
stances like children, for whom the refundable dowry was reduced. 
The following illustration will give a very clear picture of the 
position at Mende customary law which is also typical of the other 
tribes:- Joe intends to marry Boe and he gives her a friendship 
kola of 5 cents. Later he gives Boe*s mother and father a head 
tie and 30 cents respectively as shake-hand. When Boe is to be 
initiated into the sande society, Joe makes a contribution of a 
bushel of rice and Le.5. On marriage, Joe pays Le.20 as marriage 
consideration to Boe1s family. While the parties are living to­
gether as husband and wife, Boe*s sister is initiated into the 
sande society and Joe makes his own contribution to the initiation 
expenses. Boe’s mother dies and Joe spends Le.30 on her funeral 
Joe continues to make presents to Boe1s relatives. Meanwhile,
Boe continues to play her full role as housewife both at home and 
on Joe’s farm. The proceeds of the farm go into Joe’s pocket 
for the.running of the home and for his own personal use. Later, 
there is a dispute between Joe and Boe and Boe now wants to 
divorce Joe.
In the above hypothetical case, when the issue of the re­
fund of the marriage payments is to be decided, "stones are laid 
on the table" (Mende: kolugbua), each stone representing each of 
the above items in money’s worth expended by the husband on the 
wife’s family. In each tribe no consideration is given even 
from a moral viewpoint to the many years of arduous and faithful
domestic services which the wife rendered to the husband during
cohabitation, and in some cases, she is deprived of property
which both may have acquired or worked for by their joint efforts. 
But gifts and presents from her family to her husband are deducted 
from the payments recoverable.
In order to remedy this situation, Government by its dir­
ective of 27 April, 1963, decided that:
(i) "The amount of ’dowry1 that may be refund­
able in case of divorce should be limited to 
the lump sum paid for the wife at the time of 
the marriage."
(ii) "All expenses incurred by or on behalf 
of the prospective husband on, or, in connect­
ion with, the bride from the date of initia­
tion into the society to the end of the society 
ceremony can be added to the lump sum paid,
for the woman at the time of marriage as
’dowry* recoverable on divorce. Provided 
that in the case of new marriages all such 
expenses are assessed and recorded at the 
time of the payment of the lump sum; but
vin the case of old marriages such society 
expenses will have to be assessed as before."
(iii) "All other amounts paid by the husband 
in the form of loans to the wife’s parents 
and relatives during the subsistence of the 
marriage could be claimed as civil debts from 
the recipients but are not, and cannot be 
assessed as part of the dowry."
(iv) "All articles or monies advanced to the 
wife by the husband for trade purposes can be 
sued for and recovered as civil debts but are 
also not and cannot be assessed as part of 
the dowry."
(v) "No other expense incurred on behalf of 
the wife and/or her relatives should be re­
garded as part of the ’dowry1."
We have already observed that this directive has no legal 
effect as it was neither enacted as a bye-law pursuant to s.4© of 
the District Council Act, nor did it become an Act of Parliament. 
Some chiefdoms have, however, been following it while others 
have rightly ignored it and have continued to adhere to their old 
laws. A very interesting case in which the directive was invoked
in vain is that concerning the refund of "dowry" on behalf of
Madam Hawa Margao, i.e. Gbondo Kpewo of Dambara v. Tommy Mar gap 
and Family.'*' In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendants 
before the Selenga Local Court, Bo District, for the refund of 
£82*0.5* being the total amount of ‘♦dowry11 assessed which the 
plaintiff had paid on behalf of Madam Hawa Margao, the child of 
the defendants* family and who had divorced him because of his 
persistent cruelty to her. The defendants contended, inter alia, 
that expenses incurred by the plaintiff on the wife as maintenance 
during the marriage ought not to be added as part of the "dowry11. 
Despite this plea, the court held that every single penny spent 
on or on behalf of the plaintiff1s wife during cohabitation was 
recoverable in addition to expenses incurred on her parents and 
relatives. It would have been interdsting to note what would 
have been the outcome of the case if the defendants had appealed 
to the Group Local Appeal Court or District Appeal Court. In­
stead, they purusued the matter administratively with the Senior 
District Officer, Bo, only to be told that by failing to appeal 
against the decision within the 15 day period allowed by s.29(7) 
of the Local Courts Act, they were presumed to have been satis­
fied with the decision of the Selenga Local Court. The matter 
ended there. This was, indeed, an unusual case since in the
customary laws generally the cost of maintenance of a wife during
2
cohabitation is as a rule not reclaimable.
In conclusion, one would submit that the refund of marri­
age payments is one aspect of customary law in which there should
1. Unreported, dated 16 October, 1963.
2. What makes the case even more unusual is that the plaintiff 
was Chiefdom Speaker of the Selenga chiefdom where the case 
was decided and,according to the defendantSjthe plaintiff had 
used undue influence on the court in arriving at the decision. 
See the correspondence from A.S. Margao and J.A. Margao to the 
Minister of Internal Affairs, dated 21 February, 1964.
be statutory modification in order to rectify the present state 
of injustice in which a wife of a customary marriage finds her­
self. Whilst it is not recommended that the institution of the 
refund of marriage payments should be dispensed with completely, 
in determining the quantum recoverable regard shouHbe had to the 
services rendered by a wife to her husband,and the refundable 
marriage payments ought to be limited to the marriage considera­
tion only. Presents voluntarily given and services voluntarily 
rendered by the husband to the wifefs parents or family ought not 
to be recovered even as a civil debt as was suggested by the 
Government directive. These presents are given in order to 
foster cordial relations between the man and the family of the 
wife and the presents have no legal import insofar as the marri­
age is concerned. One therefore hardly sees the legal justi­
fication for their recovery. Furthermore, at customary law a 
husband has a duty to maintain his wife. If Hawa Margao* s case 
was rightly decided should that duty become a right because the 
marriage has been dissolved?
Effect of divorce on the rights to re-marry
Just as in the case of death, divorce does not affect the 
husband’s ri^ht to re-marry under the customary laws since even 
during the marriage he is free to marry as many women as he 
pleases. It is only when he wants to contract a subsequent marri­
age under the Christian or Civil Marriage Acts with a woman other 
than his present wife with whom a customary marriage is in sub­
sistence that it is necessary for him to have the customary mar­
riage dissolved.
On the other hand, divorce renders a wife free to con­
tract another marriage, customary or non-customary. The ex- 
husband has no more right over her and is not responsible for her
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maintenance. In some Temne chiefdoms, however, the wife’s 
choice of a subsequent spouse is restricted; she cannot re-marry 
a man who was responsible for the breaking up of her previous 
marriage.
There is no time limit which must expire after divorce 
before a woman may re-marry under the customary laws* Aubert  ^
states that among the Susu a wife could not re-marry until after 
6 months have elapsed from the time that the divorce became 
effective* As with his statement on the time limit for the 
marriage of a Susu widow, this is probably a reference to the 
Islamic ’idda of divorce, a period which, in our submission, is 
hardly observed by the Sierra Leone Susu although this tribe is 
predominantly Muslim.
1. Op.cit* t p.7/.
CHAPTER 19 
THE PARENT AND CHILD RELATIONSHIP
A« INTRODUCTION
In this chapter it is proposed to deal with the more 
significant features of the parent-child relationship under 
customary law* They are: legitimacy and legitimation; adoption;
guardianship; maintenance; and offences against children and 
the vicarious liability of parents for the conduct of their 
children* The tribal differences, if any at all, in this aspect 
of customary family law are so few that the law can be stated 
with precision and certainty without having to engage in elabor­
ate discussions* The statutory law on the parent-child relation­
ship under the general law which we discussed in Chapter 12 is
also applicable to that relationship under customary law if there 
is a conflict between the two systems of law. It must be remem­
bered that customary law applies only when it is not repugnant to 
statute or natural justice, equity and good conscience*^ We 
shall see in'due course that there are a number of conflicts be­
tween the general law and customary law in this area of the law.
It is not, however, intended to deal specifically with any con­
flict between customary law^on the one hand, and the received
common law together with local case law^on the other^ in a matter
2
that is not criminal; from the wording of the repugnancy pro­
visions, in the presence of such conflict, customary law would 
seem to prevail, there being no mention of the common law and
1* S.2 of the Local Courts Act, 1963, and s*76 of the Courts Act, 
1965. For details, see Chapter 2, pp*40-47.
2. In criminal matters, where there is conflict between the gener­
al law and customary law, the general law prevails*
local case law under the general law in the repugnancy provisions•
B. LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION
(i) Legitimacy
In all the customary laws of Sierra Leone, a child born 
to a wife during the subsistence of a customary law marriage is 
the legitimate child of the wife and her husband* It is imma­
terial whether the husband is physically incapable of producing 
a child, for instance, if he is sterile or impotent* A child of 
an adulterous association by the wife is, nevertheless, presumed 
to be the legitimate child of the husband* The Mende have a pro­
verb that ua man must not plant in another man* s farm11. The 
Temne have a similar expression that "a man cannot build a house 
on top of the house of another man"* What these two expressions 
mean is that a lover has no right to the paternity of a child as 
against the legal husband of the child’s mother, even if it is 
proved that the lover is the child’s natural father* However, 
because customary law lays much emphasis on blood ties in succes­
sion to certain offices of title like chieftaincy and headship of 
certain tribal secret societies, a legal husband who is not the 
natural father of a child has the right to repudiate the paternity 
of that child, in which case the child may become the legitimate 
child of his natural father if the prerequisite procedure for 
legitimation is followed; otherwise, the child becomes illegiti­
mate from the date of repudiation by the legal father*
It is necessary to consider what act constitutes repudi­
ation of paternity* Each customary law maintains that the child 
must be sent away either to his natural father or to the family 
of his mother* Some tribes like the Mende, Temne and Susu 
insist that, in addition to sending the child away, his mother
should also be divorced. This act of repudation of paternity, 
it is submitted, must not be confused with an acknowledgement of 
paternity whereby, as we shall shortly see, a child who is born 
illegitimate is afterwards legitimated by his natural father.
It should be noted that the repudiation of paternity must be a 
positive act as prescribed by each customary law. If the legal 
father omits to take this positive step, the child continues to
be his legitimate child. The right of such a child to succeed 
to certain offices of the legal father is, however, inferior to 
that of a child of whom the legal father is also the natural 
father.
We. stated earlier that, in order to be legitimate, a 
child must be born during the marriage of his parents. If he 
is conceived during the marriage but born after the marriage has 
been dissolved, the decision whether or not he is legitimate de­
pends on a number of questions. Was the marriage dissolved 
through death or divorce? Has the child* s mother re-married 
since the dissolution of the marriage during which the child was 
conceived? If she has thus re-married, is the second husband a 
member of the family of the first husband?
It is settled under each customary law that if the marri­
age during which the child was conceived ends in divorce before 
he is born, he is not the legitimate child of the divorced husband 
but is regarded as born into his mother* s f a m i l y B u t  if his 
mother has since re-married and he is born during that marriage, 
he is the legitimate child of his mother's husband. However,
such a father, not being the child's natural father, also has the
. . . .  . . ;
1, Because of the stringency of this rule, divorce is not per­
mitted at customary law if a wife is proved to be in a state 
of pregnancy until after she has delivered.
right to repudiate the child's paternity in the same manner as 
that which we have already described. On the other hand, if the 
cause of the dissolution of the marriage is the death of the hus­
band, a child conceived during the marriage but born afterwards
is the legitimate child of the deceased provided his mother is 
single at the time of his birth, or the child is born within the 
period before his mother's purification. If the mother has 
since re-married after her purification, he is the legitimate 
child of his mother's husband at the time of his birth. The 
child's right to succeed to offices of title, however, depends on 
whether or not his legal father is a member of the family of his 
mother's deceased husband. if the woman re-marries into the 
family of her deceased's husband, the child is treated on the 
same basis as other children born to his legal father during the 
subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, he can succeed to title 
from his legal father. But if his legal father at the time 
that the child is born is not a member of the family of his 
mother's deceased husband, though the child is tegarded as legi­
timate, he may not succeed to title where there are other child­
ren conceived and born during the marriage to his legal father.
Subject to what we have already discussed, a child born 
or conceived out of wedlock is illegitimate. Writing on the
i
Susu, Aubert stated that a child born from an incestuous con­
nection is also illegitimate. This statement might have been 
true at the time that Aubert wrote, but the modern Susu as well 
as the other tribes maintain that however defective a marriage 
between spouses may be, it does not affect the legitimacy of the
child. It is true that in the olden days in some cases, such a
2child was abandoned and exposed to death, but such a practice is
1. S X.S. (O.S.) No.20, p.72.
2. Aubert, ibid., p.72.
not followed nowadays. There are many examples of children of 
incestuous connections who have grown into adulthood and are very 
much alive today. If at all a parent or any other person aban­
dons and exposes a child to death, he commits a criminal offence 
or offences imposed by statute under the general law.*’
Even though a child may be born illegitimate, customary 
law in Sierra Leone, unlike the general law, makes provision for 
its legitimation.
(ii) Legitimation
As has already been mentioned, the possible instances of 
illegitimacy under customary law are:<- (a) where a child is born 
as a result of an adulterous association by its mother, and the 
child is repudiated by its legal father; (b) where the child is
born to an unmarried mother.
Such an illegitimate child may, however, be legitimated,
either by the subsequent marriage of its mother and natural father
or by an acknowledgement of paternity by the natural father with-
2
out his marrying the child*s mother. Acknowledgement of patern­
ity is indicated by the payment of compensation by the natural 
father to the family of the child*s mother and the assumption by 
him of parental responsibility for the child. Among the Mende, 
the compensation takes the form of a fine which is levied on the 
natural father by the family of the mother. Where the man has 
been caring for the child since the date of the child*s birth 
such a fine is usually nominal; otherwise, he is expected to
1. A customary law that contravenes the general criminal law and 
the repugnancy provisions is inapplicable.
2. In the case of a child born of an adulterous association, its 
paternity must first be repudiated by the legal father before 
it can become the legitimated child of its natural father.
reimburse the child’s mother’s family for expenses incurred on 
the maintenance of both the child and its mother up to the time 
that he indicates his readiness to take over responsibility for 
the child. Some families may even be reluctant to give the child 
to him especially when the natural father has waited until the 
child has reached the age of adolescence. Among the Temne, Susu 
and Liraba the compensation is usually nominal and may be paid at 
any stage of the child’s development. The Kono, Kissi and Loko, 
on the other hand, do not press for any compensation whatever.
They only require that the natural father should notify the 
family of the child’s mother of his readiness to take his child 
by his presentation to them of the customary kola. These tribes, 
nevertheless, insist that before the father does so he must al­
ready have been showing acts of kindness to the family of the 
child’s mother, even though such, kindness was not specifically 
extended to the child himself.
It is, however, agreed by all the tribes that acknowledg­
ment of paternity is incomplete unless the natural father assumes 
some parental responsibility for the child. It is not necessary 
that the child should reside in his household nor with a guardian 
appointed by him. If the child is living with xfe mother but 
the natural father is responsible for its maintenance either 
voluntarily or as a result of a judicial decree, that is suffi­
cient acknowledgment of paternity. In this regard, mention must 
be made of the practice of many mothers whereby they take the
natural fathers of their children to the Social Welfare Department 
or to Magistrates’ Courts for maintenance. The general consen­
sus of opinion under the customary laws is that if the father is 
ordered to pay maintenance for the child and he complies with 
that order, the child automatically becomes his legitimated child.
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In each customary law, a legitimated child has almost the 
same rights as one born legitimate* Therefore, such a child can 
succeed to property and offices from his natural father in the 
same manner as a legitimate child. But for succession to chief­
taincy a legitimate child is preferred to one merely legitimated.
C. ADOPTION !
Adoption in the English law sense, whereby the rights of 
the natural parents over their child are extinguished for ever in 
favour of the adopted parents, does not exist in Sierra Leone, 
even under customary law. But there is a form of adoption where­
by the parental rights and duties over the child are transferred 
to an adopted parent subject to termination by the natural parentsj 
If the foster parenthood continues until either the adopted 
parent or the foster child dies, the survivor may succeed to the 
property of the deceased* This form of adoption should be dis­
tinguished from the guardian-ward relationship which has always 
persisted in Sierra Leone.
When an administrative link between the Colony and Pro­
tectorate of Sierra Leone was established at the beginning of 
this century, it was common practice for the people of the Pro- ' 
tectorate to send their children to some Creole family in the 
Colony in order to be brought up by that family. This was the 
method by which the tribal people gained their western education 
as the opportunity in Sierra Leone for this type of education was 
first established in the Colony long before it was extended to 
the Protectorate. The guardians often gave their family names 
to their wards and treated them as "children" of the family.
The relationship, however, cannot be described els adoption either 
in the English law or in the customary law sense, since the
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children remained in both systems of law the children of their 
natural parents, and there was no right of succession as between 
the guardian and the ward.
Among the tribal people themselves, the custom has always 
persisted for a relative or friend to give his child to another 
relative or friend in order that the latter may bring up the child*. 
One reason may be to foster a good relationship between the parent 
and the guardian, for it is believed in tribal society that to 
give one*s child to another for training is one of the most 
friendly gestures which one person can make to another. A second 
reason is that some tribes, particularly the Mende, Sherbro, ICrim 
and Gallina, believe that children brought up outside their 
immediate family circle are better trained than those nurtured ■ 
within. They, therefore, give their children to some important 
personalities of impeccable character in order that the children 
may acquire the habits of their guardians. Furthermore, guardian* 
-ship may occur for educational reasons even within the tribal 
society. In Muslim communities, a child may be given to an
Arabic teacher to be taught, and he will then live in his
teacher’s household as a ward. Another form of educational ■
guardianship is connected with tribal cults and secret societies.
r
Ajchild who is to become a leader of a cult or secret society is
almost invariably brought up in the household of a man or woman
who is already a leader of that cult or society. Succession to 
leadership in these societies often depends on training for that 
purpose. In all these instances of guardianship, the child is 
not in customary lav; regarded as adopted. The guardian is respon­
sible for the care, control and discipline of the child and is 
also socially answerable for the child*s conduct. But the child
1. On the vicarious liability of parents or guardians for the 
acts of children under customary law, see pp*69/-673.
continues to belong to his natural parents and the ward has no
right to succeed to the property of his or her guardian. The
difference, therefore, "between adoption and guardianship in
customary law is that the adopted parent and child can succeed
to each other’s property, but the guardian and ward cannot.
Adoption in customary law also differs from adoption in the
English law sense in that in customary law the child remains at
all times the child of his natural parents.
Having considered the difference between adoption and
guardianship in customary lav; and adoption in English law and
customary law, let us how ddal with the instances when adoption
can occur in Sierra Leone customary law.
Writing in 1936 on the Susu,^ Aubert said:
’’Every person who has reached 40 years of 
age without having a child and who has no 
legitimate descendants may adopt, but once 
only. The adopted person must be a nephew 
through either the male or female line of 
j the adopter: an only son cannot be adopted,
nor one aged more than 16. Girls may not 
be adopted,”
  '2............
The same author wrote on adoption among the Kissi as follows:-
’’Adoption is rarely practised, perhaps 
only in the case of abandoned children 
or otherwise when the person adopting 
the child has no children himself.”
-out1
Writing in 1973, one cannot with^justification attack
the accuracy of statements made about tribes in 1936, which
statements might have been true at the time that they were made,
3
but which might have undergone change since then. One may,
1. Op;cit., p.73.
2. S.L.S. (O.S.) No.22, p.91.
3. As the statement on the Susu was made at least 37 years ago, 
the present writer tried to get the views of Susu informants 
of at least 60 years of age. None of these could remember 
what the lav; was in 1936, but they maintain that so far as 
they are aware, the law today is what has always prevailed.
nevertheless, concede that the Susu in present-day Sierra Leone 
do not impose the age limit for adoption stated by Aubert, nor do 
they confine the privilege of adopting a child to childless per­
sons without legitimate descendants. The other conditions men­
tioned by Aubert are also not complied with nowadays. The state­
ment about adoption among the Kissi is too restrictive of the
modern law of that tribe.
There is a degree of uniformity in the modern law of
adoption in the customary laws of Sierra Leone. It is very rare
for children to be given to strangers for adoption. Adoption
occurs frequently within the same family circle of the foster 
parent and child.
There is no age limit for adoption. But the adopted 
parent must have reached marriageable age and must be suitable 
and capable of discharging parental or civic responsibilities. 
Except in the case of elderly people, an adopted parent must be 
married. Either a man or a woman may adopt. There is no sex 
link. The adopted child may also be male or female and must be 
under the age of puberty at the time of the adoption. Children 
are generally adopted when very young.
Adoption is recognised in only five situations. First, 
barrenness. Where a woman has been married for a number of years 
and has not produced any child and she is becoming senile, if 
she has a sister or brother who has children, one of the child fen, 
with the consent of its natural father, is usually given to the 
aunt as her adopted child. Secondly, economic reasons. As in 
practice there is no limitation to the number of children people 
can have in tribal society, parents may have so many children that 
they are unable to care for all of them properly. Some of these 
children may be adopted. This is one of the rare instances when
a stranger may adopt a child under customary law. Thirdly, 
where a man marries a woman who already has a child by another 
man, if the child is brought up in the household of the married 
couple sis part of the family, it is deemed as the adopted child 
of its mother’s husband. Fourthly, orphanage is another ground 
for adoption. An orphan child who loses his mother immediately 
sifter his birth is usually given to a foster-mother to be nursed 
and brought up by her. The foster-mother is regarded as the
child’s adopted parent. Fifthly, adoption may take place as a
result of purely natural inclination. A man or woman may see a 
child, have parental love and affection for it and request the 
child’s parents to give the child to him or her to be adopted* 
Occurrences of adoption of this kind are very rare and often 
take place only where the adopted parent is some influential 
member of the community, for instance, a chief or a "big man”.
The parents of the child usually give the child to be adopted, 
if there is the possibility that it may succeed to some important 
office held by the adopted parent.
There is no specific procedure laid down by the customary 
laws for adoption. But both the adopted parent and the child’s
i
natural or legal father must consent to the adoption before it 
can be legal. The Child’s mother alone cannot give the child in 
adoption. If the child’s father is dead, then lis mother’s 
guardian must consent. When the prerequisite consents have 
been obtained, the child is handed ewer to the adopted parent 
and he becomes part of the family of the foster parent. In 
some customary laws, an adopted child has the same rights as the 
natural children of Lis foster parents except that for succession
1. For a legitimate child, the consent of the legal father should 
be obtained. It is also necessary to obtain the consent of 
the natural father of an illegitimate child.
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to chieftaincy., an adopted child ranks equally with legitimated 
children.
D. GUARD IANSHIP
The term guardianship is used in this sub-heading to 
denote the right of a person or his family in customary law to 
the '•ownership11 of a child. Such "ownership" carries with it 
parental rights over the child. Guardianship in this context 
must not be confused with guardianship in the guardian-ward re­
lationship to which we have referred in the last sub-heading.
In the earlier instance, the guardian is merely one who is respon­
sible for the child's personal welfare. Such a guardian is not 
regarded as having the "ownership" of the child. Therefore, in 
customary law it is possible for a child to have two sets of 
guardians; the one responsible for the child's personal welfare 
and the other entitled to its "ownership". It is guardianship 
in the sense of "ownership" with which we are presently concerned. 
In customary law, a person is said to "own" s^ bhild as if the 
child is a piece of property which can be dealt with and disposed 
of at the whims and caprices of the owner. The concept of 
child ownership has a historical foundation. Formerly, a 
child's guardian had absolute rights over the child including 
the right to enslave the child but no reciprocal obligations were 
imposed upon the guardian which were enforceable in a court of 
law except perhaps the obligation to account for the child* s 
property if the guardian became as such through succession.^
Thus, a guardian could, with impunity, ill-treat or neglect a 
child and the child could not be taken away from him on the grounc
1. Guardianship in this respect may be likened to the potestas
of the pater familiv s in early Roman law.
that he was unfit to have its custody^  As slavery is now
abolished in Sierra Leone, a guardian can, of course, no longer
exercise the right to enslave a child, but in customary law he is
still answerable to no-one if he fails in his parental obliga-
2tions to the child. Thus, in customary law, a parent/guardian 
cannot be deprived of the custody of the child without his con- 
sent even if it is in the interest of the child to do so.
Who is entitled to guardianship of a child?
4If a child is legitimate and his parents are alive, 
whether they are married or divorced, the child*s father is his 
guardian. If the father pre-deceases the mother, guardianship
5
over the child passes on to the head of the father*s family, pro­
vided that during his life-time the father did not appoint a 
guardian to succeed him. If he did, the appointee becomes 
guardian on the death of the father. In the case of an illegi­
timate child, the head of the family of the child* s mother is the 
guardian. Where the child is adopted, its guardianship remains 
vested in its father or his appointee, the head of the father*s 
family or the head of the family of its mother, as the case may 
be, depending on whether the father is alive or dead or the child 
is legitimate or illegitimate. The adopted parents, nevertheless 
remain entitled to the child* s care and control.
1. The guardian could, however, be temporarily deprived of the 
care and control of the child if he was insane.
2. This rule is, of course, subject to statute law under the 
general law with regard to care and control of children. See 
Chapter 12, pp.428-445.
3. This rule also applies subject to statute law under the general 
law in regard to custody of children. See Chapter 12,pp.428-434
4. '’Legitimate** in this context includes ’’legitimated1*.
5. This is the next-of-kin of the deceased. The next-of-kin may 
be a father, brother or son. For details, see Chapter 20.
The rights and duties of a guardian
Except where the property rights of a child are concerned,
a guardian, if not a parent, stands in the same position as the
 ^ 1 
child’s father vis-a-vis the child* Moreover, if the guardian­
ship is one that arises from succession, some of the parental 
duties imposed upon the guardian may be enforced by the child 
and/or other members of >£* family. Thus, if the guardian by 
succession fails to maintain the child and the guardian had suc­
ceeded to property from the child’s father, the guardian can be 
compelled judicially or extra-j'udicially by the family to main­
tain the child, failing which the guardian may lose his position. 
In practice, such cases do not, however, go to court but are 
settled within the child’s family.
A guardian, other than a parent, who is in possession of 
a child* s property is expected to take proper care of it with a 
view to handing it over to the child when the latter is finally 
emancipated. The guardian may, however, use and enj'oy those 
items of property which are fixed assets and of relatively perma­
nent duration, for instance, a house or furhiture, but he cannot 
sell them unless it is absolutely necessary for the maintenance 
and education of the child. On the whole, the guardian may use 
any property belonging to the child but he cannot dissipate it.
Generally, a guardian who has taken proper care of a child is not 
expected to render full account of the child’s property; if the 
child insists on his doing so, he is regarded as ungrateful*
1. A parent is in customary law not answerable for the property 
of his child.
Termination of guardianship
Guardianship may be terminated in one of three ways: 
firstly, by the death of either the guardian or the child; 
secondly, by the guardian surrendering his rights and duties in 
favour of some other person; and thirdly, by the emancipation 
of the child. Of these, only the last needs further comment. 
Writing on the Susu, Aubert  ^mentioned that among this tribe
all persons less than 25 years of age were, unless married, under 
the guardianship of their father. In other words, both persons 
under 25 years of age who were married and those above that age 
but unmarried were not under tutelage. This viewpoint, it is 
conceded, does not represent modern practice among these tribes. 
Commenting on the age limit, one informant clearly questioned how 
it was arrived at when the vast majority of births were not re­
corded by tribal people in those days* Aubert might have 
assessed the age limit from the physical appearance or develop­
ment of the Susu people.
Even nowadays, it is difficult to pin-point any age at 
which guardianship terminates, because no tribe in Sierra Leone, 
including the Susu, takes age as the deciding factor in deter­
mining the issue. We may then ask the question, what constitutes
emancipation? The answer depends on the sex of the child, 
whether or not he or she is married and the child* s ability to 
manage his own affairs.
If the child is a male, marriage does not automatically 
emancipate him. If he continues to reside in his guardian’s 
household, he is still regarded as part of it and is regarded as 
a ’’child”. But whenever he chooses to leave and lead an
independent life, his tutelage ceases, as soon as he sets up his 
own household. On the other hand, if he is not married but has
reached puberty and is capable of managing his own affairs with­
out dependence on his guardian, he is regarded as emancipated as 
soon as he sets up an independent household. The setting up of 
an independent household and the cultivation of a separate farm 
are in village communities indications of independence. In 
urban society, the seeking of employment coupled with an inde­
pendent life is evidence of emancipation. In the case of a fe­
male,however , she is never free from tutelage. Thus, upon her 
marriage as we have seen in Chapter 17, the guardianship which is 
vested in her parents at her birth is temporarily transferred to 
her husband and lasts until the marriage is dissolved when it re­
verts to the original guardian or his successor.
E. MAINTENANCE
Under customary law it is the responsibility of a father 
to maintain his children whether or not they are legitimate.
The law does not impose any such obligation on the mother but in
i
practice, among the vast majority of the tribes, she is expected 
to contribute to the children* s maintenance where she can afford 
it. Though the lav/ behoves the father to maintain his child, 
there is no machinery for enforcement under customary law should 
he fail in that duty. There is no reported instance when a 
maintenance order has been made by a local court against a father, 
and the general consensus of opinion is that such actions are not 
maintainable. This attitude of the customary law is perhaps a 
reflection of the concept that the father "owns11 his child and
1. The Susu do not think that a wife should contribute to the
maintenance of her children when she is married and living 
with her husband.
is therefore answerable to no-one if he is in breach of any 
obligation he may owe to the child.
Wives of customary-law marriages as well as unmarried 
mothers have, nevertheless, sought means outside customary law by 
which they can obtain maintenance for their children. The popu­
lar and less expensive method is to make a report to the Welfare 
Department of the Ministry of Social Welfare. The father is 
summoned to the Department and examined as to his means. Eventu­
ally, he is asked to pay a monthly sum towards the maintenance of 
the child concerned. As we observed in Chapter 7, this method 
is not satisfactory, because the order is never made unless the 
father has attended in person the proceedings before the Welfare 
Officer and, when the order is made, there is no enforcement 
action for his non-compliance with it.
The other method is a judicial one. The mother of the 
child institutes affiliation proceedings in a Magistrates Court 
under the general law. This she does even if she is lawfully 
married under customary law to the child1 s father and the child 
is legitimate under that law. Under the Hyde v. Hyde  ^doctrine, 
Magistrates* Courts, being general-law courts, cannot grant main­
tenance under the Married Women*s Maintenance Act consequent upon 
a customary-law marriage.
We have already noted in Chapter 7 the inadequate nature 
of the maintenance provisions under the general law. In the 
event of law reform whereby it may become possible for a wife of 
a non-customary law marriage to obtain maintenance from the 
Magistrates* Courts or the High Court without her having first to 
prove desertion by the husband or seek some other matrimonial re­
lief as the present state of the law demands, it is submitted
1. (1886) L.R. 1 P & D. 130.
that such innovation should be applicable to wives of a customary 
law marriage as well* One hardly sees the justice in recognising 
three forms of marriage in the country and yet withholding a 
facility from the spouse of one type of marriage while allowing 
it to the spouses of the other* Furthermore, there should be 
provision empowering local courts to order maintenance in respect 
of children* The last-mentioned proposal would save women liv­
ing in remote villages in Sierra Leone where Magistrates* Courts 
are not easily accessible, the trouble of travelling, at great 
expense which they can hardly meet, to the provincial towns where 
Magistrates1 Courts sit.
F. OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN AND THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF 
PARENTS FOR 1HB CONDUCT OF THEIR CHILDREN
(i) Offences against children
As a general rule of customary law, a parent or guardian 
cannot commit an offence against his child* This is perhaps a 
manifestation of the idea that the child belongs to him* Public 
policy, however, demands that a parent or guardian should not 
practice witchcraft on the child or breach the incest prohibi­
tions.
Witchcraft by a parent is not punished by the elders or 
the local courts* but it meets with social disapproval and the 
offender is often ostracised* He is frequently probited from 
coming near other people*s children or sending them on errands.
If he is in breach of this prohibition, he can be sued by the 
parents of the child with whom he associates on the ground that 
he intends to practice witchcraft on that child also, as he had
1. Guardian in this context is one who "owns** the child.
done with his own child*
Incest between a parent and a child which occurs when 
they are not married to each other is regarded as more serious 
than one within marriage, but in the former case the offenders 
are seldom punished. It is generally believed that the viola­
tors will die. In some chiefdoms even the "washing" ceremony 
is not performed.
A person  ^who is not the parent of a child, on the other 
hand, may be found guilty of committing offences against the 
child. These offences are not as many as those laid down by 
the general lav;. Let us examine them.
The commonest is ill-treatment. This offence is com­
mitted when a third party does a deliberate act or omission 
calculated to endanger the mental or physical health of the child 
and the child suffers as a result. Examples from rural socie­
ties are (a) setting a trap in the bush to ensnare animals with­
out warning the children in the vicinity of its presence and a
2 ................................
child is injured by it; (b) administering poison toa child;
(c) leaving a dangerous weapon like an arrow or a knife in a
place where a child is likely to take it and the child takes it
3
and causes injury to himself with it; and (d) beating a child.
So far as the administering of corporal punishment to a
1. Such person must be an adult. If any of the offences is com­
mitted by a young child against another child,it is socially 
reprehensible but no cause of action lies.
2. The position in the customary laws in regard to the duty of 
occupiers of land and premises to child-trespassers compares 
favourably with modern English law on the liability of such 
occupiers to children. For recent English case-law, see 
British Rwlways Board v. Herrington Cl972] 1 All E.R. 749.H.L.; 
Pannett v. P. McGuxness & Co. Ltd. [1972] 3 All E.R. 137, C.A.
3. Ibid.
child is concerned, however, it must be observed that, unlike in 
the general law, in traditional customary law, a stranger had the 
right to chastise another person1 s child reasonably if it took 
place by way of correction. It was considered as the responsi­
bility of every member of tribal society to ensure that a child 
was respectful to his elders and that he did not inculcate bad 
habits. For instance, if a child abused someone senior to him 
in age, the complainant could discipline the child. Similarly,
if a child was caught jSaying truant,'*' he could be reasonably 
chastised by his captor. In either case, the parent or guardian 
of the child had no cause of action before a native court if the 
corporal punishment was reasonably administered. In modern i
customary law, however, the tendency is for the child to be re­
ported to his parents who, themselves, would correct the child. 
Sometimes, the complainant, if an elderly person, is invited by 
the child* s parents to administer the punishment himself.
Another common offence against children is witchcraft. 
Whenever a child falls ill, someone in the household or in the 
neighbourhood is suspected of practising witchcraft on him. 
Witchcraft is often revealed in dreams. The dreamer may be any­
one even if unconnected, or the child himself if he is old enough 
to make a rational judgment. There are many ways of detecting 
.witchcraft from a dream but for our present purpose we shall 
mention only twoi First, a dream that involves a fight with 
or for the child. Secondly, a dream in which the child is given 
raw meat (Temne: shem i tank) to eat. In both cases, the
1. "Truancy" under customary law means wandering from an appointed 
place or neglect of duty or business. Thus, a child plays 
truant if being given "market" to sell, he abandons the "mar­
ket" and plays either alone or with other children.
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person who fights with the child or against his interest and 
the donor of the raw meat are adjudged witches or wizards. In 
Mende customary law the failure by a third party even to reveal
a dream, the disclosure of which might have saved the life of a 
child is actionable by the child*s parents if the child dies. 
Thus, in Kallon v. Sesa^,'L the defendant dreamt that he witnessed 
a struggle for the life of a child between a mand and a woman who 
was then pregnant at the time of the dream. Subsequently, the 
woman concerned gave birth but the defendent did not reveal the 
dream until 18 days afterwards when the child died. The Kori- 
bondo Local Court, Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District, fined him 
for failing to disclose the dream to the child* s father in time 
to save the child* s life.
Witchcraft in general is in customary law punishable 
with a fine and/or banishment from the chiefdom in which the per­
son is suspected. To what extent a local court has jurisdiction 
to try and punish persons for such an offence is at present un­
certain. Before 1963, however, it was quite clear that a native
court could not try the offence because in Ordinances dating as
2far back as 1896, witchcraft was excluded from the jurisdiction
3
of native courts. But the Local Courts Act, 1963, which re­
pealed the Native Courts Ordinance - the latter being the last 
legislation that mentioned witchcraft in connection with the
1. Unreported; Case No. 910/L6/70 decided on 19 January, 1971.
2. The first Ordinance was the Protectorate Ordinance 1896, Act 
No.20 of 1896, and the relevant provision was s.l0(2)(b). Sub­
sequent repeals and amendments retained the provision with re­
spect to witchcraft. See s.10(2)(b) of Act No.ll of 1897;
s.11(2)(a) of Act No.33 of 1901; s.22(2)(a) of Act No.6 of
1903; and s.7(2)(b)(i) of the Native Courts Ordinance, Cap.8 
of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960.
3. Act No.20 of 1963.
jurisdiction of Native Courts - is not clear on the issue whether 
the present local courts which replaced the native courts would 
also have no jurisdiction on the matter. On criminal jurisdic­
tion, s .13(1 )(c ) of the Local Courts Act provides that a local 
court shall have jurisdiction to "hear and determine all criminal 
cases where the maximum punishment which may be imposed does not 
exceed fifty pounds or imprisonment for a period of six months". 
On the face of this section, there is clearly no exclusion of 
the jurisdiction of local courts in cases concerned with witch­
craft; it is also evident that if they can try cases for witch­
craft, they cannot banish a person from one part of the country 
to another.*’ Though the present Local Courts Act does not 
save the provisions relating to witchcraft which were in earlier
Ordinances, it is our contention that local courts cannot try 
witchcraft cases because the offence of witchcraft itself is one 
which ought to be regarded as repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience. If a person is to be punished for 
revelations in a dream it is tantamount to the imposition not 
only of guilt without fault but also of liability for something 
over which no human being in iCe^ l life has any control, i.e. the 
subconscious mind.
Another offence against children in customary law is 
sexual intercourse by an adult with am unmarried girl. It is 
immaterial whether the girl is or is not a virgin or that the 
seducer is the prospective husband. If the girl is a virgin, 
the amount of compensation to her parents includes "virgin-moneyj*
1.. Note that in Sierra Leone, customary criminal offences have 
not been abolished by the Constitution or any other enactment. 
Specifically s .13(1)(c ) of the Local Courts Act, 1963,confers 
jurisdiction on local courts in criminal cases where the maxi­
mum punishment does not exceed £50 or 6 months imprisonment or 
both .
which is now estimated at Le.2.10.
It is also an offence actionable by a girl*s parents if, 
being married, she is seduced by another man while she is tempor­
arily resident in her parents1 household. This action is main­
tainable probably because the parents are in the ordinary course 
of events responsible for the refund of the marriage payments 
should the girl*s husband seek to divorce her on the ground of 
her infidelity.
We should repeat here what we have already mentioned in 
Chapter 17 that under s«13(l) of the Local Courts Act, 1963, se­
duction actions are outside the jurisdiction of Local Courts,*" 
and that any purported jurisdiction by these courts over such 
actions is contrary to the general law and therefore, unlawful. 
These actions may, however, be brought before the High Court and 
in accordance with s.76 of the Courts Act, 1965, that court may 
take cognisance of the customary law offence.
2
(ii) Vicarious liability of parents for the conduct of their 
children
Under customary law, a young child can neither sue nor be
3
sued. In this respect, a child is deemed to be young if, being 
a female, she is unmarried and is under the control of her parents 
or, being a male, he is either married or has reached the age at
1. On the jurisdiction of the Local Courts generally, see pp. 
118-120.
2. The position of parents is the same as that of guardians in 
respect to their responsibility for the acts or omissions of 
children under their care.
3. A court of law is in customary law not regarded as a proper 
J>lace for a young child. For the misdeeds of a child for 
which the parent or guardian is not responsible, the matter is 
settled outside the courts and the child is disciplined.
1
which he is liable to pay head-tax. For an offence committed 
by an adult against a young child which is actionable at custom­
ary law, a cause of action lies at the instance of the child’s 
parent or guardian* Conversely, however, for breaches committed 
by a young child, a parent or guardian does not incur absolute 
legal liability at customary law* Under that law, the liability
of the parent or guardian depends on whether or not he expressly
authorised the child’s act. If the parent has authorised the
act, the child is deemed to have acted as an innocent agent;
but if the parent has not authorised the child’s act,he, the
2parent, incurs no legal liability. Where the parent or guard­
ian is not legally responsible for a child’s conduct, an extra­
judicial remedy is often sought by the complainant. Thus if a 
young child, while at play, breaks a bottle of palm oil from 
somebody’s "market”, it is usual for the aggrieved party to com­
plain to the parent or guardian of the child and to seek compen­
sation from him. If the complainant is not satisfied with the
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result, the only redress open to him is to "swear"the child, but
an action to recover compensation against either the child or a
person standing in loco parentis to him is not maintainable under
customary law.
It is, therefore, noticeable that in customary law, while 
a parent or guardian can maintain actions for breaches against a 
child perpetrated by an adult, such parent or guardian is not
1. This is an annual tax levied by the District Council of every - 
chiefdom on adults as contribution to the revenue of the chief- 
dom. A male becomes eligible for payment when he has reached 
puberty, usually after emerging from initiation.
2. There is, however, a social liability on the parent or guardiar 
to assume responsibility for the child’s acts.
3. For fear of the consequences of the "swear", as it is believed 
that the child will die, parents usually meet the demands of 
the complainant.
legally but only socially liable for the acts of the child unless 
he has expressly authorised them. As a young child himself is
not a legal person at customary law for the purpose of defending 
actions, breaches by him which are unauthorised by his parent or 
guardian therefore go without a legal remedy.
There are two marked differences between customary law 
and the general law in regard to liability for the conduct of 
children, and we should now draw attention to them. Firstly, 
under the general law a child who is a minor can sue or be sued 
for his torts and contracts for necessaries except that he must 
sue through a "next friend" and defend through a guardian ad litem 
who, in each case, is the person in loco parentis to him. This, 
as we have seen, is not possible under customary law. Secondly,
i
under the general law a parent or guardian is vc-criously liable 
for certain acts of a child under his care even though the parent 
or guardian does not expressly authorise the acts. At customary 
law, there is liability on the parent or guardian only for autho­
rised acts.
In some of these areas of conflict between the general lav; 
and customary law in respect of liability for the conduct of 
children it is the general law that prevails. Customary law 
applies in Sierra Leone when, inter alia, it is "not incompatible 
either directly or indirectly with any enactment applying to the 
Provinces".^ The statutory provisions under the general law 
which impose liability on a child or on a parent or guardian in 
respect of the conduct of a child under his care apply to children- 
throughout Sierra Leone. These provisions, therefore, take pre­
cedence over the rules laid down by the tribes. It must, however
1. S.2 of the Local Courts Act, 1963, Act. No.20 of 1963.
be emphasised that not every aspect of liability on or for a 
child is governed by statute law. For example, the rules of 
the general law that a child is liable for his torts and con­
tracts are not imposed by statutes but by the received common 
law. It was observed in the introduction to this chapter that 
the repugnancy provisions for the non-application of customary 
law do not include the common law. In the absence of incompati­
bility with statute law, customary law applies unless it does not 
conform with natural justice, equity and good conscience. The 
customary law rule in regard to the inability of a young child to 
sue or be sued cannot by any stretch of the imagination be con­
trary to natural justice, equity and good conscience. It must 
therefore stand.
CHAPTER 20 
SUCCESSION UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW 1
In its broadest sense, the law of succession covers a 
vast area if one were to consider inheritance to the property of 
a deceased person with respect to all the kinds of families that 
exist under customary laws in general, namely the elementary 
family, the compound family and the corporate kinship grouping - 
the lineage. In this chapter, however, we shall discuss suc­
cession to the estates of members of the elementary and compound 
families, i.e. husband, wife or wives and children, as these are
the families which form the basis of Sierra Leone family law
o
with which we are mainly concerned in this thesis* Neverthe­
less, it is impossible to deal with succession within these two 
classes of families in isolation, since persons outside these 
families may in customary law benefit from the estate of the de­
ceased person. For the sake of completeness and clarity, 
therefore, we shall make mention of these other persons whenever 
it is appropriate. Within the scope of our analysis, the mode 
of devoluCtion and distribution will be examined, but the minutiae 
of distribution are not fully examined, because, although the 
principles of distribution are clearly laid down, the detailed 
distribution is determined by social expediency rather than by 
law.
1. This chapter is substantially a revised version of part of an 
article already published by the present writer and captioned 
"Inheritance to Property in Sierra Leone:* An Analysis of the 
Law and Problems Involved", S;L.S. (N;S*), No.24, 1969, pp.2- 
25.
2. See Chapter 4, pjty.
A. TESTATE SUCCESSION
Wills are recognised under the customary laws of Sierra 
Leone, but they axe usually oral and not written* The reason 
is that the majority of the tribal people whose personal law is 
customary law are illiterate and most of their transactions are 
conducted orally* Before the introduction of writing, written 
instruments were of course unknown; even today, if a document 
is produced which purports to be a will made by a deceased person, 
it is viewed with suspicion by his family, who are reluctant to 
accept it as a document genuinely made by the deceased* In 
traditional society such a document would not have been accept­
able at all by the family of the deceased* In the modern custom­
ary laws, however, the document may now be accepted provided 
that certain conditions are fulfilled: (i) It must have been
made in the presence of at least two of the members of the family 
of the deceased, or before some important member of the community, 
in which the deceased was resident, immediately before his death, 
for instance, the Paramount Chief or the District Officer. (ii). 
Injsome chiefdoms, it must have been registered prior to the death
i
of the testator* (iii) The immediate relatives, namely, the 
children and parents of the deceased, must, not object to the 
alleged will*
The third condition appears to be the most important re­
quirement for the validity of a written will under the customaay 
laws* Since the condition depends on the favourable disposition 
of the members of the deceased*s family, it is as good as saying
1. Harris, "Mende marriage and the le.w of inheritance1* II,
Sierra Leone Bulletin of Religion9 Vol.l, No.2, p*33*
that no written will is valid under the customary laws, even
though such a will may be valid under the general law, unless
the members of the family of the testator are willing to give
effect to it* This willingness is not readily forthcoming
under some of the customary-law systems if the testator makes
bequests to persons outside his family, while leaving very little
or nothing at all to members of his family. At present, there
are some educated natives who make written wills disposing of
property which is within the jurisdiction of the local courts.
\ '
It is submitted that so long as the testator, by his will, dis­
poses of his self-acquired property and not property regarded 
under customary law as "family property11 ^  and if has will formally
complies with th^ijeneral law, effect should be given to it under 
2
customary law* In the case of conflict between customary law
and the go£eral law in this regard, the latter ought to prevail*
Customary law applies in Sierra Leone when it is not repugnant to,
irter alia, statute law on the same matter. The Wills Act, 1837,
is a statute of general application in force in Sierra Leone.
A will that complies with the provisions of this Act should
therefore take precedence to any customary law.provision to 
3
the contrary*
Although, as we have already stated, it is unusual for a 
written will to be made at customary law, nuncupative (oral) 
wills are frequent, but they too are valid under that law only
1. For the sake of inheritance to property, one may define
"family property" as property, personal or real, which the ' 
deceased himself inherited* Typical examples are heirlooms,
. houses and land. .. _
2* See Chapter 13, pp*446-450*
3. See the Nigerian case of Adesubokan v* Yunus a [1972] J.A.L.
82, S.C.
if certain conditions are complied with. The traditional custom­
ary laws took a stricter attitude towards such wills than do the 
modern customary laws*
Under the traditional tribal systems, the first condition 
was that the oral will should be made when the testator was at 
the point of death, if there was a gift to a stranger, or at any 
time during the testator*s lifetime, if the sole beneficiaries 
were members of the family. Secondly, the property disposed of 
should be the testator* s self-acquired movable property and the 
lion*s share of the property should be bequeathed to a person or 
persons within the testator* s family.1 Thirdly, the will should 
be made in the presence of witnesses who should be members of the
2testator*s family. Among the Koranko and the Limba a gift 
made to a person who was not a member of the testator* s family 
was never recognised as valid. According to these tribes, all 
property of a deceased person must descend to his family in con­
formity with the rules laid down for devolution on intestacy.
This was also the view (as stated to the present writer) of the 
other tribes if an oral will was made.,which did not comply with 
the prescribed conditions. In this respect, the position under 
the customary lav/s compares favourably with that under Maliki 
Islamic law according to which a testator is not permitted to
dispose by will of more than one-third of his property to the
4
disappointment of his heirs at law.
Although, in general, the customary laws inclined towards
1. i.e.-lineage.
2. Ibid.
3. i.e. compound family and lineage.
4. See Chapter 13, pp.471-472.
keeping the estate of a deceased within his family^ in traditional 
society effect was given to a gift made to an "outsider" because 
if the testator's wish was not carried out, it was believed that 
the particular gift would be haunted by the spirit of the de­
ceased.
Nowadays, among some ethnic groups there is a slight 
modification of the old rules in regard to oral wills. While 
it is still the current customary law that an oral will by which 
a testator makes a gift to a person who is not a member of his 
lineage may be accepted if it is made by him in articulo mortis 
and in the presence of the prerequisite witnesses, some tribes, 
like the Mende, Sherbro and Krim, are now prepared to give effect 
to an oral will by which the testator disposes of all of his 
self-acquired movable property to a person outside the testator* s 
lineage. The Mende, Sherbro and Krim believe that the testator 
might have taken this line of action because during his lifetime 
his relatives neglected him and he was taken care of by the 
stranger concerned. The Temne and the Susu take the same atti­
tude towards the disposition of self-acquired property, but only 
if the testator acquired it outside his home, town or village^ 
and upon strict proof that he was in fact neglected by his family 
during his lifetime.
Any person whether male or female, an adult or a child,
i
who is sane can noq make a will under customary law.
A ELord or two on a possible conflict between an oral will 
and a written will under the customary laws. We may pose the 
following question: If a man makes a written will giving a
1. Compare Capacity under the general law. See Chapter 13, pp. 
458-465.
piece of property to one person and later makes an oral will dis­
posing of the same property to another, which of the gifts will 
be recognised as valid under the customary laws? Under the 
general law, if there are two wills made by the same testator, 
both of which are formally valid under that law, the presumption 
is that the second will revokes the first in the event of a con­
flict of dispositions in both wills.1 In the customary laws, 
the same principles applies.
B. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
(a) Succession rights on the death of a husband/father
Two questions are pertinent in a discussion of inheri­
tance to the estate of a deceased person in modern Sierra Leone 
customary laws* First, who is the administrator of the estate? 
Secondly, who are the heirs or the beneficiaries? There is a 
degree of unanimity in the customary laws as to the answer to the 
first question. In the traditional customary laws, the duty fell 
on the eldest surviving brother of the deceased. Nowadays, in
most tribal systems, preference is given to the eldest male child
2
if he is of mature age on the death of his father. Where the 
deceased has no brother or a mature male child, the eldest male 
member of his (the deceased's) family is the administrator. A 
woman becomes an administratrix only in the absence of any suit­
able adult male member of the deceased's family. In theory, it
1. The revocation may be either express, implied or dependent' 
relative. See Parry, The Law of Succession. 6th ed., 1972, 
pp.26-30.
2* The Temne and Loko prefer the eldest member of the deceased's 
family as the administrator. The Koranko do not consider a 
brother suitable for, they say, he may squander the estate.
The family appoints the administrator and usually the eldest 
son, if of full age, is appointed*
is. the duty of the administrator to pay the debts and bear the 
funeral expenses of the deceased. In practice, however, non- 
refundable contributions are made towards the funeral expenses 
by the deceased's relatives who consider it a moral obligation on 
them to do so.
The second question is rather complex and it requires 
especial treatment. In this aspect of the law there are a num­
ber of differences in the traditional customary laws - the differ­
ences being brought about not so much by the rules of the ethnic 
groups themselves as by the opinions of previous writers represent 
ing what these rules were. For a better understanding of the 
complex situation it is necessary to examine the rules in both 
traditional and modern customary laws, drawing attention to the 
ethnic differences as we go along.
(£) Traditional customary law
Mende: There is no absolute unanimity among previous
writers as to the priority in regard to the heirs of the estate
of a deceased man. Bockari 1 says that on a man's death, his
estate vested in the head of his family until his children were
of full age. Bockari continues "that the brothers or sisters of
the deceased took first, then the eldest son or daughter, and
then the other relatives • The writer adds that in the event of
a son who was the issue of a marriage between a man and his
mother's brother's daughter that son acquired precedence over
2 3other sons. McCulloch and Li"ttle, on the other hand, put
1. "Notes on the Mende People", S^L;S; 5 No.l, 1918, pp.31- 
- 33.
2. Peoples of Sierra Leone Protectorate, p.26.
3. The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.85.
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the deceased1 s brothers first but remain silent on the position 
of the sisters. Both writers place the children of the dead 
man next, with the sons before the daughters. In the absence 
of a brother or children of full age, Little further maintains, 
the maternal nephew (i.e. the sister's son) could inherit the 
property. Holding yet another view, Fenton 1 makes the child­
ren bf the deceased the sole heirs with the eldest son or occa­
sionally daughter, if of age, becoming trustee of the property. 
Fenton adds that if the children were under age, the senior mem­
ber of the deceased's family acted as administrator. If there
were no children, then the brothers and sisters (germane), fail­
ing them, the brothers and sisters (consanguine), and then to j
2  ^other members of the deceased's family. All these wrxters, ;
except Little, deal with the whole estate as one. Little, on 
the other hand, addresses himself to land alone but he would pro­
bably have included other property left by a man on the man's
death if such property were the subject-matter of his discussion.
According to informants iderviewed by the present writer, 
in traditional Mende customary law the whole estate of the de­
ceased descended to his heir, who was his eldest brother, or j
failing him, the eldest son if an adult, failing him, the eldest j 
surviving male member of the family. The heir stood in loco !
i
parentis or in loco viri to the children and wives of the de- i
-------   i
ceased respectively and was permitted to deal with the estate in j 
the same manner as the deceased would have done during his life­
time. The only condition was that he should take proper care of j 
the deceased's children; if he did so, he would not be accountably
1. Outline of Sierra Leone Native Lawt pp.37, 39.
2. Ibid., p.38.
to anyone for his use of the estate. In the case of land, how­
ever, portions of it was, in practice, allocated to the: members 
of the deceased's family for building and farming.
No writer has included the widow among the heirs. This 
is so because the widow was herself regarded as part of the 
estate and she descended accordingly. If, however, she married 
a member of the family of her late husband, whatever benefit the 
new husband derived from the estate could be enjoyed by her.
Thus she could be allowed to stay in the matrimonial home.
Temne: As in the case of the Mende, there are differences
of opinion among previous writers on traditional Temne customary 
law on the right of heirship. According to Thomas, the estate 
was divided into personal property and inherited or family pro­
perty. He maintains that the son, failing whom the adopted 
son, was entitled to the former and that thebrother, failing him, 
the elder brother's children, failing whom, the father's^brother*s 
children, in that order, inherited family property. Although 
Thomas holds that the son was heir to personal property, he con­
cedes that all the sons received a share with the eldest talcing 
the largest share. If the eldest son was also head of the 
family, Thomas continues, he was both trustee and beneficiary,
and after helping himself to the property, should reserve the 
balance for his younger brothers, which should be given as 
advancements on their respective marriage. Langley divides
1. Anthropological Report on Sierra Leone - ‘Part I, Law and 
. Custom of the Temne and Other Tribes, pp*162 et seq.
2. "The Temne, Their Life, Land and Ways" , S;L;S; ’ (Q;S;), No.22, 
1939, pp.64 and 68. ------ 1 ^
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the estate into personal or movable property and real property* 
Personal property, he says, was inherited by the son or adopted 
son, failing whom the deceased’s brother, whilst real property 
went to the deceased’s brother or to the brother’s children. 
Langley, however, concedes that in certain chiefdoms the order of
priority of succession to the estate as a whole was sons, then 
brother (full), brother (half), daughter, and finally father’s 
brother’s son.
i
Fenton substantially departs from the views held by the
other writers. While he does not differentiate between proper­
ties forming the estate, he says that ’’property should be kept 
for the children”. In this connection, Fenton would appear to 
have been suggesting the law as it ought to be rather than the 
law as it was when he wrote in 1932 or before that date. In 
the 1930s, however, there was a strong tendency among the Temne 
to prefer the eldest son to the brother of the deceased if the 
son was grown up at the time of the death of his father. When­
ever reference is made to ’’children”, none of the writers clari­
fies whether both sons and daughters were included* According to 
present informants, daughters did not succeed to property under 
traditional customary law in the presence of a living male member 
of the deceased’s family although, in practice, they were per­
mitted the beneficial enjoyment of the estate.
As with previous writers on traditional Mende customary 
law, the writers on Temne customary law leave out a man’s widow 
from the heirs to his estate. While the Temne admit that a
1* 0p;cit.» p.39.
wife herself was inheritable property, it has always been a 
feature of Temne customary law that if a wife contributes towards
the building of a house, which her husband leaves on his death, 
she should be compensated by the husband* s family for her contri-
i
bution to the house but that the house itself forms part of the
husband* s estate and descends accordingly.
Contrary to what some of the previous writers have statecd
just as with the Mende, so the Temne did not distinguish between
personal or movable property and real or family property, at any
rate for the purposes of intestate succession. Both categories
of property were recognised as forming the estate of the deceased
which belonged to the legal heir who made disbursements of it at
will as the occasion demanded.
2
Susu; Aubert maintains that the members of this tribe 
recognised the division of property into personal and real. 
Personal property, he explains, consisted of all movable objects
(except a boat) and included harvested crops, wild fruits that 
had been reduced into possession and fruits that had been gather­
ed. Real property, he says, comprised houses, buildings, trees, 
fruit and crops not yet harvested and boats. Despite this divi­
sion of property, Aubert rightly regards the whole estate of a 
deceased as one for the sake of inheritance. On the persons 
entitled to the estate, he says:-
”If the deceased has left any children, only 
the sons inherit, the eldest receiving the 
largest share. Fad.ling sons, the order 
of inheritance is grandchildren, eldest
1. See the case of Mariama -Bea v. Cherno Duipbuya, unreported,
. decided by the Supreme Court at,Freetown xn 1937.
2. "Laws and Customs of the Susus”, S «L.S; (Q;S .), No.20, 1936. 
pp.67 and 76.
surviving brother or, if dead, his descend­
ants; father; cousin; son of the father1 s 
sister; nephew; sister*s son; second  ^
cousin; great nephew; village headman*11
oTaking a rather different view, Fenton maintains that 
property was inherited by the deceased* s eldest brother by the 
same father*
According to information obtained from the present mem­
bers of the Susu tribe, neither of these views is accurate* The 
correct position appears to be that while the children were young, 
a man’s heir was his eldest brother (germane, consanguine or uter­
ine , in that order of priority), but if the eldest son was an 
adult at the time of his father* s death, the son was preferred 
to any of his uncles*
Kissi: The only previous written statement on the Kissi
discovered by the present writer is by Aubert. He says that
property was divided into **family possession** and "individual
possession*** He holds that on a man’s death, his "family
estate" went to his eldest surviving brother, failing whom the
deceased’s eldest son who had attained adulthood, and then to the
deceased* s nearest relatives on the male side* Aubert does not
define "family possession" or "family estate"* Probably, by
4both expressions he means a "family house". He also gives no
1* Ibid*
2. Op.cit*, p.39*
3. "Kissi Customs", S.L.S. (0«S.), p.93*
4. The present writer arrives at this conclusion from statements 
made by Aubert, op.cit*» pp*92 and 93. He says that a family 
house belonged to the head of the family and that it was only 
family possession or estate that was inherited by the head of- 
the family* He further says that land belonged to the commu­
nity and that while an individual could claim ownership of the 
house which he built on the land, he was not entitled to the 
land itself. In his view, therefore, there was no concept of 
family land* This view is inaccurate according to present 
informants.
definition of "individual possession", although he also calls it 
"personal property" and maintains that on a man1s death it descend­
ed to the children of the deceased* In Aubert*s opinion, person­
al property, in this respect, included a self-acquired or inheri­
ted house, economic trees, crops growing on a mein’s land, his 
animals (probably domesticated or wild animals reduced into capti­
vity) and the proceeds of a man’s industry* Aubert, it is sub­
mitted, appears to be utterly confused in his description and divi­
sions of property insofar as his writing on traditional Kissi 
customary law is concerned. For instance, while he regards a 
family house as family property, he uses adjectives such as "per­
sonal", "individual" and "movable" to describe am inherited or 
self-acquired house* If the classification of property were to
serve any useful purpose, under traditional Kissi customary law, 
it is submitted, a house whether self-acquired or inherited, land, 
economic trees and unharvested crops, were regarded as family 
property, and all self-acquired movable property were deemed per­
sonal property. A man’s estate was, however, treated as one for 
the sake of intestate succession and was inherited in accordance 
with the scheme stated by Aubert for the descent of what he calls 
family possession or estate*
Sherbro: The members of this tribe formerly practised a
mode of succession quite distinct from that of other tribes in 
Sierra Leone. Among the Sherbro, descent was matrilineal in­
stead of patrilineal as with the other tribes. Under tradition­
al Sherbro customary law, on a mam’s death his estate was inheri­
ted by his sister’s children.*" If he had no sister or his 
sister had no child, the estate went to the children of any fe­
male relative (generally female cousins). Among ruling houses
1, Hall, The Sherbro of Sierra Leone, p*3.
of chiefs, however, there was an inclination for a patrilineal 
descent*
Other Ethnic Groups: The other ethnic groups in Sierra
Leone followed in the main either the one or the other of the 
modes of succession practised by the tribes aforepentioned ex­
cept the Sherbro* For instance, among the Kono, Koranko and 
Yalunka the adult eldest son of the deceased was preferred to any 
other relative except that the widows went to the deceased’s 
brother* The laws of the Limba and Loko were similar to those 
of the Temne and Mende respectively except as regards the inheri­
tance of widows •*■
In conclusion, it should be stated that though a particu­
lar mode of descent could be identified with, the majority of 
members of a particular tribe, it was possible to find similari­
ties among the tribes resident in one area of the country or the 
other *
(ii) Modern customary law
In modern society, the tendency among all the tribes is 
to retain their traditional concepts of descent of property but 
only in respect of family property. This descends to the head 
of the family and it is not, as a rule, distributed. But in the 
case of movable selBf-acquired property the old canons of inheri­
tance are undergoing flexible modifications. Although it is 
still usual to mark out someone as the heir of the estate, yet in
most areas of the Provinces the general trend is now to distri­
bute the property and give shares to such near relatives of the 
deceased as the children, brothers and sisters, and the parents. 
In most districts, with the advance of education and the impact
1. For the inheritance of widows, see generally Chapter 18*
of western culture, the interest of the children supersedes that 
of any other member of the deceased’s family. Where the movable 
property is small the head of the family usually takes it abso­
lutely with the understanding that he will be responsible for the 
maintenance and education of the infant children of the deceased 
over whom he becomes guardian. But if the estate is large, the 
tendency is to distribute it and there is now among some of the 
tribes a growing inclination to give shares to wives who faith­
fully served the deceased during his lifetime. Aged parents of
the deceased are also as a rule given shares.
As an illustration of the present attitude of the members 
of the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone let us examine the manner 
in which the personal estates of some natives dying intestate re­
cently have been distributed.*"
In In the Estate of Michael Kandeh, a Mende by tribe from 
Ngelehun in the Bo district, who died intestate in 1966 leaving 
a brother, son, widow, and mother, evidence of customary law of 
the Mende was given to the effect that all the survivors except 
the widow were entitled to shares with the son receiving the 
largest share. Were there a daughter, it was conceded, she would 
have been entitled to equal shares as the son, provided that she 
was an infant but far less if she was married. In In the Estate
1. Thecases hereinafter mentioned, except the last one, are all 
non<-contentious and unreported. They concern the administra­
tion by the Administrator-General of Sierra Leone of the esta­
tes of "natives" dying while resident in the Western Area and 
having property there, but the information on succession under 
the customary laws was obtained from the places of origin of 
the deceased; i.e. the Provinces.
2. Unreported.
of Yargbagee * involving another Mende dying intestate in 1960, 
survived by only a sister, a widow and two nephews, the view 
taken was that the sister took the whole estate in preference to
the widow and the two nephews. It is significant to note that
the nephews • were excluded because it was alleged
that they had not been on good terms with the deceased during his
lifetime. According to some Mende informants, neglect of a per­
son during his lifetime disentitles a potential heir to his estate 
on his death.
The Temne hold out a very favourable inducement to the 
dutiful wife. In In the Estate of Idrissa Kamara who died in 
1963 leaving brothers, children and a widow, all the named sur­
vivors received shares from the estate with the children having 
more than the brothers and the brothers taking more than the 
widow. Similarly, In In the Estate of Kebbie Dumbuya, another 
Temne, who died in 1967 and survived by children, two wives and 
a sister, all of them had shares in the estate with the children 
receiving more than the wives and the wives more than the sister.
A typical example of the view taken by modern Loko custom-
4
ary law is afforded by the case of In the Estate of Salifu Kamara. 
In that case, Kamara died intestate in 1958 leaving no parents 
but a number of relatives. The view expressed by the Regent of 
Magbaimba Chiefdom on Loko customary law relating to succession 
to the estate was that the eldest surviving brother of the de­
ceased was administrator and nominal owner of the estate, but
1. Unreported.
2. Unreported.
3. Unreported.
4. Unreported.
that the beneficial interest in it vested in all the brothers and 
children of the deceased.
The class of the heirs is wide under Limba customary law. 
Thus, in In the Estate of Bockari Sesay,^  the deceased died in 
1965 and was survived by his sisters, children and wives. It was 
the opinion of the Paramount Chief of Masabang Chiefdom, Bombali 
District, that all the survivors were entitled to shares in the 
estate with the children receiving the largest share.
Among the Yalunka^ the eldest son is entitled to the per­
sonal estate but he is under a legal obligation to support the
dependants of the deceased and to educate his younger brothers
o
and sisters. Thus in In the Estate of Samura, who died in 
1965, the deceased1s eldest son was held to be sole heir of his 
estate where the deceased left fourteen children and a number of 
other dependants. The claim of the eldest son is, however, sub­
ject to his ability to and trustworthiness in assuming parental
responsibilities* Therefore, if he is too young to be guardian 
or if there is a strong suspicion that he will shirk his respon­
sibilities, some elderly and reliable member of the deceased’s 
family is appointed by the family in whom the estate is vested 
for the use and enj'oyment of the children and the dependants of 
the deceased. The role of the appointee is that of trustee.
In modern Sherbro customary law, the old matrilineal de­
scent of property has given way to a patrilineal pattern. The 
property of a father who dies intestate is inherited by his 
children, brothers and other relatives in that order of superior­
ity of entitlement,
1, Unreported,
2, Unreported,
Finally, in addition to recognising the claims of the 
relatives of the deceased, the members of the Gallina tribe per­
mit any wife who has had a legitimate child by the deceased to 
share in the deceased’s estate. Thus, in Isatu v, Abdulai 
Kamara,^ the Blama Massaguoi Local Court, Gallinas Perri Chiefdom, 
Pujehun district, allowed the claim of such a widow.
Which children are entitled to inherit?
In our present discussion we have been referring to
children without stating which class or classes of children can
succeed to property of their parents. Should they include all
2
children, legitimate, adopted or illegitimate?
Previous writers, except Fenton, are silent on what the 
rules were in the traditional customary laws. The rules, how­
ever, appear to have always been the same. It is settled under 
each customary law that a legitimate child, but not an illegiti­
mate child, has a legal right to succeed to the property of its 
father. As regards adopted children, while there is a general 
consensus that they may succeed, there are differences of opinion 
as to the extent of their succession rights. Some tribes like 
the Mende, Krim, Sherbro and Gallina allow adopted children equal 
rights of succession as legitimate children. In some Koranko and 
Limba Chiefdoms the entitlement of the adopted child to the est­
ate is less than that of the legitimate child. In other Koranko
and Limba Chiefdoms, the adopted child inherits only in the ab­
sence of a legitimate child. In some Temne Chiefdoms, there are 
equal rights of succession between the two classes of children; 
while in others, the adopted child receives a share less than that
1. Unreported.
2, Legitimate includes legitimated. It should, however, be noted' 
that for the office of paramount chieftaincy, legitimate child­
ren takefprecedence to legitimated children.
of a legitimate child* The members of the Susu tribe also give 
the legitimate child more of the share of the estate than the 
adopted child*
Finally, where children are entitled to succeed to pro­
perty, though under the old rules daughters could not succeed in 
the presence of sons there is now no discrimination made between 
males and females, except that in determining who should be the 
administrator of the estate, a son is still preferred to a daught­
er. Among the Northern tribes, however, a woman cannot succeed 
to the office of paramount chieftaincy.^
(b) Succession rights on the death of a wife/mother
Previous writers have expressed views on the succession
to the property of a deceased woman under the customary laws of
2
Sierra Leone* Writing in 1936, Aubert stated that if a Susu 
woman died survived by children, the sons got all her money and 
cattle and half her jewellery and kola trees, whilst the daughters
received the other half together with cooking utensils and cloth­
ing* In the absence of daughters, Aubert maintained, sons of 
full age were entitled jointly and equally to the money, jewel­
lery, cattle and kola trees whilst other personal property such 
as clothing and cooking utensils went to the deceased* s sisters 
(germane) or sisters (consanguine), failing whom, to the mother*
1* This office was and is still, to some extent, hereditary.
Formerly, when a Paramount Chief died, his successor was elect­
ed from the children of the late Chief. Nowadays, the Tribal 
Authorites exercise a discretion to elect someone outside the 
family.
2. "Laws and Customs of the Susus", p.76.
Anderson  ^doubts very much whether the descent of personal pro­
perty such as money and jewellery to the persons mentioned by 
Aubert as being entitled was the general rule, since it was rare 
for a woman to leave such property. Anderson rightly concludes 
that Aubert might have reached his conclusion from isolated cases* 
A native woman, in our submission, leaving such property must have 
been one of some standing and such women were very rare indeed in
Sierra Leone traditional society. This category of womanhood
2
included Paramount Chiefs, and perhaps, heads of families and 
the "beloved” wives of wealthy men, and it would appear to be 
closed to other women. Moreover, because of the unfettered 
traditional Susu customary-law rule that a husband inherited the 
self-acquired property of his wife, probably^ the type of woman 
whom Aubert had in mind was either single or widowed. Even in 
the case of such a woman, her property was inherited by the head 
of her family.
3
Fenton says that a husband could succeed to the person­
al property of a wife provided that she left no children; if 
there were children they inherited the personal as well as the 
family property left by their mother. A husband could not 
succeed to land which his deceased wife had from her family,
Fenton adds. Fenton1 s view, as will be seen shortly, repre­
sents the law of some but not all the^  ethnic groups in present- 
day Sierra Leone.
Under the traditional customary laws of Sierra Leone, on 
the death of a wife her self-acquired property was inherited by
1. Islamic Law in Africa, p.294.
2. Among the Susu, women do not become Paramount Chiefs.
3. Op;cit., pp.38 and 39.
her husband. Property which she inherited from her family, for 
example land, reverted to the head of her family on her death. 
Whether or not she left children was irrelevant.
In the modern customary laws, the rules in regard to the 
descent of both inherited property and self-acquired property are 
in some respects modified. So far as property which she herself 
inherited is concerned, the rule in all the customary laws is now 
that if she is survived by children who are of age, they inherit 
it from her; if there are no children the property goes back to 
her family. As regards her self-acquired property, there are 
tribal differences in the modern customary laws. Some tribes
such as the Kono, Limba, Susu and Temne still adhere to the old 
rules of inheritance, but their laws now expressly stipulate that j 
the children of the wife take after the husband. Among the mem- j
' i
bers of the Mende tribe there is a consensus of opinion that if
the wife leaves children her property belongs to them and that I
■
during their infancy her widower is trustee of the property.
...................     i
There is, however, a division of opinion on the descent of pro- j
I
perty if the wife leaves no children. In some Mende Chiefdoms j 
the husband is entitled to the property absolutely; in others, j 
the property is shared between the widower and the family of the I 
deceased wife. With the Loko, the right of inheritance of the 
children to the property of their mother is paramount and during
their infancy the widower or the head of the family of the de­
ceased wife is trustee of the property. Among the Loko, the 
widower has no legal right to the property of his wife even if • 
she leaves no children; the persons entitled are the parents of 
the woman.
In contrast with the succession rights of children to the 
property of their father, all the children of a woman, whether
716.
legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, are entitled to succeed 
from their mother. This has always been the rule in all the 
customary laws of Sierra Leone since the beginnings of traditional 
society.
(c) Succession rights on the death of an unmarried person
Two classes of persons are contemplated under this sub­
heading. The first class comprises unmarried adults with or 
without children and the second class consists of unmarried child­
ren who are under age. We shall, however, not pay especial atten­
tion to the members of the first class because the mode of descent 
of their property follows substantially the same line as that of 
married persons though with slight modifications having regard to 
the absence of spouses. The only major point of difference 
which is worthy of note is the descent of the property of an un­
married woman dying without children surviving her. Her property 
is inherited in the same manner as that of a child under age with 
which we shall deal shortly.
On the succession to the property of a child dying under 
age, Aubert 1 writing about the Susu tribe says that the de­
ceaseds eldest brother was his heir failing whom, the other 
brothers under age. With respect, thid opinion does not repre­
sent traditional - no more than it does modern Susu customary-law. 
According to informants from all the ethnic groups of Sierra 
Leone, if a child.dies leaving property which is identifiable as 
his own, such property belongs to his parents with his father 
having a superior claim over it than the mother. Under the 
customary laws, as the father is deemed to be the "owner" of
1. Op.cit.. p.79.
his child, the former has full claim to whatever property the 
latter may have both during the lifetime of the child and on its 
death. While it is truethat in practice the parents may distri­
bute the deceased child1s belongings, for example, clothing, to 
its brothers, sisters and other relatives, it is not in recogni­
tion of any legal right of such persons to the property. If the 
child is an orphan when it dies, the right of succession to its 
property passes on to the person who is its guardian  ^at the time 
of its death.
CONCLUSION
As a conclusion to this chapter, we must make three 
points clear: Firstly, though the local courts are empowered to
administer the estates of natives dying leaving property in the 
Provinces, the power is exercised on a supervisory basis rather 
than by way of the decision >of disputes. When inheritance issues
go before these courts, it has always been the practice for them 
not to investigate the details of administration and distribution 
but merely to advise the members of the family of the deceased to 
appoint an administrator, and if there is disagreement among the 
family as to who the administrator should be, to request the 
Paramount Chief, section chief, town chief or an elder to carry 
out the administration and distribute the estate to the persons 
entitled under customary law. More often than not, details con­
cerning the persons entitled and distribution are settled within 
the family. It is not, therefore, surprising that there is a 
dearth of contentious cases. Secondly, the sale of any item
1. "Guardianship" in the sense of "ownership" of the child.
of the property for the purpose of administration seldom occurs 
in customary law, and if it occurs at all, it is restricted to 
meeting the costs of the funeral expenses. As a general rule, 
therefore, personal property is given in specie to the persons 
entitled. Where the deceased is a male, it is usual to give his 
wearing apparel and implements of trade or husbandry to the male 
beneficiaries; money and household utensils are normally given 
to the female heirs. If, on the other hand, the deceased is a 
female, the position is reversed and the male beneficiaries re­
ceive money whilst the females get clothing and her domestic 
paraphernalia. Thirdly, succession in both the traditional and 
modern customary laws of Sierra Leone is per capita and not per 
stirpes.
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